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Abstract
Recent scholarship has focused on the response of Jews in the free world to 
the plight of European Jewry in Nazi-occupied Europe. The work of Anglo- 
Jewish refugee organisations in facilitating the arrival of over 50,000 refugees 
in Britain between 1933-1939 has been variously chronicled as a model of 
charitable endeavour and a half-hearted effort cramped by insecurity and self- 
interest. More consistently, scholars argue that Anglo-Jewry failed to respond 
to the catastrophe of the war years with the resolution and vigour that might 
have saved more lives.
This thesis takes issue with the current consensus on both the pre-war and 
war periods. Anglo-Jewry was a  confident, well-integrated community which 
tackled the escalating problems of refugee immigration in the 1930s with 
common sense and administrative expertise born of a long tradition of 
communal charity. Its achievement is all the more remarkable measured 
against the scale of the disaster, the constraints of government immigration 
policy regulations and the organisations' own chronic lack of funds. By 
contrast, the Anglo-Jewish organisations were hamstrung during the war years 
by their political naivete and inexperience in dealing with government officials. 
Although their administrative skills remained valuable in areas of relief work 
such as internment and parcel schemes, their preoccupation with the Jewish 
humanitarian issue prevented them from grasping the military and logistical 
implications of their proposals. Misreading the language of diplomacy, they 
doggedly pursued aims which were in practice, if not in theory, unrealistic. 
Unlike most previous literature on the record of Anglo-Jewry during this period, 
this thesis eschews both the didactic and speculative approaches to historical 
interpretation. Instead of attempting to apportion blame, or to answer 
hypothetical questions of responsibility, it offers an evaluation based on the 
evidence available. The thesis examines the quality and scope of rescue and 
relief work, both of organisations and individuals. What was done, rather than 
what should have been done, is the focus of attention.
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Introduction: Historiography and Methodoiogy
Since the pioneering study by Arthur D. Morse in 1967, many scholars have 
analysed the response of the ‘bystander’ nations to the plight of Jews In Nazi 
Europe. Historians specialising in America's response to the Holocaust have 
largely endorsed Morse's contention that the attitude of the Allied nations was 
one of indifference and perhaps even of complicity in the ‘Final Solution’ of the 
Jewish question. This view is based on what historians see as the Allies' 
deliberate restrictions and apathetic rescue efforts. 1
An important element In the evaluation of the ‘bystander’ nations and a partial 
explanation for their relative inaction has been held to be the failure of their 
organised Jewish communities to exert pressure on their governments. Some 
historians maintain that the Jews of the free world must, to some degree, share 
with the Allied governments the burden of guilt for failing to prevent the 
destruction of European Jewry. The issue has always been highly sensitive and 
contentious within Jewish communities themselves. It was first raised during the 
war, when accusations were levelled by Jewish leaders in Nazi Europe, as well 
as by anti-establishment Jewish groups in the free world, at 'world' Jewry, for 
failing to speak out with necessary force.2 This criticism was based on the 
premise that 'world' Jewry was capable of such action; little attention was given to 
the political powerlessness of Jewish communities world-wide during the 1930s 
and 1940s. 3
1 Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathv (New 
York, 1967). See Bibliography for works by, Richard Breitman and Alan K. Kraut, 
Henry Feingold, Saul Friedman, Monty Penkower and David Wyman.
2 Michael Dov Weissmandel, Min Hamevtzar (Hebrew for ‘From the Depth of 
Despair ) (Jerusalem, 1960), cited in Abraham Fuchs, The Unheeded Crv (New 
York, 1984), pp. 105-6.
3 Henry LFeingold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Government and the 
Holocaust (New York, 1980). In this edition, Feingold adds an appeal for a more
The literature has for the most part centred on American Jewry, for whose 
negative response disunity, insecurity, misplaced priorities and fear of anti- 
Semitism were held largely responsible.^ Historians hardly addressed the subject 
of Anglo-Jewry until the 1970's and then only in broadly sympathetic terms. Prior 
to this, the one study specifically devoted to the work of the Anglo-Jewish refugee 
organisations was Norman Bentwich's They Found Refuae (1956), written for the 
Tercentenary of Jewish resettlement in England. Bentwich, who was heavily 
involved in refugee work, generously praised the organisations, in particular the 
Central British Fund (CBF). He believed that Anglo-Jewry did everything 
possible, that most refugees who came to Britain were satisfied with their 
treatment by the refugee organisations and that the conduct of individuals such 
as Otto Schiff was exemplary.s
The pendulum began to swing from almost unqualified praise for Anglo-Jewry's 
efforts, to a more balanced, but still sympathetic view, typified by A.J.Sherman 
whose Island Refuae (1973), based on newly released archives, concentrates 
mainly on the Government's pre-war record in assisting refugees from Nazi 
Germany. He finds it to be ‘comparatively compassionate, even generous' 
compared with that of the United States and other countries.® Sherman refers
temperate criticism of American Jewry. He maintains that one cannot assign 
responsibility to a group which has no power.
4 See bibliography for works by Seymour Maxwell Finger (ed ), Saul Friedman, 
Haskel Lookstein, Raphael Medoff, Monty Penkower and David S. Wyman,
5 Norman Bentwich, Thev Found Refuae. An Account of British Jewry's Work for 
the Victims of Nazi Oppression (London. 1956); Bernard Krikler, 'Anglo-Jewish 
Attitudes to the Rise of Nazism', (unpublished, probably 1960s). For the most 
recent work on the CBF, see Amy Gottlieb, Men of Vision. Analo-Jewrv's Aid to 
the Victims of the Nazi Regime 1933-1945 (London. 1998).
6 A.J.Sherman, Island Refuae. Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933-
1939 (London. 1973, 1994), pp.264,267,269-72. Over 50,000 Jewish refugees 
from the expanded Reich were admitted to Britain between 1933 and 1939, 
although Sherman notes that statistics on refugee migration for this period are 
unreliable. See also Herbert A.Strauss, ‘Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi
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only Indirectly to the role of the refugee organisations, but praises their efforts in 
contrast to those of their American counterparts. He argues that government 
records show Anglo-Jewry to have demonstrated true concern for the refugees. 
But Sherman also observes that the socio-economic circumstances of the pre­
war period inevitably gave Anglo-Jewry cause for concern about 'anti-Jewish
agitation'. 7
Bernard Wasserstein's Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (1979), which 
focuses on the response of the British Government, finds 'an ocean of 
bureaucratic indifference and lack of concern', particularly with regard to Britain’s 
Palestine policy. Wasserstein is sympathetic and even positive about the efforts 
made by the Anglo-Jewish leadership in the context of the political difficulties of 
the period.® Elsewhere he addresses the issue directly. For the pre-war period, 
he maintains that without the leadership's formal guarantee of 1933 that no 
refugee would become a charge on public funds, 'it is very doubtful if the British 
Government would have admitted such substantial numbers at a time of high 
unemployment and considerable public anti-semitism’.® For the war years, he 
concludes that in its overall results the Jewish campaign to influence the British 
(and American) governments... must be judged a failure -  probably an inevitable 
one’. However, ‘the campaign’s failure is no reason for forgetting that it was 
waged.' He rejects the 'myth' that Jews in the free world were silent and 
maintains that both individuals and organisations 'bombarded Government offices
Policies and Jewish Responses’ (1), Leo Baeck Institute Year Book (1980), XXV, 
Table X, pp.354-55.
7 Sherman, op.cit., pp. 175-76.
8 Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe. (Oxford, 1979), p.351.
9 Bernard Wasserstein, 'Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Great Britain during the 
Nazi Era’, Jewish Leadership during the Nazi Era, ed. Randolph L. Braham (New 
York, 1985), p.34.
throughout the war with urgent pleas for effective measures to facilitate Jewish 
rescue and relief.
The release of government records stimulated research on British policy towards 
refugees. Concurrently, the passage of the various immigration Acts, race 
relations legislation and the debate surrounding Commonwealth immigration in 
the 1970s into the 1980s provoked scholarly curiosity about immigration, 
minorities, racism and Fascism. Jewish immigration at the turn of the century and 
in the 1930s became a topic of new interest. As a result, in the late 1980s, a new 
school of British historians began to reappraise the role of the British Government 
as well as that of Anglo-Jewry. The pendulum now swung sharply in the direction 
of adverse criticism. It has been plausibly suggested that these historians were 
reacting to the political and economic climate of the day, from a left-wing and 
anti-establishment stance. It may be added that they seem imbued with a post- 
Holocaust conception of anti-Semitism as a ubiquitous and homogeneous social 
phenomenon, the mainspring of historical events and the key to understanding 
them. For whatever reason, the British revisionists have tended to follow the 
trend of those American historians who have attacked their Jewish communities 
for abjectly failing to respond vigorously to the European Jewish catastrophe.
Much of the revisionists' work on Jewish immigration has focused on the earlier 
period of mass immigration (1880-1914) and explored the Jewish community's 
negative attitude towards east European Jews. Some historians have shown how 
communal leaders failed to defend open immigration because they feared that an
"•0 Ibid., pp.29-45, esp. p.34. B. Wasserstein, The Myth of "Jewish Silence" ', 
Midstream, vol.26 (1980), no.7, pp. 11-12. See also Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and 
the Allies (London, 1981), p.341. Gilbert deals mainly with Government policy: 
'The failures, shared by all the Allies, were those of imagination, of response, of 
Intelligence ... of initiative and even at times of sympathy'. He mentions the 
Jewish Agency and occasionally refers to the Board of Deputies.
William D.Rubinstein, A History of the Jews in the Enalish-Soeakina World: 
Great Britain (London. 1996), p.33.
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unregulated influx of alien Jews would endanger their own position. 12 in the 
course of examining anti-Semitism and British immigration policy in the 1930s, 
others have drawn similar conclusions about the reaction of Anglo-Jewry to 
refugees from the Third Reich. They are deeply critical of the leadership's 
motives and alleged inaction on behalf of European Jewry. In The Persistence of 
Prejudice (1989), Tony Kushner argues that the Board of Deputies (Board), the 
official body representing Anglo-Jewry, failed to offer a serious challenge to 
Government policy on the rescue of European Jewry, due to its own insecurities 
and fears of anti-Sem itism .W hile Kushner used Government documents and 
the social survey Mass Observation, he was unable to consult the archives of the 
Central British Fund, the main Anglo-Jewish funding agency, these having 
recently been opened for research work. Further, he draws only briefly on the 
Board's files. Kushner saw anti-Semitism as responsible for Britain's restrictive 
refugee policy. Since then, however, he has changed his position. In The  
Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination (1994), he attempts to explain the failure 
of the democracies to combat the Holocaust as a 'failure of state and society to 
solve the contradictions and ambiguities of liberalism.
Louise London, who has analysed immigration policy, maintains that Jewish 
communal leaders shared governmental unwillingness to augment the Jewish 
population, out of anxiety about their own security and believed, like the 
Government, that large-scale immigration would exacerbate anti-Semitism. This
For example, see Eugene C. Black, The Social Politics of Analo-Jewry 1880- 
1920 (Oxford 1988); David Cesarani, 'An Embattled Minority: The Jews in Britain 
During the First World War', T. Kushner and K.Lunn, eds.. Politics of Maroinalitv: 
Race, the Radical Right and Minorities in Twentieth Centurv Britain (London, 
1990), pp.61-81.
13 Tony Kushner, The Persistence of Prejudice: Antisemitism in British Societv 
durino the Second World War (Manchester, 1989), pp. 179-80; Tony Kushner, 
The Impact of British Anti-semitism', The Makino of Modern Analo-Jewrv (MMAJ) 
(Oxford, 1990)^ pp. 191-208.
14 Conversation with Tony Kushner, September 1992.
15 Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and 
Cultural Historv (Oxford, 1994).
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conviction, coupled with the enormous demands on their charity and arguably 
bolstered by their own prejudices, made Anglo-Jewish leaders seek controls on 
both 'the ‘quality and quantity of Jews entering Britain', leading to 'agonised 
debate about priorities within Britain's Jewish com m unity.'London omits to 
explain how unlimited numbers of refugees could have been supported by 
organisations on the brink of bankruptcy.
Richard Bolchover, in British Jewry and the Holocaust (1993), is among the first 
revisionist historians to have examined Anglo-Jewish responses to the Holocaust 
and attempted to answer the contentious question why the Holocaust, although 
the supreme crisis facing western Jewry, was marginalised by British Jewry (this, 
of course, assumes what has not yet been conclusively established, namely that 
the Holocaust was indeed marginalised by British Jewry). Bolchover points to 
issues that preoccupied the community during the war years, particularly internal 
friction and fear of increased domestic anti-Semitism, together with contending 
priorities such as Zionism. He concludes that Jews ‘were hamstrung by the 
political philosophy of emancipation and their belief that they were bound by a 
contract with British society that determined how they could behave’. In 
consequence, Anglo-Jewish political strategy was to maintain a low profile and 
shun any suggestion of Jewish autonomy. Bolchover's highly critical work is 
narrowly focused on Jewish communal attitudes and values and barely considers 
the practical activities of rescue and relief. Moreover, although providing some 
insight into the mindset of the established leadership, his work focuses 
exclusively on public debates, as reported in the Jewish Chronicle, on which he
16 Louise London, ‘Jewish refugees, Anglo-Jewry and British Government Policy, 
1930-1940. MMAJ. pp. 163-190, esp. 189; Louise London, ‘British Immigration 
Control Procedures and Jewish Refugees 1933-1939’, Second Chance: Two 
Centuries of German-Speaking Jews in the United Kingdom, ed., W.E.Mosse 
(Tübingen, 1991), pp.515-16.
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relies heavily, as well as on mainly secondary sources, without balancing 
consideration of events enacted in camera.
Geoffrey Alderman, In Modern British Jewry (1992), devotes only one chapter to 
the subject. Nevertheless, he Is equally sweeping In his criticism of the Anglo- 
Jewish leadership, emphasising how ‘communal policy resulted and was 
designed to result In the admission Into Britain of a minimum number of Jews ... 
from a particular social and economic background and of a particular age'. 
Alderman accuses Anglo-Jewry of passivity and of seeking to buttress Its own 
precarious security by assertions of loyalty which amounted to a betrayal of 
European Jewry. 18 Both Alderman and Bolchover argue that In contrast to the 
pusillanimous response of mainstream Anglo-Jewry, the only really determined 
efforts to save European Jewry during the war years emanated from the World 
Jewish Congress, strictly orthodox Jews and certain marginal or 'non- 
establishment' figures such as Rabbi Dr. Solomon Schonfeld. Bolchover adds 
Revisionist Zionists, socialists, academics and Intellectuals to this small llst.i^
There has been no comprehensive scholarly study of Anglo-Jewry's efforts with 
regard to rescue and relief during the late 1930's and the war years . 20 This thesis 
focuses exclusively on the character and work of the Anglo-Jewish community 
during this period and Is the first monograph to chart Its contribution 
systematically. Almost all the revisionist literature to date has dwelt on the 
negative aspect of the subject, especially on the reasons why Anglo-Jewry failed
Richard Bolchover, British Jewry and the Holocaust (Cambridge. 1993), 
p. 156. Bolchover also makes factual errors; for example his claim that Harry 
Goodman obtained Irish visas for 100 Hungarian Jewish children In 1943 and 
500 In 1944, p.185,ff.5.
18 Geoffrey Alderman, Modern British Jewrv (Oxford, 1992), pp.295-96, 302.
18 Ibid., pp. 303-305. Bolchover, op.cit., pp.146-55.
20 Various perspectives on specific aspects of the refugee experience have been 
traced. See Bibliography for works by Barry Turner, Marlon Berghahn and Karen 
Gershon.
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to mount a concerted rescue effort, what was not done and what ought to have 
been done.
The purpose of this thesis is to enter and extend the debate by challenging the 
current consensus on the character and behaviour of the Anglo-Jewish 
leadership. Contrary to recent arguments, it is shown that Anglo-Jewry was not 
an insecure community concerned primarily to keep a low profile, thereby weakly 
betraying European Jewry. Rather, the leadership comprised well-established 
and integrated figures, who had successfully synthesised their Jewish and British 
loyalties and were thus all the more confident in their support for the endangered 
Jews of Europe. The thesis examines the efforts of the mainstream organisations 
in their historical context and evaluates the reasons for their frequent failure. 
Evidence is adduced to show that these efforts were largely antithetical to the 
Government's wartime policy and were virtually doomed ab initio.
It is further argued that Anglo-Jewry's efforts, both before and during the war, 
were strenuous and unremitting, but were more successful during the pre-war 
period. Anglo-Jewry was called upon to play different roles for which it was not 
equally experienced. In the pre-war years, its roles were primarily fund-raising 
and administrative, roles for which it was well prepared by a long history of 
charitable endeavour. Moreover, it had Government approval and support. With 
the outbreak of war, it was no longer required to assist in the selection and 
admission of refugees. Instead, it was called upon to exert pressure to facilitate 
rescue on a Government engaged in global warfare, an unprecedented role for 
which it was politically and diplomatically inept.
The thesis also takes issue with the claim that marginal efforts such as 
Schonfeld's impugn the integrity and effectiveness of the mainstream 
organisations, particularly the Board. It shows that Alderman et. al. inflate
14
Schonfeld's genuine achievement by invidiously contrasting it as an 'exception' to 
the apathy of the Anglo-Jewish mainstream.21 Schonfeld was a maverick, whose 
objectives were comparatively modest in scope and his achievements were due 
largely to superior astuteness in negotiating within and around the parameters of 
government policy.22 He also took a more cavalier attitude to official restraints 
and regulations, something the mainstream organisations could not afford to do.
The methodology adopted is based on a broadly chronological framework 
focusing on key issue and crises, from the Anschluss in March 1938 to the 
Hungarian crisis of 1944, incorporating an analysis of the responses of the 
organisations as these crises unfolded. Since the principal aim is to redress the 
historical record on the role of Anglo-Jewry during this period, the thesis also 
examines the work of Schonfeld, who is cited by revisionist historians in support 
of their adverse assessment of Anglo-Jewry. It is shown that his work, although 
laudable, cannot serve as a reliable model for what the mainstream organisations 
could have achieved.
Besides utilising government records, which provide valuable insight into official 
responses to Anglo-Jewry's efforts, this thesis relies heavily on the organisations' 
and individuals' own documents. These include the files of the Board of Deputies, 
the Central British Fund, the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, the 
Agudat Israel and the Schonfeld and Goodman papers. Some of this material has 
only recently become accessible. The thesis does not draw on refugee
21 David Kranzler and Gertrude Hirschler, eds., Solomon Schonfeld. His Page in 
Historv (New York, 1982), p.80. Joseph Elias maintains, 'We can only wonder... 
what could have been accomplished during the war if the Jewish world at large 
had displayed the same determination'.
22 Ibid. At present, this is the only published work on Schonfeld, a non-scholarly 
volume commemorating his 70th birthday. It is a collection of personal 
reminiscences, both by those who participated in his work and those whom he 
saved. V.D.Lipman, A Historv of the Jews in Britain Since 1858 (Leicester, 1990), 
p. 192; Alderman, op.cit, pp.303-305.
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testimonies, whose necessarily subjective nature provides too limited a  
perspective on the wider issues.
The emphasis is on what was actually attempted and whether it was reasonable 
in principle (in the light of what was known at the time). The thesis does not 
debate whether efforts were feasible in the light of what is known today,23 neither 
does it aim to establish what 'ought' to have been done. Its purpose is rather to 
define and analyse the character and calibre of the Anglo-Jewish leadership and 
community, to consider the efforts made and explain why most of them proved 
abortive.
The purpose of this thesis is not to pass moral judgement on the role of the 
Anglo-Jewish establishment.24 This has already been undertaken, both by those 
apologists who have viewed the establishment's actions as exemplary in the 
circumstances, and by more recent historians who have taken the opposite view 
and criticised the establishment's conduct as inadequate and insufficient. The 
moral issue has been and will continue to be debated at the interface of history, 
politics and ethics.
23 The inevitable speculativeness of such 'reasoning' is demonstrated in William
D. Rubinstein's recent study. The Mvth of Rescue. Whv the democracies could 
not have saved more Jews from the Nazis (London. 1997).
24 Herbert Butterfield, Historv and Human Relations (London. 1951). Butterfield 
warns against the pitfalls of writing history as an act of moral judgement.
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Chapter One 
The Composition and Character of the Anglo-Jewish Community
During the inter-war years, Anglo-Jewry enjoyed considerable continuity of 
leadership, with communal power still vested in descendants of the pre-1881 
'grandee' families. The leadership comprised a well integrated and affluent clique 
of Sephardim (of Spanish and Portuguese origin) and an equally long-established 
minority of Ashkenazim (central and east European) origin. Some authority had 
already begun to pass to first-generation English-born Jews, the progeny of east- 
European immigrant parents. This ensued partly from the depredations suffered by 
the old leadership as a consequence of the First World War, and partly from the 
economic success of the new wave of immigrants, among them Simon (Lord) 
Marks and Marcus Sieff, founders of Marks and Spencer, and Sir Alfred Mond, first 
Baron Melchett, of I.C.U Others of this generation included Neville Laski, K.C., 
President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (Board) and Otto Schiff, 
German-born merchant banker and chairman of the Jewish Refugees Committee. 
In December 1939, the presidency of the Board was assumed by a Russian-born 
Immigrant, Professor Selig Brodetsky. These men, Norman Bentwich notes, 
quoting his father, 'combined enthusiastically a double loyalty: to the community 
from which [they] sprang, and to the country which gave civic opportunity to the 
sons of aliens'. 2
Anglo-Jewry was never a homogeneous community and never functioned 
politically as an ethnic pressure group. Numbering approximately 335,000 by the 
mid-1930's,3 Britain's Jews comprised many diverse groups, both socially and
1 V.D.Lipman, A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858 (London. 1990), 
pp.215-16.
2 Norman Bentwich, Mv Seventy-Seven Years (London. 1962), p.3.
3 Lipman, op.cit., pp.204-5.
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religiously, especially following the first wave of immigration from eastern Europe 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, given its centralised 
leadership and co-ordinated institutions, Anglo-Jewry (unlike America) may be 
characterised as a 'community', dominated by a London-based 'establishment'. It is 
represented by a number of institutions, in particular, the Board of Deputies. This 
body, established in 1760 for the purpose of defending the civil and political rights 
of Jews in Britain and the Empire, constitutes the lay leadership of Anglo-Jewry. 
Since 1836 it has enjoyed statutory recognition as the representative organ of the 
community.-* In this respect, it is possible to speak of an 'Anglo-Jewish response', 
notwithstanding differences attributable to class, ideology and age.
The Board is essentially a political institution. It operates as a parliamentary body 
whose deputies, elected by synagogue congregations and communal 
organisations, serve for three years. In 1940 there were some 388 deputies. The 
deputies meet monthly and elect executive officers, who carry out committee work 
and official representation. Laski dismissed as misleading a description of the 
Board as ‘the Jewish Parliament’, as it is not a law-making machine’ nor has it any 
‘sanctions which it could apply’.s Although true, this misses the metaphorical 
aptness of the description; a parliament is, etymologically, a debating chamber and 
in that sense the Board is indeed the 'Jewish Parliament'.
The Board's Joint Foreign Committee (JFC), the community's de facto Cabinet, 
claimed sole authority to approach the Government on matters affecting Jews 
abroad. The Anglo-Jewish Association (AJA), established in 1871, worked in 
partnership with the Board, first as the Conjoint Foreign Committee from 1878 until
4 For a fuller description, see A.G.Brotman, ‘Jewish Communal Organisations’, 
Julius Gould and Shaul Esh, eds., Jewish Life in Modern Britain (London, 1964), 
pp. 1-17.
5 Statement by Neville Laski on his retirement from the Presidency (1939), p.3 
(Retirement).
18
1917 and then as the JFC until 1943, when the Board discontinued the association 
and the JFC became the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC). The AJA's membership 
was drawn largely from the old oligarchy. The JFC and the AJA were In effect 
Anglo-Jewry's central policy-making bodies. To deal with major issues arising out
of the war, in late 1939 an Executive Committee began convening on an ad hoc 
basis. Important decision-making was now vested in this small Executive 
Committee, consisting of the president as chairman, three co-opted members, and 
former presidents of the Board, including Sir Osmond d'Avigdor Goldsmid and 
Neville Laski. Many Executive Committee members, including Lionel Cohen, Sir 
Robert Waley-Cohen, Anthony de Rothschild, Leonard Stein and Lord Swaythling, 
belonged to the old guard.e
Jealously guarding this position and rejecting the concept of 'world Jewry', the 
Board resented the establishment in 1936 of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), 
which, in reaction to the rise of Nazism, aimed 'to unite the Jewish communities all 
over the world in defence of their national and civil rights'. Over 7 million Jews 
world-wide, it claimed, were represented by the Congress, whose British Section 
acted as its European headquarters.^ The Board inevitably resented the 
Congress's encroachment on its own exclusive representative status and refused 
to accord it official recognition. Members of the British Section included the Revd. 
Maurice Perlzweig, who became head of the International Affairs Department of 
the WJC in New York, the political journalist Alex L.Easterman and Noah Barou, a 
specialist on co-operative finance. The Chairman was Labour M.P. Sydney 
Silverman; Eva, Marchioness of Reading acted as President and her brother Lord 
Melchett was also involved.
6 Acc 3121 A/30, 13 Sept.1939, Minute Book, p. 128; Annual Reports 
1940,1943,1944.
^ CZA C2/319, (n.d. probably 1943), Maurice Orbach, WJC, organising 
Secretary.
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The mainstream religious institution, the United Synagogue, was established in 
1870 and headed by the Chief Rabbi. It has always been an orthodox institution, 
because of its strict interpretation of Jewish law, although its membership 
embraces a wide spectrum of religious practice. A progressive slackening in 
communal religious observance during the nineteenth century led Chief Rabbi Dr. 
Nathan Adler to introduce an anglicisation of synagogue buildings and services. 
This style was in marked contrast to that of the numerous small ‘chevras’ 
(fraternities) set up by east European Jews in the East End of London, which 
maintained a more traditional type of orthodoxy. In 1887 Samuel Montagu 
amalgamated these 'chevras' into the ‘Federation of Synagogues', in order to 
provide small, orderly places of worship which would wean the Jewish working 
classes away from the chevras, as well as from the newly forming trade unions and 
anarchist meeting places. 69 synagogues and approximately 64,000 Jews were 
affiliated to the Federation during World War II.s
The Chief Rabbi's position is primarily one of supreme religious authority but 
lacking equal sway in secular matters, so that he might at times find himself in 
conflict with lay leaders. Chief Rabbi Dr.Joseph Hertz (1913-1946) was a staunch 
Zionist. Although head of the United Synagogue, his views on Jewish identity and 
Jewish self-assertion, together with his combative spirit, occasionally placed him at 
odds with Anglo-Jewry's communal lay leadership. His quarrels with Sir Robert 
Waley-Cohen, President of the United Synagogue, were legendary. While the two 
co-operated on many matters, they diverged increasingly in religious direction and 
orientation.9
8 Aubrey Newman, United Synagogue. (London, 1976); Geoffrey Alderman, 
Federation of Svnaaogues (London, 1987); Acc 3121 E l/43 , Federation of 
Synagogues (n.d., presumably 1942-43). At the other end of the religious 
spectrum were the Reform Congregation, founded in 1845 and the Liberal 
Movement, started by Claude G.Montefiore in 1902.
9 Lipman, op.cit., pp.217-18.
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Outside the 'establishment', Rabbi Dr.Solomon Schonfeld represented a small 
group of strictly orthodox Jews, most of them immigrants, who were members of 
the Adath Israel Synagogue. This had been established in 1909 with the aim of 
strengthening the practice of traditional Judaism. His father, Victor, amalgamated 
the Adath Synagogues and in 1926 formed a Union of Orthodox Hebrew 
Congregations. By 1943 this comprised 54 affiliated synagogues serving 
approximately 5,000 families. The Union remained separate from and at 
loggerheads with the United Synagogue, which it regarded as growing increasingly 
lax In religious matters. It has never recognised the authority of the Chief Rabbi. 
Another prominent figure in the strictly orthodox community was Harry Goodman, 
an English-born businessman who was secretary of the Agudat Israel World 
Organisation (Union of Israel, AIWO), the political wing of the strictly orthodox. 
Goodman published and edited the Jewish Weekly, and was responsible for 
weekly broadcasts, via the BBC, to Jews in occupied Europe. While the majority of 
mainstream Anglo-Jewry subscribed to the broader based Jewish Chronicle ('the 
organ of Anglo-Jewry'), whose editor, Ivan Greenberg, was a staunch Zionist, the 
readership of the Jewish Weekly was drawn exclusively from the strictly orthodox.
Some of Anglo-Jewry's leaders (such as Brodetsky and Hertz) were affiliated to the 
organised community. Others were co-opted as leaders or patrons because of the 
prominence they had gained in the non-Jewish world. Examples include Lionel and
10 Acc 3121 E2/79, 1 Sept. 1943, Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations 
meeting; Bernard Homa, Orthodoxv in Analo-Jewrv 1880-1940. (London, 1969) 
and A Fortress in Analo-Jewrv: The Storv of the Machzike Adath (London, 1952).
11 The Agudah movement had been founded in Kattowitz, Germany in 1912, in 
reaction to the inroads secularism had made into traditional Jewish life. The 
distinction between 'mainstream orthodoxy' and 'strict orthodoxy' (sometimes 
referred to as 'ultra-orthodoxy') is a matter of degree rather than kind and 
therefore admits an element of overlap at the boundaries. Nevertheless, 'strict 
orthodoxy' connotes a more conservative attitude towards lifestyle and religious 
observance, greater aloofness from secular culture, stricter interpretation of 
Jewish rabbinic law and -  frequently but not inevitably -  hostility towards 
Zionism. The Union and the Agudah are particularly noted for their 
uncompromising stand on the absolute authority of religious law in all aspects of 
Jewish personal and communal life.
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Anthony de Rothschild and politicians such as Herbert Samuel, High 
Commissioner in Palestine (1920-25) and Home Secretary in the National 
Government (1931-32) who was co-opted as Chairman of the Council for German 
Jewry (CGJ)JZ
The inter-war period saw the anglicisation and successful absorption of earlier 
Jewish immigrants and their children into British life. They followed enthusiastically 
the principle that 'there is no impediment to Jews as a religious community forming 
part of the British nation with all that it implies in undivided loyalty, common social 
and cultural ideas and complete identity of interests'. As Laski observed, the 
successful integration of twentieth-century Anglo-Jewry into British communal life 
was made possible by 300 years of harmonious integration. 13 The new generation 
of mainstream communal leaders was imbued with the anglicised way of life and 
culture of the older leadership. The Russian-born Brodetsky, Professor of Applied 
Mathematics at Leeds University and adviser on aerodynamics to the Ministry of 
Defence during the war, is widely regarded as representative of the new generation 
of Anglo-Jewish leadership which assumed prominence during World War II. 
Sharing much of the style of the older leadership, adopting many of its mores and 
attitudes, he is distinguished from it by his ardent Zionism. Nevertheless, well into 
the 1930s and even during the war, the old Anglo-Jewish establishment still 
maintained a presence in the major Jewish institutions. As Laski noted in his 
farewell address to the Board in December 1939, 'The so-called grand dukes have 
rendered and are still rendering the community yeoman [I] service'.# However by 
the outbreak of World War II, the 'personal intercession' which had characterised
12 Jewish Year Books ,1940,1945-6, list eleven Jewish Members of the House of 
Lords. Of these, seven are listed as holding some formal office in the organised 
community. There were sixteen Jewish M.P.s. in the House of Commons. Of 
these, eight are listed as holding communal office. Bentwich, op.cit., pp. 158,161.
13 FO 371/20825 El 590/506/31, 4 March 1937, Laski to Sir Robert Vansittart. 
For the anglicisation process, see Lloyd Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in 
England. 1870-1914 (London, 1973) and Eugene C.Black, op.cit.
14 Laski, ‘Retirement', p.11.
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relations between the older leadership and the authorities had largely diminished, is
During the war, with victory at stake, Jewish interests were subsumed in national 
priorities. A fundamental principle of the JFC was that any action deemed 
important on behalf of Jewish communities abroad 'should not run counter to the 
expressed or implied attitude of the British Foreign Office towards taking that 
action'. 16 The JFC was always concerned to demonstrate that the interests of the 
Jewish community were no different from those of the entire nation. The Anglo- 
Jewish leadership subscribed, probably sincerely, to the Government policy that 
the only help for the endangered Jews of Europe lay in a rapid Allied victory. 
Whether or not they genuinely believed this is less important than the fact that 
Jewish leaders were never able to counter the arguments for this policy with 
convincing reasons why it should be waived in any given case or situation. This is 
repeatedly demonstrated in the exchanges between communal representatives 
and the authorities.
'Englishmen of the Jewish Faith': The Analo-Jewish Establishment.
British Jews have traditionally viewed themselves as British in all respects except 
their non-adherence to the established Church, in parity with Catholics, Quakers, 
Methodists and other nonconformists. To the integrated sections of the community, 
Judaism was a private religious bond. Laski, who insisted that ‘our duty as citizens 
must override our sentiments as Jews', typifies those who were concerned to foster 
the image of a Jewish community visibly loyal to King and country. 17 This 
insistence on the duties of loyal citizenship is explicable in the light of the Anglo- 
Jewish establishment's need to confirm its 'British' credentials: since it could
15 A.M.Hyamson, ‘British Jewry in Wartime’, Contemporarv Jewish Record. The 
American Jewish Committee, New York, vol.VI: no. 1 (February 1943), p.20.
16 Acc 3121 C l 1/7/3a/1. 'The Work of the JFC (1940).
17 Neville Laski, Jewish Rights and Jewish Wrongs (London. 1939). p. 132.
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scarcely cite Anglo-Saxon ethnicity as proof of its Britishness, it tried perforce to 
define itself as British in terms of mindset and loyalty. Laski did precisely this 
during a conference held in October 1938 to discuss the new refugee crisis 
following the Munich Agreement: 'Above all [British Jews'] primary obligation is 
their stern and unswerving allegiance to their citizenship'.is Statements such as 
this could be taken for defensiveness, born of anxiety rooted in a conflict of 
loyalties -  loyalty to the state colliding with the ethical and instinctive imperative to 
come to the rescue of fellow Jews. However, it would be wrong to interpret Laski's 
words out of their historical context; the civic virtues of duty, loyalty and service 
were an active element in public life in the 1930s and formed a natural matrix for 
Jewish self-definition.
Certainly there is evidence to show that Anglo-Jewry was not the diffident 
community it has been portrayed as. Again after Munich, Laski announced that 'we 
seek no preferential treatment for the Jews, but that status of equality with his non- 
Jewish fellow-citizens, to which he is by every human law entitled'. 19 Far from 
seeking civic equality as a privilege for which Jews should render gratitude, Laski 
demands it as a human right.
During the nineteenth century, the Board had won increasing governmental 
support not only for Jewish emancipation in Britain and religious freedom for the 
practice of Judaism, but also in regard to British intervention with foreign powers to 
ameliorate anti-Semitic persecution.20 Certain rights were also granted to the 
Jewish community. In 1836 the Board won statutory recognition through several 
Acts of Parliament, including rights to the supervision of Jewish marriages. The
18 Acc 3121 B4/C0N 22, 15 October 1938, International Conference of 
Voluntary Organisations.
18 Acc 3121 011/12/15/2, 23 October 1938, Statement by Laski.
20 Moses Montefiore, President of the Board (1835-74), used his connections to 
enlist support for intervention in Ottoman affairs, beginning with the notorious 
Damascus Blood Libel case in 1840.
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Board was sensitive to the fact that this and other rights, such as those 
adumbrated in the Sunday Trading Laws, might be repealed should they be 
abused and that the authority of the Jewish leadership might easily be undermined 
should it be misused.21 Nevertheless, this did not place the Jewish community in 
any more vulnerable position than any other social or religious sect and it is hard to 
see how its concern not to abuse its privileges can be read as a symptom of 
timidity and insecurity. The Board was concerned for the good name of the 
community as a whole and strove to encourage a high standard of behaviour in 
public life.
The Anglo-Jewish community of the inter-war period has been labelled uneasy and 
timorous. It has been argued that the successful integration of British Jewry into 
nineteenth-century social and economic life concealed a deeper sense of insecurity 
nurtured by several factors. During the 1980s, Bill Williams, followed by a group of 
revisionist historians of Anglo-Jewry, including Tony Kushner and most recently 
Richard Bolchover, challenged the view that the liberal political culture of early 
twentieth-century England created a tolerant environment in which Jews could 
flourish. Williams argued that liberalism bred its own distinctive form of hostility to 
Jews, which he called the 'Anti-semitism of Tolerance'. Liberalism, he claimed, was 
hostile to Jewish distinctiveness and supported equal rights for Jews only insofar 
as they abandoned their distinctive religious and cultural mores: 'Jews were 
validated not on the grounds of their Jewish identity, but on the basis of their 
conformity to the values and manners of bourgeois English society' .22 This 
'emancipation contract' theory holds that Jewish acceptance into national life was 
implicitly conditional upon a high degree of integration and assimilation. The terms
21 David Feldman, Englishmen and Jews (London, 1994), p.299. The Trades 
Advisory Council demonstrated a continuing concern for ethical practice.
22 Bill Williams, ‘Anti-semitism of Tolerance: Middle-Class Manchester and the 
Jews, 1870-1900', A.J.Kidd and K.W. Roberts, eds., Citv. Class and Culture: 
Studies of Social Policy and Cultural Production in Victorian Manchester 
(Manchester, 1985), pp.74-102. Kushner, The Persistence of Preiudice. p. 10.
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of the contract have never been fully explained, and Bolchover himself maintains 
that there was in reality no such thing, except in the mind of Anglo-Jewry. Thus, 
Bolchover claims, during the war, British Jews were fearful of an anti-Semitic 
resurgence caused by Jewish abrogation of the 'contract'. For this reason, 'Anglo- 
Jewry's understanding of the emancipation as a contract and the inherent threat of 
antisemitism upon its abrogation led it to maintain a low-profile political strategy', a
This view has found favour with historians who have rejected the earlier consensus 
that Britain's liberal political culture, in contrast to the active and extreme 
Continental style of anti-Semitism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
created a tolerant atmosphere in which Jews could flourish socially and 
economically. The invidious dangers of judgement by contrast, they argue, are 
exacerbated in this instance by the political and cultural differences which made 
Britain a 'special case'. The absence of show-trials, pogroms and emigration in the 
experience of British Jewry does not mean, these historians claim, that less 
institutionalised forms of anti-Semitism did not flourish at various levels of British 
society. What is important, Kushner argues, is that the most direct impact of anti- 
Semitism was on English Jews' sense of identity. It reinforced the perception that 
Jews were alien and consequently felt compelled to meet the expectation of the 
host society by maintaining a low profile.24 The weakness in this circular argument 
is that it cites an undemonstrated effect in 'proof of its own hypothetical cause.
A certain parochialism can also be detected in the work of these historians. Taking 
the Jewish perspective as central to their analysis, they fail to take account of the 
wider factors -  political, social and cultural -  which conditioned nineteenth and 
early twentieth century responses to nonconformism in Britain, of which Judaism
23 Bolchover, op.cit., pp.42,77-120,181 n.2.
24 G.C.Lebzelter, Political Anti-Semitism in England. 1918-1939 (London. 1978, 
p.1; Kushner, The Persistence of Preiudice. pp.2,10.
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was only one example. Their assumptions are predicated on the late twentieth- 
century premises of a pluralistic society in which minority rights, both ethnic and 
religious, are enshrined in law. Thus, Kushner complains anachronistically that 
'British society, which prides itself on its liberalism. Its decency and its 
humanitarianism, has failed to produce an environment for the healthy existence of 
a positive Jewish identity',25 failing to draw a crucial distinction between focused 
anti-Semitism and general wariness of nonconformism. His conclusion, that British 
Jews felt pressured to conform to the customs and attitudes of the majority and 
were thus rendered insecure in their Jewish identity, similarly fails to address the 
fact that such Insecurity is inevitably a psychological function of membership of a 
minority culture in a host society. Rather than experiencing overtly hostile pressure 
towards conformity, it seems likely that British Jews were susceptible to a more 
subtly persuasive phenomenon -  the lure of assimilation. At precisely the time 
when legal and social barriers were being lowered, British Jews began to succumb 
to the blandishments of a society which offered a model of modern, rational life, 
through the influence, inter alia, of secular education, cultural 'anglicisation' and 
intermarriage. Thus, Anglo-Jewry, while necessarily regarding itself as a minority 
group, was nevertheless also consciously and deliberately well integrated.
An account of the undoubted insecurities and anxieties experienced by Anglo- 
Jewry in the early twentieth century must consider the broader social pressures 
which shaped both liberal and intolerant attitudes. Virulently anti-Semitic writers, 
such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain and, to a lesser extent. H.G.Wells were 
active and influential alongside a philo-Semitic culture exemplified (to name only 
literary figures) by the work of nineteenth and twentieth-century writers including 
J.S.Mill, George Eliot, E.M.Forster and James Joyce. The weakness of the 
'emancipation-contract' theorists is not only their failure to adduce any evidence for 
it, or to account for the succession of enabling legislation passed throughout the
25 Tony Kushner, 'The Impact of British Anti-semitism', MMAJ. op.cit., p.208.
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nineteenth century, but also their simplistic characterisation of a deeply complex 
society as 'liberal', an epithet which is then used loosely as a term of abuse.
To describe nineteenth-century liberalism as a creed of conformity denies the 
evidence of the radical social and political reforms brought about through the 
activities of liberals and nonconformists such as Elizabeth Fry, Wilberforce and the 
Anti-Corn Law activists, to name only a few. One of the most important documents 
of nineteenth-century liberal philosophy. Mill's 'On Liberty', is founded on the 'harm 
principle' - that the individual must be free to follow his own course unless this 
interferes with the liberty of another. Reacting against the conformism of 
contemporary society. Mill insists that 'it is good that there should be differences, 
even though not for better, even though ... some should be for the worse. '26 
Liberalism proper, at least in the cultural sense, is characterised by the creed of
E.M.Forster, who described himself as 'an individualist and a liberal who has found 
liberalism crumbling beneath him': 'Tolerance, good temper, and sympathy - they 
are what matter reall/. Such liberalism is most characteristically associated with 
Forster's own vigorous philo-Semitism: 'To me, anti-Semitism is now the most 
shocking thing of all'. 27
It cannot be denied that there was a powerful strain of anti-Semitism in British 
social life in the early twentieth century, but its causes cannot be attributed to a 
putative unwritten emancipation contract or to any all-pervasive phenomenon such 
as 'liberalism'. Other factors played a part, and only in certain cases (perhaps only 
in the purely religious sphere) can it be claimed that an exclusively anti-Semitic, as 
opposed to anti-alien, form of prejudice operated. Nevertheless, the result was an 
undoubted culture of latent and sometimes overt hostility which inevitably induced
26 j.s.Mill, On Liberty (London. 1974), p. 140.
27 E.M.Forster, Two Cheers for Democracv (London, 1951), pp.25-26,75. For a 
critique of the Emancipation Contract theory, see Todd Endelman, 'English 
Jewish History, Modern Judaism 11 (1991),. pp. 101-103.
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a certain anxiety beneath the solid surface of social and economic success 
enjoyed by British Jews in the early twentieth century and which was exacerbated 
by the wider international spread of Fascism and the rise of the British Union of 
Fascists (BUF). Nevertheless, the community's dismissive and 'stiff-upper-lip' 
attitude to anti-Semitism must not be confused with an insecure, 'low-profile' 
approach. It is in fact another symptom of the community's 'English' response.
Anglo-Jewry's style of leadership has always been indicative of the habit of 
deference towards authority natural to a culture with an ingrained respect for the 
'law' (secular as well as religious). Such deference, which is not in itself defensive, 
can only have been reinforced by the characteristic respect of the English working 
classes towards their social superiors, a respect which has been commented on by 
psephologists and social historians.2b To a great extent, Anglo-Jewry genuinely 
shared many of the attitudes and assumptions of the government and ruling 
classes, to whom it entrusted the protection of its interests. British Jewry took pride 
in the Empire, which was still a powerful global force in the 1930s. The older 
leadership had become integrated into middle and upper class society; at the 
highest level, the court circle of the Edwardian period was noted for the number of 
Jewish bankers and financiers who were personal friends of the King.
What has been viewed as sycophantic echoing of official policy on immigration, 
anti-Semitism and the conduct of war may more correctly be seen as a reflection of 
the extent to which the outlook of the host society had genuinely been absorbed by 
its Jewish community. Laski was exhibiting a peculiarly British fair-mindedness 
when he urged, 'The Jews must not expect the Jewish problem to be given first
28 On deference and voting, see David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political 
Changes in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London, 1969), p. 120; 
Robert T.Mackenzie and Alan Silver, Angels in Marble. Working Class 
Conservatives in England (London, 1968). See also Ross McKibbin, Classes and 
Cultures: England. 1918-1951 (Oxford. 1998).
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consideration when the peace of Europe is at stake. For the statesmen of Europe 
the peace of the Continent is the paramount consideration. For them, the Jewish 
question is only one of many problems' .29 Leonard Montefiore, joint chairman of the 
JFC, countering the charge that Jews were an obstacle to Anglo-German 
understanding, stated 'that in matters of foreign policy there are no sectional 
Jewish interests apart from and distinct from, the security, the strength and abiding 
power of the British Empire. British vital interests are our concern just as much, no- 
more but no less, than that of our fellow-citizens' . 30
This attitude is exemplified by a proposal, in August 1940, that 'the Board, on 
behalf of Anglo-Jewry, should raise a fund for the presentation of a squadron of 
aeroplanes to HMG'. Some urged that such a proposal 'would stand out as a 
concrete instance of Jewish help in the fight against Hitlerism'. However, the 
motion was eventually dropped on the grounds that the proposal would have the 
effect of differentiating Jews from the British citizen body.31 In the early stages of 
the war, an important question for the Jewish community was whether the general 
peace aim should be supplemented by additional aims of a specifically Jewish 
character. Waley-Cohen and other members of the Executive Committee were 
against any approaches savouring of separatism. Others, including Brodetsky, 
thought that Jews had a special contribution to make at a peace conference and 
that the Jewish problems arising out of the war should be considered part of the 
general text of a peace conference rather than as an appendix to a solution of the 
European situation.32
2 9  Laski, op.c it., p. 139.
Jew ish  T e leg rap h ic  A g e n c y  (JTA),  11 April 1938 , p .4.
91 A cc 3 1 2 1  0 1 0 /1 /1 / ,  21 A ugust 1940 , Executive M inutes.
9 2  Ibid.. 2 8  F e b ru ary  1940 .
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Zionism
Anglo-Jewry's attitudes to political Zionism, the movement to create a Jewish state 
in Palestine, are indicative of the community's diversity, as Zionism presented a 
potential conflict between Jewish and British identity. Early Zionists were an 
embarrassment to the old Anglo-Jewish oligarchy because they appeared to claim 
a national, political identity for Jews beyond that which they held as British subjects 
or citizens. The issue was first raised in 1917 following the Balfour Declaration, 
which promised a Jewish national home in Palestine. Opposition to Zionism thus 
centred on the problem of divided loyalties. Patriotism and loyalty were first and 
foremost owed to Britain and the Empire, rather than to a projected Jewish state. 
Waley-Cohen declared that English Jews were 'entirely British in thought, 
aspirations, interests and zeal'. These 'non-Zionists' or 'assimilationists' rejected 
Zionism not because they feared British hostility, but from a positive and powerful 
sense of loyalty to Britain and the Empire. Zionism offered a rival national identity 
to Jews, many of whom had fought in World War I and whose loyalties were 
already proudly given to Britain.33 For the same reason, Laski blocked the proposal 
that the Board should affiliate with the WJC in 1936 -  not only because its 
aspirations were Zionist but because it postulated that Diaspora Jews constituted a 
single Jewish 'nation'.34
Opposition to Zionism was based on a fundamental dichotomy in Anglo-Jewish 
identity and is well illustrated by an acrimonious exchange between Brodetsky and 
Anthony de Rothschild. Berating Brodetsky for his public statement that Zionists 
refused to accept 'the policy of assimilation' because it represented 'a capitulation 
on the part of the Jewish people, an abandonment of its sense of history, its
33 Gideon Shimoni, ‘Non-Zionism in Anglo-Jewry 1937-1948'. Jewish Journal of 
Sociology (JJS) (1985-6), vols.27-28, pp.89-116. Waley-Cohen's statement is 
cited in Stephen Ans, The Jews in Business (London, 1970), p.42.
34 Lipman, op.cit., pp. 178-79.
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tradition and its national dignity', de Rothschild speaks of the 'civic ideal' of 
assimilation. He defines this not in the modern sense of genetic and cultural 
absorption into the host community, but in the sense 'that apart from the religious 
difference our ideal is to assimilate with the rest of the British nation taking our full 
part as Englishmen without reservation in all the secular activities of the nation'. 
Rothschild, claiming to speak on behalf of 'a large and vital section of the 
Community', strongly contested the idea that 'we have nationalistic aspirations 
which are the reverse of our conception of British citizenship and the traditional 
position of the Jews in this country'.35
Brodetsky disagreed: I, for one, am not prepared to define Judaism as a system of 
thought and practice, the aim of which is to place British citizenship before 
everything else and to ram home the great debt which Jews owe to Britain. Nobody 
will accuse me of not understanding the world importance of British citizenship and 
the Jewish debt to Britain but the revelation on Mount Sinai happened before Great 
Britain existed’.ss Brodetsky clearly felt some irritation at those who, like de 
Rothschild, seemed to him obsessed by a compulsion to profess their loyalty ad  
nauseam.
Resistance to Zionism persisted through the 1930s and 1940s, although the Zionist 
movement attracted greater support following Hitler's rise to power. Until the 
election of Brodetsky, the Anglo-Jewish leadership remained half-hearted about 
political Zionism although it supported 'practical or constructive Zionism', the
35 Acc 3121 B5/2/2/2, 16 December 1940 and 12 February 1941, Anthony de 
Rothschild to Brodetsky. Rothschild's understanding of 'assimilation' is essentially 
synonymous with the modern term 'acculturation'. 'Assimilation' now refers to an 
irreversible genetic absorption into the host community via intermarriage and loss 
of one's original religious-cultural identity. 'Acculturation' refers to the acceptance 
of the values and traditions of the host community without loss of the original 
religious-cultural identity: in effect a mixed rather than a compounded identity.
36 Ibid., 1 May 1941, Brodetsky to A.G.Brotman, General Secretary of the Board. 
Brotman was personal assistant to Brodetsky, or 'senior civil servant of the 
community'. See Laski, 'Retirement', p. 13.
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economic and cultural development of Jewish Palestine. Opinion was divided as to 
the Partition Plan of 1937, with Laski and Waley-Cohen opposed to the proposal. 
Rothschild called for support of government policy against partition and declared 
he was ‘proud of being British' and that the ‘Government will not let us down’.37
Certainly the White Paper of May 1939, fixing a limit on immigration to Palestine, 
profoundly disturbed Anglo-Jewish sensibilities. The implication that Britain had 
reneged on the promises of the Balfour Declaration, especially at a time of dire 
need, brought many non-Zionists, like Waley-Cohen and Laski, into greater 
sympathy with Zionism. Laski envisaged a Jewish-Arab Palestine under the British 
Mandate, arguing with others for 'an immediate unrestricted immigration' based 
solely on economic capacity. To prevent Palestine alleviating the ever-growing 
refugee tragedy was, he claimed, 'to bring despair, if not death, to the tens of 
thousands whose only hope in exile can be the Jewish National Home'.as
The Zionist aspirations of a growing section of the Jewish community found a voice 
in the leadership of Brodetsky, who used his position as President of the Board to 
present the Zionist cause to the Government on every possible occasion. 
Brodetsky was able to combine deference for authority with a surprisingly forceful 
insistence on the Palestine issue when this was evidently at odds with official 
policy. Yet British Zionists still envisaged a Jewish State in Palestine which would 
remain 'in one form or another, within the ambit of the British Empire’. In January 
1938, the Board called for a solution which would 'provide for the establishment of 
a Jewish Dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations.' This was intended 
to conciliate the non-Zionists, who prided themselves on their patriotism, by 
offering a means of reconciling a Jewish with a British nationality.39 By November
37 Daily Telegraph, 28 October 1938.
38 Laski, op.cit., pp. 147-48,154.
39 CZA A/289/65, Harry Sacher, 23 Feb. 1939, 'The Jewish State and the 
Diaspora'; BOD Annual Report 1938, p.50; Lipman, op.cit., p. 182.
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1944, the Board was still hoping that Palestine would become a Jewish state or 
commonwealth and 'find an appropriate and legally secured place within the British 
Commonwealth of nations’. The proposal that the Jewish state should ultimately 
develop into a British Dominion was deemed practical by most Zionists, since 'a 
tiny little prosperous state such as Palestine ... cannot hope to survive in isolation 
in the midst of a complex Mediterranean zone'.w
Solomon Schonfeld and the Chief Rabbi's Religious Emeraencv Council (ORREC)
The potential for individual effort is illustrated by Rabbi Dr. Solomon Schonfeld, 
who has been singled out by some historians of this period for his 'exceptional' role 
in rescue and relief. 41 He was often at odds with the Anglo-Jewish establishment 
and has acquired a reputation for unconventional and even unscrupulous methods. 
Schonfeld, the British-born son of Hungarian parents, studied from 1930-33 at a 
religious seminary {yeshiva) in Nitra, Slovakia, under Rabbi Michael Ber 
Weissmandel. Simultaneously, he obtained a doctorate in philosophy from the 
University of Koenigsberg. He perceived himself first and foremost as a Jew and 
only secondly as a British subject. The laws of Judaism, rather than British social 
and cultural influences, were the main determinants of his identity and behaviour. 
At Nitra, Schonfeld became a sympathiser with, although not an official member of, 
the Agudat Israel and wholeheartedly endorsed the Agudist approach to religious 
and communal issues. Bentwich describes him as 'machiavellian', touched with the 
fanaticism of the religious zealot, whose 'zeal, imagination and energy' 
commanded respect even though his methods were perhaps less admirable.42
In succouring the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution, both religious and lay leaders
40 BOD Annual Report 1944, pp.28-29; J.C., 15 December 1944, p. 10.
41 Alderman, Modern British Jewrv. pp.303-305; Bolchover, op.cit., pp. 146,148- 
49.
42 CZA A255/491, Norman Bentwich Papers, JCRA (n.d ).
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saw themselves as continuing the age-old Jewish tradition of mutual aid and
responsibility, Including the ethical Imperative of saving life, which had been a
distinguishing feature of Jewish communal life since biblical times. According to 
Jewish law (and Indeed English law In certain circumstances), saving life validates
the transgression of any other law, Jewish or secular. The Talmud. In discussing a
Jew's obligation to the disadvantaged In society, speaks of various categories of
need and concludes that 'there Is no greater commandment than 'pidyon
shevuyim\ the obligation to ransom and rescue captlves.43
For Schonfeld, this justified taking 'short cuts' and 'by-passing the slow-moving 
wheels of bureaucracy'.'^ Even more controversially, Schonfeld has been criticised 
for his 'narrow' concentration on saving religious functionaries. Implying a lack of 
concern for other Jews.^s Schonfeld, however, was passionately committed to the 
preservation of Jewish religion, culture and education, as evidenced by his lifelong 
devotion to the development of Jewish primary and secondary education. In the 
strictly orthodox view, rescue Involved not only saving Jewish lives but also, by 
extension, saving Judaism as a living religion.-^® For Schonfeld the Ideological 
commitment to the preservation of the practice of Judaism was all the more 
Important because the forces of assimilation posed a real threat to the survival of 
the Jews. It was therefore natural that, without any lack of concern for others, he
43 Ya'akov Blldstein, The Redemption of Captives In Halakhic Tradition: 
Problems and Policy’, S.I.Troen and B.PInkus, eds., Oroanlzlna Rescue: National 
Jewish Solldarltv In the Modern Period (London, 1992), pp.20-30; Archives of the 
Holocaust, An International collection of selected documents, vol. 18, pp.IX-X.
44 Lord Immanuel Jakobovlts, Interview, January 1994, London.
45 Bernard Wasserstein, 'Tyranny of Conventional Wisdom: The Jewish Refugee 
Issue In Britain 1939-1945', CBF Conference on Jewish Refugees and Refugee 
Work, 1933-1993 (unpublished, London, 14 March 1993).
46 MS 183 Schonfeld, 668 [EM-EZ]; 655 [FL-FOY] (reference to Holy Work); 640 
[MAR-MAZ] (aiding religious Institutions In Germany, such as orphanages and 
hospitals with kosher food); 662 [WA-WAZ] (Sacred Work -  Passover Appeal). 
Israel State Archives, GL 8586/6, Zorach Warhaftig Papers, 'The Jewish Religion 
in Axis Europe: The War against Religion' (n.d ). Warhaftig documented Nazi 
attempts to extirpate the Institutions of the Jewish religion.
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should have been personally drawn to the rescue of those who would perpetuate 
these ideals. In addition, according to Jewish law, special consideration should be 
given to scholars of religious law; in matters of life and death, as Maimonides 
states, whoever is greater in wisdom takes precedence over his co lleague', 
Although the view is alien to modern western sensibilities, this was partly why 
Schonfeld concentrated on the rescue of rabbis and religious teachers. In marked 
contrast, the prevailing opinion in Christian Europe and the English-speaking 
nations has traditionally been that which prevailed on the Titanic: women and 
children first. Had preference been given to or taken by clergymen and 
theologians, this would probably have been viewed with outrage and contempt.
In practice, Schonfeld believed that orthodox Jews were marginalised in 
mainstream rescue efforts and that they were often genuinely disadvantaged. It 
has certainly been argued that the refugee committees 'ignored' the rescue of 
orthodox children and adults because of the consensus of the Anglo-Jewish 
establishment that children who came to Britain should ultimately go to Palestine.^ 
Presumably orthodox refugees would have objected, for ideological reasons, to 
seek refuge in Palestine. As regards the children's transport of 1938-9, the German 
Jewish Aid Committee (GJAC) dealt solely with the official Jewish community in 
Vienna, the Kultusgemeinde, which also favoured children who could enter training 
programmes {hachsharotj in England for eventual re-settlement in Palestine. This 
passive discrimination in favour of refugees who could be settled in Palestine 
meant that lower priority was perforce given to rabbis, religious teachers and 
functionaries, whom the refugee committees considered ‘unproductive and largely 
unassimilable', with little prospect of re-emigrating.^s
Maimonides, Mishna Torah, ‘Matnot Aryim\ 8:18.
48 Kranzler and Hirschler, eds., Solomon Schonfeld. op.cit.. p.23.
49 Ibid. During the war, the situation was very different, when the Agudat Israel 
frequently complained to the Government about the small number of Palestine 
certificates (6 percent) allotted by the Jewish Agency to its members, when 
numerically, for example in Hungary, they represented a much larger proportion
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While Schonfeld and the Agudah strove to save the orthodox, whether 
marginalised or not, there is evidence that Schonfeld also helped rescue 'non­
orthodox' Jews. His lists of candidates for visas are headed 'orthodox' and 'non­
orthodox'. Despite this unconventional taxonomy, it is nevertheless plain that, in 
the case of List 2, for example, 85 out of a total of 241 names were, by Schonfeld's 
own criteria, 'non-orthodox'.so
Unlike many in the strictly orthodox camp, Schonfeld remains an inscrutable figure. 
On the one hand, he averred great loyalty to the British State, as witnessed by the 
patriotic tone of his Message to Jewry. He praised the wartime Government in 
letters to the Jewish Chronicle and The Times both during and after the war. si He 
developed important contacts with highly placed individuals such as Colonel Josiah 
(Lord) Wedgwood and the Archbishop of Canterbury. On the other hand, his 
effusive public professions of loyalty do not ring true, for although there is a Jewish 
religious injunction to be loyal to the state in which one lives and indeed to pray for 
the welfare of the state, this is, according to the Agudist view, necessitated by self­
protection rather than inspired by belief in the ideals of the state or by genuine 
loyalty. Agudists have always seen themselves as sojourners, not immigrants, in 
the Diaspora and hope ultimately to return to Zion upon the coming of the Messiah. 
No doubt Schonfeld's extraordinarily fulsome praise of the Government was in part 
motivated by his bitterness and hostility to the Zionists, whom he blamed for 
stonewalling some of his rescue projects. The Zionists, rather than the
of total applicants. See FO 371/42848 WR1176/21/48,17 Sept. 1944, Postal and 
Telegraph Censorship. However, this is not convincing evidence of deliberate 
marginalisation: the Agudah was militantly anti-Zionist, and had previously shown 
no interest in obtaining Palestine certificates.
50 MS Schonfeld (UCL), n.d. presumably 1939, List no.2 - 'Orthodox' and 'Non- 
Orthodox'.
51 Solomon Schonfeld. Message to Jewry (London. 1959). inter alia, letter to The 
Times, 6 June 1961,p.13: ‘My experience in 1942-3 was wholly in favour of 
British readiness to help, openly, constructively and totally'.
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Government, were in his view the real culprits.52
Until the establishment of the CRREC, the Central Executive of the Agudat Israel 
was the only organisation dealing with the enquiries of strictly orthodox Jews 
regarding the possibility of emigration. In July 1938, the Agudah opened a special 
Emigration Advisory Office (EAC) [sic] in London to deal with thousands of 
individual enquiries about affidavits, search for relatives, finding posts for religious 
housemaids and apprentices, visas, supplying kosher food on boats, etc. Although 
the strictly orthodox argued the case for such an organisation, the GJAC opposed 
it. Schiff was heartily sick of Agudat Israel and their machinations', and maintained 
that the EAC 'will be an additional burden on the community'.sa He informed the 
Hilfsverein, the Jewish organisation in Germany dealing with emigration, that this 
committee ... is absolutely condemned by all the leading organisations’. Schiff 
regretted that 'such action should be taken by a body which represents only an 
infinitesimal percentage of the Jewish community" and advised the Hilfsverein to 
have nothing to do with it.s^  Schiff and others feared competing appeals and a 
further drain on the funds of the GJAC. His concern was financial and 
administrative, rather than anti-orthodox. He was especially conscious of the need 
for efficiency, particularly in view of the dire financial straits facing the organisations 
in the late 1930s.
Like other organisations, the Agudah realised during the summer of 1938 that it 
could no longer handle the burden of emigration work alone. Not only had this work 
depleted its finances but it was diverting resources from the Agudah’s other work in 
Palestine and eastern Europe. For this reason Jacob Rosenheim, President of the 
AIWO, proposed to Hertz the creation of a Fund, to which he offered all the
52 See p. 172.
53 Acc 3121 El/1, 8 July 1938, Schiff to Laski.
54 MS Goodman, 6 July 1938, Schiff to Hilfsverein derJuden in Deutschland.
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Agudah’s experience and co-operation.ss Schonfeld acted on the idea and work 
commenced after consultation with Viscount Samuel, who advised the formation of 
a special fund for these purposes, which the CGJ could not undertake. The result 
was the founding of the Chief Rabbi's Religious Emergency 'Fund' (changed to 
'Council' in November). The chairman was Chief Rabbi Hertz and the driving force 
was Schonfeld, his future son-in-law. Schonfeld had already been active on behalf 
of Austrian Jewry, and after Kristallnacht in November 1938 the CRREC went into 
full gear.56
Anolo-Jewish response to the Nazi threat
In ideological terms, Jews have always recognised the centrality of persecution in 
their history. However, by the twentieth century a new optimism had formed under 
the influence of the comparatively enlightened and tolerant conditions of British 
society. Anglo-Jewry trusted in liberal democracy and in the philosophy of 
amelioration, the legacy not only of eighteenth-century Enlightenment rationalism 
(which saw religious persecution as a form of superstition) but also of nineteenth- 
century theories of political and social evolution such as Fabianism and social 
Dan/vinism.
By extension, the Jews believed they would benefit from this gradual amelioration 
of the human condition, and as has been argued, it was therefore 'hard for most to 
accept the reality of irrational facts such as the planned extermination of the 
Jews."57 It would appear that even the widespread acceptance and popularity of
55 MS 183 Schonfeld 673 [AG-AL], 21 January 1939, Memorandum, Rosenheim 
to CRREC. Henry Pels 27 (35), 18 April 1966, Hebrew University, Institute of 
Contemporary Jewry, Oral History Department. Pels was Secretary of the 
CRREC.
56 MS 183 Schonfeld, 617/2 (f.1), Interim Report (n.d. probably January 1939); 
290 (f.2.), 19 November 1938, E.Holderness, Home Office to Hertz.
57 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p. 137.
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eugenic theories of racial purity during the early decades of the century had done 
nothing to dent this optimism. Anglo-Jewry had not realised that eighteenth-century 
rationalism expected toleration to lead inevitably to assimilation, nor that religious 
anti-Semitism had become infused, especially in Europe, with racial anti-Semitism. 
Hence its initial response to the 'Final Solution' of the European Jewish problem 
was incredulity compounded with scepticism. The deception and secrecy with 
which the Nazi policy of extermination was conducted no doubt fuelled this 
scepticism further.
By contrast, the Agudat Israel (like all strictly orthodox groups), untouched by 
secular culture, saw the Final Solution within the historical continuum of Jewish 
persecution, stretching back to the Babylonian and Roman exiles. Hitler was 
regarded metaphorically as a descendent of Amalek and Haman, the enemies and 
would-be destroyers of the Jewish people. Untouched by Enlightenment optimism, 
the orthodox experienced less incredulity at the concept of the Final S o lu tio n .®  
Traditional Jewish sources voiced a belief in the inevitability and irrationality of anti- 
Semitism. In the 1940's, some strictly orthodox authorities controversially saw the 
unfolding Holocaust as the outcome of two idolatries', predicted, like all historical 
events, by the Torah (Bible). Attributing Jewish suffering in modern times to the 
forces of assimilation and the twin "idolatries' of nationalism and socialism, the 
Agudah was psychologically receptive immediately the news of the Final Solution 
broke.59 It needed no evidence or confirmation of what it saw as the fulfilment of a 
biblical warning. In this, as in every aspect of the war, its thinking and behaviour 
was conditioned by purely religious considerations. The early Zionists, for secular
58 Gershon Greenberg, "Sovereignty as Catastrophe: Jakob Rosenheim's 
Hurban Weltanschauung', Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol.8, no.2, (Autumn 
1994), pp.202-24.
59 Rabbi Elchonon Wasserman, Ikveta DeMeshihah , pp. 11-12, cited in Gershon 
Greenberg, "Orthodox Theological Responses to Kristallnacht: Chayyim Ozer 
Grodzensky ("Achiezer") and Elchonon Wassermann', Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies, vol.3, No.4. (1988), pp.431-41; Menachem Friedman, "The Haredim and 
the Holocaust". The Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 53, (Winter 1990).
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and historical reasons, also believed that anti-Semitism was irrational and 
ineradicable, and regarded Jewish statehood as the only solution to the problem
At the tactical level, Alderman maintains that 'What is important in the context of 
Anglo-Jewish reaction to the Holocaust... is that no pressure of any significance 
was ever exerted upon the British Government on this question'. While he 
concedes that numerous appeals were made, 'there was never a mass lobby, or 
public demonstrations... What was suggested was that the patriotic duty of British 
Jews was to support the war effort, and the priorities associated therewith as laid 
down by the Government, and that to challenge these priorities was to endanger 
the good name of the community'. This disparaging view of the community's 
motives is endorsed by Bolchover, who stresses Anglo-Jewry's overwhelming 
desire to appear loyal, 'prior to any requests for sympathy or practical help for the 
Jews of Europe'. ^
The implication is that despite its integration into British society, the Anglo-Jewish 
community remained insecure. In presenting the issue in this way, however, these 
historians reduce the community's options to a stark choice between patriotism and 
Jewishness. Failing to grasp the genuine areas of agreement between the 
Government and the Jewish leadership, they assume illogically that the 
community's patriotism was synonymous with betrayal of its European Jewish 
brethren and that its concurrence with governmental policy was mere sycophancy.
The Anglo-Jewish leadership, like the community itself, was heterogeneous in Its 
religious and political affiliations. For the most part the leadership was confident.
60 Leon Pinsker's Auto-Emancipation (1882) was inspired by the Russian 
pogroms in 1881. The seeds of Herzl's Judenstaat were sown at the Dreyfus 
trials in Paris and even Jabotinsky was only converted to Zionism at the age of 
23 by the Kishinev Pogrom in 1903.
61 Alderman, op.cit., pp.295-302. Bolchover, op.cit., p. 107.
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well-established and highly integrated. This confidence is evident in the
leadership's immediate and decisive response to the German national boycott of 
Jewish business and the anti-Jewish legislation of April 1933, which resulted in the
first influx of refugees from central Europe. Before the Cabinet discussion of 
Jewish refugees on 5 April, the Jewish leadership took an 'unprecedented step,’ 
which led the Cabinet to modify the rule that immigrants must demonstrate 
financial independence. In April 1933, Laski and Lionel Cohen of the Board, 
Leonard Montefiore of the AJA and Schiff undertook, on behalf of the community, 
that ‘all expenses, whether in respect of temporary or permanent accommodation 
or maintenance will be borne by the community without ultimate charge to the 
State’. This guarantee was highlighted in the Home Secretary's report to the 
Cabinet Committee on Alien Restrictions and undoubtedly influenced Government 
policy.62 The guarantee could be maintained only on the basis of a massive fund­
raising effort and the establishment of organisations to deal with the influx. 
Between 1933 and 1939 the Anglo-Jewish community raised more than three 
million pounds, an impressive sum for a community numbering some 330,000, 
especially during an economic depression.^
Among the first refugee organisations established was the Jewish Refugees 
Committee (JRC), founded by Schiff in March 1933. To avoid prolonged refugee 
associations, in January 1938 it was renamed the German Jewish Aid Committee. 
Schiff's work for Belgian refugees during World War I had given him valuable 
administrative experience as well as close contacts with government officials. The 
Home Office consequently had ‘complete trust in Mr.Schiff and his assistants, and 
were prepared to accept their word that any particular refugee or group of refugees
62 CAB 27/549 A.R. (33) Series, Cabinet Committee on Alien Restrictions, 7 
April 1933, Report by Sir John Gilmour, Home Secretary.
63 Joseph LCohen, 'Refugees Organisations', in J.C., 10 February 1939, pp.14- 
16. Bentwich, Thev Found Refuae. p.41.
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would be maintained’.64 Thus, in practice, German Jews were allowed into Britain 
on Schiff's authority. Emphasis was placed throughout on retraining and 
resettlement, particularly of younger people, in Palestine. The JRC was the 
executive body concerned with admission, hospitality, accommodation and 
financial help. It received its funds from the Central British Fund for German Jewry 
(CBF), which had been established in 1933.65 The CBF launched Its first appeal in 
May and raised over £250,000 In the first year. Both organisations were wholly 
apolitical.
The deteriorating condition of German Jewry following the Nuremberg Laws in
1935, disenfranchising all non-Aryans, convinced Anglo-Jewish leaders of the 
necessity for a more determined international effort to save German Jewry. In
1936, the CBF became part of a wider structure when the Council for German 
Jewry (CGJ) was founded to represent American, British and other major Jewish 
communities. Together with its Chairman, Herbert Samuel, Lord Bearsted and 
Simon Marks took a leading part in its work. A major goal of the CGJ was to help 
fund the settlement of some 100,000 young adults and children, mainly in 
Palestine, within four years. For that purpose a fund of three million pounds was to 
be raised, two-thirds by American Jewry and one-third by British Jewry, with the 
help of continental bodies. Zionists and non-Zionists bridged their ideological 
differences to formulate this plan.66The non-denominational Movement for the 
Care of Refugee Children was formed in 1938 and was responsible for bringing 
10,000 children to Britain.67 Valuable help came from non-Jewish organisations 
such as the Society of Friends and from several outstanding individuals. Prominent
G4 Lipman, op.cit., p. 195; Bentwich. Thev Found Refuae. o.52.
65 Joan Stiebel, The Central British Fund for World Relief, in Transactions of the 
Jewish Historical Society of England. Sessions 1978-1980, vol.27 (London, 
1982).
66 David Silberklang, 'Jewish Politics and Rescue: The Founding of the Council 
for German Jewry', Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol.7, no.3 (Winter 1993), 
pp.333-71.
67 Bentwich, op.cit.. Chapter V.
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among these were Eleanor Rathbone M.P., Dr.George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, 
Josiah Wedgwood and the Revd James Parkes.
At the political level, the Board was reluctant to respond to the Nazi mistreatment 
of Jews with a 'policy of activism' which included protest meetings and a boycott of 
German goods. One reason cited was that such action was likely to be prejudicial 
to the interests of German Jewry, as well as likely to jeopardise the Ha'avara 
(Transfer Agreement of 1933) which enabled Germans emigrating to Palestine to 
retain some of their assets. 68 The boycott also ran counter to the policy of 
economic appeasement in which the Government was engaged. The Board
genuinely felt that 'in every community in which we live our best chance of survival, 
or equality of treatment and participation in the activities of the State, lies in the 
subordination of our specific interests to the larger interests of the whole 
community ... the wealth of this country depends not least on Foreign trade'.®® The 
Board insisted that the boycott was a matter for individual, not collective action.
The Anglo-Jewish leadership preferred to discuss with officials the possibility of 
diplomatic intervention on behalf of German Jews, to solve the problem at source. 
However, the Foreign Office declined to intervene in Germany's internal affairs.70 
In early 1937 Laski suggested that 'at the appropriate time and within and as part 
of the Government policy for peace and protection of British interests the adverse 
effects of the German government's policy to a section of its own population should 
be drawn in a friendly but firm manner to the attention of that government'. Laski 
believed, naively from a later perspective but at the time reasonably, that by 
producing evidence of persecution and showing that Anglo-Jewry had British
G8 J.C., 22 Sept. 1933, p.11; Laski, op.cit., p. 133; Acc 3121 A/30, 14 June 1933, 
JFC Minutes, 10 July 1938, Minutes.
G9 Laski, op.cit., pp. 131-32.
70 John P. Fox, 'Great Britain and the German Jews 1933’, Wiener Library 
Bulletin, vol.36 nos.26/7 (1972), pp.40-46.
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interests at heart, 'the forces of liberalism and humanitarianism would prevail'.7i 
This was by no means a uniquely Jewish attitude. Although fear of war was 
widespread, belief in the cultured rationality and humanity of Germany as a centre 
of modern civilisation was still powerful at this stage. There was as yet no 
understanding of the essential fanaticism of Nazi ideology.
Laski maintained that ‘the strongest condemnation of mass hysteria -- whether 
exhibited in meetings or in boycott protests -  is its failure to make any impression 
on Nazi Germany'. 2^ However, those in favour maintained that earlier public 
protests would have mitigated the persecution of Austrian Jewry. In May 1938, 
following the Anschluss, JFC opposition to public protest prevailed. The first 
organised Anglo-Jewish protest against Nazism occurred after Kristallnacht, on 1 
December 1938, at the Royal Albert Hall, when the chair was taken by the former 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Sankey. Hertz was the only Jewish speaker.^s The 
reasoning behind the Board’s favouring public meetings only if prominent non-Jews 
were involved was pragmatic rather than the result of a low-profile approach. The 
Board believed that non-Jews would be regarded as more impartial, which would 
give them greater credibility in Nazi eyes, and that eminent men on the right of the 
political spectrum would wield the most influence with Hitler.^^
Attitude to Refugees
It has been argued that the Anglo-Jewish response to the plight of European Jewry 
was equivocal. This view is based on the premise that Anglo-Jewry felt that its own 
security would be threatened by an influx of Jewish refugees. However, while the 
evidence suggests that the establishment’s attitude was indeed somewhat
Acc 3121 C l 1/6/4,1 Jan.1937, interview with O.G.Sargent, Foreign Office.
72 Laski, op.cit., p. 138.
73 J.C., 9 Dec. 1938, pp.33-34.
74 Lipman, op.cit., p. 194.
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ambivalent, it can also be shown that in practice Anglo-Jewry, from a position of 
strength, took a more positive approach to the refugees.
Laski countered the argument that refugees were adding to the unemployment 
problem and dismissed the criticism that they were ‘the same type as the unhappy 
emigrants from the Russian pogroms ...ignorant and uncultured, many without a 
trade and speaking no language save Yiddish. The vast number would be an asset 
to any country into which they are admitted. They are c u l t u r e d ' xhe Board issued 
a booklet defending and praising them. They were making a substantial 
contribution to the British economy and, far from taking jobs from the British, they 
were increasing employment. This measure was taken by the Jewish Defence 
Committee in response to the Sunday Pictorial headline ‘Refugees get jobs -  
Britons get dole’.^ e
But Laski also informed Schiff that 'from my own personal experience, which is 
confirmed by the experience of a large number of my friends, the refugees are 
pestilential in the matter of the derogatory remarks about various things in this 
country '.^ / This concern was behind the decision to produce a booklet entitled 
Helpful Information and Guidance for Everv Refugee, listing thirteen ‘do's and 
don'ts'. Refugees were advised to be loyal to Britain, not to criticise British 
Institutions and ways, and to refrain from speaking German in public or making 
themselves conspicuous in manner or dress. They were warned against telling 
British Jews that 'it is bound to happen in your country'. The large influx of refugees 
made the work of the anti-defamation committee both more difficult and more 
important. 'It was [more] essential to prevent the growth of anti-semitism than to 
combat \V7^
Laski, op.cit., p. 105.
76 Acc 3121 E3/286/2, 'The Refugees: Plain Facts' (1938).
77 Ibid., E3/532/1, 8 December 1938, Laski to Schiff.
78 Ibid., E3/532/2, 1 December 1938, ‘Helpful Information and Guidance fnr
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Such sensitivity on the part of the Anglo-Jewish leadership was due in part to the 
recurrent manifestations of anti-Semitism at the time, especially the activities of 
Mosley and the BUF. But there was also a tendency within the Anglo-Jewish 
establishment to agree that anti-Semitism was in part provoked by Jews 
themselves. The traditional view is that this ‘obsessive nannying [of the refugees] 
betrays not only Insecurity but a very negative perception of what refugees, if 
unrebuked, might get up to’.^ s Nevertheless, the perception that the alien 
background, appearance and behaviour of the refugees might generate hostility or 
fear was hardly irrational.
Anglo-Jewish leaders were indisputably concerned at the behaviour of some of the 
newcomers. However, this was possibly due, in part at least, to the community's 
natural desire to help the refugees settle into their new environment and adapt to 
British social values. Its concern was equally motivated by acute awareness of 
having undertaken responsibility for the entry, maintenance and well being of the 
refugees. This suggests not insecurity but rather a commitment to help the 
immigrants to become accepted and integrated in Britain: "Above all, please do 
realise that the Jewish community are relying on you -  on each and every one of 
you -  to uphold in this country the highest Jewish qualities, to maintain dignity, and 
to help and serve others'. ® These values may seem pompous to a modern reader 
but were much more prevalent throughout British society in the 1930s.
There was a communal policy of dispersal of refugees around the country. Helen 
Bentwich, Hon. Secretary of the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany,
everv Refugee'. Max Rittenberg to the Chairman of the Anti-Defamation 
Committee.
79 Lipman, 'Anglo-Jewish Attitudes', Werner E.Mosse, ed.. Second Chance, 
op.cit., p.528.
99 Acc 3121 E3/532/2, 1 December 1938, ‘Helpful Information and Guidance for 
everv Refugee': E3/280, Guide for Refugee Dentists (n.d.).
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advocated the spreading of 'our children as far over the British Isles as possible. 
We do not want too great numbers of them in any one place'.^ This measure was 
designed to avoid placing strain on any one location, which might find difficulty in 
providing suitable homes for a large number of children. There was certainly a 
desire that the refugees be settled in and Integrated as quickly as possible and not 
form social and cultural ghettos. Equally, there was concern that refugees should 
not be isolated in areas with no Jewish community, where 'there would be a certain 
amount of loneliness'.
Internal Dynamics
The Anglo-Jewish leadership has been criticised for in-fighting and disunity while 
European Jewry perished: 'The continual arguments between communal 
organisations and leading personalities damaged their effectiveness in lobbying 
government, the general public and the grass-roots community*.®® This implies that 
had there been a more united front vis-a-vis the Government and less time wasted 
on organisational friction, more could have been done to save European Jewry. 
There is, however, no evidence to support this view. On the contrary, there is much 
evidence that British Government's intransigence, conjoined moreover with 
Germany's obsessive and irrational prioritising of the Final Solution, militated 
against any possibility of rescue.
In the pre-war period, the Anglo-Jewish community was effectively united on fund­
raising and refugee Issues. The Board's officers and committees were kept 
formally notified of the work being carried out by the various refugee organisations. 
An elaborate network of cross-memberships and co-options linked the Board with
J.C., 19 Dec. 1938, p.32; Lipman, 'Anglo-Jewish Attitudes', p.529-31.
82 Acc 3121 E3/525/1, 23 April 1939, meeting between Board and GJAC.
83 Bolchover, op.cit.,p.56.
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the Jewish committees responsible for refugee relief and funds.®^
T h e  th ree  m ajor international Jewish organisations with offices in Britain w ere  th e  
Jew ish A gency for Palestine, the British Section of the W JC  and th e  AI W O . As th e  
full extent of th e  N azi genocide plan unfolded in the sum m er of 1 942 , there w as  
som e attem pt by these  organisations and the Board to consult with each  other and  
co-ord inate  strategies. T h e  idea of a  Consultative C om m ittee w as  first m ooted in 
Ju ly  by A lex  E a s te rm a n  ‘in o rder to e lim inate  s e p ara te  a p p ro a c h e s  to th e  
authorities  and to facilita te  effective action’. S im ilar suggestions w e re  m ad e  by 
M .R .S p rin g er, representing  the  Federation of C zech Jew s, and by G o o d m an .®  
R enew ed  attem pts at co-operation w ere m ade in N ovem ber 1942. In response to a  
w idespread  d es ire  to present a united front, the Board ap p roached  th e  various  
in ternational o rgan isations  'to form an em ergency C onsu lta tive  C o m m ittee  for 
collaboration'.®  T h e  C onsu lta tive  C o m m ittee  m et every  few  d a y s  throughout 
D ecem b er 1942, and w eekly  thereafter for six months.
In sp ite of B ro d etsky ’s hope that m em bers would co -o p era te  as  sm oothly as  
possible, within a  m onth there w as criticism that the Board w as  acting unilaterally  
and  not consulting  th e  W JC . In its editorial, ‘Too m any C o o k s ’, th e  Jew ish  
Chronicle  com pla ined  that ‘it is no secret that the hoped-for d e g re e  of harm ony  
and  co -operation  has not been  ach ieved. B eneath  a  superficial ap p e a ra n c e  of 
unity, there is still an absence of the willing acceptance of team  duty and the ready  
self-subordination to the general cause’.
8 4  London, o p .cit., p. 168; Li pm an, ‘A nglo-Jew ish Attitudes', p .5 2 3 . T h e  JF C  
inc luded  m em b ers  not on th e  Board, such as  C hief R abb i H ertz , N orm an  
Bentwich, Sir Robert W aley-C ohen , Sir O sm ond d ’Avigdor Goldsm id, O tto Schiff 
and H arry G oodm an.
8 5  C en tra l Z ion is t A rch ives  (C Z A ), 0 2 /5 1 0 ,  29  July 1 9 4 2 , E a s te rm a n  to 
Brodetsky; A cc 3121 E l /1 ,  8  Sept. 1942, Brodetsky, interview with M .R .Springer. 
C l  1 /13 /16 , 23  Sept. 1942 , G oodm an to JFC .
8 6  Acc 3121 A /32 , 3 0  Nov. 1942, Board Minutes.
87j.C., 25  Dec. 1942, p.8.
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The Board, the Jewish Agency and the British Section continued to act 
autonomously, sometimes impeding the efficacy of each others' work. In October 
1942, as negotiations were underway for the formation of the Consultative 
Committee, a Board deputation presented proposals to the Foreign Office which, 
according to a note of the meeting, 'were (apparently unknown to them) already 
been actively dealt with by F.O, or H.O. or C O., on representations from the 
Jewish bodies -  which seems to argue a faulty Jewish lia ison '.C om m unal 
disunity, without necessarily influencing government policy or decisions, was 
evidently perceived as a time-wasting nuisance and a symptom of amateurism.
The British Section protested against the Board's arbitrary withdrawal of its 
agreement to issue a joint statement following the December 1942 Declaration. 
Instead, separate statements were issued by the three organisations. The result, 
according to the British Section, was that none of these statements obtained the 
publicity they merited. The British Section also attacked the Board's arrangements 
for a delegation to be received by Churchill without the knowledge or approval of 
the Consultative Committee, and its subsequent negotiations for a delegation to 
Eden, without any reference to the Committee, after Churchill refused to receive it. 
Before it would agree to continue association with the Emergency Consultative 
Committee, the British Section demanded a radical change in the Board’s 
attitude.®
Brodetsky disingenuously explained that 'in the rush and urgency of the situation it 
was often necessary to call meetings at short notice and take quick decisions'.®
88 FO 371/30885 C9844/9844/62, 8 Oct. 1942, A.W.G.Randall, Foreign Office, 
Minute.
89 CZA C2/510, 18 Dec. 1942, Easterman to Brotman; 28 Dec. 1942, N.Barou to 
Brodetsky; 1 Jan. 1943, Easterman to Brotman.
90 Acc 3121 C l 1/7/1/ I ,  24 Dec. 1942, Emergency Consultative Committee 
Meeting, no. 10.
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This seems a polite but transparent fiction -  there was no good reason why the 
British Section could not have been invited to attend these 'short-notice' meetings, 
especially since the purpose of forming 'an emergency Consultative Committee for 
collaboration' was precisely to involve all agencies at short notice. He felt strongly 
that no other organisation was entitled to speak without agreement with the Board. 
Therefore the basis of the work of the Consultative Committee is that the other 
organisations should help, but not control or interfere with the work of the Board'.^i
Brodetsky was sensitive to any attempt to challenge the Board's 'exclusive' right to 
deal with the Government. He appears unaware that the Board's rights of 
representation did not preclude the possibility of the Government also dealing with 
other Jewish groups, such as the Zionists and ultra-orthodox.^z The Jewish 
Chronicle impatiently described the clash between rival organisations pursuing 
similar ends in terms of ‘reckless and competitive Koved [honour]-hunting‘, pointing 
to the number of Jewish organisations claiming credit for the December 1942 
Declaration. Brodetsky himself claims sole credit for it in his Memoirs.®
Much of the difficulty stemmed from the friction between the Board and the WJC. 
The WJC claimed to represent 'world Jewry', the existence of which the Board 
denied. Laski had earlier insisted that this concept ‘could only add credence to the 
frequent and unfounded charge against Jews by the anti-Semites that there existed 
an "international Jewry" and more fundamentally, that the concept of Jewish 
nationhood posed a danger to the civic rights of Jews in all countries’.®^
91 Ibid., 30 Dec. 1942, Emergency Consultative Committee Meeting, no.11.
92 See Inter alia, Acc 3121 B5/2/1, 25 July 1943, Statement by Brodetsky. 
9 3 j.c ., 5 March 1943, p. 10; Selig Brodetsky, Memoirs: From Ghetto to Israel 
(London, 1960), p.219.
94 Acc 3121 C l 1/10/2, 6 Jan. 1937, Memorandum, 'WJC; CZA C2/111, 7 
Sept. 1943, Lord Nathan's comment at Board Executive Meeting; G.Shimoni, 
Selig Brodetsky and the Ascendancy of Zionism in Anglo-Jewry, 1939-45’, JJS 
vol.22, no.2 (December 1980), pp. 128-29.
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The WJC threatened to encroach upon the Board's position in matters such as 
representation to the Government concerning Jewish refugees in Britain. In one 
sense this was an internal affair for British Jewry and hence the preserve of the 
Board. But the plight of European Jewry was deemed by the British Section to be 
equally its own legitimate concern.ss The WJC and the JFC took up similar issues 
in similar ways, lobbying the Government to Intervene to protect Jewish political 
rights in Europe, and presenting rival petitions to the increasingly moribund League 
of Nations. Rival claims to represent Jewish concerns led to disputes between the 
old-established JFC and the new WJC. Having led the opposition to the formation 
of the WJC in 1936, Laski tried frequently between 1937 and 1939 to persuade the 
Foreign Office to have no dealings with the British Section or its Chairman, the 
Revd. Maurice Perlzweig. The Foreign Office, however, was prepared to accept 
approaches from the WJC.^s
The AJA and the Agudat Israel were also hostile to the British Section. Leonard 
Stein categorically declared that he did not recognise the WJC nor the British 
Section and the Jewish Weekly referred to the ‘non-existent World Jewish 
Congress’, dismissing its 'fantastic claim to speak for world J e w r y ' . in the interest 
of the ‘great task on hand’. Hertz appealed to Goodman to tone down his public 
denunciations, pointing out that ‘this body is doing a certain amount of successful 
work in the field of rescue and relief, and had been particularly active in Spain and 
Portugal’. 98
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that separate approaches had any adverse
95 CZA C 2 /106 ,15 Oct. 1941, Brodetsky to Silverman.
96 Acc 3121 C l 1/10/2, 6 Jan. 1937, Memorandum, 'WJC; FO 371/20825 
El 590/506/31, 4 March 1937, Laski to Vansittart; 15 Sept. 1937, W.Strang, 
Minute.
97 CZA C2/510, 22 Nov. 1943. Easterman to Bakstansky; AIWO, A-37, 19 May 
1944, Goodman to Hertz; 26 June 1944, Goodman to Horovitz.
98 Ibid., 18 May 1944, Hertz to Goodman.
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effect on the Government with regard to relief and rescue efforts. Bentwich later 
observed that the Board and the British Section had presented the Jewish case ‘in 
unhelpful competition' but that this had made no difference: 'We got nowhere; we 
wasted hours protesting, and composing and criticising memoranda which had no 
hope of serious attention bv the Governments-'^^  [my emphasis] Bentwich’s point is 
not that communal disunity resulted in Government inertia, but that no effort, 
however well co-ordinated, would have influenced Government decision-making.
Skirmishes between the Board and the British Section continued throughout the 
war years. Attempts to reach a modus vivendi between the JFC and the British 
Section were unsuccessful .From October 1941 the British Section tried to 
ensure close contact and consultation with the JFC. In the event of any foreign 
policy disagreement, the British Section should be free to act as directed by the 
WJC, on the understanding that the British Section did not represent British Jewry. 
Yet there was no serious attempt at co-ordinating policy even though Brodetsky, 
now President of the Board, had been closely associated with the British Section 
from its inception in 1936 and, oddly, continued to serve as one of its vice- 
presidents until 1942. Most of the overtures for co-operation came from the British 
Section.101 It is curious that Brodetsky, who had been closely involved with the 
British Section, did not use his position as President of the Board to foster closer 
co-operation between the two bodies, particularly in view of his repeated calls for 
communal unity.
The status of the British Section was discussed by Jewish members of both
99 Bentwich, Mv Seventv-Seven Years, pp. 191-92.
100 The archives of the WJC, British Section, contain much evidence of this 
conflict. See, inter alia, CZA C2 /111. Also the file containing the papers of Eva, 
Marchioness of Reading, CZA C2/ 61, 11 June 1943, Lord Melchett to Lord 
Nathan.
191 CZA C2/106, 15 Oct. 1941, Brodetsky to Silverman; (n.d.); Jan. 1942, 
'Proposition for Establishment of Collaboration between the British Section and 
the Board'.
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Houses of Parliament during 1943. Silverman feared that the Foreign Office was to 
be advised that the British Section should have no right of representation to 
HM G .102 However, the Government had no objection to dealing with the WJC, 
whose existence was predicated on a world-wide Diaspora as distinct from a 
Jewish state in Palestine.
The Consultative Committee lapsed after a period of six months, though efforts 
were made to revive it. The WJC was reluctant to rejoin. Every proposal it had 
submitted had been vetoed by the other bodies represented on the Committee with 
the exception of the Jewish Agency. The Executive of the WJC felt that ‘it would be 
absurd to lend semblance to the pretence of unity, if none in fact exists between 
important Jewish organisations’.^ o^  Towards the end of 1943 a draft agreement 
was published on the maintenance of contact between the Board and the WJC for 
the exchange of confidential information. This agreement was finalised in March 
1944, but the arrangements proved only partly satisfactory. Much bitterness still 
remained between the WJC and the Agudat Israel.
The most serious clash occurred around the time of the Zionist victory at the 
Board's July 1943 elections. The Board dissolved the JFC, ending Its 65-year-old 
co-operation with the AJA, and established its own Foreign Affairs Committee. The 
AJA, under the chairmanship of Leonard Stein, retaliated by setting up its own 
General Purpose and Foreign Affairs Committee and was given assurances that 
the Foreign Secretary would be willing 'to extend to it the same facilitates for 
placing its views before him as have been accorded In the past.’^osjhe Board still
102 Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 16 March 1943, Meeting of Jewish members of 
Parliament with representatives of the Board and JFC; CZA C2/510, 15 June 
1943, L  Bakstansky to Brodetsky.
103 FO 371/42773 W383/383/48, 7 Jan. 1944, Memo (Beeley), Foreign Office 
Research Department, 'WJC and Jewish Nationalism'.
104 CZA C2/279, 13 Dec. 1943, Minutes of the First Meeting of the National 
Council of the British Section of the WJC.
105 FO 371/36741 W15236/12242/48, 29 Oct. 1943, L.Stein to George H.Hall,
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jealously guarded its position as the representative body of British Jewry. 
Brodetsky was aware that these communal disputes were taking up valuable time. 
At the end of the third monthly Board meeting devoted to the Zionist dispute, he 
disclosed that 'it was impossible to get on with any job ... [the Board's] time was 
taken up with Irrelevant matters ... [while] something like four million Jews had 
been exterminated in E u r o p e . B r o d e t s k y  shows an understandable 
despondency about the annihilation of European Jewry but prefers to blame the 
Board's preoccupation with 'irrelevant matters' rather than admit that although its 
President, he lacked vital leadership skills which would have enabled him to focus 
attention where it belonged.
However, these internal conflicts made little or no difference to the fate of 
European Jewry. On the contrary, it can be argued that the Government was more 
sympathetic to the organisations precisely because of their lack of unity. While the 
Govemment may have been disturbed by the Zionist take-over at the Board, it was 
also reassured by Anglo-Jewr/s diversity and disunity: 'the multiplicity of Jewish 
approaches from the organisations purporting to have Jewish representative status 
largely neutralised the Board’s Zionisation.’i07 One Foreign Office official, Ian 
Henderson, noted that ‘The trend of Jewish organisations in this country appears to 
be towards the loss of its British character and the assumption of some 
international one. The British position vis-a-vis Jewrv might be corresoondinalv 
weakened, were it not for dissensions among the Jews themselves’, [my 
emphasis] 108
This diversity effectively ensured that the Government, perhaps subscribing to the 
strategy of 'divide and rule', could still negotiate with the Anglo-Jewish leadership.
Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office.
106 Acc 3121 E l /111 ,12 Sept. 1943, Final Statement by Brodetsky.
107 Shimoni, 'Selig Brodetsky and the Ascendancy of Zionism', op.cit., p. 150.
108 FO 371/36741 W12242/12242/48, 20 Aug. 1943, Memorandum and Minutes.
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not all of which was ardently Zionist. A.W.G.Randall, head of the Refugee 
Department at the Foreign Office (1942-1944), considered optimistically that British 
Jewry 'will concentrate for a time on Zionism and gradually lose interest after the 
war when other countries, now cut off, are once again open to them.’^ o^  However, 
he warned 'that Zionist aims will tend to dominate the British Board' adding that 
Goodman had informed him that Brodetsky, himself a Zionist, had deplored recent 
developments but had so far been unable 'to withstand his more energetic Zionist 
colleagues'. 110 The Government regarded Brodetsky and Brotman as 'moderate' 
representatives of Anglo-Jewry. Similarly, official attitudes to Schonfeld and 
Goodman were positive, partly because they did not press the Palestine issue.m
The Anglo-Jewish community had acquired long experience in charitable and 
communal administration, which served it well in its handling of the escalating 
refugee crisis of the immediate pre-war years. After the outbreak of war, however, 
with no further influx to deal with and no practical action possible, what was 
needed was no longer administrative skill but inspired political leadership, forceful 
and ingenious enough to sway opinion at govemment level. It was in this realm that 
the Anglo-Jewish community failed; its leaders lacked the necessary political skills 
to handle the extraordinary and unique crisis facing European Jewry. It is perhaps 
unlikely that any difference in leadership style would have influenced Government 
policy; nevertheless, the reputation of the leadership might have been enhanced 
had it possessed the necessary skills to put up a more forceful, concerted and 
resourceful challenge to governmental intransigence.
The war years saw a depletion in the ranks of the Anglo-Jewish leadership, with 
many cases of illness, absence from office and death, including those involved in
109 Ibid,
110 Ibid., W12341/12242/48, 15 July 1943, A.W.G.Randall, Minute.
111 See p.278 below.
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the war effort, m  The lack of cohesion and leadership among the various Jewish 
factions is remarked on by an anonymous London Jewish journalist: The ranks of 
leaders in Jewry are thinning. The Jewish 'platform' that used to be crowded is 
depleted. The Jewish 'lions' are no longer roaring from these platforms... we have 
no Herzl, no Max Nordau, no Zangwill, no Sokolow or Gaster, not even a 
J a b o t i n s k y ' . i i 2  There was a widespread contemporary perception that the Anglo- 
Jewish leadership was dominated by second-rate, ineffectual figures; nevertheless, 
there is no evidence that rescue efforts were impeded by lack of dynamic 
leadership, nor that any opportunity was lost as a result of disunity or rivalry. 
Where conscientious administrative effort was required, the Anglo-Jewish 
community achieved remarkable successes both before and during the war. When 
political intelligence and imagination were needed, it had little to contribute, trusting 
naively to what George Orwell called 'decency' to touch the conscience of a 
bureaucratic machine engaged in global warfare.
For example. Lord Reading was engaged in military service; Sir Osmond 
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, the original chairman of the CBF, died in April 1940; Joseph 
L.Cohen, honorary Secretary of the Central Committee for Jewish Refugees died. 
The Jewish organisations lost the support of Colonel Victor Cazalet, who was 
killed in July 1943 and Lord Wedgwood, who died in August 1943.
112 FO 371/32681 W1468174555/48, 3 Nov. 1942, Postal and Telegraph 
censorship report on Jewry.
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Chapter Two 
The Austrian and Czechoslovak Crises 1938-1939
Three major crises erupted during 1938-39: the Nazi incorporation of Austria 
into the Reich in March 1938 (the Anschluss)’, the Czech crisis in September 
1938 resulting in the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany (exacerbated by 
the German annexation in March 1939 of the Czech provinces of Moravia and 
Bohemia), followed in November by the Kristallnacht pogrom in Germany. The 
prospect of a huge number of Jews fleeing persecution raised difficult 
questions for the British Government and overwhelming ones for the private 
organisations, none of which was prepared for any sudden influx of refugees. 
Nevertheless, the Anglo-Jewish organisations carried through a programme of 
fund-raising and constructive assistance, including training, retraining, 
emigration, employment assistance and relief, such that John Hope Simpson 
observed. There is no parallel in the recent history of British voluntary 
charitable effort'.^
British Immigration Policy
British policy on refugee immigration was based on legislation dating from the 
1905 Aliens Act to the Aliens Restriction Act of 1919 and the ensuing Aliens 
Order of 1920. In effect, this legislation removed the earlier (unconditional) right 
of asylum ; no alien could now enter the country, other than temporarily, without a 
Ministry of Labour permit or visible means of support. This legislation, originally 
renewable annually, was placed on the Statute Book in 1926 and, due to the
1 John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey (London, 
January 1939), p.342.
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inter-war depression and post-war austerity, determined Britain's severely 
restrictive immigration policy until 1951.2
The Government reacted to the early outrages of the Nazi regime by confirming 
that Britain was not a country of immigration and that its large population, 
concern over the state of the economy and high unemployment, and fear of 
aggravating anti-Semitism by enlarging the Jewish population, precluded any but 
a carefully restrictive asylum policy. However, this policy ‘did undergo 
modifications in response to political pressures as well as rising numbers'. 3 The 
popular perception is that Britain generously provided a haven for refugees. 
While this is true, it is important to emphasise the extent to which the Anglo- 
Jewish community facilitated Jewish immigration into Britain, as a result of the 
guarantee it made to the Government in 1933 that no refugee would become a  
charge on public funds. The Government imposed no limit on numbers, although 
the estimated numbers were no more than 3-4,000. The financial and 
administrative support of the voluntary bodies was the indispensable condition of 
entry.
Following the Anschluss, visas for Germans and Austrians were reintroduced. 
The main purpose of the visa was to regulate the flow of refugees to British ports. 
The Home Office was anxious about the future status of 'undesirable' or 
impoverished Austrian passport-holders who might seek admission to Britain. 
The power to secure the removal of an alien by means of a deportation order 
could be exercised only if that alien were recognised by some other country as 
one of its nationals. It was now possible that the German Government would
2 Bernard Gainer, The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905 
(London, 1972), pp.208-9.
3 Sherman, op.cit., p.259.
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deprive Austrian Jews of their citizenship and render them stateless.-^ 
Government fears were compounded by Schiff's indication that the GJAC could 
no longer honour the 1933 guarantee in respect of any new arrivals, though it 
would continue to support refugees already in Britain and was prepared to make 
an exception for refugees approved by the Home Office or the Ministry of 
Labours It has been suggested that Schiff's letter directly prompted the 
Government's decision to impose visa controls.e This seems simplistic, given that 
the sudden surge in applications would inevitably have resulted in some initiative 
to restrict numbers. The idea of imposing visa restrictions on the entry of 
Germans had been mooted before the Anschluss, in consequence of the recent 
German law obligating every German living abroad to report to a German 
consulate. It was anticipated that most German refugees would avoid reporting, 
thereby forfeiting their German nationality and rendering themselves stateless.?
Schiff and the Board certainly shared Home Office concern, not only about the 
numbers of would-be immigrants but also about what Sir Samuel Hoare, the 
Home Secretary, termed the 'type of refugee who could be admitted into Britain. 
If a flood of the wrong type of immigrants were allowed in there might be serious 
danger of anti-Semitic feeling being aroused in this country*.® The wrong type of 
immigrant was, according to the Home Office, 'the small Jewish traders and
4 HO 213/94, Visas for Holders of German and Austrian passports -  General 
Principle (n.d. presumably March 1938). FO 372/3282,T3517/3272/378, 15 
March 1938, Home Office, Memorandum.
5 Ibid. See also Acc 3121 011/12/1, 14 March 1938, Chairman of the GJAC 
(presumably Schiff) to Sir Samuel Hoare. Joan Stiebel, Schiff’s secretary, 
maintains that although the guarantee was officially withdrawn after the 
Anschluss except for cases already sponsored by the JRC, in practice it was 
honoured until after the outbreak of war. Interview with Joan Stiebel, 23 March 
1994, London.
6 Louise London, ‘Jewish Refugees and British Government Policy’, MMAJ. 
op.cit., pp. 175-76.
7 HO 213/94, 1 March 1938, McAlpine, Memorandum.
8 HO 213/42, 1 April 1938, Minutes of Anglo-Jewish Deputation meeting.
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business man [sic] of limited means ... forced out of business and out of his 
country ... driven by economic and political pressure to seek asylum here' and 
stay.9 By implication, the right type of refugee was one whose maintenance was 
assured, who would not compete on the job market and would be a good 
candidate for re-emigration.
Here, as on other occasions, the Anglo-Jewish leadership genuinely agreed with 
the Government. It would be fallacious to infer that Schiff's views could have 
significantly influenced the decision to impose visa controls or that his letter was 
intended to do so. The visa system was meant to facilitate investigation of would- 
be immigrants before they started their journey, so as 'to obviate the hardships of 
rejection at the ports, which might have otherwise arisen.'io It is hard to accept 
that the Anglo-Jewish leadership could have foreseen that it would result in 
hardship, delays, suicides and, in many cases, failure to escape Nazi-occupied 
territory. 11
At the Evian Conference on Refugees in July 1938, the Government announced 
that ‘on the grounds of humanity', the Home Office would now adopt ‘an even 
more liberal attitude’ in the matter of admissions and employment. While pre­
selection remained, certain additions to the categories of admission were 
outlined, particularly for those to be admitted for training with a view to 
emigration. Fearing that many of the new arrivais would become a permanent 
charge on their dwindling funds, the refugee organisations insisted in late July on 
a formal guarantee of maintenance for any applicant who wished to bring friends 
or relatives to Britain. By October 1938 the voluntary bodies, overwhelmed by the
9 FO 372/3282 T3517,14 March 1938, Home Office, Memorandum.
10 FO 371/22528 W8597/104/98. 29 June 1938, Holderness to R.M.Makins, 
Foreign Office, Memorandum on UK Immigration Laws.
11 Morse, While Six Million Died. pp.201,206,224. For Nazi victimisation of Jews 
outside the British Consulate in Vienna, see J.C., 29 April 1938, p. 18.
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enormity of their task and the inadequacy of their resources, threatened to 
collapse under the strain. The number of casework delays grew and Schiff 
requested a temporary halt to the admission of refugees until those already 
admitted had either been assimilated or had emigrated.12
In spite of this, following Kristallnacht, when other countries were increasing 
restrictions on refugee admissions, the British Government took steps to facilitate 
immigration into Britain. New categories of refugees, including transmigrants, 
were admitted. In order to deal more expeditiously with these classes of refugees 
and to eliminate unnecessary work on the part of the Home Office and Passport 
Control officers, an arrangement was made towards the end of December with 
the GJAC for a simplified procedure in regard to these categories of refugees. 
The Home Office also facilitated the entry of all children and young people whose 
maintenance could be guaranteed. Domestics and people over 60 whose 
maintenance was assured were also included. Selection was increasingly 
delegated to the voluntary bodies, which were now able to submit lists of 
names. 13 However, in contrast to those who had arrived before 1938, most 
refugees were not allowed to take up employment and many depended on the 
refugee organisations for financial support.
12 Sherman, op.cit.^ pp. 108-9,125,155-58.
13 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (hereafter HO Debates), Fifth Series, 
vol.341, 21 Nov. 1938, cols. 1428-1438, esp.1471-72; PC 371/24074  
W1368/45/48, 23 Jan. 1939, Refugee Position in the United Kingdom,
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Analo-Jewish Responses to the Anschluss
Until Kristallnacht, when it became clear that the only option was immediate 
emigration, the Anglo-Jewish organisations believed that the best solution to 
the refugee crisis was to resolve the plight of German and Austrian Jewry. The 
Foreign Office insisted that this was a domestic matter and that any 
representations to Germany would embitter relations between the two 
countries without helping the persecuted. While the JFC recognised that ‘in the 
confusion that followed the Anschluss... there was little that could be done to 
help the s u f f e r e r s ' , it nevertheless urged HMG to communicate to Berlin the 
deep anxiety of British Jews for their Austrian co-religionists. Although 
'assurances of moderate treatment had been received from the German 
Government', in view of previous broken assurances and promises, Laski 
feared that present assurances would not be honoured.is
Perlzweig was similarly advised ‘that the treatment of the Jews was an internal 
matter and no concern of ours’. The Foreign Office did, however, agree that 
Informal enquires be made through the British Embassy in Berlin about the 
closing of the Palestine Office in Vienna and saw no objection to the WJC 
approaching the Italians to use their influence in the matter.16 The WJC also 
submitted two strongly worded petitions to the Council of the League of 
Nations asking it to intervene on behalf of Austrian Jewry under the Minority 
Rights Treaty (Article 6 9 ).
14 b o d  Annual Report 1938, p.57.
15 Acc 3121 O ilZ6/4 /2 ,15 March 1938, interview with Vansittart; J.C., 25 March 
1938, p. 17.
16 American Jewish Archives. Cincinnati (AJAC), MS coll. 361 A13/15, 18 
March 1938, Perlzweig's correspondence with Foreign Office; FO 371/21748 
02908/2289/18, 21 March 1938, Baxter, Foreign Office, Minute.
17 J.C., 25 March 1938, p.41 ; CZA C2/807, WJC. ‘Our Fight for Jewish Rights 
and Jewish Dignity’, p.3.
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Both the Home Office and the refugee organisations feared that a large influx 
of Jewish refugees might produce a wave of anti-Semitism in Britain. The 
Home Office had received a report that 'the Germans were anxious to inundate 
this country with Jews, with a view to creating a Jewish problem in the United 
Kingdom.' There was also an Increase in British anti-Jewlsh propaganda, 
largely foreign-inspired, representing Jewish refugees as potential sources of 
moral and political contam ination .a  campaign was therefore launched by 
the Co-ordinating Committee (renamed the Jewish Defence Committee in late 
1938) of the Board to educate the public about Jews. Leaflets and pamphlets 
were issued and speakers sent round the country. Laski also maintained that 
communal vigilance and self-monitoring of business practice by some Jews 
could help reduce anti-Semitism. Vigilance Committees were established in 
those trades in which Jews were chiefly concentrated, together with a Trades' 
Advisory Council and a special Arbitration court. 20
Laski opposed any protest meeting in response to the Anschluss, arguing that 
'the Jewish question was one facet of a much larger one which constituted a 
grave danger to civilisation as a whole’. Rather, it was ‘the duty of Jews to act 
in conformity with their obligations as citizens and at the same time to try to 
educate those outside the community to the dangers of Nazism ’. 21 Laski 
suggested that an Intercession Service would be more beneficial than a 
protest meeting and would provide a high-profile outlet for Jewish sentiment. 
The Jewish Chronicle agreed that a Day of Prayer and an Intercession Service
18 CAB 23/93 14(38), 16 March 1938, Cabinet Conclusions; Acc 3121 A/29, 
April 1938, Co-ordinating Committee Report; 21 March 1938, 10 April 1938, 
Minutes.
18 U.C., 15 April 1938, p.13; BOD Annual Report, 1938, pp.53-56.
20 Acc 3121 A/29, Feb. 1939, Jewish Defence Committee Report.
21 Acc 3121 A/29, 10 April 1938, Minutes, JFC Report.
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(17 July 1938) would 'arouse the conscience of the world’. The Board 
considered It a further advantage that the ‘Christian churches ... have 
announced their intention of joining this intercession'.22
The British Section, always more proactive than the Board, held a 
demonstration on 28 June 1938, attended by church leaders and other 
dignitaries. It called on all nations to support the forthcoming conference at 
Evian by opening new outlets for Jewish immigration and appealed to HMG to 
ensure that the full economic absorptive capacity of Palestine be made 
available to Jewish immigration.23 The British Section accused the Board of 
‘persevering in their general policy of taking as little public action as 
possible...giving the impression that the Board is really used as a barrier 
between Jewish public opinion and governmental agencies that could be of
help’. 24
Relief Efforts.
If, on a wider political level, little could be achieved, on an administrative level 
the voluntary bodies organised much-needed relief and constructive 
assistance. The situation of Austrian Jews after the Anschluss was 
considerably worse than that of the Jews in Germany. The system of 
oppression and exclusion of Austrian Jewry from all economic and social 
activity was ruthlessly applied and accomplished within months, rather than
22 J.C., 8 July 1938, p.10; Acc 3121 A /29,10 July 1938, Minutes, JFC Report.
23 AJAC MS coll. 361 A13/14; CZA C2/342, Press cuttings of ‘Mass Meetings 
against Persecution of Jews in Germany’.
24 CZA C2/342, 24 June 1938, British Section to Philip Guedalla.
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the five years it had taken in Germ any.P lundering and violence against 
Jews were widespread, and mass arrests of Jews and anti-Nazis occurred. In 
May, the Nuremberg Laws were extended to Austria.26 Thousands of Jews, 
now impoverished, besieged foreign consulates seeking immigration permits. 
A major problem was that, unlike in Germany, the machinery of the Jewish 
community had been closed down, its small cash reserve (55,000 schillings) 
confiscated and its communal leaders arrested.27 it was not until May 1938 
that the Viennese Jewish community, after paying 300,000 schillings 
($40,000), was able to reopen its offices and resume its activities.
Until the Anschluss, the CGJ had been exclusively concerned with the Jews of 
Germany, mainly in 'constructive' work such as training and resettlement 
primarily in Palestine, rather than local relief. Although its burden now Included 
Austrian Jewry, by March 1938 hardly any funds were available to meet the 
new crisis. During 1933-37 a sum of over £1,000,000 had been collected in 
Great Britain and the Empire for assistance to German Jewry. The greater part 
was subscribed under seven year covenants and had already been spent or 
allocated for specific purposes of emigration and settlement. The CGJ had to 
borrow large sums in anticipation of contributions still to be collected. 28
25 Acc 3121 011/12/2, 27 April 1938, Situation of the Jews in Austria -  Jewish 
Central Information Office; AJJDC AR 3344.445, M.Wischnitzer, The Martyrdom 
of Austrian Jewry, A Year of Trials' (March 1938 to March 1939).
26 Acc 3121 E3/266, 6 May 1938, ‘Decree Concerning Registration of Jewish 
Property'; A /29 ,11 May 1938, JFC Report; Karl A.Schleunes, The Twisted Road 
To Auschwitz: Nazi Pol lev Toward German Jews. 1933-1939 (Chicago, 1970), 
Ch.7.
27 FO 371/21748 02908/2289/18, 21 March 1938, Perlzweig, Situation of the 
Jews in Vienna.
28 CGJ, 15 March 1938, Minutes of Executive Meeting, p.2.
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To a great extent, the emigration of German Jews, numbering some 1 5 0 ,0 0 0  
since 1 9 3 3 , was self-financed. Austrian Jews, however, were mostly 
impoverished. After the Nazi invasion, the numbers dependent on Jewish 
public relief more than doubled to over 6 0 ,0 0 0 . By the summer of 1 93 8 , over 
6 0  percent of Austrian Jewry was partially or entirely dependent on 
organisational support.29 The /Cu/fusgeme/ncfe jp Vienna was supported by 
the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and the CGJ. The two bodies 
together made a grant for immediate relief in Vienna of about £ 1 0 ,0 0 0  for 
March and April, but this was a mere palliative. The sums required for soup 
kitchens, as well as for emigration and training schemes, rose considerably. In 
August, a sum of nearly £ 2 0 ,0 0 0  was a llocated .^o  Sir Wyndham Deedes, 
Norman Bentwich and Leo Lauterbach of the Jewish Agency travelled to 
Vienna to expedite the CGJ's emigration work. They tried unsuccessfully to 
negotiate with the Nazis the reopening of the Austrian Zionist organisations 
and the possibility of transferring Jewish capital to Palestine. A member of the 
GJAC remained in Vienna to assist with em igration.^i
The CGJ was reluctant to grant funds for relief, maintaining that relief should 
be provided by the local municipalities. Moreover, such grants would diminish 
the reserves available for emigration. Financial support for the Kultusgemeinde
29 J.C, 25 March 1938, p.41, 25 Aug. 1938, p.25.
39 CGJ, 27 July 1938, Norman Bentwich, CGJ, to the IGCR. Special foreign 
exchange arrangements were made with the consent of the Bank of England. 
See Joan Stiebel, The Central British Fund for World Jewish Relief’, op.cit. 
Similar arrangements were worked out with the JDC and German financial 
authorities, so that no dollars were sent into Austria or Germany. See AJJDC AR 
3344.541,12 Dec. 1938, Herbert Katski to J.E.Finn, Dayton, Ohio.
31 J.C., 29 April 1938, p. 13; CGJ Annual Report, 1938, p.9; CGJ, 7 June 1938, 
Minutes, p.3; Acc 3121 C l 1/12/2, 29 April 1938, Report by Leo Lauterbach, The  
Jewish Situation in Austria’; 17 Aug. 1939, Norman Bentwich, Report on a visit 
to Austria’.
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was largely designed to support training and assist emigration.32 New funds 
were needed to meet this emergency, as the funds of the CGJ were fully 
absorbed and almost exhausted. The CGJ, under the chairmanship of Lord 
Reading, therefore launched the Austrian Appeal. Attempts to persuade the 
JDC to launch an international appeal failed. Nevertheless, together with the 
United States contribution, the Austrian Appeal succeeded in raising 
approximately £170,000.33 The CGJ was convinced, however, that this total 
would not be substantially increased. Even if the whole amount were spent on 
emigration, it would be sufficient for the emigration of only a minute fraction of 
those Jews wishing to leave.34 There was concern that the very limited funds 
available should be used as effectively as possible.
One consequence of the Anschluss was the expulsion of Jews from the 
Burgenland provinces -  the so-called ‘Seven Communities', home to Jews for 
centuries -  to be dumped' over the frontiers of adjacent countries, destitute 
and threatened with deportation. By early 1939, there were reportedly at least 
12 ‘no-man's-land’ refugee camps along these borders with thousands of 
refugees, some confined in appalling conditions.35 Supported by Schonfeld, 
Goodman and others, the plight of the Burgenland refugees received wide 
publicity in influential non-Jewish circles and the press, as well as within the 
Jewish community.36 By the summer of 1938, efforts were still being made to
32 CGJ, 13 June 1938, Minutes, p.2; CGJ, Annual Report, 1938, p.10. During 
1938, it was estimated that 50,000 Jews were enabled to leave Austria with the 
assistance of foreign organisations.
33 CGJ, 29 March 1938, Minutes, p.2; AJJDC AR 3344.575, 7 April 1938, 
Dr.B.Kahn to P.Baerwald; CGJ Annual Report, 1938, p.20.
34 CGJ, Agenda File, no.7, June 1938, draft Letter from CGJ to Dr.Loewnhertz, 
Director, Kultesgemeinde.
35 j ,c „  6 Jan. 1939, pp.7,15,25.
36 CGJ, 608, Series 5, 9 May 1938, Schonfeld to CGJ; Acc 3121 C l 1/12/2,18  
May 1938, Goodman to Laski; MS 183 Schonfeld 117/8, 23 May 1938, Minutes 
of Liaison Conference.
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induce countries overseas to receive the fugitives, most of whom, however, 
were unable to comply with entry requirements.
Evian Conference
The United States Government proposal, in March 1938, that 32 European 
and Latin American states meet in order to facilitate the emigration of 
refugees, offered little hope to the refugee organisations. Cordell Hull, the 
American Secretary of State, had already clarified that no country would be 
expected or asked to receive greater numbers of immigrants than already 
permitted by existing legislation. Any financing of assistance and settlement 
schemes for refugees would remain the responsibility of the private 
organisations.37 Moreover, as a concession to the British, it was agreed that 
Palestine would not be discussed at Evian.
Although the Conference proposed to 'facilitate the emigration of refugees', it 
is hard to see what in practice it had in mind if it was going to offload the 
financial burden onto the private charities and make no changes to existing 
legislation, especially on Palestine. Lord Bearsted rejected the view, 
emanating from Germany, that foreign Jewish communities could raise 
unlimited sums to support emigration, adding that these communities had 'no 
intention of impoverishing their mother country by paying ransom to Germany'. 
Bearsted's argument was disingenuous and no doubt perceived as such. The 
only impoverishment would be that of the Jewish communities, not the 'mother 
country'. Bearsted was aware of the circular nature of the problem, namely, 
that a willingness to finance emigration would be taken as encouragement to
37 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol.1, 23 March 1938, Cordell 
Hull to Joseph Kennedy, American Ambassador to Britain, pp.740-41.
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other east European countries to increase persecution, with the object of 
unloading 'surplus' populations. He feared that in default of a practical lead 
from the United States, the outlook for Evian ‘was gloomy’ and that 'the 
meeting would be chiefly occupied with passing the buck'. He predicted that 
the delegation would be overwhelmed by 'all manner of pressure from private 
organisations'.38
While it is accepted that the Conference was convoked without well-defined 
terms of reference and the Jewish organisations did not know what their status 
would be in relation to the Conference',39 the fact remains that the voluntary 
organisations failed to present a united front. When the Liaison Committee of 
the High Commissioner of the League of Nations met just before Evian, no 
unanimous policy could be agreed upon and the various international bodies 
decided to submit individual proposals.'*® Altogether 12 Memoranda were 
submitted to Evian by the various Jewish and non-Jewish voluntary 
organisations. "*1
However, the Anglo-Jewish organisations did liaise with each other before the 
Conference. They submitted a Memorandum urging the re-establishment of 
the principle of economic absorptive capacity for Palestine immigration and 
stressing that they could not financially support any large-scale emigration
38 FO 371/21749 C568172289/18, 9 June 1938, Conversation, Bearsted. Strang 
and Makins.
39 Acc 3121 A /30 ,19 June 1938, Minutes, Laski to Goodman.
40 CGJ, Agenda File. no.7. May 12-13 1938, 'Note on proposed International 
Conference -  Norman Bentwich’s visit to Geneva’, p.3. The Liaison Committee 
consisted of the principal organisations, both philanthropic and political, 
concerned with refugees. J.C., 1 July 1938, p.29.
41 Acc 3121 E3/282/1, 'Evian Conference - Memorandum of Certain Jewish 
Organisations' [n.d.]; Memorandum of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (JA) and 
of the WJC; E3/282/3 First List, Memoranda submitted to the Evian Conference.
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schemes -  the two issues on which the Conference had already ruled. The 
Memorandum also suggested that a small executive body be set up by the 
Conference to supervise emigration and to undertake negotiations with the 
German authorities, to allow refugees to transfer some of their property, In 
order that an orderly emigration could be carried out. The Memorandum 
shows that the organisations concurred with the Government’s selection 
procedures based on economic suitability and re-emlgratlon potential: 'every 
effort will be made by the Jewish bodies to ensure that only fit and well- 
quallfled persons emigrate, that they are prepared by manual training and 
otherwise fit for life In the new countries'. 2^ in practice, they had little option 
but to acquiesce In the Government's Insistence on a selection procedure 
based on economic suitability, especially In view of their own precarious 
financial position. The consensus was that mass settlement of refugees was 
neither practicable nor desirable, and that accordingly, ‘Infiltration’ Into settled 
communities was preferable. 3^
The Interdenominational Co-ordinating Committee (representing all the 
voluntary refugee organisations) was concerned about the large number of 
Interested private organisations. The Foreign Office also thought It undesirable 
that special Interest (particularly political) groups should be granted access to 
the deliberations. Both the Foreign Office and some Anglo-Jewish communal 
leaders, such as Lord Samuel, were aware of the danger that Jewish 
representation at Evian might be taken by the Germans as confirmation that
42 Acc 3121 E3/282/1, Memorandum of Certain Jewish Organisations.
43 Ibid.,‘Inter-Governmental Conference on Refugees Held at Evian", 
confidential report by Brotman [n.d.]; FO 371/22528 W8435/104/98, 'The Future 
of Assistance to Refugees’, communicated to Vansittart by private organisations, 
pp. 5-6 [n.d.].
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the conference was being engineered by ‘international Jewry'.^^ Lord 
Winterton, head of the British delegation, advised the CGJ ‘to be represented 
only by comparatively subordinate members’, and the voluntary organisations 
themselves opposed 'too much publicity ’. in the end, the voluntary 
organisations were not officially invited to the Conference but sent 
representatives as observers. The actual work of the Conference was carried 
out by two sub-committees, one technical, the other established to hear 
representations from 39 separate refugee organisations.*^®
The organisations knew in advance that it would be impolitic to refer to 
Palestine47 but this did not deter them from doing so. They called for a 
substantial Increase in the Palestine immigration quota and assistance for 
refugee resettlement schemes through an international loan. All speakers 
stressed that the country of origin must co-operate by relaxing its regulations 
concerning the conditions attached to emigration and the transfer of refugees' 
property. On the final point of the status of refugees, several organisations 
urged that the February 1938 Convention, providing for the juridical position of 
refugees, be ratified immediately.^ In the event, attempts to unify the plethora 
of interested organisations failed and none succeeded in influencing the 
outcome of Evian. However, it must be stressed that the principal failure of
44 FO 371/22528 W8673/104/98. 28 June 1938, Makins. Memorandum. Evian 
Meeting -  Position of Representatives of Private Organisations; CGJ, 27 June 
1938, Minutes, p.2.
45 FO 371/22528 W 8713/104/98, 30 June 1938, inter-departmental meeting at 
the Foreign Office; W8829/104/98, 2 July 1938, Meeting between James 
G.McDonald and members of the Anglo-Jewish leadership.
46 S.Adler-Rudel, The Evian Conference on the Refugee Question’, Leo Baeck 
Institute Year Book vol. XIII (1968), pp.235-73.
47 CZA S25/9778, 24 June 1938, Interview, Lord Winterton and Chaim 
Weizmann.
46 AJJDC AR 3344.256, 9 July, 1938, ‘Report of the Sub-Committee for the 
Reception of Organisations', Evian.
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Evian was that, with the exception of the Dominican Republic, the 
governments produced no effective solution to the problem of locating places 
of settlement for refugees. Most of the discussion focused on German policy 
rather than on that of potential host countries.
Several specific requests were, however, met: among these was the 
establishment of a permanent Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees 
(IGCR), whose immediate task was to negotiate with the Germans to establish 
conditions of orderly emigration by allowing refugees to take some of their 
property with them, which at this stage still appeared a viable proposition. 
Britain ratified the February 1938 Convention, extending it to Austrian 
r e f u g e e s . Y e t ,  these slight achievements did not alleviate the refugee 
problem. Attempts by the IGCR to engage in dialogue with Germany were 
deliberately protracted and systematically sabotaged, and negotiations for the 
transfer of at least part of the prospective emigrants’ capital were 
unsuccessful. One of its secondary duties was to find destinations for 
refugees. At the insistence of President Roosevelt, the IGCR continued to 
exist but its role was considerably diminished after the outbreak of war. Its 
activities were confined to settling refugees who had already left Reich territory 
and were resident in neutral countries.so All the proposed settlement schemes 
foundered.51 Ultimately, it was immaterial whether the proposals forwarded by 
the organisations were practical or not, or whether a united front was 
presented, since the Conference itself had eliminated at the outset any ideas 
that might have borne fruit.
49 Ibid., 17 Aug. 1938, Digest of the Memorandum for the Evian Conference by 
the Liaison Committee.
50 Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, p.9.
51 Henry L. Feingold, 'Roosevelt and the Settlement Question’, M.Marrus ed., 
Bvstanders to the Holocaust: The Nazi Holocaust vol.8 (London, 1989), pp.271- 
329.
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Evian was little more than a public relations exercise. A Foreign Office note 
reveals the hope that the Conference 'would secure sympathy and support of 
world Jewry for HMG and perhaps make easier a solution of the position of 
Palestine'. The Government was also anxious to respond positively to 
America's departure from its policy of non-intervention in European affairs. 
Moreover, if it produced concrete results such as the formation of the IGOR, 
the Evian meeting was likely to 'enhance the prestige of the League in a field 
of work largely humanitarian in c h a ra c te r 'l l
The failure of Evian to do anything for European Jewry at this point is all the 
more striking because the German policy of forced emigration had been 
gathering momentum throughout 1938. There was, at this stage, no difficulty 
about extricating Jews from German-occupied territory as there was after the 
outbreak of war. This did not prevent the Allied Governments at Bermuda 
(April 1943) lamenting that wartime conditions made it impossible to extricate 
Jews from enemy-held territory.
Czechoslovakia
The Czech crisis in the summer of 1938 overshadowed the entire question of 
an approach to Germany about Jewish emigration. During the Munich 
negotiations in September, the plight of thousands of refugees in the 
Sudetenland was raised by neither the British nor French representatives. 
Anglo-Jewish leaders tried unsuccessfully to introduce this issue onto the 
international agenda. Of special concern was the anticipated transfer of
51 FO 371/21749 C 5319/2289/18, 23 May 1938, Foreign Office Memorandum, 
Makins.
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populations on a linguistic basis. Various appeals were made to the 
Government to safeguard the interests of the Jews.^z
The cession of territory placed in jeopardy a large number of people in 
Sudeten Germany, who were 'obnoxious to the Nazis either on account of their 
race or their political views.'^ 3 The number of refugees from the Sudetenland, 
now in the newly truncated Czechoslovakia, was approximately 40,000 (of 
whom 15,000 were in Prague with more arriving at a rate of 1,500 a day). Of 
these, the 20,000 German Jews and 5,000 Social Democrats from the 
Sudetenland posed the gravest problem. The latter, most outspoken against 
Nazi Germany and the Henlein movement, were considered as enemies of the 
new regime. Nor could Czechoslovakia risk allowing a new German minority to 
grow in its midst, serving as a pretext for further German encroachment on the 
reduced Czech territory. Consequently, they were faced with an order for 
compulsory return.54
The Jewish immigrants from Austria and Germany who had first taken refuge 
In the Sudetenland, estimated at around 5,000, were also faced with 
threatened expulsion. While the political causes differed, economic factors and 
potential Czech anti-Semitism were strong reasons. Not only were the 
refugees aggravating the Czech unemployment problem (totalling 100,000 in 
October), but they were also competing for scanty relief and resettlement
52 Acc 3121 C11/6/4/1, 22 Sept. 1938, Laski to Halifax; 23 Sept. 1938, Laski to 
Butler; C l 1/12/7, 29 Sept. 1938, Olivier Harvey to Laski; 3 Oct. 1938, Laski to 
Harvey; AJAC, MS coll. 361 A13/15, 2 June 1938, Perlzweig to Butler; 25 Oct. 
1938, Halifax to Perlzweig.
53 BOD Annual Report 1938, p.63.
54 FO 371/21583 012266/11896/12, 14 Oct. 1938, Report by Sir Neill Malcolm. 
pp.2-3.
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opportunities.56 The CGJ received reports that the situation of the Sudeten, 
German and Austrian Jews now in Prague was 'absolutely desperate'. While 
some Sudeten Jews were already residents and hence Czech Jews, these 
others were being treated by the Czech Government as Germans, and 
expulsion orders had been issued at the request of Berlin. Their fate depended 
on their being given the right of opting for Czech citizenship; presumably, they 
could then reclaim the property and possessions they had left behind. 57
This threat of forcible return of all non-Czech refugees by the Czech 
authorities to German areas was the most immediate problem. In addition, it 
was anticipated that when the residents of the newly annexed Sudeten areas 
began to exercise their ‘right of option’ under Article 7 of the Munich 
Agreement, there would be approximately 600,000 who would opt for Czech 
citizenship and become, in effect, re fu g ees .58 The British Government came 
under pressure from many quarters to dissuade Germany from enforcing its 
demands for the return of refugees. Its representatives at Berlin and Warsaw 
were instructed to do everything possible to persuade the German and Czech 
Governments to refrain from such action and to urge an early settlement of the 
‘right of option’ arrangement .59
56 FO 371/24074 W 1075/45/48, 18 Jan. 1939, Emerson, Report on visit to 
Prague, p.4. Victor S.Mamatey and Radomir Luza, A Historv of the Czechoslovak 
Republic. 1918-1948 (Princeton, 1973)^p.261.
57 CGJ, 24 Oct. 1938, Minutes, p.4.
58 FO 371/21583 012266/11896/12, 14 Oct. 1938, Report of visit by Sir Neill 
Malcolm, pp.2-3; John Hope Simpson, Refugees: A Review of the Situation 
since September 1938 (London, August 1939), pp.35-40.
59 FO 371/21583 C l 2337/11896/12,10 Oct. 1938, Deputation from the National 
Council for Civil Liberties; C l 2250/11896/12, 13 Oct. 1938, Deputation from the 
National Council of Labour; C l2372/11896/12, Deputation from the League of 
Nations Union, which included many of the voluntary organisations; 
C l2329/11896/12,13 Oct. 1938, Telegram, Foreign Office to Sir N.Henderson.
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When Laski and Waley-Cohen finally met with Halifax in October, they began 
by linking the appeasement policy with the wider refugee problem. Intolerance 
and violence towards Jews and others in Germany was bound 'to create 
insuperable obstacles to the ultimate success of the policy of appeasement 
and peace ... thus, so far from becoming an internal German question this has 
become an international question of the most far-reaching consequence'. They 
urged HMG to use its influence to secure for Jews the right of opting for Czech 
citizenship. Halifax repeated that ‘one had to be very careful with regard to 
intervention as sometimes intervention with Germans ... produced more harm 
than good'. Nevertheless, he promised every help that could be given within 
the limits of international agreements and practice. The right of option' was 
defined in the Agreement between Germany and Czechoslovakia on 23 
November 1938. It gave the Czech Government the right to demand that 
persons of 'German nationality' leave the Republic.
Until the establishment of the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in 
March 1939, Anglo-Jewish leaders assumed that refugees in Czechoslovakia 
were better off than those elsewhere.®”' Certainly the Czech Government 
attempted to assist the mass of refugees within its borders, using financial 
support in the form of an Anglo-French £10 million loan (for the settlement of 
refugees within Czechoslovakia), of which £4 million was set aside as a free 
gift, earmarked for migration and settlement of refugees. This agreement 
(reached on 27 January 1939 and later known as the Czech Refugee Trust) 
defined as refugees both inhabitants of the ceded areas before 31 May 1938
60 Acc 3121 C 11/6/4/1, 26 Oct. 1938, Deputation to Foreign Office; 
Memorandum, An Aspect of relations between this country and Germany'; 31 
Oct. 1938, ‘Memorandum on the Jews in the Sudeten Territories'; 11 Nov. 1938, 
Strang to Board; Simpson, op.cit., p.36.
61 BOD Annual Report, 1938, p.63.
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and Austrians and Germans who had fled to Czechoslovakia before 30 
September 1 9 3 8 .6 2  However, it did not cover all categories of refugees, 
including some Jews who were inhabitants of the new Protectorate, who could 
only apply to the Czech Refugee Trust Fund under certain conditions. 63
Before the Trust was created, several appeals were launched in Britain, 
indicating strong popular sympathy for the plight of Czech refugees. These 
included the Lord Mayor's Mansion House Czech Relief Fund (which raised 
£372,000 within a few weeks) and the News Chronicle Appeal. The 
Government made no distinction in terms of immigration regulations between 
Czech refugees and those from Austria and Germany, as stated on 22 March 
1938. It reiterated that as public money was not to be made available for relief 
and emigration of aliens, the extent to which they could be granted admission 
into the UK depended on the capacity of the voluntary organisations to 
undertake responsibility for their maintenance and their not displacing British
labour. 64
The GJAC, already at the end of its financial and human resources, was 
unable to help, having informed the Government that ‘it is very hard pressed 
and cannot accept responsibility for refugees from C zechoslovakia ’.65 The 
CGJ advised against the Jewish community making an organised collection on 
behalf of the Lord Mayor's Appeal as it would 'be detrimental to the collection
62 FO 371/24074 W1368/45/98, 23 Jan. 1939, Refugee Position in UK; 
A.Tartakower and K.R.Grossman The Jewish Refugee (New York, 1944), p.38.
FO 371/32669 W4693/781/48, 25 March 1942, The Czech Refugee Trust 
Fund.
64 FO 371/21586 013598/11896/12, 8 Nov. 1938, Brief for Parliamentary 
enquiries.
65 Ibid., C l3325/11896/12, 2 Nov. 1938, Holdernessto Mallet.
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which the CGJ will be compelled to make'.®® Consequently, Schiff advised 
Czech applicants to apply to the voluntary, non-denominational British 
Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia, set up in October to provide 
temporary hospitality for endangered refugees who could not return to the 
Third Reich or to any of the ceded territories. Permits had been granted to 350 
such persons (Social Democrats) to come to Britain for a limited period and 
the Committee guaranteed their maintenance. Between October 1938 and 
March 1939 the British Committee brought 3,500 refugees from 
Czechoslovakia to Britain, absorbing all the Committee's financial resources.®®
Emigration was the only solution for these German Social Democrats and 
Jews -  none of whom were wanted in Czechoslovakia. Following Kristallnacht, 
in addition to the problem of the 20,000 Sudeten and Old Reich Jews, the 
situation of Czech Jews (estimates varied from 150,000 to 250,000) became 
more precarious. Not only were there reports that the Czech Government 
intended to expel Reich German and Austrian refugees (at the latest by mid- 
January) but there were indications of the possibility of a 'wholesale expulsion 
of Jews from Czechoslovakia'. Germany was pressing the Czech Government 
to take action against the Jews, although the latter recognised that 'there must 
be no pogroms before January or February as nothing must be done to 
Interfere with the possibility of obtaining a further Anglo-French loan'. But it 
was hoped that before January, 'all the Jews in Czechoslovakia would have 
decided to emigrate'.®^
G5 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/7,13 Oct. 1938, Stephany to Brotman.
66 Ibid., ‘Aim of New British Committee’ (unidentified newspaper clipping, n.d ). 
This Committee was later replaced by the Czech Refugee Trust Fund. See HO 
294, Czechoslovak Refugee Trust: Records.
67 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/7, 2 Jan. 1939, M.Schmolkova, Comite Central Tcheco- 
Sloavaque [sic], to Board; FO 371/21587 C l4387/11896/12, 15 Nov. 1938, 
R.J.Stopford, Prague, to Makins.
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The Liaison Committee, meeting in February, stressed that as the political 
refugee question would soon be settled (the Social Democrats had obtained 
temporary visas for England and Canada), 'the problem will then become a 
problem of Jewish emigration only'. Help from the British loan was available to 
certain refugees who had the possibility to emigrate. It was feared that Jewish 
emigration would be subordinated to the political emigration and that the £4 
million would be spent without Jewish emigration having derived any benefit 
from it. There was, additionally, an absolutely destitute mass of 20,000  
German Jewish refugees, for whom there would also be no emigration outlets. 
Sir Herbert Emerson, the High Commissioner for Refugees, pointed out that 
the Czech Government, while allowing German and Austrian refugees to come 
to Czechoslovakia, did not acknowledge any responsibility for them. It wanted 
to confine the benefits of the loan to the Sudeten refugees (by January 1939 
numbering 125,000 and continually growing) for whom it felt particular 
responsibility. Emerson tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Czechs to make 
available some proportion of the loan to the refugees from Austria and 
Germany. He also stressed the necessity for the Jewish organisations 'not to 
stand aloof as they have practically done up to now, from the Jews in 
Czechoslovakia’,®® an unusually forceful criticism of the community’s efforts on 
behalf of Czech Jewry. The comparatively poor response is perhaps 
accounted for by the community's assumption that Czech Jews were in a less 
precarious position than those of Germany.
However, the German move into Prague in March 1939 and the extension of 
Nazi racial laws to Czechoslovakia's large Jewish population seriously
68 Acc 3121 E3/286/1, 21 Feb. 1939, Minutes of Liaison Committee meeting, 
Paris, pp. 10-12.
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worsened the situation. Legal emigration became impossible and even worse, 
the relief and refugee organisations in Prague and elsewhere in 
Czechoslovakia, which had run the refugee camps, were immediately 
disbanded. The refugees dispersed and little could be done to help them leave 
the country legally.69 Laski lamented that ‘if great democracies could do 
nothing ... then a body like ourselves ... could only depend on the good offices 
of the democracies for an amelioration of the position of our brethren’.[sicj^o It 
now became clear that anti-Jewish legislation in Czechoslovakia would 
augment the number of refugees. As with holders of German and Austrian 
passports following the Anschluss, the British Government imposed visa 
regulations on Czech nationals in April 1939.^1 After the destruction of 
Czechoslovakia, the conditions for the proposed loan became inapplicable. 
The £4 million gift was reaffirmed, but it only provided for 20,000 refugees 
(£200 per person). This provision proved inadequate for the number of 
refugees, much larger than contemplated in October 1938, when only those 
from the Sudetenland were under consideration. Pro-refugee groups vainly 
tried to ensure that an addition be made to the free gift and that permits be 
freely given in anticipation of this extra su m .72
Not all Czech refugees were maintained by the Czech Refugee Trust Fund 
after March 1939. According to the White Paper regulations (21 July 1939), the 
Fund could help only those who had fled Germany and the Sudetenland and 
found refuge in Czechoslovakia. There was no organisation for refugees 
unprotected by the Fund. Thus, just after the Germans established the
G9 HO 213/268, 31 March 1939, Odo Nansen, Report on the Czecho-Slovakian 
Refugee Problem.
T'O Acc 3121 A/29, 19 March 1939, JFC Report.
Tartakower and Grossman, op.cit., p.36. Between October 1938 and July 
1939, 20,684 Jews left Czechoslovakia.
72 FO 371/24100 W11762/1873/48, Aug. 1939 [n.d], Halifax to Lord Balfour.
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Protectorate, a ‘Self-Aid Association for Jews from Bohemia, Moravia and 
Slovakia’ was formed. A separate Jewish group was considered necessary, 
although the British Committee had on its board a representative of the CGJ. 
Leo Herrman, its acting chairman, explained that 'while there are Jews who 
had acted as Social Democrats, Communists, etc. ... in the former 
Czechoslovakia, Jews qua Jews were not represented in the framework of the 
British Committee for Czechoslovakian Refugees ... who now constituted the 
main element among refugees'. It now became absolutely imperative that the 
interests of all Jews 'be co-ordinated, safeguarded and represented vis-a-vis 
the British Committee'. Harry Goodman had also started a Federation of 
Czech Jews in March and in November 1939, together with the Self-Aid 
Association, merged with another two groups to form the Joint Committee of 
Jews from Czechoslovakia. ^ 3
The Federation immediately arranged an informal conference to discuss 
emigration and to co-operate with the British Committee. Its memorandum 
admits frankly that ‘British Jewry has not shown much interest in those people 
who since 1933 have made great sacrifices for their unfortunate brethren.' 74 
At the outbreak of war it was estimated that 7,000 refugees from Austria and 
Germany in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were still being 
maintained and supported by the local Jewish community. Between 1939 and 
1945, the Federation alone spent more than £8,500 for the relief of Czech
73 CGJ, 27 March 1939, Minutes of Executive Meeting, p.4; Acc 3121 C l 1/12/7, 
19 May 1939, Leo Herrman to Stephany; 31 May 1939, Herrman to Stephany.
74 J.C., 24 March 1939, p. 20; AI WO E-31/15R Annual Report of Federation of 
Czech Jews, 1942; Acc 3121 E3/510, 15 Jan. 1940, ‘Memorandum of the 
Federation’.
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Jews In exile. It took a special interest in Czech Jewish children in the UK who 
had experienced pressure to undergo baptism.
The number of destitute refugee children in Czechoslovakia was estimated at 
between 15,000 and 18,000. Many had been removed to State Recovery 
Homes, where they were cared for out of the Lord Mayor’s Fund, while others 
were looked after by the Save the Children Fund, but apart from the Society of 
Friends, there was no organisation to help Czech children to emigrate. Like the 
CGJ, the Refugee Children's Movement would not deal with Czech children. 
Its resources were insufficient to cover the additional responsibility. In April 
1939, the children's section of the British Committee opened. Those involved 
were largely unaffiliated to the mainstream refugee organisations. Eleanor 
Rathbone visited the refugee camps and drew constant attention in the 
Commons to the Czech refugees who were not covered by the British gift.^e 
Nicholas Winton visited Prague, arranging for 'child emigration into Sweden on 
a big scale.' By May 1939, Winton calculated that there were 5,000 registered 
cases and an estimated 10,000 needing to register. Winton appealed, 
unsuccessfully, to President Roosevelt about the plight of these refugee 
children, many of whom were stateless. 7^ Only 120 children had so far been 
brought to Britain, over 85 percent of whom were Jewish. The initial 25 
children were brought over only after undertakings had been obtained by the 
Barbican Mission that they would be baptised. Goodman drew public attention
75 J.C., 24 March 1939, p.20; MS 183 Schonfeld 636 [Fau-Feu], Report of the 
Federation, 1939-45.
75 J.C., 6 Jan. 1939, p.26; for Rathbone's efforts in the Commons, see J.C., 11 
August 1939, p.20.
77 Nicholas Winton, ‘Saving the Children -  1939', A Scrapbook recording the 
Transportation of 664 Children out of Czechoslovakia, vol.1 ; N.Winton, 'Report on 
the Problem of Refugee Children in Czechoslovakia', [n.d.]; National Archives 
(Washington D.C.), 840.48 REFUGEES/1635, 16 May 1939, Winton to 
Roosevelt. However, 'the U.S. Government, in the absence of specific legislation, 
could not permit immigration in excess of existing laws'.
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to this and attempted to ‘rescue’ these children/s But the missionary bodies 
were independent organisations and therefore free from external interference.
Expulsions
One result of the Munich Agreement was the escalation of expulsions of Jews 
into no-man’s-land. The borders between Slovakia and Hungary were not yet 
definitively established. Jews of Hungarian origin were driven from Slovak 
territory, while Slovak Jews were expelled by the Hungarian occupation 
authorities.79 In October 1938, the Board had expressed the hope that Jews 
and other minorities in the affected territories would not suffer loss of security 
or status. The Foreign Office noted that the issue was 'primarily a matter for 
the Czech Government... but HMG would watch the situation in light of the 
representations made by the Board and take any opportunity which may 
present itself for using their good offices in this matter'. In the meantime, the 
Board attempted to involve leaders of the Catholic Church world-wide in 
bringing pressure to bear on the Slovak Government and people.®®Schonfeld 
and Goodman were particularly concerned about the plight of refugees in 
Slovakia, many of whom were close friends.®  ^ However, an appeal to HMG 
from Rabbi Weissmandel via the Archbishop of Canterbury met with the
78 Winton, Saving the Children-1939', op.cit.; Jewish Weekly, 16 June 1939, 
vol.IV, No.177, p.1; MS 183 Schonfeld 658 [Mov-MZ], Hertz to Lord Gorell, 
[n.d.]; MS 183 Schonfeld, 117/8, 9 May 1939, Meeting of the Committee; J.C., 
21 July 1939, p.29, LRabinowitz to Editor; J.C. , 11 Aug. 1939, p.21.
79 AJJDC AR 3344.541, 20 Feb. 1939, Translation, ‘No-Man’s Lands of the 
Jews’.
80 Acc 3121 C11/6/4/1, 31 Oct. 1938, Memorandum on Jews in the Sudeten 
Territory and Elsewhere'; 011/12/7, 24 Nov. 1938, 30 Jan. 1939, Board to Revd. 
Monsignor Elwes; 12 Dec. 1938, Board to M.Waldman, Secretary of the 
American Jewish Committee; 6 Dec. 1938, Board to the Alliance Israelite 
Universelle, Paris.
81 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/7/1, 9 Nov. 1938, Goodman to Brotman.
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response that ‘the Munich Agreement Is not applicable' -  and that it was 
pointless to protest to the Hungarian Government
Local communities in Bratislava and Budapest supervised the building and 
maintenance of barracks for the refugees, supported by funds provided by the 
JDC and the Lord Mayor’s Czech Fund. In February 1939, Schonfeld raised 
the matter with the secretary of the League of Nations U n i o n . B y  then, 
however, most of the no-man’s-lands on the Czech-Hungarian frontier had 
been liquidated, following an agreement between the Hungarian and Czech 
frontier authorities.
More serious was the expulsion (28-29 October 1938) of 18,000 Polish Jews, 
long resident in Germany, who had lost their Polish citizenship. The Polish 
Government refused to admit them and they were abandoned in destitution for 
months in no-man’s-land along the Polish-German border between Neu- 
Bentschen and Zbaszyn. Jewish relief organisations, particularly the JDC, 
arranged emergency housing and food for t h e m . T h e  CGJ made several 
small grants to the Warsaw Jewish Refugee Relief Committee, but this was 
considered a poor response. Attitudes towards Polish and German Jews 
differed, as Polish Jews could always be repatriated to Poland, 'especially now 
that Poland and the Democratic countries have a kind of alliance', whereas 
German Jews had nowhere to return to.85 However, Morris Troper, the JDC
82 FO 371/21587 014581/11896/12, 23 Nov. 1938, Chaplain of Archbishop of 
Canterbury to Foreign Office.
83j.c.. 3 Feb. 1939, p.20; Acc 3121 E3/286/1, 3 Feb. 1939, Meeting of the 
Refugees Committee of the League of Nations Union, Minutes.
84 JTA, 23 Jan. 1939, p.2; S.Milton, ‘The Expulsion of Polish Jews from 
Germany: October 1938-July 1939: Documentation', Leo Baeck Institute Year 
Book. 29 (1984), pp. 169-99.
85 Acc 3121 0 1 1/7/1/4, 20 April 1939, W.E.Prins, Antwerp, to Schiff.
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representative, urged ‘greater participation by British Jewry in relief for 
refugees from the Reich, including those from Czechoslovakia and also those 
marooned at Zbonszyn [sic] for more than 8 months'.
The Polish Refugee Fund was the first organisation to assist the deportees. It 
issued a national appeal for funds and a first group of children arrived in Britain 
in February 1939.®^ A Parliamentary Committee was formed to support the 
appeal and pledged to use its influence for the purpose of transferring the 
Zbaszyn deportees. Funds were sent to the Warsaw Committee, but by June 
1939 these were almost exhausted. The CRREC launched a Passover Appeal 
for the refugees.®® A conference, convened in May 1939, decided to launch a 
campaign for assistance in the evacuation of further groups of children, 
estimated at 1,339. Disappointingly, by September, only 160 children had 
reached Britain from Zbaszyn, by which time the camp had been liquidated.®^
Up to this point, the Anglo-Jewish community had conscientiously attempted to 
deal with the deteriorating condition of its central European co-religionists. 
However, despite the increasing gravity of the situation following the 
Anschluss and the Munich Agreement, there was not the same sense of 
urgency which was to characterise Anglo-Jewry's response to events after 
November 1938. It was only after Kristallnacht that a marked shift in the 
community’s attitude found expression in its more forthright approach to the 
emergency in Europe.
86 AJJDC AR 3344.541, 9 June 1939, Statement from Paris by Mr.Smolar [n.i.] 
to JTA.
87 J.C., 17 Feb. 1939, p.23. Since March 1938 the Polish Refugee Fund was 
the amalgamation of four bodies concerned with Polish relief. J.C., 25 March 
1938, p.18; CGJ, 27 March 1939, Minutes, p.4.
88j.C., 2 Dec. 1938, p.17; 3 March 1939, p.27.
89 Ibid., 26 May 1939, p.20; 1 Sept. 1939, p.20.
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Chapter Three 
Escalating Crisis: Kristallnacht and After
The Kristallnacht pogrom on 9-10 November 1938 resulted in the mass 
Incarceration of Jews in concentration camps, widespread violence and 
destruction of Jewish property, institutions, and places of worship, as well as the 
wholesale confiscation of what remained of their wealth, in the form of a penal 
fine of £80 million. The declared goal of Germany's Jewish policy was the 
complete prohibition of any kind of economic activity by Jews, in order to force 
them into emigrating more quickly.i The regulations preventing emigrants from 
taking anything but a fraction of their property became more stringent. Previously, 
many refugees had financed their own emigration; the great bulk were now 
practically penniless. 2
Condemnation of Kristallnacht came from all sections of the British Government, 
press and public. Laski condemned both the murder of von Rath and the avenge 
[sic] on people devoid of any complicity’.3 The Anglo-Jewish leadership 
recognised that the Nazis were now operating the ‘Laws of the Jungle’ and that 
the only solution for German Jewry was to leave as quickly as possible.^ Fearing 
reports that 'further measures early in 1939 calculated to complete the liquidation
"I A.Barkai, Bovcott to Annihilation: The Economic Struggle of German Jews. 
1933-1943 (London. 1989), pp. 133-38.
2 FO 371/22536 W15037/104/98, 16 Nov. 1938, Meeting between the CGJ and 
Chamberlain.
3 Andrew Shad, The British Press and Jews under Nazi Rule (London, 1964), 
p.58; F.R.Gannon, The British Press and Germany. 1936-1939 (Oxford. 1971), 
p.226; JTA, 12 Dec. 1938, p.4.
4 Acc 3121 A/30, 20 Nov. 1938, Minutes of Board Meeting.
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of the Jewish population',s the CGJ decided that it must 'endeavour to get as 
many Jews as possible out of Germany immediately’.® The first Board meeting 
following the pogrom, attended by a record 214 deputies, appealed for 
government intervention and called on the community for financial support to 
rescue 'those in Germany whom it was still possible to save'.?
Laski urged that Jewish defence and anti-defamation activities should be 
strengthened and enlarged. It may seem curious that the great wave of public 
sympathy for German Jews was accompanied by resurgent fear of domestic anti- 
Semitism, as happened after the Anschluss. Yet 'the Baldwin appeal for 
refugees, while revealing on the one hand the open-hearted generosity of the 
British public, had unfortunately also made manifest a carefully engineered 
campaign against the refugees as seen in the columns of many newspapers and 
elsewhere’.® Much of the hostility was doubtless inspired by fears about 
immigrants competing for jobs at a time of high unemployment.
Despite the conviction that protest meetings were futile, one such was now 
organised. The Government, aware of the effects of the pogrom on Anglo- 
German relations, advised against any intervention or public protest, which it 
again insisted would only aggravate matters for German Jews and for British 
Jews with interests in Germany.^ However, an interdenominational protest
5 FO 371/22539 W16166/104/98, 2 Dec. 1938, Sir N.Malcolm to Butler; FO 
371/22539 W16205/104/98, 7 Dec. 1938, Sir G.Ogilvie-Forbes, Berlin, shared 
this prognosis.
6 CGJ, 1 Dec. 1938, Minutes of Executive Meeting, p.2.
7 Acc 3121 A/30, 20 Nov. 1938, Board Resolution.
8 J.C., 25 Nov. 1938, p.15; Acc 3121 A /30 ,15 Jan. 1939, 19 March 1939, Board 
Minutes. For fears of anti-Semitism, see J.C., 28 April 1939, pp. 14-16.
8 FO 371/21636 C 13661/1667/62,10 Nov. 1938, telegram no.662. Sir G.Ogilvie- 
Forbes, Berlin. The British Government did not follow the American example of 
recalling its Ambassador from Berlin.
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meeting was convened at the Albert Hall in December 1938. Hertz also called for 
a day of ‘Prayer and Intercession' to take place in November.
The organisations now concentrated on extricating as many Jews from Germany 
as possible. The CGJ immediately launched an Appeal, under the chairmanship 
of Lord Rothschild. This was the first appeal to be extended to the non-Jewish 
public. At this period, public appeals on behalf of persecuted minorities were 
rare and the sponsors of this appeal appear to have accepted as justifiable the 
risk that it might provoke some anti-Semitic response, in view of the urgency of 
the s itu a tio n .12 A deputation from the CGJ met with Chamberlain. While 
accepting that diplomatic action was neither feasible nor likely to be effective, and 
might further damage Anglo-German relations. Viscount Samuel asked that wider 
facilities be made available for child immigrants, and added that the Jewish 
organisations would collectively guarantee their maintenance and planned re­
emigration. Lord Bearsted added that financial difficulties made Government help 
essential for any large-scale settlement schemes for German emigrants to places 
such as British Guiana. Chamberlain gave qualified assurances but ruled out 
putting pressure on Germany, adding that any State aid or loan scheme to help 
evacuate Germany's 300,000 remaining Jews was 'premature'. He concluded 
that ‘this was not purely a Jewish problem, but part of a larger question - the 
refugee p ro b le m ’l l  - although it is hard to see how he could reconcile this 
statement with German anti-Jewish legislation since 1933 and the fact that 
Kristallnacht v/as a specifically Jewish pogrom. This disingenuous argument was
10 J, a, 18 Nov. 1938, p.32.
11 CGJ Annual Report. p.21; FO 371/24074 W1368/45/98, 23 Jan. 1939, 
Refugee Position in UK.
*•2 J.C., 10 Feb. 1939, p. 15, ‘Refugee Organisations -  How the Funds and 
Committees Work'. The Jewish organisations were responsible for raising nine- 
tenths of all funds in Britain between 1933 and 1938.
13 FO  371/22536 W15037/104/98,16 Nov. 1938, record of meeting.
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one the organisations could never counter: either the Jews were, legally, 'not 
Jews, just part of the refugee problem and therefore one could not discriminate in 
their favour' or they were Jews, and as such could not be favoured ahead of any 
other category of refugee.
The CGJ urged that the governments of the IGOR co-operate in raising an 
international loan, guaranteed by the central banks, stressing that ‘the voluntary 
organisations find themselves totally unable to accept the implication that the 
extent to which the rescue of thousands can be organised ... must remain entirely 
dependent upon private effort'. Samuel led a further deputation in December to 
meet with Lord Winterton of the IGOR, to discuss three issues: approaching the 
German Government to facilitate Jewish emigration, setting up refugee camps 
and government financial assistance. Although there was no objection in principle 
regarding the first two issues (unofficial talks were already going on with 
Germany), Winterton again observed that 'public funds should not be spent on 
provision for one class of refugees...Not only would it cause anti-semitism but it 
would only encourage the Germans to banish all Jews once they discovered that 
other countries were prepared to finance their migration'.
However, Winterton told Halifax that the time had perhaps come for a formal 
protest. He had been impressed by the deputation, which ‘represent everything 
that is best in British Jewry'. Certainly the Government's financial situation 
worsened as the threat of war grew and rearmament programmes accelerated. 
Efforts were made throughout 1939 to change Government policy on financial
14 CGJ, Agenda File, no.10 (17 Nov. 1938-15 Jan. 1939), 25 Nov. 1938, 
Confidential Memorandum.
15 FO 371/22539 W16410/104/98, 7 Dec. 1938, H.E.Brooks, Treasury, transmits 
record of meeting.
16 FO 371/22540 W 16641/104/98, 9 Dec. 1938, Winterton to Halifax.
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aid. Finally, in July, Winterton announced that financial aid for refugee settlement, 
probably on a basis proportionate to the amount of private subscription, would be 
forthcoming if other governments were prepared to co-operate.
Rescue Initiatives
Three rescue initiatives speedily followed Kristallnacht: the Children's Movement, 
the establishment of transit camps and the opening of training (hachsharah) 
centres in Britain. Samuel’s request for extended facilities for child immigration 
marked the beginning of organised Anglo-Jewish activity on behalf of child 
refugees. Following the Government's refusal to allow 10,000 children to go to 
Palestine, it agreed to facilitate the entry of refugee children by waiving visa 
restrictions, enabling the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany 
(Movement) to arrange the selection, emigration and temporary settlement of 
children under seventeen, both Jewish and non-Aryan Christians, provided that 
guarantees were given regarding their maintenance and eventual re­
emigration. Children were found places in various locations, including foster 
homes in London and in the major provincial cities, where local subcommittees of 
the refugee aid committees were formed. A letter appeared in the principal 
newspapers, signed by Samuel, and by Lord Selborne on behalf of the Christian 
organisations, appealing for hospitality for these children. 20
24 Jan. 1939, p.24; 10 Feb. 1939, p.18; 14 April 1939, p. 15; Acc 3121 
A/30, 12 July 1939, JFC Minutes; FO 371/24077 W 10942/45/48, 19 July 1939, 
Statement by Winterton.
18 j.stiebel. The Central British Fund for World Jewish Relief, op.cit., pp.53-54.
19 FO 371/22536 W15037/104/98, 16 Nov. 1938, record of meeting; HC 
Debates, Fifth Series, vol. 341, 21 Nov. 1938, cols. 1428-1483.
20 AJJDC AR 3344.589, 28 Nov. 1938, British Inter-Aid Committee for Children 
from Germany. In 1940, the Movement became the Refugee Children’s 
Movement.
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The Movement Itself had no funds. It was subsidised by the CGJ, the Council of 
the Christian Churches and indirectly but most importantly, by the Lord Baldwin 
Fund, launched in December 1938.21 The public was invited to assist in 
guaranteeing the maintenance of child refugees, who were divided into 
guaranteed and unguaranteed cases. At first, the Movement gave priority to 
children whose parents were either dead or interned or who were themselves in 
danger of internment. Almost 3,000 children, mostly unguaranteed, arrived 
between December 1938 and January 1939. However, because of shortage of 
funds, by February 1939, only guaranteed cases were considered for selection.22
As Hoare had commented, the extent and speed of the arrangements 'depended 
on the numbers of offers of private homes and help'.23 This became even more 
difficult following the Government's requirement in February that all prospective 
foster parents make a cash deposit of £50 to fund the re-emigration of children 
entering the country from March. This halted the children’s transports from 
February until April, when it was rescinded. The Movement had a self-imposed 
limit of 10,000, to comprise children only from Greater G erm  any.24
The Nazis were prepared to release those between 18-35 years old, either 
already in concentration camps or threatened with incarceration, on condition of 
their immediate emigration. Owing to the difficulty of finding countries of refuge.
21 CGJ Annual Report 1938, p.2. The CGJ undertook a commitment to the 
Movement of £50,000 for 1939. FC 371/22539 W 16055/104/98, 1 Dec. 1938. 
‘Lord Baldwin’s Broadcast appeal’. By 31 July 1939, £523,000 was raised, half of 
which was allocated to the Movement.
22 AJJDC AR 3344.589, CGJ, 16 Jan. 1939, ‘Note on the Present Position of 
the Movement'.
23j.C„ 10 Feb. 1939. p.27.
24 Acc 3121 E3/286/1, 31 March 1939. Dorothy F.Buxton to Laski; FO 
371/24100 W6529/3231/48, 6 April 1939, Colonel Wedgwood calls to stop the 
£50 deposit during Parliamentary Ouestions. Acc 3121 E3/533/3, July 1939, 2nd 
Issue, ‘Movement -  Statistical Analysis’, p.3.
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temporary transit camps were proposed. Winterton saw no objection to Samuel's 
original proposal, although confirming that the Government could not finance the 
scheme. He was, however, willing to grant administrative facilities for admitting 
persons to camps established and maintained by the Anglo-Jewish 
organisations.25 The derelict Kitchener army camp at Richborough was taken 
over by the CGJ under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Waley-Cohen. By 
February 1939, the first 100 skilled manual workers had arrived. Regular 
transports arrived from Germany and Austria until the outbreak of war, by which 
time it is estimated that it was a place of temporary refuge for over 3,500 men.26 
Reports suggested that the camp functioned well. Following a campaign by the 
CRREC, the Jewish Weekly was able to describe 'a very intensive religious life 
... developing in this camp'. It was closed in May 1940, by which time half the 
inmates had joined the pioneer corps while the rest were temporarily interned on 
the Isle of Man.27
A further initiative was the extension of training facilities outside Germany and 
Austria, preparatory to eventual settlement in Palestine. Hachshara (training) 
programmes had already begun in the 1920"s and became part of the 
Auslandshachshara {hachshara outside Germany) created in 1933. By the end 
of 1938, hachshara centres operated in various European countries, now 
including England. After Kristallnacht, the CGJ, with Government consent, set up 
an ‘Agricultural Committee for Refugees’, under the chairmanship of Col. Charles
25 FO 371/22539 W16410/104/98, 7 Dec. 1938; FO 371/24074 W1368/45/48, 23 
Jan. 1939, Refugee Position in UK.
26 CGJ, Annual Report 1939, p.15; Bentwich, They Found Refuae. pp. 102-7.
27 CGJ, Minutes, 13 April 1939, p.1; Jewish W eekly, 14 July 1939, vol.IV, 
No.181, p.1; 8 Sept. 1939, vol.IV, no.189, p.1; interview, Phineas May, 
Richborough welfare officer, 17 Nov. 1994, London; CGJ, Annual Report, 1933- 
1943, p.6.
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W aley -C o h en .28  Most of the Jewish trainees came from the 'Halutz (pioneer) 
Movement’ in Germany. The British 'Halutz Organisation’, part of the Zionist 
Federation, opened an office in London and assigned individuals to specific 
centres according to their cultural and social needs. The project became a joint 
undertaking of the Agricultural Committee and the 'Halutz World Movement’, 
which also set up offices in London. This organisation was formed by orthodox 
and non-orthodox groups in England, and on the whole, ‘the harmonious co­
operation lasted throughout the stay of the groups in England’.29
Chief Rabbi’s Religious Emeraencv Council
While the mainstream organisations were devising strategies for handling large 
numbers of refugees, Schonfeld was concentrating on small groups, mainly of 
religious functionaries. After Kristallnacht, he stepped up his operation with the 
rescue of 47 German rabbis and scholars with their families. His report claims 
that 'the list included all Rabbis known to be arrested, and covered all sections 
from the Liberal to the ultra-orthodox'. Such individuals found temporary asylum, 
their maintenance guaranteed by the CRREC until suitable positions could be 
found in the UK or abroad. Schonfeld often exaggerated the ‘urgent’ need for 
rabbis and religious functionaries in the Anglo-Jewish community in order to 
facilitate their immigration. A second list was presented to the Home Office and 
by February 1939, another 150 teachers and scholars as well as 120 Yeshiva 
(talmudic) students had been allowed entry to complete their studies at various
28 S.Rudel-Adler, (27) 17, p. 12, Oral History Department, Institute of 
Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
29 Bentwich, op.cit., p.95; Aryeh Handler, 14 (156), Oral History Department, 
Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Aryeh Handler, 
interview, 7 May 1994, London.
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rabbinical schools in England. Priority was given to those arrested and interned 
in Germany.3o
In some cases Schonfeld found private individuals to undertake the care of 
refugees but the majority were to be a charge on his Religious Emergency Fund. 
The CRREC had also commenced a scheme for placing rabbis, teachers and 
other officials in existing vacancies throughout the English-speaking w o r l d . I n  
this way, vacancies in England would become available for more refugee 
religious functionaries. Schonfeld also persuaded several western European 
governments to admit families of rabbis and teachers from destroyed German 
synagogues and schools, totalling 260 people. With calculated enthusiasm, he 
reported to the Home Office that 'As a direct result of British behaviour many 
other governments followed her example by granting p e r m i t s ' . ^ z  Such 
transparent sycophancy can hardly have duped the authorities; on the other 
hand, it cost nothing and could do no harm.
Following direct negotiations with the Home Office, Schonfeld's first transport of 
children arrived in Britain in December 1938. Altogether he brought over about 
300 children before the war. Because Schonfeld's contacts were mainly with 
orthodox communities, it was natural that most of the children he brought over
30 CGJ, Agenda File, no.10 (17 Nov. 1938-15 Jan.1939), 24 Nov. 1938, 
Memorandum from CRREC to CGJ; MS 183 Schonfeld, 290 (f.2),19 Nov. 1938, 
Holderness to Hertz. MS 183 Schonfeld 617/2 (f.1), CRREC, Interim Report, 
(n.d., probably May 1939).
31 MS 183 Schonfeld 652 [SCH-SCHL], 30 Nov. 1938, Hertz to Dr.Schleslnger, 
Beunos Aires; 665 [WEB-WEIR], 8 June 1939, GJAC Overseas Settlement 
Department to CRREC, regarding British Honduras; 663/2 [U-Z], 23 June 1939, 
CRREC to Stephen Wise.
32 MS 183 Schonfeld 290 (f.2), 9 Dec. 1938; 31 Jan. 1939, Hertz to Holderness.
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were from orthodox families. 3^ His work was independent of the Movement, but 
had to follow the same criteria. He established a Refugee Children’s Department 
and a Children’s Relief Fund. Children were brought over ‘on the understanding 
that there will be no charge on the Central Funds’.^4 Schonfeld repeatedly 
requested that representatives of the ecclesiastical authorities be co-opted onto 
the CGJ to advise on religious matters.^s After the first children arrived in early 
December, a Friends of Children’s Committee was formed, enabling ministers to 
care for those placed in their area. In March 1939, every community was urged to 
form its own local youth hostel in conjunction with the synagogue authorities.^®
Schonfeld’s activities brought him into conflict with the mainstream organisations, 
especially with regard to children. He invariably insisted that every consideration 
be given to religious principles, which he considered of equal importance with 
physical rescue.®^ But for the overburdened and underfunded organisations, 
physical rescue and placement necessarily preceded matching children with 
families of similar religious affiliations. This is not to imply that efforts were not 
made to match children with suitable families. But Schonfeld, whose outlook was 
conditioned by the long-term implications of placing Jewish children in non- 
Jewish homes, saw in such ‘rescue’ a negligent and casual indifference to the 
survival of Judaism. Unamenable to compromise, he insisted that Jewish families 
should be made to open their doors to these children.
33 MS 183 Schonfeld 117/8, Report year ending 1 Oct. 1941, p.4; Felice Selton, 
interview 2 June 1994, London. Selton, a non-orthodox child, was brought over 
by Schonfeld.
34 MS 183 Schonfeld 676 [SA-SAW], 9 Dec. 1938, Hertz to Samuel. Hertz 
assured Samuel that this fund would not compete with Lord Rothschild's Appeal 
and that all monies collected would be handed over to the central organisation. 
AJJDC AR 3344.589, 28 Dec. 1938, Helen Bentwich, Report on the Movement.
35 MS 183 Schonfeld 617/2 (f.1.), 24 May 1939, CRREC to CGJ.
36 J.C.. 24 March 1939, p.22.
37 MS 183 Schonfeld, 384 (f.3), 18 Jan. 1939, CRREC to Stephany, CGJ; 22 
March 1939, Schonfeld to CGJ; 28 March 1939, Stephany to Hertz.
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A contemporary criticism of the Anglo-Jewish community was that active 
sacrifices were comparatively rare. Dr. I. Grunfeld complained that 'the Jewish 
community, which had shown such great generosity in donating money for the 
refugee organisations, were very reluctant to take Jewish children into their 
homes'. Grunfeld described as ‘lost souls’ children raised in non-Jewish homes, 
citing several cases of conversion. Schonfeld later asserted that placing Jewish 
children in non-Jewish homes had led to the loss to the Jewish community of 
many children, and he spoke bitterly of a 'Child-Estranging Movement’.ss
The issue became a source of great tension and long-term bitterness between 
the CRREC and the Anglo-Jewish refugee organisations, continuing throughout 
and even beyond the war. Most of the 10,000 children who came to Britain 
between December 1938-August 1939 were Jewish, of various levels of religious 
observance.39 As a general rule, the Movement allocated children to the care of 
families of their own faith and orientation, although this was not always 
possible.40 Appeals for orthodox homes were regularly made at Jewish functions 
and through the Jewish newspapers.However, insufficient orthodox homes 
offered hospitality for the numbers of orthodox children. Even for the non­
orthodox, more offers came from non-Jewish homes than from Jewish ones. To
38 j  . a ,  31 Dec. 1943, p. 12; 7 Jan. 1944, p.6; 14 Jan. 1944, p. 12. 'The Child- 
Estranging Movement’, An Expose on the Alienation of Jewish Refugee Children 
in Great Britain from Judaism (The Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, 
1944).
39 Acc 3121 E3/533/3, July 1939, 2nd Issue, 'Movement-Statistical Analysis’. A 
representative sample of 136 questionnaires found that 24.7% were orthodox, 
61% were Liberal and the remaining 14.3% were non-practising [presumably 
unaffiliated].
40 Ibid. J.C., 10 Feb. 1939, p. 16. For a contrary view, see Barry Turner, '...And 
the Policeman Smiled'.(London. 1991), pp.75-76 and Marks of Distinction. The 
Memoirs of Elaine Blond (London. 1988), p.86.
41 J .C , 12 May 1939, p.35; Jewish Weekly, 23 June 1939, vol.IV, no. 178, p.1.
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have refused these would have resulted in affronting the humanity and 
benevolence of these Christians. Besides it was pragmatic -- homes were 
needed’.- 2^ as a result, orthodox children were often placed in non-orthodox 
homes and non-orthodox children in Gentile homes.^s in order to encourage 
hospitality within the community, the CGJ agreed to assume responsibility for the 
re-emigration expenses of all refugee children so that they no longer required a 
£50 deposit.'^
The Anglo-Jewish leadership, both secular and religious, has been criticised for 
its failure to mobilise the community and find homes for these children. Schonfeld 
believed the problem was not a shortage of Jewish homes, but reluctance on the 
part of Jewish families to take in children. Aryeh Handler agrees: There was 
something lacking in the motivation of Anglo-Jewry ... they should have ensured 
that everyone was taken into Jewish homes. In the event the bulk went to non- 
Jewish homes and no one cared'.^s Jewish children often found themselves in 
areas which had little or no Jewish community, especially during the evacuation 
period. 46
Schonfeld would not accept that Jewish homes could not be found. In some 
cases, he pestered members of the orthodox Jewish community to take in
42 John Presland, A Great Adventure: The Storv of the Refugee Children's 
Movement (London, July 1944), p.8.
43 MS 183 Schonfeld 617/2 (f.1). Memorandum on Jewish Refugee Children in 
non-Jewish Homes, (n.d., presumably mid-1939). Mention is made of the 
confusion in Britain with regard to the nomenclature of religious affiliation of 
German Jews such as Liberal Judaism.
44 j c . ,  12 May 1939. p.35.
45 Aryeh Handler, Interview. 7 May 1994. London; J.C., 8 Sept. 1989. p.29; Acc 
3121 E3/533/3, July 1939, 2nd Issue, 'Movement-Statistical Analysis’.
46 Presland, op.cit., p.9.
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children.“^7 This stridency was undeniably effective in finding orthodox homes. 
However, Schonfeld's aggressive methods were not available to the official 
organisations, which would certainly have laid themselves open to charges of 
harassment. Schonfeld's criticism of the CGJ as a 'Child-Estranging Movement' Is 
somewhat ill-judged and unreasonable, especially since he himself saw the 
problem as communal indifference. Hertz feared the impossibility of absorbing 
further numbers and appealed to individuals or committees of hostels for offers of 
future help.48
The danger of conversionary influence was always potent, even if the Gentile 
host were not evangelical. The GRREC worked continuously to remove refugee 
children from ‘conversionist and other unsuitable influences', thereby causing 
friction with the Movement.^^ While the Movement stood in loco parentis, its 
power to remove a child from an unsuitable foster home was legally restricted. 
During the war, the GRREC urged it to take legal action to establish its 
guardianship over the refugee children.^o This was finally achieved with the 
Guardianship Act (1944) and the appointment of Lord Gorell, Chairman of the
47 Mrs.Rosie Goldfield, interview, Jerusalem, July 1994. Mrs. Goldfield recalls 
that few Jewish families in Manchester wanted refugee children. Although 
reluctant, once Schonfeld appealed to them, 'they had no choice but to take 
them in'. Acc 3121 E3/533/3, July 1939, ‘Movement -  Statistical Analysis’: 
‘The orthodox Jewish community have as a whole responded better to the 
appeal for hospitality and ... it has proved that the goodwill is uniformly great 
but that it only has effect where there is an energetic local committee’.
48 J.C., 23 June 1939, p.23.
49 MS 183 Schonfeld 617/2 (f.1). Memorandum on Jewish Refugee Children in 
Non-Jewish Homes, (n.d.), p.3a. For another view, see George Bell (Bishop of 
Chichester) Papers, Lambeth Palace, Volume 29: ‘There was no intention of 
converting children ... They found it difficult to have these children looked after 
while they were at Church’ and therefore took them along. As to removing 
children from non-Jewish homes, this 'would cause grief to the children and 
foster-parents as well as create antisemitism.'
80 MS 183 Schonfeld 117/8, Report, year ending 1 Oct. 1941, p.4.
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Refugee Children’s Movement, as legal guardian of the hundreds of children. 
Problems and controversy persisted Into the 1950's.5i
Conflicting Approaches
The Anglo-Jewlsh voluntary organisations, which relied on donations from the 
community, faced grave shortages of funds In 1939. The CGJ opposed separate 
fund-raising, which might conflict with the main appeal.sz Although It made two 
grants to the CRREC In the pre-war period. It could not stop the latter from 
launching Its own a p p e a l s . L i k e  the other organisations, the CRREC was 
obliged to stipulate that It could only consider guaranteed cases. But It Included a 
number of 'particularly urgent' unsubsldlsed cases In Its lists: 'We had a slightly 
different attitude towards the question of guarantees’.S c h o n fe ld  does not 
appear to have been overly anxious about finances. Even with formal 
guarantees, there were many defaulting guarantors. The GJAC had decided by 
April 1939 to Institute legal proceedings against guarantors who failed to honour 
their guarantees.55 in several other cases, refugees brought over by the CRREC 
applied to the GJAC for support, to be refused on the grounds that ‘they received 
their visas through the guarantee of your [CRREC] Commlttee’.se
51 MS 183 Schonfeld, 658 [MOV-MZ], 10 Sept. 1943, Maxwell to Hertz; Acc 
3121 E l/3 2 ,16 September 1951, Julius Carlebach, Report on the files of children 
who came to England as refugees.
52 Acc 3121 El/37, 3 Aug. 1938, LaskI to Schonfeld; MS 183 Schonfeld 676 [SA- 
SAW], 21 Nov. 1938, Hertz to Samuel.
53 MS 183 Schonfeld 384 (f.3), 2 Jan. 1939, Stephany to CRREC; 10 May 1939, 
Stephany to CRREC.
54 MS 183 Schonfeld 676 [SA-SAW], 27 July 1939, Pels, Secretary of CRREC, 
to Mr. Salomon, Berlin; Pels, 18 April 1966, 27 (35), Oral History Department, 
Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
55 Acc 3121 E 3/525/1, 23 April 1939, Meeting between Board and GJAC.
56 MS 183 Schonfeld 638 [GA-GE], 15 March 1939, GJAC to CRREC; GJAC, 15 
March 1939, Wiener Library, Reel 32, no. 175/57, Executive Board Minutes.
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When Schonfeld submitted a new list of applications in March 1939, the Home 
Office consulted the CGJ, which advised that ‘extreme caution must be exercised 
before any further substantial commitments could be undertaken'. Hertz 
nevertheless convinced the Home Office, in good faith, that his Committee did 
not rely on the funds of the CGJ for maintenance of the ecclesiastics guaranteed 
by it, that all 99 teachers and 73 students on its list were fully guaranteed by 
private individuals and that the CRREC was undertaking their re-emigration.57 As 
a result, these refugees were finally admitted. Just how Schonfeld planned to 
cope financially remains unclear. His approach was in contrast to the more 
professional attitude of the Anglo-Jewish voluntary organisations, which were 
understandably apprehensive of Schonfeld's refugees becoming a burden on 
them and of being tainted with his reputation for unreliability.
The conflict between these approaches is illustrated by the case of a number of 
students brought over by Schonfeld and placed at a Talmudic college in 
Manchester, where funds were exhausted. The students, not all bona fide, had 
unofficially applied to the GJAC trainee department for work, unavailable to 
genuine students. The GJAC notified the authori t ies.The Home Office now 
refused to allow any new applications unless the CGJ took responsibility for a 
further group of 92 students, sponsored by Schonfeld, and awaiting visas. The 
Council would agree only on confirmation from the CRREC that all possessed 
guarantees and had evidence that they were bona fide students.ss Schiff tried to 
resolve the situation without impugning any of those involved. The episode 
shows how far Schonfeld was prepared to flout the rules in order to achieve his 
ends, while the Anglo-Jewish establishment would do nothing that might threaten
57 MS 183 Schonfeld 290 (f.2) 12 May 1939, Hertz to Holderness.
58 JC . ,19 May 1939, p.40; 2 June 1939, p.25.
59 MS 183 Schonfeld 652 [SCH-SCHL], 14 July 1939, Schiff to Hertz.
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Its own credibility and hence Its capacity to Implement Its own rescue procedures 
In co-operation with the authorities. Schonfeld was thus regarded by the 
establishment, not unreasonably, as a ‘loose cannon’. Joan Stiebel recalls Schiff 
telling Schonfeld that he did wonderful things but always In the wrong way, so 
that 'we had to clear up the mess'.
Financial and Administrative Pressures
Both at the time and more recently, the Anglo-Jewlsh organisations have been 
harshly criticised for their failure to deal effectively with the catastrophe they 
faced. Contemporary criticism focused on their administrative failure and was 
often confined to specific complaints about delays and Inefficiencies In 
processing refugee applications and arrivals. Such understandable and no doubt 
valid criticism Is distinct from the critical reappraisal by recent revisionist 
historians who argue that the organisations not only did not facilitate more rescue 
but actively sought limitations on both the ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ of those 
admitted. London maintains that the Government made a massive effort to 
accelerate the entry of those eligible for admission, but that the voluntary bodies 
moved Increasingly to restrict admissions. In order to conserve funds and limit 
numbers.®'*
Certainly the refugee organisations, facing the prospect of bankruptcy, were 
obliged to Initiate supplementary controls of their own, Including formal 
guarantees and a £50 deposit for children,®  ^but London Isolates the moral Issue 
and the motives of those Involved with Insufficient consideration of the financial
60 Interview, Joan Stiebel, March 1994, London.
61 London, ‘Jewish Refugees’, op.clt., pp. 183,189.
62 Simpson, Refugees: A Review of the Situation since September 1938. p.73.
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and administrative crisis which faced them. This indictment of the putative 
motives of the organisations seems at the very least dangerously speculative. It 
is difficult to accept London's rather naive attempt to blacken the organisations by 
portraying the Government as so extraordinarily anxious to save as many 
refugees as possible, especially as London elsewhere criticises the Government 
for lack of humanitarianism.®^ Nor is it evident that the raison d’être of the refugee 
organisations was to restrict the entry of refugees.
The Anglo-Jewish organisations were under tremendous pressure at this time. 
The three crises of 1938-39 had created for them a major financial and 
administrative problem. In 1938 approximately 8.500 persons were registered 
with the GJAC. The influx from January-June 1939 amounted to over 22,000 
registered cases, more than twice the total for the whole of 1938 and more than 
the total for the period 1933-38, estimated at 10,500. Re-emigration of registered 
cases stood at only 1,543 for January - June 1939.®^ The GJAC was registering 
500 arrivals per week in January 1939. Many of these immediately became a 
charge on the Committee, as guarantors had been unable to meet their 
commitment. Some visas had been issued by the Home Office without reference 
to the GJAC,®® which then had to maintain the holders. Schiff warned that the 
GJAC could not support those brought over under Ministry of Labour permits and 
the Ministry ceased to issue permits for domestic servants, all of whom now 
entered through the Domestic Bureau.®®
63 London, 'British Immigration Control Procedures, op.cit., pp.485-517.
64 Acc 3121 E3/532/2, May 1939, GJAC Report, p.1 ; June 1939, Appendix II.
65 CGJ, 18 Jan. 1939, Minutes, p.4.
66 Ibid., 1 May 1939, p.4; 10 August 1939, p.3; 13 Sept. 1939, p.5. By Sept. 
1939, there were approximately 15,000 German Jewish domestics, of whom
5,000 had been brought over by the Ministry of Labour.
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The Committee’s weekly expenditure during the last months of 1938 had been 
£5,000, compared to £800 in 1937. The JRC's total expenditure for the six years 
from 1933 amounted to £233,000. In December 1938, the GJAC's estimated 
budget for the following twelve months was a minimum of £350,000. The CGJ 
also had to budget for the agricultural training schemes and the children's 
scheme.67 The expenditure of the GJAC alone during the first six months of 1939 
was £183,136, while the average number of persons receiving weekly assistance 
by June 1939 was over 3,000.®® So fearful of the future, that in December 1938 
the CGJ, which was subsidising refugees in Shanghai (the one place with an 
open immigration policy), was obliged to request a halt to further admissions.®^
On the administrative level, the Anschluss brought a flood of applications to an 
already overburdened organisation, headed by Schiff with the help of a 
comparatively small staff, some paid, others voluntary. No competent 
administration could be organised quickly and efficiently to cope with a pace of 
work completely transformed after KristallnachtJ^ Towards the end of 1938, the 
appointment of a full-time director became necessary and in March 1939 the 
organisations relocated from Woburn House to Bloomsbury House. However, 
numerous complaints were still made, often in the national press, about 
inefficiencies, incompetence, rudeness and delays. Arrears of work piled up and 
were dealt with by improvised methods, operated for the most part by 
Inexperienced staff hurriedly mobilised. The original workers felt, with some
G7 CGJ, Agenda File, no. 10 (17 Nov. 1938-5 Jan. 1939), Dec. 1938, note on 
GJAC Finances.
68 Acc 3121 BOD E3/532/2, June 1939, GJAC Report, p. 12.
69 FO 371/24074 W405/45/48, 6 Jan. 1939, CGJ to Foreign Office; CGJ, 25 Jan. 
1939, Minutes, p.3; Acc 3121 011/7/1/4, 27 June 1939, report by Laski of 
meeting in London with M.Speelman, director of the International Saving Society, 
Shanghai. Nevertheless, the Council was still sending funds to support refugees 
there. See CGJ, 10 Aug. 1939, Minutes, p.7.
70 CGJ Annual Report, 1938/1939, p.7.
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justification, that much of the criticism levelled at them was unjust. The 
Committee of Investigation, set up in May 1939 to examine the work of the GJAC 
and make recommendations, expressed admiration for the spirit of service and 
self-sacrifice displayed by these workers.
Woburn House was receiving 1,500 letters and up to 1,000 personal callers daily 
by December 1938. By the end of March 1939, the GJAC was receiving 17,000 
letters and holding approximately 6,000 interviews a week. By April 1939, over
50,000 letters had still not been dealt with. By July 1939, a staff of over 400 was 
handling 21,000 letters a week. 72 Nevertheless, the GJAC was pleased that 'the 
Home Office had so far raised no objection to the increasing influx' and that there 
was 'a growing realisation on the part of some sections of the public ... that 
refugees, ... need be neither a burden nor a m e n a c e '.73 Clearly there was no 
private agenda to restrict immigration, as has been claimed, except for purely 
practical reasons.
Ironically, the organisations became victims of their own success. Precisely 
because of the relaxation in Government policy, they were now confronted with 
an avalanche of work which, numerically and administratively, they were not 
equipped to cope with. Schiff vigorously defended the GJAC: 'We all have been 
working here day and night in order to safe [sic] human lives ... Whilst some of 
the criticism of the Board may be justified ... much of the criticism is unjustified'. 
He added, 'What happened recently has of course upset every possible 
calculation and this Committee can only get back to its previous state of
Acc 3121 E3/532; all 3 folders contain numerous complaints.
72 Acc 3121 E3/533/2, 16 Dec. 1938, Schiff to Laski; E3/532/2, March 1939, 
GJAC Report, p.8; J.C., 21 July 1939, pp. 15-16.
73 Acc 3121 E 3/532/2, March 1939, GJAC Report, p.1.
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efficiency when the Home Office is able to co -o p era te '74  gy the beginning of 
1939, substantial staff increases had been made and the Aliens Department was 
moved to larger premises. Some progress was made in co-ordinating casework 
by attempts at reorganisation in January 1939.75
To counter the still mounting criticism, the GJAC called a conference in April, 
attended by representatives of 21 provincial Jewish refugee organisations. Laski 
tried to explain the difficulties arising from the crises of 1938 .7 6  Schiff admitted 
there were grounds for criticism, but argued that some of it was unjustified and 
based on erroneous information. He acknowledged that the Home Secretary had 
done everything possible to help but that self-denigration and internal problems 
were seriously demoralising the Anglo-Jewish establishment. Shortly after this 
conference, Schiff expressed frustration and annoyance at the "constant criticism 
which the entire community sees fit to pour on the Refugee Committee, without 
ever taking the trouble to come and see the difficulties under which we work and 
the almost unbelievable influx of correspondence and callers with which we have 
to contend'.77
Jewish leaders were conscious that these problems and criticisms had "alienated 
and antagonised non-Jewish organisations and people" and a special Committee 
of Enquiry was appointed to investigate the matter.78 The Board, through the 
Jewish Chronicle, invited complaints about refugee administration. Schiff 
protested that this "placed me in a position of the accused in the dock and the
74 Acc 3121 E3/533/2, 16 Dec. 1938, Schiff to Laski.
75 Sherman, op.cit., pp.214-16.
75 Acc 3121 E3/525/1, 23 April 1939, Laski's statement at the Conference of 
Provincial Jewish Refugee Organisations.
77 Ibid., 23 April 1939, meeting between Board and GJAC; E3/532/3, 24 May 
1939, Schiff to Laski.
78 Acc 3121 A/30, 21 May 1939, Minutes.
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Board of Deputies as the prosecutor’. He added that the expenses of the GJAC 
were no less than £10,000 per week and wondered where future funds were to 
co m e fro m .79 Schiff and Simon Marks made various recommendations and by 
August, Schiff was able to report that the Board was satisfied that everything 
possible was being done to improve British refugee organisations.®®
Another target of recent criticism is the selection procedure adopted by the 
organisations. Alderman claims that ‘communal policy towards refugees resulted 
and was designed to result in the admission into Britain of a limited number of 
Jews from a particular social and economic background, those easily assimilable 
and of a particular age’. He accuses Schiff, who had it in his power to accept or 
reject German Jewish applicants, of complicity with Home Office 'prejudices and 
preferences'.®i The extraordinary logic of this argument leads to the 'conclusion' 
that Schiff's work was designed, not to assist refugee immigration but to prevent 
It and to prevent anyone else facilitating it. Alderman's case is based on the a 
priori assumption that co-operation with the Home Office was synonymous with 
treachery to German Jewry, as if hostile relations were more ethically acceptable 
or could have saved more lives.
The guarantee given by the Jewish organisations in 1933 stated that 'all German 
Jewish refugees should be admitted without distinction'. It was originally 
anticipated that the total number would not exceed 3-4,000.®^ Only later, when 
numbers reached unmanageable levels, did choices have to be made. Following 
Kristallnacht, the Home Office was prepared to receive certain categories of
79 Acc 3121 E3/532/3, 23 June 1939, Schiff to Laski.
80 CGJ, 19 June 1939, Minutes, p.4; 10 Aug. 1939, Minutes, p.2.
81 Alderman, op.cit., pp.276-78; London, 'Jewish Refugees', op.cit., pp. 175-76.
82 CAB 27/549, A.R. (33) Series, Cabinet Committee on Aliens Restrictions, 7 
April 1933, report by Sir John Gilmour.
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German refugee on the recommendation of Jewish organisations, without 
investigation of individual cases, including children, old persons and persons 
likely to re-emigrate within 18 months of arrival. Guarantees of maintenance were 
still required.83 Since the ultimate liability would fall on the Jewish organisations, 
they were necessarily circumspect about recommendations. Given the scarcity of 
resources and the limited employment opportunities, decisions were often 
reached by singling out those who could be maintained, and therefore 
guaranteed, by families or friends and those, like the young, who could be 
retrained prior to re-emigration, thus creating further opportunities for immigration 
and thereby saving a maximum number of individuals. German Jews over 45 
were therefore a lower priority, since, as Bentwich noted regretfully, they were 
'not fitted for emigrat ion ' .The Academic Assistance Council's approach to 
assisting displaced academics was also highly selective and fostered re­
emigration, on the same grounds of 'limitation of its resources'.85
Interestingly, in spite of this selection procedure and the present perception that 
only a certain calibre of refugee was admitted. Passport Control Officers abroad 
expressed 'great concern at the poor type of refugees for whom authorisations for 
visas were being issued'. In Vienna, candidates for selection were impecunious 
and in certain cases, visa cards were issued by the committees to individuals 
who had previously been rejected.86 The testimony of the Passport Control 
officials in central Europe belies arguments that only a certain type of refugee 
was admitted. The policy of admitting only those whose maintenance was
83 CGJ, Agenda File, no. 10 (17 Nov. 1938-5 Jan. 1939), 8 Dec. 1938, 
N.Bentwich, 'Admission of Refugees into England'.
34 Bentwich to Porter Goff, 15 December 1938, cited in London, 'Jewish 
Refugees', op.cit., p. 185, ff.119.
35 Acc 3121 E3/286/1, February 1939, Bulletin of the Co-ordinating Committee 
for Refugees, no.1, p. 12.
36 HO 213/103, 14 Feb. 1939, note on the heavy work thrown on Consuls and 
Passport Offices abroad.
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guaranteed and who would not take up employment without special authorisation 
meant in practice that some of the 'better' types of refugee, including 
professionals, were ruled out at the start; only those professing willingness to 
come, for example, for private domestic service, were admitted.
More crucially, the recent criticism levelled at the refugee organisations should be 
viewed in the light of the huge discrepancy between the number of visa cards 
issued and the number of refugees who actually arrived between Kristallnacht 
and June 1939. A disparity was noted as early as November 1938 and at various 
times during 1939.®® In November 1938, the total number of refugees entering 
Britain since March 1933 was 17,000, of whom about 6,000 had re-emigrated. In 
April 1939, there were 25,136 refugees, an influx of about 14,000 since 
November 1938. Yet between 1 May 1938 and 31 March 1939, 79,271 visas had 
been issued.®^ Allowing for a certain number who might have left since 
November, it seems clear that the great majority of those granted UK visas never 
arrived. The Government wanted to use these figures to 'rebut criticisms of the 
Government’s refugee policy.’ However, the voluntary organisations feared 'that 
they might raise an outcry that far too many visas are being given.’9®
From January to June 1939, almost 13,000 visas had been issued but only 5,500 
refugees had arrived. By the end of July, out of a total of 14,644 visas issued.
87 FO 371/24100 W7740/3231/48. 8 May 1939. R.T.Parkins, Passport Control 
Department, Memorandum.
88 HC Debates, Fifth Series, vol.341, 1938-1939, col. 1470; FO 371/24100 
W10840/3231/48, 20 July 1939, Statement by Winterton to the IGCR. By July 
1939, there were approximately 40,000 refugees in the UK, of whom some
29,000 had entered since November 1938.
89 FO 371/24100 W 7031/3231/48, 27 April 1939, Jeffes, Passport Control 
Department, to Randall.
90 HO 213/268, 1 May 1939, Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees, Meeting. 
E.N. Cooper, Home Office, confirmed that 57,000 visas remained unused.
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7,253 persons had arrived and registered with the GJAC while 7,391 had not yet 
registered. It was not known how many of those who had arrived had simply 
failed to register. This left it uncertain as to how many had remained in Europe, 
though the report stated that many had probably not yet arrived. Examination of 
the previous three months of the time-lag between the issue of the visa cards and 
the arrival of refugees showed that 90 percent arrived within two months of the 
issue of the v is a .s i Moreover, during the last months before the outbreak of war, 
it is now known, British Consular officials in Germany and Austria had issued, 
without reference to London, huge numbers of visas, which were still unused by 
the outbreak of war.^z
The reason why so many visas remained unused is unclear. The Foreign Office 
suggested that it was 'owing to the difficulties that refugees frequently 
experienced in winding up their affairs in Germany and securing the necessary 
permission to leave the Reich'. A GJAC enquiry offered a similar explanation.^^ 
Passport Control representatives in Europe claimed that the main reason was 
that these visas were an 'insurance policy', British visas for the United Kingdom 
being widely regarded abroad as the 'hallmark of perfection', even though holders 
might have no desire to leave unless absolutely compelled to do so. Again there 
were others, a smaller number, who, having obtained UK visas, broke their 
journey in countries such as Belgium and Holland, stayed with friends and were 
in no hurry to come to Britain. There was also a larger number who obtained UK
91 Acc 3121 E3/532/2, May and June 1939. GJAC Report; E3/533Q. July 1939, 
GJAC Report.
92 FO 371/24074 W1368/45/48, 23 January 1949, Refugee Position in the UK; 
Acc 3121 E3/532/2, May and June 1939, GJAC Reports. For example, it is 
estimated that Frank Foley, a British passport officer in Berlin, issued over 3,000 
emigration visas to Britain. J.C., 3 March 1995, p.7.
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visas as a stepping-stone to obtaining a visa for some other country, such as 
America, to which they genuinely desired to go.94
If any large proportion of these visa-holders suddenly decided to come to Britain, 
the influx would have had serious consequences. A disproportionate amount of 
money subscribed for refugee purposes was already being spent on overheads 
in relation to applicants who, it became clear, very often never arrived. The 
voluntary bodies could not 'afford any unnecessary waste of money'. The Foreign 
Office therefore supported the Passport Office's proposal to alter the regulations 
regarding the granting of visas to refugees and set a time limit to their validity. 
This never materialised. The Home Office's view was that most of the unused 
visas would never be used, ss
Bentwich commented that 'The refugee organisations were faced with an 
immense burden ... The altogetherness of everything overwhelmed us, and the 
forced march of time overtook our puny efforts'.9® Yet it is clear that the 
overburdened organisations were determined to cope with the mounting 
difficulties they faced during the final years before the outbreak of war, even 
though they were ill-equipped for the huge scale of the task. Their efforts, on an 
administrative level, were vigorous and achieved impressive results. This 
achievement has, however, been eclipsed by the drama of the war years, during 
which the role of the organisations changed. Their administrative skills were no 
longer required, except to some extent during the period of internment. What was 
now needed was political expertise in devising and negotiating strategies to help
94 FO 371/24100 W7740/3231/48, 8 May 1939, Parkins, Passport Control 
Department, Memorandum; W10840/3231/48, 20 July 1939, Statement by 
Winterton to the IGCR.
95 FO 371/24100 W 7740/3231/48, 18 May 1939, Randall to Cooper; 
W8127/3231/48, 17 July 1939, Minute, Randall.
96 N.Bentwich, Wanderer Between Two Worlds (London. 1941), p.283.
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European Jewry which the wartime Government might find acceptable. This was 
an area in which the organisations lacked both skill and experience; they were no 
match in argument for the mandarins of the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, in light 
of the criticism to which they have recently been subjected by revisionist 
historians, a reappraisal of their untiring efforts and achievements during the pre­
war years seems overdue.
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Chapter Four
National Emergency: internment and Deportation
The war transformed the work of the voluntary organisations. All visas granted 
prior to 3 September 1939 to what had now become 'enemy' nationals were 
automatically invalid. No new immigration applications would be considered. 
Besides the almost insuperable difficulties of establishing contact, it was 
necessary to proceed with the utmost caution for fear that enemy agents might 
infiltrate as 'refugees'. Immigration was restricted to those who had close 
relatives in Britain and had reached neutral or friendly countries, refugees in 
neutral countries who had possessed visas prior to the war and refugees 
proceeding to overseas destinations from neutral territory via Britain. It would 
be up to the organisations that originally sponsored them to resubmit 
applications on their behalf. i
Until 1943, therefore, the work of the GJAC (which reverted to its original title, 
the Jewish Refugees Committee) and the CGJ, now renamed the Central 
Council for Jewish Refugees (CCJR), was almost entirely restricted to refugees 
already in Britain. Among the few exceptions were several hundred refugees, 
holding United States visas, who escaped to Britain after the fall of the Low 
Countries and France in May and June 1940. From 1943, with the anticipation 
of liberation, attention turned to the relief of European Jews.2
1 FO 371/24101 W13792/3231/48,18 Sept. 1939, Cooper to Randall.
2 CCJR Annual Report, 1944, p.4.
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Financial Crisis
The war exacerbated the already grave financial crisis in the affairs of the 
refugee organisations. The GJAC had informed the Home Office during the 
summer that the financial resources of the voluntary organisations did not ailow 
them to accept responsibility for any further refugees.^ Although immigration 
into Britain had practicaliy ceased, the organisations faced greatly increased 
expenditure. The CCJR was burdened with the maintenance of numerous 
refugees, especially domestics, who, on account of the war, had become 
unempioyed and were consequently dependent upon charitable support. In 
addition, the war put a stop to re-emigration, leaving many transmigrants 
stranded indefinitely in B rita in .  ^The number of refugees being maintained in 
part or in whole by the voluntary organisations as of November 1939 was 
approximately 15,000. It was estimated, on the basis of current demands, that 
funds for essential purposes such as maintenance, emigration and 
administration for six months, would be £375,000, i.e. £15,000 per w e e k .s
The CCJR informed the Government that if it 'would not help, the refugees 
would become a charge on local authorities'.® Schiff was biamed for bringing 
refugees to Britain without proper regard to available finances and future 
liabilities. He threatened to resign but Sir Aiexander Maxwell, Permanent
3 FO 371/24100 W13792/3231/48,18 Sept. 1939, Cooper to Randall.
^ CCJR Annual Report, 1939, p. 17.
5 HO 213/294, 24 Nov. 1940, Central Office for Refugees, Memorandum. 
Rothschild Archives, XIV/35/19, CCJR Report for the first six months of 1940. 
The Council had been compelled to borrow nearly £400,000, on the security of 
instaiments from covenants. The money borrowed had already been spent. 
CCJR Annual Report 1939, pp. 18-19. Expenditure was running at £60,000 a 
month. The Council maintained its activities by a ioan from the Christian Council 
for Refugees.
6 Rothschild Archives, Xi/35/19, 26 Oct. 1939, Memorandum.
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Under-Secretary to the Home Office, reassured him that the authorities had 
confidence in his judgement and that discussions were shortly to begin on the 
question of financial assistance for refugees/ It is rather poignant that Schiff 
was blamed at the time for carelessly bringing over refugees without regard to 
expense, and then blamed later for restricting admissions of the 'wrong type of 
refugee' and conniving in Home Office prejudices.
By December 1939 the crisis was such that the heads of the Anglo-Jewish 
voluntary organisations informed the Home Office that it would be necessary to 
close down their organisations and inform all those being maintained to apply to 
the public assistance authorities for relief. Fearful that the cost of maintaining 
the refugees would fall on municipal funds, the Government finally agreed,® 
after lengthy negotiations, to grant 50% of the expenditure of the voluntary 
organisations from 1 January 1940, provided that they made a further effort to 
raise funds. This proved difficult, especially when internment aggravated the 
situation, and towards the end of 1940, in an unprecedented move, the 
Government agreed to contribute (from 1 October 1940) 100 percent of the cost 
of maintenance of the refugees and 75 percent of the cost of administration, 
welfare and emigration.®
The CRREC was also unable to meet its commitments. It had sole 
responsibility for maintaining some 985 individuals, many of whom were 
unsuited, because of age or ill-health, for re-employment. A number of
7 HC 213/294,17 Nov. 1940, meeting, Schiff and Sir Alexander Maxwell.
8 Ibid., 2 Dec. 1940, Refugee Crganisations, Financial Situation.
9 Rothschild Archives, XI/35/19, File (Cet. 1939- March 1940); CCJR Report for 
1933-1945, p.5. As the war progressed and the refugees found employment, 
expenditure decreased. At the beginning of 1945 the number supported by the 
CCJR was just under 1,000. By the end of 1945 it was 750. Between 1939 and 
1945, there was a total aided emigration of refugees from England of 11,207, of 
whom 9,665 went to the United States. See CCJR Annual Report, 1945, p.8.
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guarantors had, for various reasons, been unable to meet their commitments. 
Some refugees had been receiving maintenance from relatives and friends in 
Holland and Belgium, but this had ceased by the spring of 1940.1° Efforts to 
secure financial aid from the CCJR meant that the CRREC had to stop its own 
collection so as not to conflict with the Central Council's fund-raising activities.”'^
The CRREC joined the Government support scheme under which eventually 
100 percent refugee maintenance under Assistance Board rates and 75 percent 
of welfare and administrative expenses were repaid by the Treasury. The grant 
from the CCJR thereupon ceased, although the Council continued to contribute 
to certain causes, such as kosher food. However, the CRREC stiil had to find 
the 25 percent of welfare and administrative costs, as well as undertaking a 
considerable monthly outlay for the Needy Clergy and War Victims’ Fundjz 
There was also the Jewish Soldiers’ Kosher Food Fund, the Kosher Canteen 
Committee, the Care of Refugees and Evacuees and the Palestine Aid 
Committee, which met the religious and social welfare needs of various 
institutions in Palestine. ”>3 Separate appeais, under the heading ‘United Jewish 
Charities’, encompassing ail the charities administered by the CRREC. were 
frequently issued.
10 MS 183 Schonfeid 117/8 Report year ending 1 October 1941, p.2.; CCJR, 
Agenda File, (19 March - 5 June 1940), 4 June 1940, The Chief Rabbi’s 
Religious Emergency Fund’.
11 CCJR, 9 May 1940, Executive Meeting, Minutes, p.1. The CCJR granted on 
average £400 per month. The CRREC was to rely on private donors to help raise 
the additionai £600 required monthiy. See Agenda File (19 March - 5 June 1940), 
CRREC.
12 MS 183 117/8, Report for year ending 1 Oct. 1941, p.6. The annual budget of 
the CRREC and its associated organisations amounted to over £20,000, as 
reported at the end of 1941.
13 MS 183 Schonfeld 297/1, Report for year ending 31 Dec. 1942.
14 MS 183 Schonfeld 665 [WEB-WEIR], Lord Wedgwood Appeal, 1942 and 
1943.
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Internment
The most serious new problem facing the organisations during 1940 was the 
general internment of enemy aliens (from May), which threw further heavy 
burdens and responsibilities onto all refugee committees, in respect of 
internees' dependants and the private affairs which refugees were unable to 
settle before internment's
With the collapse of Norway, the Low Countries and France (April-June), the 
imminent possibility of invasion created sudden panic in Britain. Lulled into 
temporary, false security by the 'phoney war", Britain now struggled desperately 
to prepare for invasion .is a  wave of anti-alien feeling was exacerbated by 
reports of the activities of German ‘Fifth Columnists' in Holland and France. 
Under this stress, aggravated by a press campaign to ‘intern the lot’ backed by 
the Chiefs of Staff, the Government felt compelled to disregard its previous 
distinction in favour of most refugees when the Aliens Tribunal had been 
formed in September 1939. During May and June, over 25,000 aliens, mostly 
German and Austrian Jewish refugees, under categories ‘B’ (those hitherto 
restricted but not interned) and ‘C  (those hitherto exempt from internment and 
restriction) were interned. This was followed in August by the announcement 
that some 8,000 persons, believed potentially dangerous, had been deported to 
Australia and Canada. i7
15 Schonfeld Papers (UCL), 30 May 1940, Central Office for Refugees, circular 
no.50; Rothschild Archives, XIV/35/19, Report of the CCJR for the first six 
months of 1940. Some refugees were able to claim under the Prevention and 
Relief of Distress scheme, initiated by the Government at the beginning of the 
war. But not all refugees were eligible and the amount available was insufficient; 
CCJR Annual Report, 1940, p.6.
15 CZA A255/539, 24 May 1940, Herbert Bentwich to Jose [n.i.].
17 For a general review of internment policy see Ronald Stent, A Bespattered 
Pace?: The Internment of His Majesty's 'most loyal enemv aliens' (London, 
1980).
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The Government's position on internment, as stated by Sir Herbert Emerson, 
Director of the IGCR, was that while it was hoped that all German refugees 
were loyal to Britain, it was impossible to be certain: 'the country faced the 
gravest crisis in its history, the situation in the battlefields was critical, air-raids 
on England might be expected at any time, attempts at invasion would almost 
certainly be made'. In these circumstances, 'considerations of national security 
had to supersede all other considerations. Internment was not merely to allay 
public uneasiness, rather it was an obvious measure for public safety and was 
based on the known facts of what had happened in other countries ... of 
German Fifth Column activities'. Emerson emphasised that 'even if there was a 
1% risk ...it would be absolutely criminal to take that 1% risk.' This view was 
shared by the vast majority of the public.**®
Reactions to Internment
Initially, the voluntary organisations acquiesced in the decision to intern 
German and Austrian refugees. The interdenominational Refugee Joint 
Consultative Committee (RJCC), formerly known as the Co-ordinating 
Committee for Refugees, on which the Anglo-Jewish organisations were 
represented, agreed that the case-working committees should be apolitical and 
not comment on general policy. The CCJR was of 'the firm opinion that matters 
of general policy towards refugees, including internment were matters solely for 
the Government to decide, and [the] Council would accept their decisions 
without question'. 19 This support was undoubtedly a product of the intense
18 Schonfeld Papers (UCL), 27 May 1940. Minutes of Refugee Joint Consultative 
Committee Meeting.
19 Ibid.
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wave of national solidarity generated by the threat of invasion. The 
organisations were anxious to be seen to be 'rallying round'. In the same spirit, 
the Jewish Chronicle, referring to The Home Front in Peril’ and the danger of a 
Nazi Fifth Column, declared, 'In a life and death struggle for national survival 
the Government justifiably claims the right to interfere drastically with the 
freedom of the individual’. This wholehearted support prevailed throughout 
May. 20
The Anglo-Jewish leadership accepted that the Government had been 
compelled to adopt a policy involving great individual hardship purely for 
national security reasons and was not inclined to oppose it while Britain was 
fighting for survival. Although he had private reservations, Brodetsky agreed 
‘that in view of the war situation, the Government’s policy in regard to 
internment should not be opposed’. 21 Oswald Peake, Under-Secretary at the 
Home Office, acknowledged that 'No refugee Committee has any quarrel with 
this policy, but there has been some criticism of the manner in which it has 
been carried out' .22
The Board recommended that facilities be provided for access to the internees 
and for the continuance of welfare, cultural and social work in the internment 
camps. The CCJR had decided that, for the present, no guarantee as to the 
bona tides of refugees should be given by any committee.23 Although it was 
considered necessary to persuade the War Office to recognise the difference 
between refugee internees and enemy alien internees, it was decided that, for
20 J.C., 10 May 1940, p.12; 24 May 1940, p.1.
21 Acc 3121 C l0/1/ I ,  28 May 1940, Executive Committee, Minutes; C2/3/3/1, 23 
May 1940, RJCC, Draft Resolution to the Home Office.
22 Schonfeld Papers (UCL), 11 July 1940, Government's Internment Policy.
23 CCJR, 22 May 1940, Minutes, p.3; Acc 3121 CIO/1/1, 28 May 1940, 
Executive Committee, Minutes.
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the moment, individual appeals should not be pressed.24 The Council was 
acting on Government advice 'that individual applications for release would not 
be welcomed at present in view of the grave situation'. 25
However, acquiescence was not unqualified. Brodetsky questioned whether 
current procedure was really securing the internment of potentially dangerous 
persons. Sir Robert Waley-Cohen added somewhat illogically and irrelevantly 
that ‘there had not been a single case of a person who was supposed to be a 
refugee, having been found guilty of sabotage or in any way acting in a manner 
detrimental to the Government of Holland'.26 Various members of the Council, 
such as Lady Reading, felt that in the circumstances internment was in the 
interest of the refugees, a view endorsed by the RJCC, which considered it 
unwise to release internees 'to live in heavily bombed areas'.27 This attitude 
was bitterly resented by some internees. Hans Gal, an exiled Austrian 
composer, recalls a ‘shameful event when a prominent Jew ... came to the 
camp and ... told us that they will do everything for us .... But we must stay 
there till the end of the war, it’s best for us! ... they too felt somehow 
endangered.’ Gal believed British Jewry felt endangered by the presence of so 
many co-religionists who could be regarded as not quite safe and reliable.’28
While some elements in British Jewry understandably felt this way, the crucial 
consideration, not mentioned by Gal, was the internees' German background. 
Certainly there was also an acute awareness of increased anti-Semitism at this
24 CCJR, 14 June 1940, Minutes, p.1.
25 Schonfeld Papers (UCL), 27 May 1940, RJCC, Minutes.
25 CCJR, 22 May 1940, Minutes, p.2.
27 Schonfeld Papers, (UCL), 9 Oct. 1940, RJCC, Minutes, p.3; CCJR, 22 May 
1940, Minutes, p.3.
28 Dr.Hans Gal, Imperial War Museum, Department of Sound Records, 
no.004304/4. Reel 03.
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time. The press campaign against refugees became so fierce during the early 
stages of internment that the Ministry of Information, in a confidential 
memorandum dated 27 April 1940, noted that local governments and refugee 
committees were disturbed by increasingly anti-Semitic attitudes among the 
general public. 29 While the circumstances of war inevitably meant that it was 
the German/Austrian background of the refugees, rather than their Jewishness, 
that attracted suspicion and hostility, nevertheless, the Jewish community 
became increasingly anxious that the refugees should present as low a profile 
as possible. Gordon Liverman, chairman of the Jewish Defence Committee, 
was greatly concerned about 'the thoughtless behaviour of so many [refugees] 
in areas where they were concentrated, as doing a great deal of harm'.^o The 
fear of increased anti-Semitism was reflected in a letter drafted by the Board for 
circulation to all refugees in England. It was similar to the pamphlet issued 
before the war, reminding them that it is ‘the duty of every refugee to remember 
that he is a guest in this country ... The least he can do is to adapt himself to 
the customs of this country'. Included was a list of rules of public behaviour, 
namely not to speak German in public, not to push in queues and not to tell 
Englishmen that things were done better in Germany.si
Internment and deportation remained unopposed until 2 July 1940, when the 
SS 'Arandora Star", carrying internees to Canada, was torpedoed. The disaster 
provoked bitter public outrage. Many of the victims had not been Nazi or Fascist 
sympathisers but refugees mistakenly selected for deportation. By 26 July, the 
Jewish Chronicle was speaking of an ‘Internment Scandal'.22 Although public
29 stent, op.cit., pp.51-52.
20 Acc 3121 C2/3/3/1,14 May 1940, Gordon Liverman to Brotman.
21 CCJR, Agenda File, 19 March 1940-45 June 1940, ‘Draft of suggested Letter 
for Refugees'.
22 J.C., 26 July 1940, pp. 1,10. By 2 August, the J.C. was reporting ‘Gestapo 
Methods in Britain' and ‘Disgraceful Hounding of Refugees'.
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opinion had changed drastically after the Arandora tragedy, the RJCC decided 
not to 'criticise' the principle of Internment but to consider how best It could work 
within the framework of that policy. Nevertheless, it frequently exercised the 
right 'to indicate to the Government where their policy was felt to be misdirected 
or needed change'. 3^ The Committee evidently drew a fine distinction between 
'criticising' and indicating to the Government 'where their policy was 
misdirected'. Whether the Government was alive to such delicate semantic 
nuances is questionable. No doubt the RJCC wished to retain the right to 
criticise without appearing openly negative.
Schonfeld appears to have been perfectly amenable to internment: ‘the whole 
problem of the refugees from Nazi oppression must be judged in relation to the 
entire British and international situation'. Unlike Brodetsky, he believed that the 
refugees were better off interned for their own safety. He praised the 
authorities' ‘sincere determination all round to see as much ‘fair play’ and as 
many wrongs redressed and improvements carried out as the circumstances 
permitted'.34 Schonfeld’s surprising complaisance about internment conceals a 
characteristically pragmatic attitude towards the inevitable. Since there was no 
question of changing government policy, he concentrated his efforts instead on 
maintaining good working relations with the authorities. In this way he was able 
to supervise and ameliorate conditions in the camps. This was undoubtedly 
wise, but it is all the more difficult to follow the argument of those historians who 
condemn the establishment's grovelling sycophancy and praise Schonfeld's 
'exceptional' efforts.
33 Schonfeld Papers (UCL), 9 Oct. 1940, Minutes, RJCC, p.2.
34 MS 183 Schonfeld, 593/1, July 1941, ‘Great Britain and the Refugees'; The 
Times. 30 July 1940, p.5. Letter to the Editor.
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The British Section did not openly challenge government policy, but pointed out 
that the 'precautionary measures which the Government are taking have 
inevitably and unavoidably resulted in grave hardships ' and that ‘the 
interests of National Economy would be better served if the labour of aliens 
whose loyalty is beyond suspicion were made available for the national effort 
rather than they should become a burden on the public purse in internment 
camps'. Perlzweig also argued, somewhat naively, that of the priceless value of 
our liberal treatment of refugees as an element in securing the sympathetic 
support of neutrals as well as that of the United States’
Support for Internees
Brodetsky rejected accusations that the Anglo-Jewish leadership had adopted a 
pusillanimous attitude towards internment, stressing that the Board acted 
through Parliament and other organisations intensely interested in amelioration 
of the position in regard to internment’.^ e This could hardly have seemed a 
persuasive or even logical rebuttal. In practice, it was the only possible 
approach. The Board was in constant touch with the Parliamentary Committee 
for Refugees under Eleanor Rathbone, who brought the plight of the internees 
to the attention of the Government.^^ Hans Gal regarded it 'as a great relief to
35 Acc 3121 E3/520/1, 27 May 1940, Perlzweig to (presumably) Board; FO  
371/24239 A3317/131/45, 20 May 1940, Perlzweig to Halifax.
36 Acc 3121 0  2/3/573, 8 August 1940, Nathan Laski to Brotman; 9 Aug. 1940, 
Laski to Churchill; 15 Aug.1940, Brodetsky to Laski; 20 Aug. 1940, Laski to 
Brodetsky.
37 The Parliamentary Committee for Refugees' dual function was to influence 
Government policy and public opinion in favour of generous treatment of 
refugees and to assist individual refugees in presenting their cases for release 
from internment. By February 1942 it had a membership of nearly 200 M.Ps. of 
all parties, with 25 members on its executive. See Acc 3121 C2/3/4/2, Refugee 
Conference Feb. 1942, Parliamentary Committee, statement by Rathbone, 
pp.22-23.
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have somebody [Rathbone] open their mouth for us -  very temperamentally 
she did it'.sa Brotman submitted to this Committee various suggestions for 
consideration, including, inter alia, wrongly interned persons, provisions for 
welfare work in the internment camps, release of internees who could be 
usefully employed in work of national importance, and reconsideration of all 
cases of internment in due course. He recommended the formation of a joint 
committee representing the War Office, the Home Office and the Ministry of 
Home Security to deal with the problems of internment.^^ On 24 June 1940, the 
day before general internment was to commence, a deputation met with Peake, 
who gave some reassurances,
At the Board's two emergency Executive Committee meetings (9 and 17 July), 
Brodetsky took the defensive, challenging accusations that he had supinely 
acquiesced in government policy from the start. All-inclusive internment had 
only commenced on 25 June, and Brodetsky noted that the orders for 
internment had originally only affected persons in category 'B', those living in 
certain areas, whose numbers were small compared with the total number of 
refugees in the country. Brodetsky pointed out that the situation was now very 
different, ‘when internment had assumed a general and indiscriminate character 
and large numbers of people ... were being interned at very short 
notice...without knowing what the Government’s intentions were'.^i
38 Dr.Hans Gal, Imperial War Museum, Department of Sound Archives, Tape 
no.004304/04; Dr.Fritz Hallgarten, Tape no.003967/06, ‘Civilian Internment in 
Britain 1939-1945’.
39 Acc 3121 C2/3/5, 4 June 1940, note of 'Meeting of Parliamentary Committee 
on Refugees’, signed by Brotman; Acc 3121 C2/3/5/3,11 June 1940, Brotman to 
Rathbone; CCJR, Executive Minutes, 14 June 1940, pp.2-3.
40 Stent, op.cit., pp.81-82.
41 Acc 3121 CIO/1/1, 9 July 1940, Executive Committee, Minutes; J.C., 12 July 
1940, p.5. The J.C. noted that the Board had foregone its usual two months 
vacation. Acc 3121 A/31, 25 July 1940, Executive Report.
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Brodetsky acknowledged that conditions in some of the camps left much to be 
desired. There was a lack of cultural activities and useful employment. 
Deportations to Canada had taken place without adequate notice to relatives. 
He also noted that it was senseless to intern persons, UK-resident for many 
years, but born in Galicia (or other territories of the old Austro-Hungarian 
Empire), and therefore regarded as Austrian nationals. It was pointed out that 
when Galicia became part of Poland, its ties with Austria were severed and 
Galicians were strongly opposed to Nazism. Brodetsky suggested a review of 
policy detail and of internment conditions. He also called for the centralisation of 
the government authority supervising internment, currently administered by 
several government departments. The general principle of the Committee was 
that 'persons [of] whose loyalty to this country the Home Office is satisfied ... 
should be released'. Furthermore, there should be no stigma attached to those 
friendly aliens interned and that immediate steps be taken to expedite the 
release of those classes of persons the Home Office expected to announce. 
Consideration was to be given to the internees' personal belongings and 
capital. 42
At the end of July, the War Cabinet established two Advisory Committees, one 
to assist the Home Secretary in dealing with applications for the enlargement of 
the categories of release, and the other to assist the Foreign Office in dealing 
with the welfare and employment of aliens in internment camps. The Home 
Office produced its first White Paper at the end of July, detailing 18 categories 
of internees to be released. The immediate reaction of the voluntary 
organisations was critical because the White Paper confirmed rather than
42 Ibid; J.C., 2 Aug. 1940, p.1.
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changed internment policy. It provided for the release of only those internees 
whose services could be useful to the nation and the war effort.*^
The Central Office of Refugees (now incorporating the RJGC and comprising 
the principal organisations dealing with refugees from Germany and Austria) 
was invited to present a memorandum to the Home Office Asquith Advisory 
Committee on Aliens. This committee, under the chairmanship of Mr.Justice 
Asquith, had been set up to examine the whole policy of internment and 
suggest whatever changes it considered necessary, and to examine all 
individual cases which were referred to it by the Home Secretary. The 
memorandum stated that 'release from internment should not be restricted by 
any standard of employability but that consideration should be given to the 
release of all who ... give unquestionable proof of their anti-Nazi and anti- 
Fascist sympathies and their willingness to serve the causes for which this 
country is fighting and for whose maintenance proper provision has been 
m ade'.44 The Board also sent a memorandum. While Brodetsky agreed that 
there should be no anti-government agitation and that complete reversal of 
internment policy should not be requested, the Government should be asked to 
reconsider its view of refugees in Britain and their potential, both positive and 
negative, for the war effort. He believed refugees should be interned only if they 
were considered a threat to national security and hoped this would lead to a 
restriction of the categories of those interned.45
More practically, a sub-committee, formed to deal with the welfare of internees 
and consisting of Brodetsky, Schiff and Harry Sacher (an executive member of
43 CMD 6217, July 1940, copy in Schonfeld papers (UCL); JTA, 27 July 1940, 
p.3.
44 Schonfeld Papers (UCL), 6 Aug. 1940, Memorandum, p.2.
45 CCJR, 8 Aug. 1940, Executive Minutes, p.4.
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the CCJR), prepared a memorandum on CCJR p o l i c y / ^  The ensuing 
discussions are revealing. Schiff wrote privately to Sacher, You might object to 
the whole approach but I feel simply to go to the Government and say that they 
must reverse their entire policy would meet with a refusal ... as we are going to 
the Government and telling them that we have no funds left and that they must 
take over the entire maintenance of refugees, we cannot very well dictate to 
them where to keep them and it is unquestionably cheaper for them to keep 
large numbers together than have them distributed over the c o u n t r y ' .47 Realism 
and economics, as ever, held most weight with Schiff. This is understandable, 
in view of the negotiations with the Government on refugee maintenance. The 
sub-committee agreed that the principle to be adopted by the CCJR and the 
Board should be that ‘While stressing that internment should be governed by 
the exigencies of national security, it was to urge the Government to proceed 
immediately with the release of all those internees of whose honesty and loyalty 
they were satisfied, and whose release would constitute no danger to national 
security’.4Q
The CCJR wanted all approaches to the Government to be co-ordinated with 
the Christian Council; the association of the Jewish and Christian Councils was 
‘close and harmonious’ and ‘in all matters they acted together'.^Q The Bishop of 
Chichester, aithough he maintained that the Government 'made a great 
mistake', felt ‘that the present time was not one when the Government should
^6 Ibid, pp.3-4.
47 Acc 3121 C2/3/5/1,13 Aug. 1940, Schiff to Harry Sacher.
48 CCJR, 16 Aug. 1940, Executive Committee, Minutes, p.1; 21 Aug. 1940, 
Executive Committee. Minutes, p.2. See J.C., 31 May 1940, p. 10, with reference 
to the Duke of Devonshire’s criticism of internment as a ‘gross waste of effort and 
man-power which we can ill afford in this grave emergency’.
49 CCJR, Agenda File (14 June-13 Nov. 1940), 14 August 1940, ‘Policy 
Regarding Internment of German and Austrian Refugees’; CCJR, Annual Report, 
1941, p.5.
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be pressed to reverse Its policy regarding Internment [as proposed by the 
Friendly Allens Committee]... the Christian Council did not feel that they could 
join In sending such a letter at the p r e s e n t ' .so This was at the height of the 
Battle of Britain and the fear of Imminent Invasion. The Bishop therefore 
suggested that ‘they ought to go slow...to wait a month or possibly two to see 
how things developed, when the national security problem would not be so 
acute’.si
Brodetsky agreed that the time was not ripe for further representations to the 
Government and that It was best not to send the sub-committee's memorandum 
before the House of Commons debate on 22 August. Rather, the sub­
committee should suggest extensions of the present categories of persons to 
be released. Again, In October, Brodetsky stated that ‘whilst It was necessary to 
make representations for a change In Internment policy on the basis of the 
principle agreed upon by the Board, It was felt that as there had been a change 
of Home Secretary ... It was not, at present, advisable to approach the Home 
Office on the question of a change of the Internment pollcy'.sz Given the critical 
military position during this period, Brodetsky was apparently actuated by a 
desire to win as much humane consideration for Internees as possible. He was 
also understandably anxious not to antagonise those whose compliance was 
essential If the Internees were to be assisted.
Brodetsky's view, with some dissension, prevailed. It was felt that the Executive 
was ‘wise In not pressing for reconsideration of the general principles of the
50 Stent, op.cit, pp.80-81 ; Ronald Jasper, Georoe Bell. Bishop of Chichester 
(London 1967), p.152; CCJR, 28 Aug. 1940, Executive Committee, Minutes, p.2.
51 J.T.A., 27 Aug. 1940, p.3.
52 Acc 3121 CIO/1/1, 28 Aug. 1940; 9 Oct. 1940, Executive Committee, Minutes; 
J.C., 18 Oct. 1940, p.14.
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policy of internment. Instead they had rightly tried to obtain new categories of 
releases', in particular for aliens of Galician-Polish o r i g i n . 5 3  Again, it was 
decided that these suggestions receive Christian Council approval before being 
submitted to the Advisory Committee.54 in light of the military emergency during 
the summer of 1940, and after, with the imminent prospect of invasion by a 
power which had already conquered most of Europe, any attempt to press for 
an end to internment would have been regarded by the Government as, at best, 
an irritant and at worst, perversely unco-operative. The practical sense of the 
organisations' approach is indisputable. Those who see it as weakly conciliatory 
might address the question why the Christian Council shared this approach.
In spite of Brodetsky's reluctance to press for a reversal of internment, he was 
keen that the Board should not be seen to be feebly condoning Government 
policy. He refuted Lord Winterton's comment in the House of Lords on 22 
August that 'certain prominent Jews' had said to him, 'Preserve us from the 
extremist Jewish and gentile friends of the refugees in the House of Commons 
and elsewhere'. Winterton explained that in some quarters, Jewish and non- 
Jewish, this had been taken to mean that persons entitled to speak for the 
community were in favour of general internment. Brodetsky maintained that 'I 
had no doubt that this was at least partly correct, but the CGJ fought hard 
against internment and so of course did the Board and other bodies'.5s The fact 
remains that the Board fought hard for the internees but not 'against internment' 
itself.
53 Acc 3121 A/31, 18 Dec. 1940, Minutes; JTA, 20 Dec. 1940, p.3; CCJR, 
Agenda File (14 June-13 Nov. 1940), 6 Sept. 1940, Brodetsky to Justice Asquith, 
Advisory Committee on the Internment of Aliens; 1 Oct. 1940, Schiff to Brotman.
54 CCJR, 18 Sept. 1940, Executive Committee, Minutes, p.3.
55 Acc 3121 C2/3/5/4, 29 Aug. 1940, Sir Andrew McFadyean to Neville Laski; 18 
Sept. 1940, Brodetsky to Oscar Deutsch; Brodetsky, Memoirs, pp.200-201.
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The organisations’ attempts to secure reappraisal and extension of the 
categories of interned aliens eligible for release were only partially successful. 
Some internees, although apparently perfectly loyal and reliable, did not fit into 
any of the categories. The Board continued its contacts with the Advisory 
Committee and proposed that the whole basis of internment policy needed 
reconsideration with a view to making loyalty and reliability the chief criteria of 
release. 56 The Board preferred to stress the loyalty of the internees rather than 
their economic usefulness as justifying their release.
By the end of 1940, when the number of internees had fallen to about 10,000, 
other issues were dominating the Anglo-Jewish agenda, namely the problems 
of air raids and appeals for funds to maintain essential communal services 
necessary for evacuation.57 Brodetsky now felt that ‘in view of the opportunities 
for release of internees under various categories, it was not considered 
expedient at present to rouse [sic] with the authorities the general policy of 
internment’ even though there were still a number of refugees who should, he 
felt, have been released.58 On the whole, it was left to the sub-committee of the 
Refugee Committee to study the question of policy and make recommendations 
accordingly.
Clearly, no concerted effort on the part of the organisations, at a time of 
national emergency, could have altered government policy. By contrast, in the 
area of welfare and humanitarian relief, for which they were experienced and 
well-equipped, the organisations, by virtue of not conflicting with government 
objectives, took a more pro-active approach and achieved considerable results.
56 Acc 3121 A /31 ,17 Nov. 1940, Minutes; Board Annual Report 1940, p. 18.
57 J .C ,18 Oct. 1940, p.1; 18 Oct. 1940, p. 14.
58 Acc 3121 A/31, 25 Feb. 1941, Minutes.
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Amelioration of Conditions
The White Papers did not deal with the welfare of internees but only with 
defining categories for release. Steps were taken to improve the conditions of 
internment. In view of the fact that 80 percent of German internees were 
Jewish, efforts were made to have representatives from the CCJR on the 
second Advisory Committee. Schiff was particularly concerned that differences 
between genuine refugees from Nazi oppression and Nazi sympathisers be 
clarified q u i c k l y .  5 9
Until 5 August, internment camps for both civilians and POWs were controlled 
by the War Office, which preferred to work with only one voluntary organisation, 
already known to it, the interdenominational Joint Committee for the Welfare of 
Civilian Internees and Prisoners of War. This had been formed at the beginning 
of the war under the chairmanship of the Revd. Dr, D. Paton of the Church 
Commission and had added a number of Jewish representatives, including 
Schonfeld. It became known as the Edinburgh House Committee. With general 
internment, this committee widened its functions and a Central Committee for 
Internees was set up in Bloomsbury House in mid-June 1940, representing all 
the major case-working bodies.
Permission to visit the camps was obtained through the Edinburgh House 
Committee. While the War Office was in charge, there were considerable 
difficulties in obtaining permits to visit the camps. Once the Home Office had 
taken over it became somewhat easier, though permits were issued sparingly.5°
59 CCJR, 24 July 1940, Executive Committee, Minutes, p.3. 
50 Schonfeld Papers (UCL), 9 Oct. 1940, Minutes, RJCC.
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Within a few days of the internment order, however, Schonfeld obtained a War 
Office ‘pass’ enabling him to visit all the internment camps both on the Isle of 
Man and on the mainland. Schonfeld never questioned internment policy itself 
but only the conditions he found in the camps, and at all times praised the 
military commandants.
There was close co-operation between the voluntary organisations over 
ameliorating conditions in the internment camps. At the outset, the CRREC was 
the only Jewish body dealing with the general welfare of many thousands of 
internees and remained so until the establishment of the Central Committee for 
lnternees.63 Apart from official representations on welfare questions and 
periodic visits by Schonfeld, the CRREC undertook religious welfare work 
among all refugees, including those interned since the setting up of the Home 
Office Tribunal when the war began. At that time German pastors were 
appointed for non-Jewish inmates and Schonfeld tried to secure a parallel 
arrangement for Jewish internees. Curiously, the United Synagogue Welfare 
Committee and the JRC initially refused to undertake this work and Schonfeld 
turned to the Board which agreed to take up the matter. Even the Central 
Committee for Internees showed an apparent reluctance to advertise its 
existence, presumably because it would be ‘inundated with en q u iries ’.^^ 
Eventually, the United Synagogue, as well as other communities and
61 Acc 3121 C2/3/5, 17 July 1940, Brotman to Julius Jung, Secretary of the 
Federation of Synagogues; 26 July 1940, Brotman to Norman Bentwich.
62 The Times, 30 July 1940, p.5, Schonfeld's Letter to the Editor; MS 183 
Schonfeld 117/8, Report for the year ending 1 Oct. 1941, Internees.
63 Ibid.. p.4.
64 MS 183 Schonfeld 673 [AG-AL], 31 March 1940, Pels to Rosenheim; Acc 
3121 C2/3/5/3, 27 Dec. 1939, Schonfeld to Brotman; Acc 3121 B5/2/2, 24 July 
1940, Brotman to Brodetsky.
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Individuals, co-operated in the provision of general welfare and religious
requirements. 65
Within the first few months of internment, Schonfeld carried out five tours of 
inspection which proved a source of great moral encouragement by transmitting 
news to relatives and representing ‘the first contact of these unfortunate men 
and women with Jewry’.®® Each tour of the camps was followed by a detailed 
report, together with suggestions for improvements. Schonfeld reported back to 
the Central Council, which praised his report ‘for not overstating the facts and 
for having made practical suggestions’. The JRC considered it 'the best report 
... it is moderately worded and yet points out the shortcomings'.®^ The Home 
Office was similarly impressed by Schonfeld's 'constructive' reports. Others also 
arranged similar visits to the camps.®®
Most of the issues reported were dealt with effectively. Schonfeld's most 
pressing demand was for the release of all invalids, many of whom, according 
to Home Office instructions to the police, should never have been interned. As 
a result of his first tour and the subsequent White Paper on invalids, he was
65 MS 183 Schonfeld 117/8, Report for the year ending 1 Oct. 1941, Internees- 
Ministrations and Religious Services; Acc 3121 C2/3/5/3, 17 June 1940, Report 
of visit to internment camp on Isle of Man.
66 MS 183 Schonfeld 117/8, Report for the year ending 1 Oct. 1941, p.4; 
D.Kranzler and G.Hirschler, eds., Solomon Schonfeld. His Page in Historv. 
pp.93-94.
67 MS 183 Schonfeld, 593/1, Reports on visit to Internment camps (16-23 July; 
23-28 Aug; 5-7 Sept; 4-6 Nov. 1940); 228/1, 12 Aug. 1940, Schiff to Schonfeld.; 
297/1, Report for the year ending 31 Dec. 1942, p.3; CZA A173/63, 1 Aug. 1940, 
Schiff to Simon Marks.
68 Schonfeld Papers (UCL), 24 Aug. 1940, Home Office to Dame Joanna 
Cruickshank; MS 183 Schonfeld 228/1,10-17 July 1940, Report by W.R.Hughes, 
Society of Friends, visit to Huyton Internment Camp; Rathbone and Major Victor 
Cazalet visited Huyton Camp; Acc 3121 C2/3/5/2, 26 July 1940, Brotman to 
Bentwich; 5 Aug. 1940, Wilfred Israel, Overseas Department, JRC, visit to Isle of 
Man Camp. For Israel's role see Naomi Shephard, Wilfred Israel. Germanv's 
Secret Ambassador (London. 1984), pp. 173-176.
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able to secure the immediate release of sick persons. Schonfeld also secured 
the closure of the Frees Heath Camp, which he considered unsuitable for 
internm ent.69 Together with others, he made suggestions concerning 
accommodation, rations, furniture and overcrowding. Educational, religious and 
social activities among the refugees were of vital importance. Social amenities, 
such as radios, newspapers and libraries were arranged. Censorship delays in 
correspondence, mixed camps and meetings between husbands, wives and 
children were issues that required attention. Food supplies and pocket money 
were given to the destitute. In all these matters, progress was made, although 
sometimes after long delays.
With War Office approval, Schonfeld arranged for the provision of kosher food, 
religious services and books. A parcel scheme was initiated. Camp rabbis were 
appointed and Revd.S.Anekstein was sent to the Isle of Man as the Council's 
representative from September 1940 until May 1942. The CRREC organised 
the first Jewish plot in the Douglas cemetery on the Isle of Man in November 
1940. Both the Isle of Man Government and military Headquarters co-operated 
in this scheme, which received financial assistance from the CCJR and other 
communities. 71
Applications for releases were made through the Central Committee at 
Bloomsbury House. Steps were also taken by the CRREC to obtain the release 
of refugees classified as bona-fide by the White Paper regulations. The CRREC
G9 MS 183 Schonfeld 117/8, Report for year ending 1 Oct. 1940, Internees; The 
Times, 30 July 1940, p.5, Schonfeld’s letter to the Editor; MS 183 Schonfeld, 
228/1, 16-23 July 1940, Report on Schonfeld's visit to Internment Camps.
70 MS 183 Schonfeld 117/8, Report for year ending 1 Oct. 1941, Internees; 
CCJR, Annual Report, 1940, p.8.
71 MS 183 Schonfeld 673 [AG-AL], May 1941, Report on Activities of Agudat 
Israel, p.8; MS 183 Schonfeld 297/1, Report for year ending 31 Dec. 1942, p.3.
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participated in Home Office deliberations, Schonfeld representing Hertz at the 
Asquith Commission. Schonfeld dealt with a different category of internees; 
besides invalids, he also assisted the aged, ministers of religion, theological 
students, teachers of religion, Polish and Galician refugees and cases of 
doubtful nationality. These were drawn from those with whom his organisation 
had some connection. In most cases his suggestions were approved. Close on 
1000 internees were released on the sponsorship of the CRREC alone.^z The 
Agudat Israel was also Involved In securing the release of certain categories of 
refugee internees. Releases were obtained in about 75 percent of cases 
applied for, including cases that had been previously refused. 3^ The recruiting 
of refugees for the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps, which had been stopped in 
May, was renewed. This was the swiftest way to secure release. During the 
later part of 1940, with the help of Captain Davidson, the JRC's principal 
Recruiting Officer, 2,000 more recruits were enrolled, bringing the total number 
of refugees to 5,000.^4
The RJCC expressed unease, both that persons for whom the organisations 
were prepared to vouch were experiencing problems In obtaining release, and 
at what appeared to be over-generosity on the part of the authorities in 
releasing persons on medical grounds, evidence suggesting that many releases 
were of doubtful validity. Its chairman. Lord Lytton, pointed out that the 
voluntary organisations had more intimate knowledge of refugees than 
government departments and that 'no committee wished any refugee to be 
released under present conditions if there was any doubt of his or her honesty
72 MS 183 Schonfeld 117/8, Report for year ending 1 Oct. 1941, p.4; 297/1, 
Report for year ending 31 Dec. 1941, p.4. and Internees -  releases.
73 MS 183 Schonfeld 673 [AG-AL], 30 July 1940, Rosenheim, London, to Joint 
Orthodox Refugees Committee; May 1941, Agudat Israel, Report p.8.
74 CCJR, Annual Report, 1940, p.8.
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or integrity'75 This would have seriously impugned the credibility and 
effectiveness of the RJCC itself.
The JRC, however, received praise for its help to the Appeal Tribunal of North- 
East England, regarding the bona-fides of the internees: the Committee was ‘on 
the whole entirely impartial and truthful and more often than any other 
competent authority gave information which led to discoveries being made of a 
useful character’. Such discoveries included the cases of 2,414 out of a total of 
3,760 applicants released under the sickness clause: ‘The Government was 
alarmed at the mistakes made in releasing persons on the grounds of sickness. 
As a result they tightened up medical examinations and asked the JRC whether 
any persons have been released without proper r e a s o n ' . 7 6  Clearly, there had 
been sufficient numbers of unauthorised or doubtful releases on medical 
grounds to provoke this concern, but there was evidently co-operation and trust 
between the Anglo-Jewish organisations and the Government on this point.
Deportation
The worst consequence of the internment policy was the deportation of 
approximately 8,000 internees to Canada and Australia in the summer of 1940. 
The Anglo-Jewish organisations were generally averse to the deportation of 
refugees, largely due to the manner in which the deportations were conducted 
and uncertainty about the treatment and fate of deportees once they reached 
their destination.77 Deportees were treated by the authorities in these countries 
as dangerous prisoners-of-war. Even though their treatment complied with the
75schonfeld Papers (UCL), 9 Oct. 1940, RJCC, Minutes, p.3.
76 Acc 3121 C2/3/5/4, 3 Oct. 1940, R.CIare Martin, Secretary of the RJCC, to 
Board.
77 CZA A173/63 17 July 1940, Sacher, Note on Deportation.
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Geneva Convention on POWs, many civilian internees felt distressed and 
stigmatised. There were complaints that Nazis and non-Nazis were being 
Interned together, creating considerable friction. Saul Hayes, of the United 
Jewish Refugee and War Relief Agencies in Canada, dealt with the authorities 
there on these and other related issues. In June 1941 he managed to secure 
for deportees a change of status from POWs to that of refugee. On the whole, 
however, all matters of release and policy were referred to the United
Kingdom. 78
The Board, initially unaware that the Central Committee for Internees at 
Bloomsbury House maintained contact with refugees in Canada and Australia, 
demanded that regular contact with deportees should be established under its 
auspices. It then attempted to gain representation on the Central Committee but 
Leslie Prince, co-chairman of the CCJR, argued that the Committee was ‘non- 
denominational... and its suggestions for action would be all the more effective, 
because it would not involve a specifically Jewish aspecf.79 The Board deferred 
to this view.
This impartiality was particularly pertinent in the case of the 'Dunera', the 
troopship carrying the survivors of the ill-fated 'Arandora Star'. The 'Dunera', 
with the capacity to hold 1,000 people, transported 2,542 German, Austrian and 
Italian deportees under appalling conditions, on a two-month voyage to 
Australia, during which the deportees were robbed of their possessions and
78 MS 183 Schonfeld 673 [AG-AL], August 1940, Report by United Jewish 
Refugee and War Relief Agencies, p.2. According to this report, 6,735 people 
were interned in Canada, of whom 2,290 were considered non-dangerous. 
Included in this latter category were 1,746 Jews. J.C., 22 Nov. 1940, p. 13, 28 
Feb. 1941, pp.5,19; Acc 3121 C2/3/5/5, 30 July 1941, Saul Hayes, Central 
Committee for Interned Refugees, Montreal, to Stephany.
79 Acc 3121 B5/2/2, 14 Feb. 1941, Brotman to Brodetsky; C2/3/5/5, 23 Feb. 
1941, Brotman to L.Prince.
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mistreated by British guards. Among them were many Jews, who were 
allegedly singled out for harsher treatment.^o The Board now opposed Jewish 
representation on a Government Committee of Enquiry being set up to 
investigate this. It was pointed out that ‘the inter-denominational Committee at 
Bloomsbury House ... was able to keep a more effective watch on these 
matters if only because it dealt with questions not entirely from a Jewish aspect, 
but from the general humanitarian aspect’. Lady Reading, too, maintained that 
'we should surely be throwing aspirations [sic] on the reliability and impartiality 
of those whom the Government is entrusting to go into the matter, if we ask 
whether a Jew might sit on the board’.®i
However, specifically religious concerns could not be subsumed into the 
interdenominational 'humanitarian' issue and here the attitude of the Board was 
more forceful. In February 1941, representatives of the Joint Orthodox Jewish 
Refugee Committee inquired about the religious welfare of internees, citing 
those in an Australian camp 400 miles from Sydney, whose Jewish community, 
due to shortages of funds, was unable to help. After some difficulty, religious 
observance was permitted and kosher food provided, to be paid for by outside 
organisations or by the internees.®^ other religious issues included the so- 
called Sabbath scandal in Camp B’, an order issued by the office of Internment
80 Major Julius Layton, Imperial War Museum, Department of Sound Archives, 
no.004382/03, ‘Jewish Refugee Question'; Michael Blakeney, Australia and the 
Jewish Refugees 1933-1948 (Sydney, 1985), pp. 167-68; Benzion Patkin, The 
Dunera Internees (Sydney, 1979), p.51; Acc 3121 C2/3/5/5, 2 Feb. 1941, David 
Brotmacher to Brotman.
81 Ibid.; 18 Feb. 1941, Brotman to Prince; 6 Feb. 1941, Lady Reading to Brotman.
82 Ibid., 15 Feb. 1941, Brotman to Schildenkraut; 29 Jan. 1941, extract of letter 
from the Australian Jewish Welfare Society, Sydney; CCJR, 13 Nov. 1940, p.5 
and 15 May 1941, p.5. Executive Committee, Minutes. The CCJR authorised 
£1000 out of the £2,000 landing money granted by it for destitute refugees. MS 
183 Schonfeld 673 [AG-AL], Canada -  August 1940, Report by United Jewish 
Refugee and War Relief Agencies, p.4.
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Operations in Canada, penalising Jews who refused to work on the Sabbath. 
The Board protested strongly and suggested that all such issues be directed to 
Hayes, via the Central Committee for Internees in London. Within a month the 
issue was resolved.
The British voluntary organisations approached the Advisory Committee to 
make overtures to the Dominion Governments to arrange for release and 
integration into the Canadian and Australian war effort of all refugees who 
wished to stay and whom the Home Cffice considered eligible for release.^* 
They were particularly concerned about deportees who had volunteered for 
internment in Canada on the mistaken supposition that they would be able to 
secure visas there for the United States.How ever, the Home Cffice refused 
to approach the Dominion Governments; internees eligible for release were 
either to be returned to Britain or were to emigrate elsewhere.®®
At the end of 1940, the Home Cffice appointed two Jewish representatives, 
Chaim Raphael and Major Julius Layton, to visit Canada and Australia to help 
in the work of releasing deportees and those who came within the new 
categories for release as specified in the White Paper.®^ Eventually by Cctober 
1945, the Canadian Immigration Department had agreed to allow all refugees In 
Canada with non-immigrant status (by then numbering 3,500) to remain
83 Acc 3121 C2/3/5/5, 13 March 1941, R.W.Cppenheimer, Joint Crthodox 
Jewish Refugees Committee, to Brotman; 18 March 1941, Brotman to 
Cppenheimer.
84 Ibid., 8 Cot. 1940, Internment of Aliens: Suggestions.
85 Chaim Raphael, Imperial War Museum, Department of Sound Archives, 
no.004289/2, ‘Civilian Internment in Britain 1939-1945'; Acc 3121 C2/3/5/5, 30 
July 1941, Hayes to Stephany; CCJR, Annual Report, 1941, pp.4-5.
86 Stent, op.cit., p.226.
87 CCJR, Annual Report 1940, p.8.
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permanently.®8 In Australia, where interference from Whitehall was unwelcome, 
it proved more difficult to obtain release or settlement for deportees, despite the 
efforts of the Parliamentary Committee for Refugees. By the end of 1942 only 
some 600 had been released from internment in Australia and permitted to join 
HM forces, with the prospect of ultimate settlement in Australia after the war.®^
The Anglo-Jewish establishment's record on internment and deportation 
effectively refutes the criticism that it weakly condoned Government policy. 
What emerges is the establishment’s initial philosophical resignation to the 
policy in view of the wartime emergency and in line with the national mood, and 
its wholehearted attempts, within the constraints of that policy, to ameliorate the 
problems and harsh conditions that resulted from it. This amounted to 
acquiescence rather than endorsement. The leadership here again showed its 
experience and skill in dealing with matters of a charitable and administrative 
nature. This is in contrast to its weak and fumbling response -  the result of 
inexperience -  to the political and diplomatic challenges of the war years.
Schonfeld appears to have taken an even more supportive view of internment 
and deportation. Instead of echoing mainstream opinion that these were 
perhaps necessary evils, he actively sanctioned the internment policy as being 
in the best short-term interests of those affected, whilst working just as 
vigorously to ameliorate conditions in the camps. This approach appears at 
face value to be surprisingly complaisant, though it had the undoubted benefit 
of placing Schonfeld in a good light with the authorities, whose co-operation
88 Acc 3121 E3/520, 26 Oct. 1945, Government House, Ottawa; 14 Nov. 1945, 
Hayes to Brotman.
89 Acc 3121 02/3/5/5, 21 Nov. 1941, Brodetsky to Anthony de Rothschild; 28 
Nov., Schiff to Brodetsky; 20 July 1942, Schiff to Brotman; Board Annual Report, 
1943, p.27.
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was essential for much of his work. This was almost certainly the motive for his 
resoundingly fulsome and widely publicised praise. Schonfeld's work during this 
period shows that despite certain ideological and tactical differences, he was 
able to achieve much through harmonious co-operation with the mainstream 
organisations. There was certainly a great deal of effort on the part of all 
concerned in relief work, an effort whose intensity has perhaps been diminished 
over time by Its inevitably limited success in terms of influencing government 
policy. The area of internal relief work, in which the voluntary organisations 
achieved significant but undramatic results, has been overshadowed by the 
negative connotations of the whole internment episode and their comparative 
failure in the sphere of political efforts on the international scene.
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Chapter Five
Turning Point: The Final Solution 
Political Activity (Summer 1942 - Spring 1943)
Recent criticism of Anglo-Jewry's wartime record has focused almost 
exclusively on the question of whether sufficient effort was made for European 
Jewry. However, analysis of the effort Itself has been hitherto lacking, the 
assumption being that what mattered was the will to achieve results rather 
than the ingenuity or practicality of individual endeavours. Notwithstanding the 
desperation and good intentions of the organisations, an element of naivete 
and short-termism characterised much of their approach. This inevitably 
doomed their efforts to failure because their exclusive focus on the Jewish 
tragedy, particularly after the summer of 1942, failed to take account of the 
wider political and military context within which it took place. The Anglo-Jewish 
leadership appeared unable to understand the dynamics of global war and 
incapable of comprehending the subtle and complex calculation with which 
officials treated its requests. Furthermore, it was not fully understood at the 
time that the annihilation of European Jewry was a central Nazi war aim.
The Government was committed to a long-term strategy for winning the war 
whatever the human cost; the organisations, by contrast and understandably, 
took the short-term view that immediate rescue must take precedence. The 
official documents of this period reveal the Government's politely concealed 
impatience at the narrow-minded naivete of the Jewish organisations, which 
were sagely offering diplomatically phrased advice on aspects of the conduct 
of war without regard to logistics or possible consequences.
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Until the summer of 1942 Anglo-Jewry managed to sustain a balanced 
perspective on the European Jewish problem as both a Jewish and a wider 
humanitarian issue: ‘Anti-semitism and its effects are a world problem...aiming 
at the undermining of decent human relations everywhere and endangering 
world peace.' By emphasising the malign effects of anti-Semitism on non-Jews 
as well as Jews, the Jewish leadership hoped to present the persecution of the 
Jews as both a Jewish and a non-Jewish issue. Brodetsky on this occasion 
attempted to retain the universal perspective on Jewish persecution while at 
the same time pointing to the special nature of the Final Solution. 'It is thus 
clear that the Jewish problem cannot be compared with usual minority 
problem, and needs special attention'. 1 After the news of the Final Solution 
broke in the summer of 1942, the leadership's attention increasingly turned to 
the Jewish nature of the persecution.
Contrary to the widely held view of the Anglo-Jewish community as timid and 
insecure, the documents show that after 1942 it was forceful, if polite, to the 
point of presumption in virtually instructing the Government on its moral 
responsibilities and the ways in which these might be met, although at the 
same time deferring perforce to government edict that the only way to help 
Jews was to win the war. In contrast to the Board's exclusive focus on its 
objectives without reference to their compatibility with government policy, 
Schonfeld, who was in any case a non-Zionist, took this wider perspective 
more into account in framing his rescue proposals. This is particularly evident 
in his careful avoidance of any controversial reference to Palestine in the 
January 1943 Motion.2 Conversely, the Board seems at times to have been
1 CZA A82/6, 31 Aug. 1942, Brodetsky, 'The Jewish Problem', p.1.
2 See pp. 170-72.
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almost perversely intent on making self-defeating references to Palestine 
which it must surely have realised would not be well received.
Until late 1941, the Anglo-Jewish community was primarily concerned with 
internal problems: internment, evacuation following the threat of air-raids and 
growing anti-Semitism. Following the news of the Final Solution in the summer 
of 1942, the community was mobilised into action and presented numerous 
rescue proposals to the Government, most of which proved abortive because 
of the exigencies of Britain’s wartime priorities. The Government's policy 
considerations were thus the crucial factor in all rescue efforts; from the 
organisations' point of view, their task was not to effect rescue, but to 
persuade the Government to do so. But officials consistently maintained that 
the only means of helping European Jewry was an Allied victory; the corollary 
of this was the overriding imperative of subordinating everything else to the 
war effort.
British Wartime Policy
Immigration
Once war broke out, for security reasons, all refugees from enemy territory 
were effectively barred from Britain, though a number arrived in 1940 after the 
German invasion of the Low Countries and France. An exception was made 
for a number of Jewish orphans, with British relatives, from unoccupied Vichy 
France in the summer of 1942.3 Allied nationals were admitted only on 
compassionate grounds in limited categories. In 1943, limited extensions were 
made to certain categories eligible for special consideration: parents of
3 See pp.243-6.
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persons serving in the army, persons eligible to enlist in the army and parents 
of children under 16 years already in Britain. However, admission was still 
conditional on these people already being in neutral countries.^ In its defence, 
the Government confirmed that between 1940-1942, 63,000 refugees had 
been admitted to Britain and in the first 5 months of 1943 a further 4,000 had 
arrived .5 Many of these, however, were Allied nationals or useful for the war 
effort.
Immigration policy remained otherwise unchanged, despite increasing 
pressure on the Government from late 1942 to admit Jewish refugees. A token 
gesture was made by the Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, when he 
announced in early 1943 that Britain would accept between 1,000-2,000 
refugees on condition that the United States and Dominions accepted 
proportionate numbers. He observed, however, that there were already 
100,000 refugees, mainly Jews, in Britain and that accommodation problems 
were already acute, due to the destruction of some 30 percent of housing in 
London during the Blitz of 1940-41, especially in the East End, where most 
Jews had gravitated. The problem would become critical in the event of 
renewed air attack. Any substantial increase in the number of Jewish refugees 
might lead to 'serious trouble’.®
4 FO 371 «6648  W121/49/48, 29 Dec. 1942, Randall, Minute; HC Debates, 
Fifth Series, 1942-43, vol.389, col. 1127.
5 Ibid., col. 1123.
6 CAB 95/15,31 Dec.1942 and 19 Feb 1943, Cabinet Committee on Refugees, 
Minutes.
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Shipping
The most intractable logistical issue for the organisations was shipping. The 
authorities Invariably dismissed their requests for ships to transport any 
escapees from occupied Europe, on the grounds of severe shortage. The war 
effort was undeniably unsustainable without the import of food and raw 
materials, which included the demands of the British military services fighting a 
global war, the outcome of which was not certain in 1943. Shortages of fuel 
and personnel, also required for any shipping rescue schemes, compounded 
the difficulties.
The defeat of France in June 1940 resulted In the loss of the French navy for 
the Allied cause. Italy's entry into the war that month endangered Britain's vital 
imperial route through the Mediterranean to Suez and India. Moreover, Hitler’s 
attempt to cut off Britain’s Atlantic trade route drastically affected the supply of 
British shipping. Between August 1940 and March 1943, merchant shipping 
was sunk at a steadily increasing rate and faster than it could be rep laced .^
Shipping needs were enormous and hard to calculate or plan for. The 
decision, for example, to launch the North African campaign in the autumn of 
1942 imposed a great and unexpected burden on the resources of Allied 
shipping. Shipping was also a crucial factor in the Allies’ postponement of a 
Second Front until 1944.8 The escalating demands on British shipping for 
military purposes had increasingly threatened to curtail imports. Britain
7 J.R.M.Butler, Historv of the Second World War: Grand Strateav. vol.Ill, part II 
(London, 1964), p.541; Richard J.Overy, Whv the Allies Won (London, 1995)^ 
pp.25-62.
8 M.Howard, Historv of the Second World War Grand Strateav. vol.IV, (London, 
1972), p.289.
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imported over half her food (to feed 47 million people) and two-thirds of her 
raw materials. In early January 1943, the British navy had only two months’ 
supply of oil left.9 The situation, already worrying in the summer of 1942, had 
now become critical.
By spring 1943, stockpile resources had reached their lowest point of the 
entire war.i° At the time the Anglo-Jewish organisations were pressing their 
most urgent requests, a Shipping Committee report (January 1943) estimated 
that shipping for only two-thirds of required imports for the first half of 1943 
could be found from British controlled sources. It was therefore decided that 
sailings to the Indian Ocean, which supplied the Middle and Far East theatres 
of war, be reduced by half (to 40 sailings a month). This was at a time when 
famine menaced large areas of Asia and Africa.ii It was hoped that such 
measures would, together with US help, just about ‘keep our heads above 
water -  but it will be a close thing. We cannot afford to forgo a single ton ’l l
By March 1943, imports were running at less than half their peace-time level, 
carried by a fleet one third its peace-time size. The monthly requirements of 
one million tons each of raw materials and food were ‘irreducible’ and it was 
feared that by April stocks would be nearly a million tons below minimum 
safety levels. The prospect arose that 'British ships will have to be withdrawn 
from their present military service even though our agreed operations are 
crippled or prejudiced.’
9 Ibid., p.10
"19 C.B.A.Behrens, Merchant ShlDDlna and the Demands of War (London, 
1955), pp.305-6.
Howard, op.cit., pp.291-92.
12 w.P.(43) 46, cited in Howard, op.cit., p.635.
13 W.P. (43) 100, cited in Howard, op.cit., pp.632-36.
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This was the position facing the Anglo-Jewish organisations. Requests 
presented in Parliament to secure Allied or neutral ships for rescue were 
rejected on the grounds that Britain relied on overseas supplies and every 
ounce of food imported into this country is being brought in by the blood and 
sweat of British sailors.' With the Battle of the Atlantic still raging in mid-1943, 
Lord Cran borne, the Colonial Secretary, warned that there was no margin of 
safety in the event of any military setback.
Senior officials regarded shipping as the most pressing limit on strategy. The 
British and American Governments thus inevitably dismissed shipping 
requests at the Bermuda Conference in April 1943. Accepting the principle that 
winning the war in the shortest possible time was the best service which their 
respective Governments could render prospective refugees, delegates 
concluded that 'it would be a grave disadvantage not only to the Allies but to 
the refugee cause to divert shipping from essential war needs to the carriage 
of refugees.'is This view persisted even after mid-1943, when the Battle of the 
Atlantic had been won and the Mediterranean cleared. By November, the 
spectre of a shipping shortage had reappeared, partly through the demands of 
‘Overlord’, the projected Allied invasion of north-west Europe. The principal 
reason, however, was the difficulty in making reliable estimates of 
requirements. Merchant shipping was apt to fluctuate at short notice and on a 
considerable scale.
Ironically, in the summer of 1943, just as the situation began to look less bleak 
from the British perspective, the voluntary organisations appear to have lost
14 HL Debate, 23 March 1943, vol.26, cols. 849-50.
15 FO 371/36734 W7542/7542/48, 4 May 1943, Foreign Office to Washington; 
19 May 1943, Draft Speech for Refugee Debate.
15 J.Ehrman, Grand Strateav. vol.V, (London, 1956), p.32.
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momentum and accepted the Government’s position that little could be done. 
By the time of the Hungarian crisis in 1944, shipping difficulties had to some 
extent eased, though it was almost impossible to assemble refugees at ports 
of embarkation. It was out of the question to keep ships immobilised for long to 
await their arrival. 17 Although Britain confirmed, at the time of the 1944 Horthy 
Offer to halt the deportation of Jews from Hungary, that it could draw on 
neutral shipping and could itself supply ships, Germany refused to grant safe 
conduct. Hence, for example, the SS Tari', the Turkish ship which the War 
Refugee Board had hoped to charter for the transport of Jews, could not be 
used, owing to the deterioration of Turkish-German relations.
Palestine
Britain's insistence on rigidly implementing the immigration restrictions of the 
White Paper of May 1939 effectively closed off Palestine as the main escape 
route for Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi-occupied Europe. From 1922 
immigration into Palestine had been limited by its 'economic absorptive 
capacity’. Effective limitation began after the outbreak of Arab unrest in 1936, 
with the introduction of 'political high level' of 12,000 per annum, culminating in 
the White Paper which placed a ceiling of 75,000 Jewish immigrants from 
1939 until 31 March 1944, after which no further Jewish immigration would be 
permitted without Arab consent.is immigration into Palestine was sharply 
reduced during the war, owing partly to the ban on emigration from enemy and 
enemy-controlled territories, and partly to attempts to stem the tide of illegal
17 Acc 3121 BOD C11/7/3a/2, 28 March 1944, interview with Major Arthur 
Henderson.
18 FO 371/42812 WR 500/3/48, 27 July 1944, Foreign Office Memorandum.
19 Statement of Policy, May 1939, Cmd.6019, cited in Sherman, op.cit., p.232,
ff.32; Wasserstein, op.cit., p. 13.
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immigration. As a result, even the restricted Jewish immigration granted by the 
White Paper was not fully achieved.20
Britain's policy was designed to maintain internal security and stability in the 
Middle East. Appeasing the Arabs was intended to prevent outbreaks of anti- 
British feeling at a time when Britain could ill afford to divert large numbers of 
troops to the region. A further, frequently cited justification for the stringent 
regulations was fear of Nazi agents infiltrating the refugees entering Palestine. 
For this reason, when the war began, an overall ban on refugees from Nazi- 
occupied countries was imposed.
Despite Churchill's earlier opposition to the White Paper, the Cabinet 
consensus was that the status quo in Palestine should be maintained during 
the war. This was considered even more important after the Biltmore 
Conference in May 1942 when David Ben Gurion postulated for the first time 
the foundation of a Jewish State and called for millions of Jews to emigrate to 
Palestine as soon as the war was over. This was regarded as an overtly 
hostile proposition. Reports from British representatives in the Middle East 
endorsed fears that 'the country is heading for the most serious outbreak of 
disorder and violence which it has yet seen ... Zionism has embarked upon an 
expansionist programme, which it is, it appears, prepared if necessary, to try 
and carry through by force.’2i
Illegal immigration rose sharply after the White Paper was announced. In 
1939, out of a total of 27,561 Jewish immigrants to Palestine, 11,156 were
20 Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees 1939-1952 (London, 1957), p.68. 
During 1940-44, a total of 58,296 Jews entered Palestine.
21 CAB 66/37 W.P.(43) 246, 17 June 1943, Memorandum, Minister of State to 
War Cabinet.
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illegal. The reluctance of the Jewish Agency to deter illegal immigration led the 
Colonial Office to regard the problem unsympathetically, not as a refugee 
issue, but as ‘an organised political invasion of Palestine which exploited the 
facts of the refugee problem. ’22 As a deterrent, the Government periodically 
suspended legal immigration and deducted the number of illegal immigrants 
from the yearly legal quota. The Foreign Office tried to persuade the 
Governments of south-east European states to co-operate by preventing ships 
from sailing, and requested countries of transit to refuse transit visas. Ships 
were intercepted and prevented from landing. A dramatic deterrent used by 
the Colonial Office and the Government of Palestine was deportation to the 
country of embarkation. While only a few suffered this fate, many were 
deported to Mauritius after the conflict over illegal immigration reached a 
climax when the 'Patria' was blown up in November 1940 with the loss of 252 
lives. In this case, as an act of mercy, the Government allowed the survivors to 
remain in Palestine, but excluded survivors of the 'Atlantic' about to board the 
'Patria' at the time of the explosion. 23
However, the sinking of the 'Struma', carrying 769 passengers, in February 
1942 led to a significant modification of policy. The Cabinet, while reaffirming 
its opposition to illegal immigration, did accede to the Colonial Secretary's 
proposal that those reaching Palestine should be allowed to remain there in 
internment camps rather than be deported. Their numbers would still be 
deducted from the semi-annual immigration quota.24 This concession was
22 CO 733/396/75113/38 (40), Dec. 1939 - Jan. 1940, Foreign Office 
Memorandum, cited in Ronald Zweig, Britain and Palestine during the Second 
World War (London, 1986)^ p.56; Wasserstein, op.cit., pp.21-26.
23 Ibid., pp.40-80.
24 CO 733/445 (76021/41), 18 May 1942, Cabinet Conclusions, cited in 
Wasserstein, op.cit., p.161.
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obtained through the pressure brought to bear on the Government by British 
and American Zionists and several M.P.s, but in effect, it was insignificant 
since there was no deviation from the White Paper quota 25
In order to counter accusations of inactivity and following requests from the 
Jewish Agency, the ban on immigration from enemy territory was relaxed. In 
February 1943 the British Government announced that it would allow some 
4,500 Bulgarian Jewish children with 500 accompanying adults, followed by up 
to 29,000 others from various central and south-eastern European countries, 
to enter Palestine, still within the White Paper quotas.26 However, following 
Bulgaria's decision, under German pressure, to close its border with Turkey to 
all Jews, there was little prospect of legal immigration into Palestine. 
Nevertheless, in July, HMG instructed the British Passport Control in Istanbul, 
in order to encourage Turkey to allow transit of refugees, that all Jews who 
reached Turkey from enemy-occupied territory would be eligible (after 
preliminary security checks) to proceed to Palestine.27 Oliver Stanley, the new 
Colonial Secretary, accepted the Jewish Agency's case that the problem of 
immigration was now synonymous with that of rescue and claimed that these 
measures reflected the Government's desire to help those in Axis-controlled 
countries. This included the decision nade in July, but only announced in 
November 1943, to extend the time limit of the White Paper, allowing 
immigration beyond the March 1944 deadline, until all the allotted certificates 
were used. Nevertheless, the decision to cancel all unused immigration visas
25 Nathaniel Katzburg, ‘British Policy on Immigration to Palestine During World 
War Two', Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust. Proceedings of the Second 
Y ad Vashem International Historical Conference. Jerusalem 1977 (April 1974), 
pp. 185-86.
26 FO 371/36711 W4070/1315/48, 9 March 1943, E.Boyd, Colonial Office, to 
Randall.
27 CO 323/1846/2, July 1943 [n.d.], Colonial Office to Foreign Office.
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issued prior to September 1 9 4 3  (1 8 ,3 0 0 ) for non-enemy countries and give 
priority to refugees from enemy-occupied countries did not signify any increase 
in the overall 7 5 ,0 0 0  quota. While these measures simplified and accelerated 
procedures, they did not effect a substantial change in policy. Moreover, by
1943 , with Europe effectively sealed off by the Nazis, the chances of escaping 
from enemy territory were rem o te .^8 Consequently, as of October 1 9 4 4 , there 
were still 1 0 ,3 0 0  unused Palestine immigration certificates.29
During the Hungarian crisis and at the time of the Horthy Offer in the summer of
1 9 4 4 , British officials feared that the 'floodgates of Eastern Europe were going 
to be opened' and opposed any large-scale immigration into Palestine. 
R.M.A.Hankey, of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, cautioned that 
a serious crisis would arise as soon as the Palestine quotas were filled. He 
suggested that camps be established "somewhere in the Mediterranean a re a ... 
preferably not too near Palestine. The Foreign Office must at all costs protect 
the Colonial Office from unreasonable pressure to receive in Palestine all 
Jewish refugees who come into Turkey, even though, for the purpose of getting 
them into Turkey, Palestine visas have been promised', Hankey added that 
'the 1 0 ,0 0 0  - odd places must be spun out as long as possible'. A factor was the 
"importance of not burdening the army with a new administrative liability at this 
time'. 31
28 Ibid., 29 July 1943, Minutes. According to Katzburg, while these 
arrangements were in force, 7,739 Jews reached Palestine during 1943-44. 
See Katzburg, op.cit., p. 186; FO 371/42724 W5424/15/18, 5 April 1944, 
G.H.Gater, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, to Jewish 
Agency for Palestine (JA).
29 JC. 3 Nov. 1944, p.6.
30 FO 371/42810 WR 315/3/48, 20 July 1944, Hankey to Randall.
31 FO 371/42816 WR 890/3/48, 30 Aug. 1944, Hankey, Minutes; 25 Aug. 1944, 
Lord Moyne, Cairo, to Foreign Office.
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The Anglo-Jewish organisations had little hope of changing Britain's Palestine 
policy. Brodetsky, an ardent Zionist though regarded as a moderate in official 
circles, insisted on promoting the importance of Palestine as a solution to the 
Jewish refugee problem in all his overtures to the Government. However, 
political concerns inclined officials to suspect the motives of Jewish leaders 
and to reject suggestions considered contrary to British imperial interests. Both 
the Foreign Office and Colonial Office feared the radicalisation of Palestine 
throughout the war and considerably exaggerated the Jewish political as well 
as the military threat.32
The Final Solution
Information revealing the projected ‘deliberate extermination of the Jews' as a 
‘Final Solution' of Europe's Jewish problem filtered into Britain from a variety of 
sources during the course of 1942, culminating in Gerhart Riegner's telegram 
in August.33 However, the news was received with scepticism by the Allies, 
wary of what was considered Jewish hysteria and propaganda.The Anglo- 
Jewish leadership evinced similar scepticism. Brotman had previously 
expressed incredulity at the report that 700,000 Jews had been murdered in 
Poland: 'The figure seems on the face of it to be an exaggeration, even having 
regard to the kind of beasts the Germans are, and if it is an exaggeration it is a 
pity that it is published'.^s Even when the reports were confirmed, uncertainty 
remained about the extent of the extermination of Polish Jewry. Two
32 Michael Marrus, The Holocaust in History (London, 1987), p. 166.
33 Yehuda Bauer, ‘When did they Know?’, Midstream, vol. 14 (April 1968), pp.51 - 
8.
34 FO 371/30917 07853/61/18, 10 Sept. 1942, D.Allen. Minutes; FO 371/30885 
09844/9844/62, 1 Oct. 1942, Frank Roberts, Minute; Walter Laqueur, The 
Terrible Secret (London ,1980), pp.65-84.
35 Acc 3121 B5/2/2/1, 25 June 1942, Brotman to Brodetsky.
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explanations were offered at the time: first, that the information reaching the 
West from Poland was often fragmentary and incoherent; second, that 'the fact 
that a whole nation is being ruthlessly annihilated, exceeds the capacity of 
comprehension of a normal human being'.3^  Not until the end of November did 
Anglo-Jewry's initial scepticism give way to acknowledgement of the appalling 
extent of the atrocities against the Jews, as the news was officially confirmed: 
'No one now doubts -  certainly not official circles -  the reality of the 
extermination plan, and its progress towards achievement.’37
Although initially sceptical, Brotman recognised the importance of keeping 'the 
conscience of the civilised world alive to the crimes and atrocities committed 
by the Nazis and their associates.’38 Stimulating neutral, satellite and even 
German public opinion was one of the few courses available. Brodetsky 
suggested leaflet drops over Germany and radio broadcasts to the peoples of 
Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.39 The threat of post-war retribution was 
similarly regarded as an important deterrent, if not for the Nazis, then at least 
for their satellites.
36 CZA C2/279, 13 Dec. 1942, First Meeting of National Council of WJC, 
Minutes, Dr. Ignacy Schwarzbart, member of the executive of the British Section 
and of the Polish National Council. See also A.Leon Kubowitzki, Unitv in 
Dispersion. A Historv of the World Jewish Congress (New York, 1948), p. 194; 
Walter Laqueur, 'Jewish Denial and the Holocaust', Commentarv (December 
1977), pp.44-55; Yehuda Bauer, Jewish Reactions to the Holocaust (Jerusalem, 
1989), pp.110-14. These historians invoke the psychological mechanisms of 
denial and repression to account for the community’s failure to respond. Bauer 
drew a crucial distinction between information and knowledge.
37 J.C., 11 Dec. 1942, p.8.
38 FO 371Q0917, 07839/61/18, 14 July 1942, Brotman to M.Stanczyk, Polish 
Minister of Social Welfare.
39 Acc 3121 A /32 ,19 July 1942, BOD Minutes; J.C., 24 July 1942, p.5.
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It Is dangerously easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to argue that none of this 
would have impressed the Nazi regime.^o Certainly the threat of post-war 
retribution could hardly have acted as a deterrent since most Nazis were 
convinced until almost the end that Germany could still win the war. It must be 
remembered, however, that the futility of all attempts at persuasion was not, 
and could not have been, grasped by the Allies, so thoroughly was the 
essential fanaticism of the Nazi psyche and ideology misunderstood. The 
organisations were entirely reasonable in believing that propaganda activity of 
the type they repeatedly proposed might have some effect, however little, 
especially on the satellites.
The WJC led the publicity campaign with a press conference (sponsored by 
the British Ministry of Information) in London in June 1942, detailing the 
systematic destruction of European Jewry. Sidney Silverman, who presided, 
spoke of 'a conspiracy of silence on the part of the press about this tragic 
situation' and dismissed the suggestion that publicity would merely lend 
credence to Goebbels’s claim that ‘this is a Jewish war'.^i Public response 
was immediate and included forceful denunciations of ‘the bloodthirsty 
racialism of the Nazis’ by leading churchmen and parliamentarians. The 
exceptional plight of Polish Jewry was also noted and the Board proposed a 
public protest meeting, to be held in late October.^z
Nevertheless, the Anglo-Jewish leadership showed some naivete in its failure 
to grasp the implications of the Final Solution, as manifested in its emphasis 
on planning for the post-war period. In August 1942, the JFC convened a two-
40 See Rubenstein, The Mvth of Rescue: Whv the democracies could not have 
saved more Jews from the Nazis (London. 1997).
41 CZA 02/409, 29 June 1942, Press Conference, Minutes.
42 Acc 3121 A /32 ,15 July 1942, JFC Minutes; BOD Annual Report 1942, p.31.
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day conference devoted to Jewish post-war policy. The assumption that there 
would be large numbers of survivors was reiterated in Brodetsky’s public 
reference to the importance of Palestine as a target for post-war Jewish 
emigration, which would be ‘very much greater than after the last war’. He 
estimated the number of Jews who would want to emigrate after the war at 
between four and five million.^s
More realistically (as it turned out), Richard Lichtheim, representing the Jewish 
Agency in Geneva, warned that estimates of ‘seven million dispossessed Jews 
in Eastern Europe’ (cited in the House of Commons in August) were over- 
optimistic: ‘there will not be more than one and a half or two million Jews’. 
Lichtheim criticised the Jewish organisations in Britain and America, which 
'should have done much more on previous occasions to inform the public, the 
press and the leading statesmen of what is happening to the Jews of Europe.’ 
He warned of the danger to Europe's remaining Jewish communities and 
suggested that a warning, perhaps by the Vatican or some neutral power, 
might have a deterrent effect.44
However, the Board was not entirely inactive, though it felt there was little it 
could do beyond passing strongly-worded resolutions. The leaders seemed 
oblivious to the hopelessness of such resolutions reaching an audience wider 
than the readership of the Jewish Chronicle. The Board expressed its gratitude 
to the Allied Governments ‘for their expression of sympathy and horror’ and to
43 Acc 3121 B5/2/2, 3-4 Aug. 1943, JFC Meeting: CZA A82/6, 3.1 Aug. 1942, 
Brodetsky, ‘The Jewish Problem’; Acc 3121 02/2/5/1, Aide- Mémoire on Post- 
War Emigration (February 1943). By February 1943, Brodetsky estimated that 
'perhaps two million might require to emigrate after the War', although this figure 
‘in light of later developments, may be subject to radical revision’.
44 CZA L22/177, 27 Aug. 1942, Lichtheim to Joseph Linton, JA representative, 
London; CZA L22/149,15 Sept. 1942, Lichtheim to Linton.
157
Churchill for his assurance that those responsible would be held to account/s 
Some reserve remained. Brotman wondered whether the reports from Geneva 
‘were purposely put about by the Nazis for certain nefarious ends' and felt ‘we 
should not necessarily add to the anxieties of the millions of Jews outside 
Europe who have relatives in it under the Nazis'. ^ 6
The Anglo-Jewish leadership had appealed several times to the Allied 
Governments to issue warnings to the Nazis and their satellites. However, the 
Foreign Office invariably opposed emphasising the specific plight of the Jews. 
British policy on atrocities had been formulated in October 1941 when 
Churchill announced that ‘retribution for these crimes ... must henceforth take 
its place among the major purposes of the war.' This statement, like most 
which followed, contained no specific reference to crimes committed against 
particular minorities and was in line with the Government's position that Jews 
were citizens of their countries of residence rather than a discrete nationality. It 
was consistent both with Britain’s Palestine policy and the principle not to 
single out Jews as that would be a surrender to German racialism’; it would 
reinforce German claims that the Allies were fighting a Jewish war'. The 
Government therefore avoided specific mention of Jewish suffering, refusing 
any separate representation of Jewish concerns at international conferences 
and, until the summer of 1944, the formation of a Jewish army. It also insisted 
that Jewish organisations should play no specific part in post-war planning or 
the rehabilitation of European Jew ry.^7
Acc 3121 A/32, 9 Sept. 1942, BOD, Minutes.
46 Acc 3121 BOD B5/2/2/3, 7 Oct. 1942, Brotman to Brodetsky.
47 FO 371/30917 08055/61/18, Statement on War Criminals, [n.d., presumably 
August 1942]; 07839/61/18, 19 Aug. 1942, Randall, Minute. See also 
Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, p. 163.
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In January 1942 a conference of allied powers met at St. James's Palace, 
London, under the presidency of General Sikorski, in order to consider 
German actions in occupied Europe. The conference issued a declaration 
regarding Nazi atrocities against civilian populations. At this time, the JFC and 
the British Section appealed to the Foreign Office and to the signatories of the 
Nine-Power Declaration to bear in mind 'the suffering of the Jews and the part 
played by them in the common struggle'. They added, however, that they had 
'no desire to differentiate between the sufferings and brutalities inflicted by the 
Nazis on Jews and non-Jews’.*^ ® To this, Sikorski reiterated that specific 
reference to Jews would ‘be equivalent to an implicit recognition of the racial 
theories that we all reject’. 49 Undeterred, Easterman continued to press Eden, 
unsuccessfully.®® In August 1942, Brodetsky appealed to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury to raise the question in the House of Lords debate, which would at 
least reinforce previous warnings. Brodetsky pointed out that these had so far 
'not dealt specifically with this threat of the extermination of the whole Jewish 
people on the Continent of Europe’.
The Board's first official stand against Nazi atrocities was a deputation to the 
Foreign Office in October 1942, calling for a statement by HMG charging 
enemy governments with atrocities against Jews and offering refuge to those 
able to escape. The deputation also mooted the evacuation of Jews to neutral 
countries and Palestine, and the possibilities of ICRC aid and a separate 
Jewish council to advise the Allies on post-war relief and rehabilitation. Despite
48 ACC 3121 C11/7/2/8, 12 Jan. 1942, Brodetsky and Stein, to Sikorski; FO 
371/30914 C487/61/18,12 Jan. 1942, JFC and AJA to Foreign Office.
49CZA C2/295, 9 May 1942, Report, translation of letter by Sikorski to WJC, p.8.
50 FO 371/30914 C2009/61/18, 18 Feb. 1942, Easterman to Eden; 9 May 1942, 
Sikorski to WJC; CZA C2/295, WJC (British Section) Oct. 1942 reports, no.2, 
St. James’s Conference.
51 Acc 3121 C l 1/13/16, 20 Sept. 1942, Brodetsky to Archbishop of Canterbury; 
CZA Z4/302/25, 17 Sept. 1942, JA, Minutes.
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Brotman's urging the exceptional nature of the Jewish persecution, the 
Memorandum of this meeting reveals considerable official reluctance to draw 
such a distinction. Randall agreed with Frank Roberts, head of the Central 
Department, that the 'Jewish organisations have been angling for some time 
past to be placed so to speak on the same footing as the Allied Governments 
and allowed to speak for Jews in regard to atrocities. It is, I submit, most 
important ... to maintain the principle that each of the Allied Governments 
speaks for all its nationals, Jew or Gentile'. S2
Zionists were also calling for a Jewish army and specific mention of the 
suffering of Jews. The Foreign Office considered such endeavours a covert 
part of Zionist ‘propaganda for a Jewish sovereign state in Palestine and it also 
no doubt aims at securing separate Jewish participation in any Peace 
settlement.' The more diplomatic approach of the Board, albeit equally 
unproductive, was received more favourably and it is not surprising that 
Brotman was considered ‘a reasonable person' who was 'unwilling to bother us 
unreasonably'.^^
In November 1942, following American confirmation of the genocide reports. 
Silverman and Easterman handed the Foreign Office the authenticating 
document received from the Polish Government. They proposed a Four-Power 
Declaration by the United Nations, warning of reprisals against the 
perpetrators, and the broadcasting of messages encouraging Gentiles to aid 
the persecuted Jews. Although doubtful whether much could be achieved, Law 
noted that 'we would be in an appalling position if these stories should prove to
52 FO 371/30885 09844/9844/62, 1 Oct. 1942, Law, Foreign Office 
Memorandum.
53 Ibid; FO 371/30917 07839/61/18, 21 Aug. 1942, Roberts to G.Lias, Ministry of 
Information.
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have been true and we have done nothing whatever about them'.54 One 
implication of this remark is that the authorities themselves were genuinely 
sceptical of the authenticity of 'these stories' even as late as November. By 
December 1942 pressure had mounted on the Government from various 
quarters to secure a joint-government declaration. This was accompanied by 
offers of suggestions for the relief of Europe's Jews.ss Confronted with ‘reliable 
and convincing reports’ from the Polish Government, the Foreign Office 
decided that in view of mounting public concern, a Declaration should be 
published as soon as possible, though it could be expected to achieve little.®®
The JFC met in December to consider appropriate action. It resolved to 
increase pressure on the Government to issue a declaration referring 
specifically to the atrocities committed against Jews. The Board had already 
approached Law on this Issue but had received no reply. The importance of 
wide publicity, via the BBC, the Ministry of Information and the Department of 
Political Warfare, was stressed. Such work would obviously be co-ordinated 
with that of the Foreign Office’ and would counteract the widespread public 
ignorance and incredulity about the horrors. Hertz suggested a ‘manifestation 
of a religious character’ - a day of mourning and a fast with services in 
synagogues. A date, 13 December 1942, was chosen, to be followed by a 
week of mourning culminating in a public demonstration. ®7
54 FO 371/30923 C l 1923/61/18, 26 Nov. 1942, conversation between 
Silverman, Easterman and Law.
55 The Times, 18 Dec. 1942, Wiener Library, 215D, Press cuttings; FO 
371/30923 C l 1975/61/18, 7 Dec. 1942, Foreign Office to Washington; 
C l 2147/61/18, 8 Dec. 1942, Telegram from Foreign Office to the Dominions; 
C l 1923/61/18, 1 Dec.1942, Roberts, Minutes; FO 371/30925 C l2716/61/18, 16 
Dec. 1942, Deputation from the Council of Christians and Jews; Law, Minute.
56 FO 371/30923 C l 2147/61/18, 5 Dec. 1942, Eden to Winant and Maisky; 
C l 1975/61/18, 7 Dec. 1942, Foreign Office to Washington.
57 ACC 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 3 Dec. 1942, JFC Emergency Meeting.
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The JFC also agreed to send Jewish and non-Jewlsh delegations to the 
Government, to stimulate debates in Parliament and to seek the mediation of 
the Pope. Approaches were also to be made to the Protecting Powers, neutral 
countries and the ICRC; other ideas included broadcasts on the BBC's 
European Services and leaflet drops over Germany. It was also suggested that 
Jews in the ghettos be granted the status of prisoners-of-war. How much could 
be achieved depended, as Brotman observed, on Government co-operation, 
but it was felt that some statement should be published in order ‘to 
demonstrate to the Jewish community that the Board and other Jewish 
organisations were doing what they considered was within their power to meet 
the situation’, [my emphasis] Shortly after, a resolution of solidarity with the 
endangered Jews of Europe was unanimously passed.58
The Board was In a moral and public relations quandary. It was naturally 
concerned to be seen to be doing something 'within their power' but Brotman's 
comment implicitly acknowledges that it had no 'power' at all. On the other 
hand, it needed to justify its 'authority' in the eyes of the Jewish community, so 
fell back on a resolution of solidarity which, however well intended, can hardly 
have been expected to impress anyone except the Board's own constituents. 
Brotman explicitly acknowledged this in a private admission that 'hopeless as 
is the prospect, there is a strongly expressed desire that something should be 
attempted. We cannot go to the Government authorities without definite 
proposals, for we have none and it would be purposeless to go simply to 
depict the situation, of which the Government is fully aware'.^s [my emphasis] 
The importance of maintaining communication with the Foreign Office was not
Ibid. ACC 3121 A/32, 7 Dec. 1942, Board Executive Committee, Minutes. 
59 Acc 3121 C l 1/2/37/2, 25 Nov. 1942, Brotman to Stein.
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so much that it was likely to produce any concrete results as that it reassured 
the Jewish community that its leaders were acting tirelessly on behalf of 
European Jewry.
Declaration of 17 December 1942
As a result of efforts made by the organisations, a Declaration, sponsored by 
all the Allied governments, was issued. The sole objective of the December 
Declaration was to deter further atrocities; it contained no practical proposals 
for rescue and relief. It was formulated in response to a question by Silverman, 
in reply to which Eden stated that the Allied Governments ‘reaffirm their 
solemn resolution to ensure that those responsible for these crimes shall not 
escape retribution and to press on with the necessary practical measures to 
this end'. 60 This Allied Declaration was essentially a public commitment to the 
eventual juridical prosecution of Nazi war crimes against Jews and others, si
Eden referred to the ‘immense geographical and other difficulties’ preventing 
the Government from taking immediate constructive measures to assist the 
emigration and relief of Jews in occupied Europe. These difficulties included 
Home Office restrictions on large-scale immigration, constraints on further 
immigration to the Colonies and the fact that neutral countries ‘can hardly be 
expected to help much.'62 However, a Cabinet Committee on the Reception 
and Accommodation of Refugees (hereafter Cabinet Committee on Refugees) 
was subsequently formed at the end of December to consider arrangements
60 FO 371/30925 C12711/61/18,17 Dec. 1942, Extract from HC Debates.
61 John P. Fox, The Jewish Factor in British War Crimes Policy in 1942', English 
Historical Review, vol. XCII, no.362 (January 1977), p.82.
62 FO 371/30925 C l 2711/61/18, 16 Dec. 1942, Roberts, Minutes; CZA C2/308, 
14 Dec. 1942, Easterman to Law.
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for such Jewish refugees who might find their way out of enemy-occupied 
territory.
Despite some disappointment at the Declaration’s lack of constructive 
measures, it did succeed in stimulating public opinion and encouraging efforts 
by both organisations and individuals. The Standing Conference of National 
Voluntary Organisations resolved 'to request HMG to take immediate steps to 
bring to this country Jewish and non-Aryan refugees now in neutral countries 
contiguous to Nazi-occupied territory'.63 Pressure groups were formed in 
Parliament, most notably around Eleanor Rath bone, while In January 1943, 
the Archbishops of Canterbury, York and Wales issued an appeal to the 
Government urging immediate measures of rescue and sanctuary within the 
Empire and elsewhere for those who could be saved.64 The press joined the 
campaign and offers of homes and help came from all over Britain.65 The 
Declaration also inspired Victor Gollancz’s striking and influential pamphlet, 
‘Let My People Go’, which succinctly summarised the various rescue
proposals. 66
On behalf of Anglo-Jewry, James de Rothschild expressed deep gratitude in 
Parliament for the Declaration. Shortly after, Brodetsky expressed to Eden his 
'warm appreciation for your sympathetic interest and desire to help'.67
63 FO 371/36648 W121749/48, 23 Dec. 1942, Wyndham Deedes to Eden.
64 b o d  Annual Report, 1943, p.39.
65 Manchester Guardian, 18 Dec. 1942, "Urgency of Practical Measures’, Wiener 
Library, 215D, Press cuttings; CZA A354/50, 18 Feb. 1944, Hertz File, 'Speaker’s 
Notes'.
66 Victor Gollancz, Let Mv People Go (London, 1942); BOD Annual Report 1942, 
p.35. Manchester Guardian , 12 Jan. 1943, Wiener Library, Press cuttings, 21 SB.
67 FO 371/30925 C l2711/61/18, 17 Dec. 1942, Extract from HC Debates, p.2; 
C l 2748/61/18 ,1 8  Dec. 1942, Brodetsky to Eden.
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However, members of the Consultative Committee soon voiced their 
disappointment that the 'perpetrators of these crimes' were not named, that the 
governments of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania were not mentioned, and that 
the question of rescue was not touched upon, though Sweden was mentioned 
as a likely haven for refugees.®® The Board grew disappointed at the 
Declaration's failure to mitigate the atrocities, adding presciently that ‘it seems 
to have spurred on Dr.Goebbels and his propagandists to further efforts at 
representing ... the entire American and British Governments as tools in the 
hands of the Jews’.®®
Critics such as Silverman added that the Declaration should have been 
followed by offers on the part of the United Nations to accommodate Jewish 
refugees. The Jewish Agency urged the Government to ‘forget legalities and 
make Palestine into a Jewish sanctuary’. T h e  Jewish Chronicle complained 
of Eden’s pusillanimity: ‘What an opportunity he missed! Instead of what 
appeared like hedging, the occasion was surely there for a splendid offer of 
sanctuary’. Brushing aside the logistical, geographical, political and military 
difficulties of such action, the Jewish Chronicle appealed for asylum in Britain 
and encouragement to neutral states.Such solutions are characteristic of the 
Zionist mindset in Anglo-Jewry during 1942-43. Britain's complex role in the 
Middle East was reduced to obstructiveness over Palestine and her policy to 
'legalities' which she might forget whenever she chose; the rhetoric of a 
'splendid offer of sanctuary' suggests a naive belief that 'magic wand' solutions
68 Acc 3121 BOD C l 1/7/1/I/ ,  24 Dec. 1942, Consultative Committee Meeting, 
Minutes.
89 BOD Annual Report 1943, p.35.
70 Manchester Guardian, 18 Dec. 1942, Urgency of Practical Measures’, Wiener 
Library, Press cuttings, 215D; CZA Z4/302/26, 22 Dec. 1942, JA, Minutes, 
statement by Simon Marks.
71 J.C, 25 Dec. 1942, p.8.
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to the Jewish tragedy were feasible. Also typical is the failure to realise that the 
Declaration was never intended as a public announcement of a grand solution 
to the refugee problem.
Following the Declaration, the organisations submitted proposals for 'practical' 
rescue measures. The WJC and the Jewish Agency considered the possibility 
of removing two million Jews from Europe, a proposal that would have been 
dismissed as absurd and unworkable even in peacetime. All these measures 
visualised the admission of refugees into areas controlled by the United 
Nations, together with financial aid for neutral countries which might be willing 
to accept refugees. Had funds been unlimited, such suggestions would 
perhaps have been received more sympathetically. An early proposal pointed 
to the suitability of Palestine in the work of rescue and relief. ^ 2 The logistical 
difficulties of such proposals do not seem to have daunted the organisations 
any more than the problem of extricating the Jewish population of Europe en 
masse from enemy territory.
Conflict and rancour arose because each organisation made independent 
representations to the Government, creating in turn a bad impression on the 
authorities. The British Section, in particular, felt that the Board was not 
working in collaboration with the Consultative Committee, and had not co­
operated during the Week of Mourning.73 Brodetsky had insisted on sending a 
delegation to the Government even though Law had advised against it and 
Churchill refused to meet it. Easterman felt that ‘It was absurd, after the
^2 CZA C2/295, 21 Dec. 1942, Suggestions of Practical Steps; FO 371/36648 
W 415/49/48, 6 Jan. 1943, ‘Measures proposed for the Rescue of European 
Jewry’.
73 Acc 3121 C l 1/7/1/ I ,  24 Dec. 1942, Emergency Consultative Committee 
Meeting, Minutes.
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announcement of the United Nations Declaration, to send twelve people to see 
them/74 His proposals, of varying practical value, included supplementing the 
Declaration by leaflet-drops over enemy territories, appeals to neutrals to offer 
asylum to Jews, the establishment of refugee camps in Spain and an 
approach to the Pope75
A deputation from the Board met Eden on 23 December. It expressed thanks 
for the Declaration and, contrary to claims that "statements of gratitude were 
rarely accompanied by suggestions of further action',76 suggested a number of 
immediate rescue measures. These included asylum for refugees in areas 
controlled by the United Nations, particularly Palestine, and substantial 
concessions in granting visas for Britain to some of the 10,000 refugees then 
in Spain. Britain was asked to encourage neutral states to continue taking 
refugees by providing guarantees that other homes would be found for them 
after the war. Brodetsky stressed that the Jewish community was "ready to 
help in every way possible'. Viscount Samuel suggested that the restrictions 
on entry into Britain be reviewed, stressing the value of refugees in the labour 
force and war effort. In reply. Eden acknowledged that the Declaration had 
been issued earlier than expected and before practical suggestions could be 
considered. He assured the deputation that full consideration would be given 
to its points and the Anglo-Jewish leadership felt innocently that it had "done 
extraordinarily well'.77 A week later, the Consultative Committee again 
discussed with Law its proposals for practical rescue and relief measures. In
74 CZA C2/510, 28 Dec. 1942, Barou to Brodetsky; 28 Dec. 1942, Easterman 
to Brotman.
75 Acc 3121 BOD C11/7/3a/2, 18 Dec. 1942, Brodetsky to Samuel; C11/7/3a/4, 
18 Dec. 1942, interview with Roberts.
76 Bolchover, op.cit., p.116.
77 FO 371/30925 C l2853/61/18, 23 Dec. 1942, Deputation to Eden; Acc 3121 
C10/2/8/1, 23 Dec. 1942, Eden to Samuel.
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the event, little was achieved. The 'dilatory attitude of the US Government’ was 
blamed.
Dissatisfied with the Government’s ambivalence, a group of M.P.s and Jewish 
representatives, invited by Rathbone and Professor A.V.HIII, M.P., met at 
Burlington House in January and agreed that a deputation of M.P.s should see 
Churchill. Brodetsky summarised the proposals which had already been laid 
before Eden, under two headings; those aimed at preventing the murder of 
Jews and those at saving those who could escape. The latter meant getting 
neutral countries to take a number of refugees; refuge in Palestine and help by 
the United Nations by way of taking refugees into their own territories. He 
expressed disappointment that despite numerous approaches to the 
Government, ‘little had yet been done’.^s Other suggestions included a direct 
appeal to Hitler, a relaxation of Home Office restrictions on immigration and 
the setting up of a council to deal with practical and administrative work. 
Brodetsky compiled a number of ‘Suggested Steps for Saving Jews in Nazi 
Occupied Europe’, to be presented by the Parliamentary deputation at the end 
of January. He emphasised the opportunities in Palestine for refugees, who 
could be readily absorbed In agriculture. Industry and war work; 37,000 
immigration certificates were still available under the 1939 White Paper. Some 
consideration was also given to planning for post-war relief.
78 Acc 3121 02/2/5/1, 30 Dec. 1942, meeting with Law; C1//7/1/1, 4 Jan. 1943, 
Consultative Committee Meeting, Minutes.
79 Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 7 Jan. 1943, Nazi Extermination Policy, Burlington 
House Meeting.
80 Ibid; C11/7/1/5, 7 Jan. 1943, Rathbone, ‘Jewish Massacres: The Case for an 
Offer to Hitler’; C2/2/5/1,19 Jan. 1943, ‘Suggested Steps for Saving Jews in Nazi 
Occupied Europe.’
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The mood of the Anglo-Jewish leadership was one of frustration and 
impatience, rather than optimism. Hertz complained of the ‘fatal inertia' of 
governments and proposed that Viscount Samuel act as a liaison officer 
between the United Nations and Jewry in order ‘to ensure an end of 
Government delay in the work of human salvage.'ai
Individual Initiatives
In early 1943, Schonfeld unsuccesfully approached Sir George Jones to form 
a special Parliamentary Committee to deal with the European Jewish situation. 
Despite Brodetsky’s objection that such a committee already existed (the 
Parliamentary Refugee Committee), a National Committee for Rescue from 
Nazi Terror (National Committee) was nevertheless established in March by 
Rathbone under the chairmanship of Lord Crewe. Represented on this 
Committee were prominent political and ecclesiastical figures as well as 
representatives of the main Jewish and non-Jewish voluntary organisations.®^ 
It was dedicated to ensuring the closest co-operation between all those 
engaged in rescue and relief.
Unlike the Anglo-Jewish leadership, which continually pressed the 
Government to relax its restrictive policy on immigration to Palestine, 
Schonfeld deliberately refrained from including Palestine (or admission into 
Britain) in his appeals to the Government to open up its territories to refugees. 
This was perhaps not ideologically but tactically motivated; recognising the
81 Acc 3121 El/31, 15 Jan. 1943, Hertz to Brodetsky. Brodetsky rejected the 
idea. El/31, 27 Jan. 1943, Brodetsky to Hertz.
82 Ibid., 11 Jan. 1943. Brodetsky to Hertz; C2/2/5/1, 12 Jan. 1943, Brodetsky to 
Sir George Jones.
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hopelessness of trying to amend Government policy, Schonfeld felt it would be 
more productive to press the suitability of alternative asylum schemes.
In consultation with his friend Josiah Wedgwood, Schonfeld decided that the 
best procedure to obtain Government action would be to table a widely 
supported, non-denominational Motion in both Houses of Parliament. 
Rathbone thought the idea promising and Schonfeld approached Sir George 
Jones, who offered co-operation and valuable suggestions. However, when 
Brodetsky expressed opposition, Sir George retracted, explaining to Schonfeld 
that such a Motion might be regarded as ‘an attack on Eden or at least, as 
“gingering” up effort, and might be resented by some of your friends.'84
Nevertheless, Schonfeld, together with the Archbishop of Canterbury and 
other leading churchmen and parliamentarians, enlisted the support of 277 
M.P.s for a Motion to be tabled in both Houses of Parliament, asking HMG ‘to 
declare its readiness to find temporary refuge in its own territories or in 
territories under its control, for endangered persons who are able to leave 
those countries'. The Motion was worded in such a way as to avoid 
controversy, leaving matters of detail open to HMG and avoiding direct 
proposals for admission of refugees into Britain or Palestine. The Motion also 
suggested that neutral countries might be encouraged to receive refugees and 
offer transit facilities, an important provision with far-reaching implications
83 Schonfeld, No Alternative to Zion', Message to Jewrv. p. 163; CZA Z4/302/26, 
21 Dec. 1942, JA, Minutes. Brodetsky insisted that ‘if Palestine was not properly 
mentioned then he would not be a member of the delegation to Eden.’
84 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/2, 12 Jan. 1943, Schonfeld to Brodetsky; C2/2/5/1, 15 Jan. 
1943, Sir George Jones to Brodetsky.
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since the possession of documents evidencing foreign protection afforded 
Jews at least temporary protection from deportation.
Brodetsky fiercely opposed Schonfeld’s efforts on the grounds that 
independent initiatives were damaging to Jewish unity and caused 
'exasperation on the part of our non-Jewish neighbours'.®® Defensively but 
irrelevantly, Brodetsky added that persistent efforts were being made but that 
those involved in what he called ‘political work’ were ‘not always free to say 
what they were doing'. In a private letter to the editor of the Jewish Chronicle, 
Brotman reiterated his own opposition to Schonfeld’s initiative as ‘an activity 
with potentialities of great value undertaken in the wrong way. It would have 
been better that the internal difficulty should have been got over without 
parading our differences in public.’®7 Understandably, Brotman ignored the fact 
that the parading of differences which he found so damaging was largely the 
Board's own doing.
Brodetsky disapproved of the Motion, arguing that 'His original text, in my 
opinion, was vague, gave little guidance in the way of action and omitted all 
mention of Palestine'. Brodetsky accepted his 'well-meaning motives ... but 
only encourages further acts of irresponsibility by people who are a law only to 
themselves'.®® Schonfeld knew that any reference to Palestine would lose the 
Motion valuable support and that in any case, the term territories under the
85 MS 183 Schonfeld 656/1 [Poii-Pz], 'Motion’; 153/1 (1.1), 12 Feb. 1943, 
Schonfeld to the Editor.
86 MS 183 Schonfeld 656/1 [Poll-Pz], 11 Jan. 1943, Brodetsky to Hertz; J.C., 29 
Jan. 1943, p.5; Acc 3121 El/31, 3 Feb. 1943, Brodetsky to Hertz; J.C., 5 Feb. 
1943, p.6.
87 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/1, 29 Jan. 1943, Brotman to I.Greenberg, Editor, J.C.; Acc 
3121 El/31, 3 Feb. 1943, Brodetsky to Hertz.
88 Acc 2805/6/1/17, 3 February 1943, Brodetsky to Hertz. See also Acc 3121 
BOD C l 1/7/1/ I ,  25 Jan. 1943, Consultative Committee Meeting, Minutes.
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control of the British Empire’ implicitly included Palestine.®^ The Motion was 
opposed on similar grounds by the British Section and the Jewish Agency. The 
Agudat Israel, as a member of the Consultative Committee but closely allied 
with Schonfeld, found itself in a difficult position. While refraining from outright 
criticism, it disassociated itself from the Motion, maintaining that 'it is unwise 
for individuals to act on their own'. Hertz distanced himself from the issue, 
stating that he did not 'accept responsibility for Dr.Schonfeld's action'.so
A special meeting of the Emergency Consultative Committee discussed the 
issue, which was also fought out in the columns of the Jewish Chronicle, with 
Schonfeld accusing Brodetsky of ignoring his invitation to co-operate in the 
initiative and Brodetsky denying that Schonfeld had made any such overtures. 
According to Schonfeld, the Motion failed, not because of Government 
opposition -  'Britain was at her best' -  but because of 'the Zionist opposition 
on the Board of Deputies ... over the omission of Palestine from the list of 
British possessions.’ However, Schonfeld’s resentment was misplaced. 
There was never any chance of the Motion being tabled since, as Eden 
remarked, 'the statement made by Attlee on the 19 January 1943 ... covers the 
ground more fully than Dr.Schonfeld’s draft which now seems therefore
superfluous.’92
The episode is a striking illustration of the extent to which governmental 
considerations, rather than the efforts of individuals or organisations, shaped
89 C2/2/5/2, 22 Jan. 1943, Schonfeld to Brotman.
90 Acc 3121 El/31, 9 Feb. 1943, R.Oppenheim, Secretary, Agudat Israel, to 
Brotman; Acc 2805/6/1/17, 4 February 1943, Hertz to Brodetsky.
91 J.C., 29 Jan. 1943, p.5; 5 Feb. 1943, p.6; 12 Feb. 1943, p.5; 6 June 1961, 
p. 13; Interview with Marcus Better, August 1994, New York. Better, who worked 
with Schonfeld, understandably supports his view.
92 FO 371/36649 W1067/49/46, 30 Jan. 1943, Eden to Sir Austin Hudson, MP.
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the direction and implementation of policy. Notwithstanding the natural 
inclination of the Zionists to insist on Zionist solutions, it nevertheless 
illustrates the Jewish community's fatal tendency towards disunity and point- 
scoring. This may have had little bearing on the eventual outcome of events, 
but Is symptomatic of a lack of strong leadership.
However, Schonfeld succeeded in persuading the Archbishop of Canterbury to 
introduce a Resolution in the House of Lords In March 1943, condemning Nazi 
atrocities against Jews and demanding government action to provide help and 
temporary asylum to persons in danger... who are able to leave'.^s During this 
session, Samuel complained that 'While Governments prepare memoranda 
and exchange Notes and hold conferences ... the Nazis go on killing men, 
women and children.’ He enlarged on the Archbishop’s proposal, suggesting 
that a fresh influx of refugees to Palestine would add to the permanent 
prosperity of that country and denying that immigration into Britain might stir up 
anti-Semitism: ‘Possibly that might be so if it were a question of a hundred 
thousand or a million refugees...it would be no more than a few thousands at 
the most who would succeed in making their way here.’ This elicited a 
reassurance from Cranborne of 'the House’s fullest support’ for immediate and 
generous measures ‘compatible with the requirements of military operations 
for providing help and temporary asylum to r e fu g e e s .A s  usual, the escape 
clause of compatibility with military requirements enabled the Government to 
offer the appearance of full support without any commitment to deliver it.
This indifference to the exhortations of such eminent figures as Lord Samuel 
and the Archbishop of Canterbury indicates that the Government was unlikely
93 h L Debates, 23 March 1943, vol.26, cols. 827.
94 Ibid.
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to have acted on Schonfeld’s Motion even if it had been adopted - again 
illustrating how unequal the efforts and achievements of the voluntary 
agencies were in their dealings with the Government.
Parliamentary Deputation
Clement Attlee had reiterated in January 1942 that the only effective remedy 
for the victims of the Nazis was an Allied victory and that a concerted, rather 
than a unilaterally British, approach to rescue and relief must be followed. He 
emphasised the difficulties: 'Even were we to obtain permission to withdraw all 
Jews ... transport alone presents a problem which will be difficult of solution. 
The lines of escape pass almost entirely through war areas where our 
requirements are predominately military, and which must therefore In the 
interests of our final victory receive predominance. These difficulties are very 
real, and cannot unfortunately be dismissed as "fetters of red-tape": but we 
shall do what we can'.^s
Nevertheless, on 28 January, an all-party deputation, led by Labour M.P. 
Arthur Greenwood, met Churchill, Eden, Morrison and Stanley to urge an 
approach to Germany to release Jews and to suggest that the Allied countries 
afford transport facilities and sanctuary to Jewish refugees, together with 
encouragement to neutral countries to assist in this work.ss These suggestions 
were coolly met. The Government was wary of being drawn Into making 
compromising commitments and deemed it essential to kill the idea that mass 
immigration to this country and the British Colonies was possible.' 7^ Similarly,
95 CZA C 2/296,19 Jan. 1943, copy of Attlee's statement in House of Commons.
96 The Times, 28 Jan. 1943, Wiener Library, 215 B, Press cuttings.
97 Cab 95/15, 27 Jan. 1943, Cabinet Committee on Refugees, Minutes.
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Brodetsky and Brotman failed to obtain any assurances from Law, who 
repeated that the problem could only be dealt with when an appropriate 
opportunity for international co-operation arose. He observed that the 
Government was bound to consider Arab sensibilities regarding Palestine but 
noted that they ‘attached no importance to that."98
Notwithstanding the real desperation which can be inferred from this comment, 
the Anglo-Jewish leadership clearly gave the Impression that the 
Government's concerns were immaterial to its own, thereby shutting off the 
prospect of negotiating some middle course or compromise deal. Brotman 
shortly afterwards notified Law of his considerable disappointment at the 
continuing inaction, particularly in view of the escalating urgency of the 
situation.99
Frustrated by the dilatoriness of the British and American Governments, the 
National Committee sent a strongly worded cable to Eden, then In 
Washington, signed by 206 public figures. It spoke of the situation as one of 
extreme urgency calling for immediate and boldest measures of rescue. British 
conscience so deeply stirred that country prepared for any sacrifice consistent 
with not delaying victory.”'0° In February, the Consultative Committee 
considered making another press appeal and suggested that a number of 
prominent Jewish parliamentarians, such as Lords Samuel, Melchett and 
Reading and James de Rothschild, might jointly address the Government on
98 FO 371/36694 W416/124/48, 29 Jan. 1943, Law, conversation with Brodetsky 
and Brotman.
99 Acc 3121 C11/6/4/1, 23 Feb. 1943, Brotman to Law. For urgency of the 
situation, see CZA L22/149,19 Jan. 1943, Lichtheim Report.
190 Acc 3121 E3/536/1, 20 March 1943, National Committee to Eden, 
Washington.
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the urgency of the situation, followed by a statement from the organisations.loi 
On this occasion, Brotman felt, 'the paramount issue of rescue’ outweighed 
even the undesirability of any body (namely the British Section) other than the 
JFC issuing any public statement.102
Further ideas included the suggestion that refugees should be moved from 
Spain to the Isle of Man or some other territory under British control. Earlier 
proposals were repeated: help and assurances of assistance should be 
offered to neutral countries to encourage them to accept refugees, Turkey 
should accelerate the transfer of refugees permitted to enter Palestine, and the 
possibility of individual exchanges should be e x p lo r e d .^ ° 3  As well as urging the 
importance of such immediate measures, Brodetsky and others repeatedly 
touched on Palestine. They expressed gratitude for the Colonial Secretary’s 
Commons statement in February that the 29,000 Palestine immigration 
certificates still available would be used to admit Jewish children, and some 
adults, from enemy territory, to Palestine. However, they were anxious that this 
should be done as soon as possible and that the figure of 29,000 should not 
be treated as immutable. They added suggestions regarding the movement of 
refugees and a request to bring a substantial number to Britain; they also 
asked what measures HMG had proposed to the Dominions and Colonies to 
secure offers of asylum. All these suggestions, which were reasonable in 
principle, were untenable in practice. In February, the JFC prepared a six-point 
programme for providing facilities for immigration, transportation and 
maintenance of Jewish refugees. Like earlier approaches, this was 'noted for
101 Acc 3121 C l 1/7/1/ I ,  15 Feb. 1943, Emergency Consultative Committee 
Meeting, Minutes.
102 Acc 3121 B5/2/4,19 Feb. 1943, Brotman to Brodetsky.
103 Acc 3121 C11/6/4/1, 23 Feb. 1943, Brotman to Law; 25 Feb. 1943, Brotman 
to Roberts; 16 March 1943, Roberts to Brotman.
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consideration' and reference was made to the imminent Anglo-American 
preliminary conference on the refugee problem
Bermuda Conference.
British public reaction to reports of the exterminations led to increased 
pressure on the Government from December 1942. The National Committee’s 
cable to Eden in March typified the mood of urgency and it was hoped that 
Eden’s visit to Washington would lead to speedy and definite rescue 
m easures. 105 However, it soon became clear that the forthcoming Conference 
would deal not with rescue but solely with the refugee problem. Furthermore, 
as at Evian, Britain reiterated her opposition to any consideration of Palestine 
as a haven and America insisted on retaining her current immigration laws.
The refugee crisis had peaked with the Nazi invasion of unoccupied France in 
November 1942, which resulted in thousands of refugees fleeing into Spain. 
They were held there in internment camps, notably Miranda del Ebro, 
designed to accommodate 700 people but holding over 3,000. A few private 
relief organisations supervised, together with representatives of the British 
Embassy and a team of Red Cross workers. The Spaniards were 'afraid lest 
the relief workers, acting independently, should give undesirable publicity to 
conditions in the camps and prisons which the Spaniards realise leave much 
to be desired'. As the private organisations became increasingly overwhelmed, 
the British Government urged the American State Department in January to 
call an informal conference of Allied nations to review possible action. Five
104 Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 25 Feb. 1943, Brodetsky and Stein to Law; 15 March 
1943, Randall to Brodetsky and Stein.
105 Acc 3121 E3/536/1, 20 March 1943, National Committee to Eden, 
Washington.
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weeks later, Cordell Hull proposed a meeting at Ottawa for ‘preliminary 
exploration of new ways and means of aiding victims of Nazi oppression.’ Hull 
suggested that in view of shipping difficulties, asylum should be sought as 
close as possible to Nazi-dominated territory and stated that ‘the refugee 
problem be not confined to persons of any particular race or faith’.^ o®
Eden’s Washington visit exemplified British caution. Referring to the 60-70,000 
Jews under threat in Bulgaria, he noted that ‘we should move very cautiously 
about offering to take all Jews out of a country like Bulgaria.’ He feared that 
such a move would unleash a torrent of similar requests on behalf of Jews in 
Poland and Germany and that ‘Hitler might well take us up on any offer.’ This 
would result in a open-ended commitment to accept an unquantifiable flood of 
refugees, a problem which would be further exacerbated by difficulties over 
transportation and potential security r i s k s . Eden's reservations were 
designed to show that the logistical difficulties could not be adequately 
addressed without jeopardising the imperative aim of winning the war as 
speedily as possible. His implicit conclusion -  notable for sophistry rather than 
logic -  was that because little could be done, nothing should be done, a point 
that was not raised by the Anglo-Jewish leaders.
In view of the disappointing lack of action following the December Declaration, 
the National Committee called for a continued demonstration by all sections of 
the public in favour of immediate action by HMG and other governments of the
106 Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1943, vol.1, pp. 134-47; FO 
20/107, W240/351/50, Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, January to June 
1943, no. 175, p.11; BOD Annual Report 1943, p.40.
107 FRUS, 1943, Volume 111, pp.38-39. Memorandum of conversation by Harry 
Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.
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United Nations, particularly A m e r i c a Jos it welcomed the Anglo-American 
Conference, though the American request for a preliminary meeting at Ottawa 
was deplored as likely to cause long delays at a time of acute emergency. 
According to reports, one and a half million Polish citizens, one million of them 
Jews, had already been killed, along with nearly 750,000 Yugoslavs. The 
Committee prepared a Twelve-Point Programme’ of feasible rescue 
measures. Rathbone urged that, in the meantime, HMG should take all 
possible steps, including the relaxation of entry regulations, to rescue 
endangered refugees. The Committee considered direct action of this kind the 
strongest incentive to other governments to follow suit.io^
In order to facilitate co-operation, the JFC and the AJA called a conference in 
April of representatives of Jewish communities and organisations. Aware that 
despite overwhelming public support, little had yet been achieved, the 
conference endorsed the National Committee’s rescue proposals and urged 
the Government to take all possible immediate unilateral action, again citing 
the suitability of Palestine for the reception of r e f u g e e s . T h e  conference 
extended a similar appeal to the governments of the United Nations and 
endorsed the measures proposed by the Consultative Committee. A Twelve- 
point Memorandum with supplementary notes was sent to Eden and 
transmitted to Bermuda. Its proposals included the issue of visas, the 
establishment of refugee camps, opportunities in Palestine and the provision 
of neutral or Allied shipping facilities. The Memorandum reiterated proposals
"108 Acc 3121 E3/536/1, 8 April 1943, Mary Sibthorp, National Committee 
Secretary, to Brodetsky.
109 Ibid., Draft Statement for [first] Conference 16 March 1943; 6 April 1943, 
Twelve-Point Programme for Rescue Measures'; 9 March 1943, National 
Committee Conference, Minutes.
110 JTA, 28 March 1943 and Manchester Guardian, 5 April 1943, ‘Speedy 
Rescue of Jews', Wiener Library, 215 A, Press cuttings.
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that assurances be offered to neutral countries regarding assistance and 
speedy transfer and resettlement of refugees. The exchange of refugees for 
enemy nationals was raised, as was an approach to German and other Axis 
and satellite Governments to allow Jews - especially Jewish children - to leave 
enemy-controlled areas, m  The Memorandum incorporated points which had 
been put to various government departments following the December 
Declaration and which also featured in the memoranda submitted to Bermuda 
by organisations such as the WJC and the Jewish Agency.112
While Eden was still in Washington, Dr.Nahum Goldmann, President of the 
WJC, Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, 
and Perlzweig appealed to the Foreign Office for a direct approach to the 
German Government to release Jews or, if this were refused, for facilities to 
send them food. However, Ian Henderson repeated the objections that Eden 
had made in W a s h i n g t o n .  His flat dismissal underlines the hopelessness of 
the organisations' endeavours: there was never any intention of implementing 
suggestions so totally at variance with government policy on the conduct of the 
war and the refugee issue, and which, apart from that, given the military and 
political situation, were impractical to the point of naivete.
Disturbed that the debate on the refugee question was to follow rather than 
precede the Bermuda Conference, Rathbone requested that a deputation, 
fifteen-strong at most, present the case for the Twelve-Point Programme for 
Immediate Rescue Measures.’ Eden declined to receive the deputation, but,
111 FO 371/36659 W6301/49/48, 15 April 1943, Memorandum; BOD Annual 
Report 1943, p.42.
1 1 2  Acc 3121 A/32, JFC Report, April-June 1943; 02/2/5/1, April 1943, JA 
Memorandum.
113 FO 371/36658 W5684/49/48, 24 March 1943, W.Strang, Memorandum; 15 
April 1943, Minutes.
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according to Walker, ‘As a sop ... to Miss Rathbone’, it was agreed that the 
Twelve-Point Programme would be communicated to Bermuda. Still 
dissatisfied, Rathbone continued to press the refugee case: ‘what can we all 
do but go on making ourselves a nuisance to you and everyone else in 
authority? We recognise the disadvantage of publicity. But nothing here seems 
to happen without.’
Neither Government would countenance facilities for specific Jewish 
representation at the Bermuda Conference. The US representative. Sol 
Bloom, a Jew, was considered a concession to Jewish sensibilities, although 
Bloom himself had never been identified with any recognised Jewish pressure 
group. The Foreign Office remarked that ‘we should find it difficult to equate 
the claims of the various Jewish organisations to be represented.’ The 
Conference was designed to deal with the refugee issue as a whole, rather 
than rescue, and its work might be ‘embarrassed’ or unfairly biased by special 
consideration for the Jewish interest, which ‘is parallel with other interests such 
as those of Polish, Czechoslovak, Greek and other refugees.’“‘■'s
Consequently, there was no Jewish representation at Bermuda. Nevertheless, 
Law, the British delegate, advised Eden that ‘We are subjected to extreme 
pressure from an alliance of Jewish organisations and Archbishops.’ Law 
believed it would be unwise to ignore such pressure, either from the powerful 
American Jewish lobby or from British Jewry, although he recognised the
114 Ibid., W5673/49/48, 9 April 1943, Rathbone to Eden; E.A.Walker, Minutes; 
10 April 1943, Rathbone to Eden.
115 FO 371/ 36658 W5534/49/48, 8 April 1943, Halifax, Wasfiington, to Foreign 
Office; FO 371/36659 W6301/49/48, 9 April 1943, Brodetsky to Foreign Office; 11 
April 1943, Walker, Minutes; Perlzweig approached Halifax with a similar request, 
see W6042/49/48, 16 April 1943, Washington to Foreign Office; CZA Z4/15202, 
29 April 1943, Walker to Linton.
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danger of counter-pressure from those 'afraid of an alien immigration into the 
country because it will put their liveiihood in jeopardy after the war.’ i^®
The three principal proposals of the voluntary organisations were dismissed as 
impractical in the early stages of the Conference. The first was that the United 
Nations should approach Hitler to release Jews in Nazi-occupied countries: 'It 
was impossible to negotiate with the enemy -  the terms of negotiating with 
Hitler were unconditional surrender'. It was also 'ridiculous', since the 
possibility of Hitler releasing 40 million 'useless mouths' would place the Allies 
in an impossible position and gravely hinder the war effort. Delegates also 
rejected the second suggestion, that military prisoners in Allied hands be 
exchanged for civilians. Finally, the suggestion that food should be sent 
through the blockade to Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe was also rejected: 'Any 
modification of the blockade was a matter for the Ministry of Economic
Warfare'.ii7
In order to encourage neutral states to grant temporary asylum, the British 
delegation proposed that members of the United Nations give assurances of 
immediate financial assistance and guarantees that all exiles would be 
repatriated when hostilities ended. Although the assurance never materialised, 
Britain did act unilaterally, providing financial assistance and some easing of 
blockade restrictions, stimulating a positive response from Switzerland and 
Sweden. 118 This was an important departure from the principle adopted at the 
Evian Conference, that refugees were not to be a charge on public funds.
116 FO 371/36731 W6933/6933/48, 3 May 1943, Law to Eden.
117 FO 371/36725 W 6785/6711/48, 5 May 1943, Record of discussion at 
Bermuda, Discussion no.2., 20 April 1943; W7106/6711/48,10 May 1943, Report 
of Bermuda Refugees, Discussion.
116 FRUS, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 143-44. See pp. 194-97.
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Emerson had been pressing the matter for some time and now planned to 
launch a national appeal to raise public funds for the assistance of European 
refugees. The Foreign Office approved but felt this ought to wait until after 
B e r m u d a .  119 it was also feared that ‘some harm [anti-Semitism] might result 
because in fact, the funds would be used mainly for J e w s .’120 Here again, 'fear* 
of potential anti-Semitism became a reason for not saving Jews from actual 
anti-Semitism.
The results of the Bermuda Conference were kept secret, on the grounds that 
it was ‘inadvisable in the interest of those in danger to disclose any further 
details’. 121 However, although the final report was not Issued until November 
1943, it was clear, especially after the Commons debate in May, that the 
Conference had been a failure. Its few achievements included the reconvening 
of the IGCR established at Evian, but with a revised mandate enlarging its 
membership to include all refugees. The other positive outcome was the 
establishment of two small camps in North Africa, relieving the pressure on 
Spain and enabling other refugees to enter Spain from France and be 
extricated in turn. By June, it was noted, some 3,000 French nationals, mainly 
Jews, had been moved into North A frica . 122
Many years later. Law frankly described Bermuda as ‘a facade for inaction ... 
there were no results that I can recall. ’ 123 At the time, however. Law was 
confident that the IGCR could do a great deal for refugees’ and offered
Acc 3121 C2/2/5/2, 31 March 1943, Emerson to Revd.W.W.Simpson; 4 April 
1943, Simpson to Archbishop of Canterbury.
120 CZA Z4/302/27, inter alia, 19 April 1943 and 3 May 1943, JA, Minutes.
121 FO 371/36725 W6785/6711/48, 28 April 1943, Discussion no. 12.
122 National Archives, 840.48 REFUGEES/4009, 29 June 1943, Breckinridge 
Long, assistant Secretary of State, to Hull.
123 Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, p.206.
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constructive suggestions for its composition. Interestingly, he did not consider 
the shipping problem altogether insurmountable: ‘If neutral shipping is 
unobtainable, is it really beyond the bounds of possibility that we should find 
one ship?’ His note to Eden concluded with the hope that the inevitably 
meagre results of the Conference might at least be ‘followed up with vigour. ’ 124
The Foreign Office acknowledged that ‘so far as immediate relief to refugees is 
concerned the conference was able to achieve very little’ and expressed thinly 
disguised irritation at what it saw as the unrealistic and unreasonable demands 
of Jewish pressure groups for the early rescue of large numbers of potential 
refugees from Hitler’s hands.’ Its report added that the Conference had to 
dispel the illusion ‘that there could be any rescue from enemy territory’, in 
order to concentrate on the tasks ‘of removing refugees from countries where 
it was impossible for them to remain’, distributing the refugee problem more 
widely ‘and so take it to a certain extent from the shoulders of the British and 
American Governments, on which it has almost entirely rested.’ It was noted 
that wartime conditions would hamper the fulfilment of even these modest
aims. 125
The Conference was clearly intended as a forum for distributing the present 
and post-war refugee crises as widely as possible. Its unspoken and 
unspeakable agenda was to minimise the refugee burden while appearing to 
assist refugees. Although the Jewish organisations understandably saw it as a 
last chance to rescue the endangered Jews of Europe, there was never any
124 FO 371/36731 W6933/6933/48,3 May 1943, Law to Eden.
125 FO 371/36725 W7541/6711/48, 28 June 1943, UK Delegates to the 
Bermuda Conference to Eden.
184
realistic possibility of a large-scale rescue operation from Nazi-controlled 
territory, which might have seriously undermined the war effort.
The short communiqué issued by the Government after the Conference stated 
encouragingly that 'everything that held out any possibility of a solution was 
investigated and d i s c u s s e d . 26 This understandably aroused in the Anglo- 
Jewish leadership a certain innocent optimism, evidenced in a proposal by 
Brotman and a senior official of the Board, Dr.Mowshowitz, that public 
confidence would be raised if the Government were to issue a rough estimate 
of the numbers it hoped to save. They were also anxious for assurances which 
would enable them to counter the 'bitter and... irresponsible abuse' from within 
the Jewish community of the Anglo-Jewish leadership itself. Randall noted that 
the suggestions were 'too vague and impractical; the very idea of saving Jews 
is based on an i l l u s i o n . ' 127 More clear-sighted, the WJC reacted to the 
Conference's final communiqué, which insisted that recommendations must 
not be such as to interfere with the war effort, with the comment 'that what 
stands in the way of aid to the Jews in Europe by the United Nations is not that 
such a program is dangerous, but simply lack of will to go to any trouble on
t h e i r  b e h a l f . '128
Even while the Bermuda Conference was in session. Colonel Victor Cazalet, 
chairman of the National Committee Executive, criticised the opening 
speeches for their pusillanimous insistence on magnifying the difficulties at the 
expense of practical possibilities. Cazalet warned of a mounting wave of 
indignation in Britain’ should the Conference fail to initiate immediate rescue
126 b o d  Annual Report 1943, p.43.
127 FO 371/36725 W7127/6711/48,10 May 1943, Harold Beeley, Foreign Office 
Research Department, to Randall.
128 Kubowitzki, op.cit., p. 165.
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measures. Yet for a short while the National Committee suspended its public 
activities in the faint hope that the Conference might have some limited 
results. 129 The Conference's meagre achievements evoked bitter 
disappointment in the Jewish and national press. 1^0 Even early on, the Jewish 
Chronicle was pessimistic about its prospects of success, afterwards summing 
up its results as 'not impressive’. The Jewish Weekly similarly spoke of its 
earlier scepticism being justified.i3i
A full-day parliamentary debate on the refugee problem was held on 19 May 
1943, opening with a statement on the Bermuda Conference by Osbert Peake. 
The parliamentary members of the National Committee, headed by Rathbone, 
pressed the Government for evidence of concrete rescue efforts. Several 
points were also raised by private members. Some emphasised the potential 
problems of refugee immigration into Britain, while others spoke more 
sympathetically of the humanitarian need to mitigate the crisis.i32 in response 
to the Government’s critics, Peake observed disingenuously that the purpose 
of the Conference had been to consider possible courses of action 'as a 
preliminary to wider international collaboration', not to take executive 
decisions. He reiterated that 'winning the war must take priority over all other 
considerations' and pointed out that ‘the rate of extermination was such that no 
measure of rescue or relief on however large a scale could be commensurate 
with the problem.’ This all-or-nothing logic implied, as Eden had previously.
129 Acc 3121 E3/536/1. 22 April 1943, Cazalet to The Times: E/536/2, Dec. 
1943, National Committee, letter.
130 News Chronicle, 'How not to hold a Conference on Refugees’ and The 
Observer, Honour our Guide', cited in CZA A354/50, Joseph Hertz Papers, 18 
February 1944, Speakers Notes on ‘Jewish Situation in Central Europe’ 
(hereafter'Jewish Situation'), pp. 11-12.
’*3'* J.C. 23 April 1943, p.8; 7 May 1943, p.8. Jewish Weekly, 30 April 1943, 
vol.VII, no.370, p.1.
132 HC Debates, Fifth Series, 1942-1943, vol.389, cols. 1117-1204.
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that it was not worth while trying to save only a very small number of victims. 
Peake dismissed suggestions that visas be issued to individual Jews in enemy 
or enemy-occupied territory on the grounds that nothing could be ascertained 
about [the whereabouts of] such individuals.‘•33 It followed, therefore, that there 
was no point trying to rescue anyone.
The Government’s inertia was sharply criticised by individual Members such 
as Cazalet and Rathbone, who condemned Morrison’s continued inactivity in 
the face of strong public sympathy and complained that their own efforts were 
apparently perceived as a nuisance . ‘•34 David Grenfell and Silverman also 
voiced disappointment at the Government’s failure to exploit the potential of 
Palestine as a haven for refugees. Eden rejoined that the Colonial Secretary 
had referred on 3 February to the 30,000 vacancies in Palestine, now difficult 
to fill owing to the attitude of Sofia and Berlin. He concluded the debate by 
denying that the Government was indifferent to the refugee issue but 
reiterating that little could be done until victory was a c h i e v e d . ‘•35
Aborted Hopes
The final communiqué of the Bermuda Conference had made it plain that any 
recommendation must be capable of accomplishment under wartime 
conditions without impeding the war effort. The Conference concluded that the
133 Ibid., pp. 1120,1129-30,1124.
134 Ibid _ pp. 1137,1157-58, 1184. For Rathbone's critical view of Morrison, 
'whom she never forgave', see Mary D.Stocks, Eleanor Rathbone: A Biography 
(London, 1949), pp.300-301.
135 Ibid., pp. 1178, 1195-96, 1197-99,1202.
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solution of the refugee problem would have to wait for final victory because the 
proposals it had considered would adversely affect the conduct of warJ^®
Continued effort now seemed futile. The day after the debate, the Board 
issued a polite statement expressing disappointment at the limited prospects 
held out by the United Nations and hinting that more could surely be done to 
alleviate the present crisis without prejudicing the war e f f o r t .  1^ 7 The Agudat 
Israel report noted that everything possible had been done to stimulate the 
Governments to action, but that even a concerted Jewish approach had been 
utterly frustrated by ‘considerations of higher p o l i t i c s ’. Perlzweig confided to 
Easterman, 'We must continue this fight on every front to which we have 
access: but it is idle to pretend that the outlook is ... e n c o u r a g i n g ' .  1^9 public 
interest in the fate of European Jewry, which had been intense from the end of 
1942, appears to have waned by mid-1943, perhaps as a consequence of 
compassion fatigue. The National Committee, which was now at the forefront 
of political efforts, tried to sustain public sympathy and continued to press the 
authorities on behalf of European Jewry. A year later, Rathbone expressed 
deep disappointment at the continued Inaction, in spite of initial widespread 
public sympathy. Since Eden’s visit to Washington in March 1943, she noted, 
interest had subsided with official assurances that everything possible was 
being done.'i^o
“•36 CZA A354/50, 18 February 1944, Joseph Hertz Papers, ‘Jewish Situation’, 
p.29, Text on the Final Communiqué of the Bermuda Conference on Refugees.
137 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/1, 20 May 1943.
138 AI WO, Report, January to June 1943, p.5.
138 aJAC coII.361 A14/5,17 May 1943, Perlzweig to Easterman.
139 Acc 3121 E3/536/2, 26 July 1944, National Committee, ‘Our Purpose’, points 
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The Board passed a resolution In July, expressing sympathy with the victims of 
Nazi terror, appreciation for the limited rescue measures so far adopted and 
concern that the measures proposed by the Bermuda Conference be 
implemented as soon as p o s s ib le . it is symptomatic of the Board's lack of 
power or influence that it could do no more on this occasion than previously: 
pass resolutions which stated the obvious, show that it was 'doing something' 
and circulate this information within the Jewish community. The Board 
accepted that there were no new proposals to make. Brotman continued to 
appeal desperately for shipping, however unseaworthy, to be made available, 
arguing that almost any ordeal would be gladly welcomed ... rather than the 
horrors of the sealed railway w a g o n s . '1^2 This again illustrates how out-of- 
touch the organisations were with the competing demands of rescue and 
warfare; they failed to appreciate that Jews in enemy territory were effectively 
trapped and could not easily be extricated. A complex rescue operation would 
have to be mounted before the question of shipping could even be broached. 
Randall assured Brotman that every possible practical suggestion which could 
pose no obstacle to the war effort ‘had been fully and sympathetically 
considered' at Bermuda. Brodetsky observed despondently that I cannot say 
that we have any new proposals to make other than those that were submitted 
at Bermuda, but that those, if implemented, would go far to rescue the 
remnants of Jews in Europe.'1^ 3
The failing of the organisations was not that they did not try hard enough but 
that the vast majority of their ideas were impractical, unrealistic, even naive.
141 FO 371/36725 W996176711/48, 4 July 1943, Brotman to Foreign Office; 
BOD Annual Report, 1943, pp. 19-20.
142 Acc 3121 011/7/1/5, 10 June 1943, interview with Randall.
143 Ibid. Acc 3121 02/2/5/1, 16 July 1943, Brodetsky to Dr.J.M.Machover, United 
Emergency Oommittee for European Jewry, Sydney.
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given their utter incompatibility with Government priorities. No amount of mass 
lobbying or agitation would have made these ideas less so. Communal leaders 
did not perceive their specific suggestions, such as those relating to shipping 
and physical rescue, within the overall context of the global war situation. They 
saw, for example, only a Jewish frame of reference in the Government's 
'Palestine' policy, failing (either consciously or unconsciously) to realise that 
Palestine formed only a small piece of the Government's policy in the Middle 
East. The real failure of the Anglo-Jewish organisations in this period was not 
one of will but of political and diplomatic experience and acumen.
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Chapter Six
impasse and Frustration
Poiitical Activity (Summer 1943 - Autumn 1944)
Following Bermuda, the voluntary organisations could do nothing except try to 
ensure that the Conference’s few recommendations were Implemented and 
press the Allied Governments to Issue further warnings of retribution for war 
crimes. The focus now shifted to post-war relief and reconstruction. 1 With the 
invasion of Sicily well advanced, Rome liberated in June, and the continued 
Soviet advance westward, the prospects of an Allied victory were increasing.
It has been argued that divisions within the Board over Zionism, which came to a 
head in the summer of 1943, distracted its attention from the plight of European 
Jewry.2 No doubt these clashes occupied time and energy. But there is no 
evidence that internal friction within the Board prevented it from accomplishing 
any useful work it might otherwise have achieved. More importantly, many of the 
Anglo-Jewish voluntary organisations and personalities co-operated through the 
interdenominational National Committee.
Publicity Campaign
The National Committee recognised the importance of sustaining public interest 
in the Jewish catastrophe. Brotman maintained that quick action could save 
hundreds now threatened in the Balkans and called for an intensive publicity
Acc 3121 B5/2/1, 25 July 1943, Board Meeting. 
2 Bolchover, op.cit., pp.54-7.
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campaign. However, in view of public apathy, it was agreed that public meetings 
should not be called.3 Rathbone’s ‘Rescue the Perishing’, incorporating the 
revised Twelve-Point Programme, formed the basis of a renewed publicity 
campaign. It continued the work begun by Gollancz’s pamphlet, ‘Let My People 
Go’, already in its sixth edition by March, and now replaced it. ^  The pamphlet 
contained strongly worded criticism of Government inaction and outlined various 
rescue measures regarded as practicable. Peake responded for the  
Government, complaining that these publications, like the title ‘National 
Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror’, were misleading (and by implication 
sensationalist), since ‘Your proposals are in effect limited to those who have 
already escaped from Nazi territory'. He added rather tartly that Rathbone's 
proposals ‘were all discussed at Bermuda and so far as practicable have been 
or will be adopted', s
By June 1943. the National Committee had decided to establish a Press, 
Research and Information Bureau and was investigating opportunities for 
collaborating with American organisations and with the Dominions. However, no 
mass meetings were held during 1943 and the suggestion to hold one in 
December was rejected on the grounds that it would be difficult to fill the Albert 
Hall, a reflection of the weakening of public interest.® Later historians, such as 
Alderman, who have accused the organisations of failing to hold mass
3 Acc 3121 E/536/1, May 1943, Cazalet, letter; 8 June 1943, National 
Committee, Minutes.
4 Ibid., 16 June 1943, Short Secretarial Report. By mid-June, 40,000 copies of 
‘Rescue the Perishing’ were in circulation, and about 55,000 copies of the 
Twelve-Point Programme.
5 FO 371/36662, W8192/49/48, 25 May 1943, Peake to Rathbone.
6 Acc 3121 E3/536/1, 16 June 1943, Short Secretarial Report. By September 
1943, the National Committee had rejected the idea of liaison with America; 
E3/536/2, 23 Sept. 1943, National Committee Executive Meeting.
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demonstrations, seem unaware of the limited effectiveness of rhetoric on empty 
benches.
Attempts were made during Parliamentary debates to keep the issue alive. 
However, as Rathbone observed, although the National Committee had tried to 
co-operate with the Government by avoiding publicity on sensitive issues. 
‘Practically every suggestion we have made to them has been rejected. 
Rathbone was discouraged from raising in the House of Commons the question 
of guarantees to neutral states and the failure of the Moscow Conference 
(November 1943) to refer to atrocities against Jews. The Government insisted 
that it could not publicly support neutrals without embarrassing them and that 
protest stimulated, rather than deterred, the Nazis. Rathbone finally settled for 
an assurance, to be given during the debate, that the Government was giving 
the matter close and active attention.®
In February 1944, Rathbone issued another pamphlet, entitled ‘Continuing 
Terror", detailing a new ‘Ten-Point Programme" devised by the National 
Committee. It contained nothing new, but called on Britain to take the lead in 
rescue work. The Government complained that this pamphlet gave the 
misleading and unfair impression that rescue depended soleiy on its own energy 
and conviction.® The National Committee also launched a campaign to sustain 
public interest, this time with a mass meeting in February at Central Hall, 
Westminster, designed to recreate 'public interest in the whole subject of rescue
^ FO 371/36665 W11588/49/48, 9 Aug. 1943, Rathbone: Note on the Position 
Regarding Rescue From Nazi terror and Post-War Refugee Policy.
8 Acc 3121 E3/536/2, 9 Nov. 1943, National Committee Meeting; 25 Nov. 1943, 
Rathbone to Hall; HC Debates, Fifth Series, 2 Dec. 1943, vol.395, cols. 1467- 
1471.
9 FO 371/42751 W2859/83/48, 25 Feb. 1944, Minutes. Lady C. Cheetham and 
Randall.
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work ... and to get people who can raise emot ion' .Speakers continued the 
growing trend since before Bermuda to denounce Allied inaction as the reai 
impediment to rescue. However, the response to the campaign, throughout 
1944, was disappointing. The National Committee received very few  
contributions and experienced great difficulty in attracting speakers."* ^
Neutral States
The most promising avenue of rescue lay in the escape or the permitted 
departure of threatened victims from enemy-occupied countries to bordering 
neutral states. To the organisations, the extent to which this might be 
encouraged or permitted depended partly on how far these states could count 
on Allied aid for the support and eventual transfer elsewhere of such refugees. ■*2 
It has been argued that one of the main influences on the neutrals, however, 
was the military situation. Hence, after the end of 1942, when Allied victories 
proved that Germany was not invincible, the neutrals became more 
accommodating towards Jewish refugees and certainly, during 1944, with the 
end of the war in sight, new refugees were allowed into Switzerland. Despite 
repeated attempts, the voluntary groups failed to secure an Allied Declaration of 
assurances to the neutrals.
10 Acc 3121 B5/2/7/1, 31 Jan. 1944, Brotman to Brodetsky.
11 Acc 3121 E3/536/1, Hertz to United Synagogue, (n.d., presumabiy April 
1944); 10 May 1944, National Committee Executive Meeting, Minutes; 2 June 
1944. Wilfred Israel to Brotman.
12 Acc 3121 E3/536/2, 'Continuing Terror', p.2.
10 Leni Yahil, 'The Historiography of the Refugee Problem and Rescue: Rescue 
Efforts in the Neutral Countries', The Historioaraohv of the Holocaust Period: 
Proceedings of the Fifth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference. 
Jerusalem March 1983 (Jerusalem, 1988), p.530.
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In February 1943, the Board first proposed such assurances, to be backed with 
material aid. At that time Schonfeld sought permission to go to Turkey in order to 
organise assistance for refugees en route to Palestine. To expedite matters, he 
suggested that one of the voluntary bodies undertake this work. The 
Government, however, was reluctant, Randall expressing doubts about a ‘Rabbi 
running round in Turkey: the Turks would stiffen and regard him as sent by us.' 
Such work was in any case regarded as the province of the Jewish Agency and 
the Government decided that a co-ordinated approach by a single agency would 
be more effective. its view also reflects a wider suspicion of the unpredictable 
consequences that might arise from the activities of individuals acting on their 
own initiative on such sensitive issues.
By November, the voluntary groups had become deeply disappointed that no 
formal declaration of assurances to neutrals had materialised.is During the 
December debate on the war situation, Rathbone urged the Government to 
accept a proportion of the large number of non-repatriable refugees in the 
neutral states, enabling the latter to take more. Eden replied that he would look 
into the matter. is At issue was the position of non-repatriables, Jewish refugees 
who could not reasonably be expected to return to countries where anti- 
Semitism was deep-rooted and their families had been massacred. It was 
considered vital to assure the neutrals, especially Sweden and Switzerland, that 
the Allied nations would not merely assist in repatriation but assume 
responsibility for those who could not be repatriated after the war. However, the
14 FO 371/36711 W 3042/1315/48,18 Feb. 1943, Schonfeld to Millard, 2 March 
1943, Millard to Schonfeld.
15 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/2,10 Nov. 1943, Lord Crewe to Churchill
16 HC Debates, Fifth Series, 2 Dec. 1943, vol.395, col. 1471; CZA A354/50, 
Joseph Hertz Papers 18 Feb. 1944, ‘Jewish Situation', p. 19.
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proposed Declaration, drafted in December, evaded the issue altogether and the 
National Committee arranged to see Emerson to challenge itJ^
A few weeks later, Randall observed acidly that ‘there was no reason why 
Switzerland, with her comparatively comfortable economic and financial 
situation, should be singled out for assurances of relief at the expense of this 
country and others who had given their all for the purpose of the war’. Britain 
‘would fully play its proper part’ in dealing with non-repatriables, but as part of an 
international effort, and he advised Brodetsky that it was a policy of defeatism’ 
to campaign against the voluntary return of large numbers of German, Austrian 
and Polish Jews to their countries of origin.is
The guarantee to neutrals was again raised by a deputation to Eden, led by 
Grenfell in January 1944. Rathbone enclosed a bluntly expressed’ note, 
described by Randall as ‘ill-informed and offensive’, on the Proposed 
Declaration to Neutrals. In reply. Law reiterated that responsibility for non- 
repatriable or stateless refugees lay with the IGCR, as agreed at the first 
session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), held in November 1943.^^ He added that Britain and 
America had approached the Swedish and Swiss Governments with proposals 
regarding financial assurances regarding refugees, which were currently 
receiving sympathetic consideration. In the circumstances, ‘it would be a 
disservice to the refugees’ to force this delicate issue into the open. Rathbone 
nevertheless urged HMG, together with the Dominions, to take the initiative by 
offering open assurances to the neutrals. Eden pointed out that a limited Anglo-
17 Acc 3121 E3/536/2, 26 Nov. 1943, Rathbone to Hall; E3/538/1 ,13 Dec. 1943, 
Rathbone: Note on the Proposed Declaration.
18 FO 371/42745 W127/26/48, 29 Dec. 1943, Randall, Minutes.
19 FO 371/42751 W 543/83/48,14 Dec. 1943, Rathbone to Hall.
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American guarantee to this effect could not be given, but offered helpful 
assurances and advice 20
Approached again by Brodetsky in February, Randall reiterated that there was 
no reason to think that the absence of overt assurances had prevented the 
neutrals from offering asylum. He informed Brodetsky confidentially that Britain 
and America had given assurances where required and together offered 
substantial assistance to Sweden in recognition of the extra burden of refugees 
assumed by that country; negotiations with Switzerland were also underway.21 
Brodetsky nevertheless continued to press for a declaration to the neutrals with 
dogged tenacity, undeterred by repeated and predictable rebuffs. Britain 
maintained her existing commitments to the neutral states, especially in the 
summer of 1 9 4 4 .2 2  but the official declaration sought by the voluntary 
organisations never materialised.
It seems that the Government believed that negotiations with neutrals on the 
refugee issue were best conducted in private, as 'the publication of such as 
statement might well prejudice the escape of refugees' and because any public 
assurances of help 'would imply that their previous attitude towards refugees 
had been illiberal and inhospitable'.23
20 Ibid., 7 Jan. 1944, Hall to Rathbone; 11 Jan. 1944, notes on points for 
submission to Eden; W544/83/48, 8 Jan. 1944, Foreign Office note on 
Rathbone's points for 11 January deputation; W855/83/48, 14 Jan. 1944, 
Randall, Minutes and Randall to Emerson; Acc 3121 E3/536/1, 18 Jan. 1944, 
National Committee Executive Meeting, Minutes.
21 FO 371/42751 W1060/83/48,1 Feb. 1944, interview with Brodetsky.
22 FO 371/42811 WR 481/3/48, 28 July 1944, Cheetham, Minutes; WR 484/3/48, 
5 Sept. 1944, Paul Mason, head of Refugee Department, to Emerson; FO 
371/42845 WR 346/13/48,18 July 1944, Sir R.Campbell, Lisbon.
23 FO 371/42845 WR 346/13/48, 8 Aug. 1944, telegram no. 235, Foreign Offivce 
to Lisbon.
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Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR)
The Government considered the reconvening of the IGCR one of the major 
accomplishments of the Bermuda Conference. It adopted the Conference's 
recommendations for reorganising and enlarging the IGCR membership and 
undertook to cover all except administrative expenses, which were to be shared 
with other member-states. The Foreign Office welcomed the reconvening of the 
IGCR as shifting the diplomatic initiative elsewhere, as in the case of the Adler- 
Rudel scheme for taking 20,000 Jewish children to Sweden, and relieving 
pressure on Britain. It would now be more difficult for the American State 
Department to avoid decisions and Law revealingly hoped for American support 
in steering the IGCR 'free from undue Jewish influence and intrigue in 
connection with Palestine.'24
The IGCR did not meet until August 1943, by which time the Jewish 
organisations had been given to understand that they would have some 
representative status with the IGCR. However, because it was a committee of 
governments, direct representation of specialist and non-official bodies was 
ruled out. Emerson advised Brodetsky that all representative organisations 
would meet monthly and maintain a productive liaison with the IGCR. Parliament 
was assured that the IGCR would co-operate with the Jewish and other 
organisations. However, by June 1944, Brodetsky was complaining of 
Emerson's failure to involve the organisations effectively.^s
24 FO 371 «6666  W12841/49/48, 3 Sept. 1943, The Refugee Situation', Law, 
Memorandum.
25 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/2,19 Aug. 1943, Law to Crewe and inter alia, C l 1/7/3a/2,10 
Aug. 1943, interview with Emerson; C2/2/5/2, 29 Nov. 1943, Brodetsky to 
Emerson; B5/2/1, 27 June 1944, conversation with Patrick Malin, deputy Director, 
IGCR.
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Before the IGCR's Fourth Plenary Session met in August 1944, the National 
Committee, supported by the Board, submitted a range of proposals, including 
the suggestion that the Allied and neutral powers take advantage of the Horthy 
Offer and that Jewish refugees be allowed into Palestine.26 Although thirty- 
seven states participated, there was no official Jewish representation; observers 
representing numerous Jewish organisations attended but their role was strictly 
limited. William Frankel, a Board observer, noted that The realities of the Jewish 
situation in Europe appeared remote from the conference hall’. Suggestions 
about Palestine as a potential haven for Jewish refugees and about further 
warnings to the satellites were evaded. The IGOR did pass a resolution 
‘affirming the principle of co-operation with non-Governmental organisations in 
their humanitarian activities’ but the only practical decision of the session 
concerned travel documents for stateless refugees.27
The IGOR did co-operate with other governmental bodies dealing with refugees, 
in particular UNNRA, which dealt with the vast problem of displaced persons 
and applied itself particularly to the plight of stateless refugees. It is debatable 
whether any official representation by the voluntary groups would have made 
any difference to the IGCR’s achievements. It had no relief machinery of its own 
and no real power to negotiate with neutral or enemy states. One of its functions 
was to use credit payments to assist Jews, via post-war pledges of repayment. 
In this way it was able to provide a secret channel for sending relief to Romania 
in the summer of 1944. But on the whole it 'failed to acquire sufficient
2 6 a c c 3121 C2/2Æ /3,11 Aug. 1944, Board to IGCR.
27 Ibid., 15-17 Aug. 1944, William Frankel, Report of Fourth Plenary Session of 
the IGCR; AJYB, vol.47 (1945-1946), p.347.
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independent authority to play any significant role in the succour of refugees from 
Nazi Europe'28
War Refuoee Board (WRB)
Unlike the IGCR, which was engaged in placing refugees temporarily in neutral 
countries and with affairs in newly liberated countries, the WRB, established by 
an American Presidential Executive order in January 1944, concentrated on 
rescue from enemy-controlled territories. It claimed to have facilitated the rescue 
of 'hundreds of thousands' from the Balkans and western Europe and provided 
relief for those who found refuge in Sweden and Switzerland.^^
Although the British voluntary organisations were encouraged to maintain 
regular contact with the WRB, they failed to secure a British equivalent.^o Hall 
advised Brodetsky that 'an analogous body already existed in Britain and that 
the IGCR, the main instrument of rescue and relief, was building up its 
membership (in the British Dominions and Soviet Union in particular), with the 
fullest support of HMG'.^i Brodetsky pointed out that the WRB was engaged in 
the critical work of rescue, unlike the IGCR, which dealt solely with refugees 
from occupied territories. He added that rescue measures must go outside the 
ordinary methods, even if “illegally” from the enemy’s point of view. We were not 
bound to consider legal technicalities imposed by the enemy for the very
28 FO 371/42751 W544/83/48, 8 Jan. 1944, notes on Rathbone’s points for 11 
January deputation; Wasserstein, op.cit., p.218.
29 BOD Annual Report, 1944, p.41; Acc 3121 E3/536/2, 2 Oct. 1945, WRB, 
Twenty Months' Humanitarian Record.
80 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/3, 14 Sept. 1944, Brotman interview with James Mann, 
British representative of the WRB.
81 Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 1 Feb. 1944, interview with Hall; FO 371/42751 
W1060/83/48, 3 Feb. 1944, Randall, Minutes. Hall was referring to the Cabinet 
Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees.
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purpose of extermination.’ How Brodetsky distinguished ‘ordinary’ from 
‘extraordinary’ rescue measures remains unclear, nor is it obvious why he 
considered it necessary to refute the legal niceties of the enemy’s extermination 
programme. Prompted to be more specific, Brodetsky fell back on vague 
generalisations about ‘military measures and instructions to commanders’ which 
went no further once the Government confirmed that such an approach would 
interfere with the war effort.32 in this, as in many other of Brodetsky's exchanges 
with the Foreign Office, a surprising lack of argumentative rigour is evident. This 
was perhaps because Brodetsky himself knew that his proposals were often 
untenable in principle as well as in practice. He may have hoped that repetition, 
together with diplomatic rhetoric, would wear down official opposition.
Support for a body similar to the WRB, to replace the ineffectual IGCR, which 
was ‘bogged down with protocol and diplomatic niceties’, came from various 
quarters.33 Such pressure was sometimes an irritant to the Government, which 
already viewed the WRB dubiously as the product of the American-Jewish 
political lobby. Randall objected that 'Miss Rathbone and her friends are going 
around saying that the War Refugee Board is going really to rescue Jews from 
Europe by secret means, and that HMG should be urged to do likewise.’ He 
added that ‘secret lanes’ from France into Spain could only prove effective 
‘provided there was no publicitv.’ This was a reference to the escape routes 
used by 'our own prisoners, especially the R.A.F. personnel and allied recruits.
32 Ibid.
33 FO 371/42727 W1629/16/48, 30 Jan. 1944, Easterman to Law; W2231/16/48, 
9 Feb. 1944, Parliamentary Question Time; W3012/16/48 16 Feb. 1944, Emanuel 
Cellar to Halifax. For the British press, see W2413/16/48, 12 Feb. 1944, extract 
from Manchester Guardian; The Times, 10 April 1944, p.3.
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but refugees have taken advantage of them'.34 it would have been dangerous to 
leak the existence of these routes to the Jewish refugee organisations.
The mass meeting called by the National Committee resolved to urge the 
Government to speed up the rescue of all those who could still be saved and to 
set up a British organisation similar to the WRB.^s The Government’s refusal to 
accede to this demand seems to have put an end to any hope of British rescue 
for the remnant of European Jewry. Later that month, Brodetsky and Hertz 
pressed again for a WRB - style organisation in Britain. While accepting that a 
Cabinet Committee already existed to deal with rescue, they proposed that 'a 
special organisation should be set up which would not in any way be hindered 
by financial considerations or formalities'. They were politely assured that 
everything possible was already being done. The proposal that a blank cheque 
be issued for the use of a committee unrestrained by 'formalities' is 
characteristic of the more naive element of the Board's thinking. By March, the 
issue had finally been dropped.^®
Political Warfare
Allied leaders had promised to place retribution for war crimes among the major 
objectives of the war. This was first announced by Churchill in October 1941 and 
was reaffirmed at the Nine-Power Declaration of January 1942, though neither 
mentioned atrocities specifically against Jews. Sikorsky explained that the 
omission bore no other implication than that Jews were considered to be victims
34 FO 371/42727 W3201/16/48, 22 Feb. 1944, extract from The Times: Randall. 
Minutes.
Jewish Weekly, 10 March 1944, vol.VIII, no.415, p.1.
36 Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 27 March 1944, interview with Randall; 28 March 1944, 
interview with Major Arthur Henderson; AJYB, vol.46 (1944-1945), p. 190.
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of crimes committed against nationals of their home-states. The United Nations 
Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, established in October 1942, 
similarly stated that The Commission will investigate war crimes committed 
against nationals of the United Nations'37
Although the Allies did not commit themselves at that time to any formal legal 
procedure, Jewish bodies feared that some members of the United Nations 
might disclaim 'national' responsibility for certain Jews who had been dispersed 
or dispossessed by the Nazis and that these would therefore be excluded from 
the category of those for whom retribution was promised. Moreover, crimes 
against Jews of Axis nationality on Axis territory were not included In the 
retribution which the Allied Governments had pledged. In international law, 
crimes committed by enemy governments against their own nationals were not 
'war crimes': international law dealt only with relations between sovereign states. 
None of the declarations had gone beyond the general assurance that such 
'crimes would not go unpunished'.30 It was feared that crimes against Jews 
might slip through the net of international law, owing to the fact they were 
considered citizens of their countries of origin. The organisations therefore 
lobbied for special mention of Jews in any Allied declaration calling for 
punishment of Nazi war crimes.
37 FO 371/30917, C7870/61/18, 6 Aug. 1942, Treatment of War Criminals; HL 
Debates, 1941-42, vol. 124, cols. 581-86; CZA 9775a, WJC, Report National 
Conference 23 - 24 Oct. 1943, p.9.
38 FO 371/30917 07870/61/18, 6 Aug. 1942, Treatment of War Criminals; Fox, 
'The Jewish Factor', op.cit., p.98; Priscilla Dale Jones, 'British Policy Towards 
German Crimes against German Jews, 1939-1945', Leo Baeck Institute Year 
Book, vol. XXXVI (1991), pp.339-66. This became a major controversy in 1945, 
finally resolved in August 1945 with the establishment of a new legal category of 
'Crimes Against Humanity'. See Acc 3121 C11/7/2/9, 26 April 1945, Board to 
A.Greenwood.
203
Following the December 1942 Declaration, the Anglo-Jewish voluntary 
organisations repeatedly pressed the Government for further warnings of 
retribution, hoping for specific mention of Jews. But the Government invariably 
refused, maintaining that declarations were ineffective and potentially damaging. 
The Declaration had merely aroused excessive expectation amongst Jewish and 
other groups and led to ‘immense pressure on HMG to undertake measures of 
rescue which were quite impracticable'. When Rathbone called for a public 
warning to the Bulgarians, following the revelation that Bulgarian Jewry was 
threatened with deportation to Poland, Randall declined and advised that the 
Bulgarians be allowed, despite German pressure, to honour their agreement to 
enable 4,500 children and 500 adults to leave for Palestine.^^
Nevertheless, the Agudat Israel and the British Section continued to press for 
warnings and declarations. Easterman maintained that such action was part of 
the ‘Political Warfare of the Allies' and that any declaration should highlight the 
plight of Jewish victims. He was told that further declarations would merely 
‘debase the currency", weakening the effect of those already issued. Some quite 
exceptional incentive would have to arise', as had been the case with the 
December 1942 Declaration, to justify its reaffirmation.^o When the December 
Declaration was reaffirmed in conjunction with the Moscow Conference in 
November 1943, a general statement was issued to cover future atrocities, but it 
was not thought necessary to distinguish crimes against Jews, as the December 
Declaration had already done so.^i This failed to satisfy the Jewish
39 FO 371/36662 W8192/49/48, 4 June 1943, Randall, Minutes; 7 June 1943, 
Randall to Hendricks.
40 CZA 02/540, 6 Oct. 1943, Jan Masaryk to Easterman; 11 Oct. 1943, 
Easterman to Masaryk; FO 371/34377 013026/31/62, 3 Nov. 1943, Goodman to 
Hall; Jewish Weekly, 12 Nov. 1943, no.398, vol.VII, p.1.
41 AIWO A-37, 3 Nov. 1943, Goodman to Hall; 13 Nov. 1943, G.W.Harrison, 
Foreign Office, to Goodman.
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organisations, which feared that the Jewish issue would be allowed to lapse 
after the war. On Rathbone's advice, Lord Crewe wrote to Churchill, meeting, in 
advance, the objection that 'of course, a Polish Jew was a Pole and crimes 
against him were no different from crimes against Poles in general'. Brodetsky 
felt that a letter from Crewe on the subject was more effective than a protest 
from a Jewish organisation. 2^
The demand for a further warning followed the Nazi attempt in early 1944 to 
‘justify’ the extermination of the Jews by declaring all Jews, irrespective of 
nationality, to be belligerents. This was possibly a protective measure designed 
to rebut criticism in the event of a German defeat. In February 1944 Silverman 
and Easterman appealed for a new declaration on the grounds that the 
Germans had aimed ‘a fresh blow to international law’ by disregarding the legal 
nationality of the Jews of Greece, many of whom were of Turkish or Spanish 
origin, and deporting them all. Law’s tepid response was that HMG would first 
need to consult Washington. Easterman also suggested that the satellites be 
reminded that kindness to Jews would be remembered at the peace conference. 
Law informed him that both Romania and Hungary were already ‘attempting to 
lay up a treasure of good works against the day of reckoning’, though it might be 
disastrous to draw public attention to this.43
Eden continued to object to Rathbone’s proposal to discuss warnings in the 
House of Commons, maintaining that the satellites already knew the British 
attitude and had shown ‘signs of developing in the right direction.’ Rathbone
42 Acc 3121 C 2/2 /5 /2 ,10 Nov. 1943, Crewe to Churchill; B5/2/4/1, 5 Nov. 1943, 
Brodetsky to Brotman.
43 CZA C2/299, 8 Feb. 1944, Proceedings of WJC; FO 371/42751 W1635/83/48, 
[n.d.j Feb. 1944, Foreign Office Memorandum; Acc 3121 C2/2/5/3, 16 Feb. 1944, 
J.SIawson, American Jewish Committee, to J.W.Pehle, WRB.
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reluctantly agreed to postpone her question. 44 But an appalling document, which 
reached London in February from the Jewish National Committee in Warsaw, 
revealing that the Germans were butchering the last survivors of Polish Jewry, 
called for immediate attention. The British Section agitated strenuously for a 
solemn warning to be issued jointly and simultaneously by Churchill, Roosevelt 
and Stalin.45 Eden remained sceptical of the efficacy of any new Allied 
statement. The Cabinet Committee agreed that a declaration of this kind, 
'addressed to the Germans would do no good, and might do harm; but that HMG 
favoured a declaration addressed to the satellite powers'.46 Lord Melchett, Vice- 
President of the British Section, was eventually persuaded that such a  
declaration might make matters worse, though it 'would certainly be a great 
solace to the Jews condemned to die, and to world Jewry to know that their 
sufferings were not passed by in silence.' Melchett agreed to leave the matter to
the Government.47
Easterman had been negotiating with the Foreign Office since September 1943 
for a new declaration, to embody the 17 December one and make it stronger by 
an appeal to the peoples of Europe with regard to better treatment of J e w s .48 
Easterman believed that an Allied statement might encourage some reduction, 
however minimal, in the atrocities, and that the oppressed people themselves, 
whenever they could communicate with the outside world, called for public 
condemnation. He pointed out that the Government had agreed that failure to 
condemn the atrocities might be taken by the Germans as a sign of weakness or
44 FO 371/42751 W3567/83/48, 3 March 1944, Eden to Rathbone.
45 CZA C2/666, 22 Feb. 1944, Melchett to Eden.
46 Cab 95/15, J R. (44), 1st Meeting, 14 March 1944, Cabinet Committee on 
Refugees.
47 CZA C2/666, 11 March 1944, Eden to Melchett; 14 March 1944, Melchett to 
Easterman.
48 Acc 3121 B5/2/7/2, 22 March 1944, Dr.D.Mowshowitz to Brodetsky.
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even complicity. The situation was so desperate that nothing could be lost, even 
if nothing were gained, by public denunciations.^^
The Hungarian Crisis
Hungary had so far escaped German savagery, although its 800,000 Jews had 
been subjected to anti-Jewish measures. The Nazis took control of Hungary on 
19 March 1944; provincial Jews were sent to ghettos in larger towns and their 
mass deportation began on 15 May. The disaster facing Hungarian Jewry, which 
called for renewed action by the Jewish leadership, occurred at the time that the 
Allied governments were concentrating their energies on preparations for D-Day.
Riegner’s telegram of 21 March first alerted the Anglo-Jewish organisations to 
the fate of Hungarian Jewry. Riegner called for "a world-wide appeal' to the 
Hungarian people and for reminders that Hungarian conduct would form 'one of 
the most important tests of behaviour which allied nations will remember in the 
peace settlement after the war'. Similar broadcasts should be made every night 
in Hungarian during the next weeks.so The WJC vigorously renewed its 
campaign for a new declaration addressed to satellites. In late March, with the 
approval of Churchill and Stalin, Roosevelt condemned the Nazis and their allies 
and proclaimed the Allied governments’ determination to punish the criminals. 
Shortly after, prompted by Silverman, Eden called on the satellites ‘to join in 
preventing further persecution and co-operate in protecting and saving the 
innocent.' These warnings were broadcast to the Hungarians.^i
49 CZA C2/666, 24 March 1944, Easterman to Melchett; 29 March 1944, 
Easterman to Melchett.
50 FO 371/39258 C3849/15/21, 23 March 1944, Telegram no. 1249, Clifford 
Norton, Berne, to Foreign Office.
51 CZA C2/458, Chronology of Events, p. 15.
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An emergency session of the Board’s FAC agreed that the only possibility of 
influence lay with the Soviets, whose armies were now liberating some of the 
occupied countries and who were therefore in a special position to assist. 
Support might also come from the Pope, who exerted a strong moral influence 
over the Hungarian people. Some committee members argued that warnings 
might provoke further outrages in the event of a Nazi defeat, others that 
warnings might have some effect in mitigating the atrocities.sz A list of 
suggestions was presented by Brodetsky, Brotman and Hertz, himself of 
Hungarian origin. They urged that the recent announcements of Roosevelt and 
Eden be followed by a formal statement to be broadcast to the populations of 
Germany and the satellites. It was felt that an approach from HMG would carry 
considerably greater weight than any intercession by the Jewish Anti-Fascist 
Committee in Moscow. They mentioned various 'secret' parachute activities 
which they curiously claimed had saved many Jewish lives in occupied Europe. 
More realistically perhaps, they suggested that Marshal Tito be encouraged to 
facilitate the escape of Jews from Hungary into Yugoslavia, by enlisting those 
who were fit to serve in his forces and by any other means open to him. Randall 
assured them that these suggestions would receive careful consideration; 
approaches to Tito and the Soviets were being made, but he again stressed the 
necessity of secrecy.ss
The statements by the Allied leaders in March were welcomed by the 
organisations, but were also considered vague and ineffectual. A special
52 Acc 3121 C9/1/4a, 21 March 1944, FAC Emergency Meeting, Minutes.
53 Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 28 March 1944, interview with A.Henderson; FO 
371/42723 W4878/15/48, 10 April 1944, Foreign Office to HM's Charge d'affairs 
to the Yugoslav Government in Cairo; FO 371/42724 W5799/15/48, 21 April 
1944, Randall to Hertz; 26 April 1944, Donald Hall, Foreign Office, to Easterman.
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conference of the leading Jewish organisations, attended by prominent Jewish 
and non-Jewish figures, was held. Proposals for a mass meeting at the Albert 
Hall and for a march through London were opposed by government officials. 
Easterman, on Foreign Office advice, maintained that at the present stage of the 
crisis 'political action was the important thing and any public action might have a 
very harmful effect'. 54
The news from Hungary prompted independent action by the British Section, to 
the disapproval of the Board. Easterman and Silverman presented President 
Benes and A.Zinchenko, the Soviet Ambassador, with various ideas. Like the 
Board, the WJC maintained that the only possible help lay with the Soviets; the 
newly affected areas, Hungary, Transnistria and Romania, were now closest to 
the advancing Russian armies, which would be the first to reach the Jews in the 
line of retreat. The Soviets were consequently asked to take political and military 
measures to rescue Jews from those areas. In addition, the suggestion was 
made 'that the Russian Government might give the whole Jewish question a 
new turn if it put on trial captured Germans guilty of atrocities against Jews and 
charged them, specifically, with these acts.' While the Soviets had already 
begun such trials in 1943, Zinchenko replied that 'there was no distinction 
between citizens in Russia and the Germans had committed crimes against all 
sections of the population'. Instead of lamely agreeing, as Brodetsky might have 
done, Easterman suggested that 'this difficulty could be overcome if the 
Russians, in their advance into Poland, would put on trial captured Germans 
who were guilty of terroristic acts specifically against Jews ' Not surprisingly, the 
Ambassador thought it was 'an excellent idea' and asked for particulars to
54 CZA C2/15, 28 March 1944, ‘Special Conference’.
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forward to the proper quarters in Russia. Easterman also held discussions with 
Dr.Kullmann of the IGCR and with the ICRC.ss
Benes had been willing to approach Stalin, although his general impression was 
that the Soviets viewed the war 'from a much wider and bigger angle ... the 
Jewish problem is only a small, particular case.' Easterman arranged contact 
with Tito’s representatives to see whether his partisans might be employed to 
secure the protection of refugees. He insisted that these negotiations be 
conducted in the strictest confidence, as any public agitation on behalf of 
Hungarian Jewry carried the threat that the Germans might tighten up border 
controls.56 Easterman prepared a dossier, giving details of his rescue proposals, 
for the Board and asked for similar information from Brodetsky, who was 
somewhat reluctant to reciprocate.57
The BBC's Hungarian service gave full publicity to Roosevelt's and Eden's 
warnings to the satellites and their appeals to the Hungarians to protect Jews. 
Special messages were addressed to the Hungarians by British church leaders 
and repeatedly quoted in BBC Hungarian transmissions. Because Hungary was 
an important centre of Roman Catholicism, appeals were also directed by Hertz 
and the British Section to the Pope, through the Apostolic Delegate in London, 
to use his influence with the Hungarian clergy. Archbishop Godfrey had 
indicated that the Holy See would be fully supportive.B roadcasts were 
considered valuable as 'a good deal depended upon the degree of
55 a JAC m s  coll. 361 D108/18, 22 March 1944, conversation with Zinchenko; 
CZA C2/15, Note of action taken from 21-23 March 1944; 28 March 1944, 
‘Special Conference’.
56 AJAC MS coll. 361 D108/18, 14 June 1944, Kubowitzki to Members of the 
Office Committee; CZA C2/15, 28 March 1944, 'Special Conference’.
57 Acc 3121 B5/2/7/2,18 May 1944, Brotman to Brodetsky.
58 Ibid.
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acquiescence which the Hungarians showed' towards the German occupation 
and the fate of the Jews.^s However, the Refugee Department had taken the 
view that reiterated warnings were 'apt merely to intensify German persecution 
... continual exhortations of this kind have convinced the Germans that the 
Jewish question is a sore point with us and ... they prod it accordingly.'Go
The Board too felt concern about excessive publicity. A few days before the 
ghettoisation of Hungarian Jewry, it had received warnings from Riegner and 
Lichtheim of Nazi plans for the extermination of Hungary's 800,000 Jews within 
six months, by concentrating them in three zones. It was suggested that the 
'Jews should be told to seek refuge, both inside and outside of Hungary ... to 
join the partisans if possible. They should be warned ... to destroy in time all 
relevant list of communities and to avoid registration'. Yet there was some 
reservation about broadcasting this warning. The Board thought it would be 
mistaken to include such details, which would 'draw undesirable attention to the 
Jewish communities who were in any case well aware of the situation and what 
could or should be done to deal with it. Warnings ... should be couched in 
general terms only'. The PWE agreed, adding that 'Unless this information is to 
be regarded as entirely reliable ... its release might only cause unnecessary 
alarm '.62 This was one reason why Hungarian Jewry was ill-informed about the 
peril. Survivors remain bitter that Jewish leaders in Hungary and the free world 
were part of a 'conspiracy of silence'. 63
59 FO 371/42723 W4586/15/48, 21 March 1944. Randall, Minute.
60 FO 371/42724 W5286/15/48, 4 April 1944, W.D.Allen to Miss Barker, Political 
Intelligence Department.
Ibid., W 5791/15/48.11 April 1944, message from Lichtheim and Riegner.
62 Ibid., 17 April 1944, Walker, Minute; 28 April 1944, P.Scarlet.
63 Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hunaarv. 
vol.2 (New York, 1981), pp.691-731; Shlomo Aronson,' "The Quadruple Trap" 
and the Holocaust in Hungary', D.Cesarani, ed.. Genocide and Rescue: The 
Holocaust in Hungary 1944 (Oxford. 1997), p.94.
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The effectiveness of the broadcasts was hard to gauge. The British Section 
regarded them as among the few practical measures by which Jews might be 
saved. Easterman wanted appeals to be continuous and varied so as to attract 
the attention of non-Jews. He suggested a broadcast appeal by Lord 
Rothermere, but the PWE declined for political reasons, insisting that current 
appeals should be maximised before further appeals from distinguished 
personalities were arranged. Easterman tried unsuccessfully to have this 
decision reconsidered.^^
Auschwitz Protocols
In mid-June 1944, detailed accounts reached London of a drastic turn in the fate 
of Hungarian Jewry. Four escapees from Auschwitz provided eye-witness 
testimony of the mass killings. They warned that Auschwitz was being enlarged 
to accommodate Hungarian Jews and compiled a 36-page statistical report on 
the camp's operations. This report, the 'Auschwitz Protocols', was sent to Jewish 
organisations in Switzerland, Turkey and Jerusalem, and thence to the Allied 
governments. Until this point, it has been argued, the immense death factory 
operated in secrecy.®^ The Polish Government in London received the 
information, dated 14 June, that 'the Germans have gassed in Oswiecim 
100,000 Jews deported from Hungary' and that truckloads of Jews were
G4 CZA 02/46, 1 June 1944, Easterman to E.Thurtle, Ministry of Information; 15 
June 1944, Thurtle to Easterman; 16 June 1944, Easterman to Thurtle; 19 June 
1944, Thurtle to Easterman.
65 Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies (London. 1981), pp. 190-98,231-39; 
Bela Vago, The British Government and the Fate of Hungarian Jews in 1944’, 
Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust: Proceedings of the Second Yad 
Vashem International Historical Conference.Jerusalem. April 1974 (Jerusalem, 
1977), pp.205-23.
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proceeding regularly from Hungary to Poland. The information was passed to 
the British Government and various organisations, together with calls for a 
renewed warning to the Nazis.®®
The British Section responded immediately with an appeal that Allied High 
Command issue a military warning that captured Germans suspected of 
atrocities against Jews and others would be speedily brought to trial. Easterman 
again called for a broadcast on behalf of Lord Rothermere and for an appeal by 
the Pope to the Hungarian people.®  ^While the Board passed another resolution, 
calling on Allied governments to take immediate and urgent action, it deferred 
making specific proposals until after consultation with the Foreign Office.®®
The Soviet Government and the Vatican, at the instigation of the British Section, 
were again asked to protest against the Hungarian atrocities, so that when, 
some time later, Brodetsky and Lord Bearsted proposed the same action, they 
were told that their suggestions had either been already received and noted or 
that action had already been taken.®  ^Hall had earlier indicated to the Board the 
desirability of co-ordination between the Jewish bodies approaching the Foreign 
Office and had been assured that such arrangements were being made.^® While 
this was the case with the AJA, it was evidently not so with the WJC, with which 
a modus vivendi was still being negotiated. It must therefore have appeared
66 CZA C2/15, 25 June 1944, Schwarzbart, Communiqué; FO 371/42807 WR 
75/3/48, 26 June 1944, Telegram, no.2949 from Norton, Berne, to Foreign Office; 
FO 371/42809 WR 218/3/48, 4 July 1944, Hubert Ripka, acting Czech Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, to Philip Nichols, British representative to Czech Republic.
67 CZA C2/97, 26 June 1944, Easterman to Hall; FO 371/42807 WR 18/3/48, 5 
July 1944, interview. Hall, Silverman and Easterman.
68 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/3, 18 June 1944, Board Resolution; FO 371/42809 WR 
225/3/48,12 July 1944, Brodetsky to Hall.
69 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/3,18 July 1944, interview with I.LHenderson; FO 371/42810 
WR 329/3/48,19 July 1944, Henderson, Minute.
70 Acc 3121 0 1 1/7/3a/2, 28 March 1944, interview with Major A.Henderson.
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odd that the Board was unaware of the successful initiative of a 'fellow' 
organisation. Accusations of petty rivalry seem, in the circumstances, 
unsurprising.
Easterman's suggestion that HMG approach the Vatican received mixed 
responses from the Foreign Office. A.R.Dew, head of the Southern Department, 
complained, ‘Why are we the tools of these people? Why should the Pope 
condemn murder of Hungarian Jews before he condemns use of flying bombs 
against this country?’ However, Henderson felt that ‘There is no harm and may 
be some good in expressing the interest and sympathy of HMG in a 
humanitarian cause.' He observed that the sympathy of wide Jewish circles’ 
was valued by HMG and that ‘concessions when possible, make easier a refusal 
when essential.’ Dew subsequently withdrew his o b j e c t i o n s . Henderson's 
comments highlight the degree of calculation involved in every Government 
decision; even a simple, humanitarian expression of sympathy was a trade-off 
for support from Jewish circles.
Nevertheless, the Foreign Office did approach the Soviets on the subject of 
German massacres of Hungarian Jewry. Eden explained that 'this action is 
being taken as the suggestion was pressed on HMG with particular earnestness 
by high and responsible Jewish circles here'.^z However, for political reasons, 
the PWE opposed a broadcast appeal on behalf of Lord Rothermere (he and his 
father were strong supporters of Hungarian revisionism and a broadcast might 
imply that HMG regarded revisionism favourably). There was also some 
reluctance to multiply individual appeals, especially since Eden and the
71 FO 371/42807, WR 28/3/48, 29 June 1944, Easterman to Hall; 5-6 July 1944, 
A.R.Dew and I.LHenderson, Minutes.
72 FO 371/42809 WR 226/3/48, 13 July 1944, Foreign Office Telegram no.2107 
to V.M.Molotov; 14 July 1944, Eden to HM Ambassador, Moscow.
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Archbishop of Canterbury, as well as the King of Sweden, had already 
publicised their condemnation. Eden believed 'that our attitude has been made 
clear enough, and that there is no point in "inflating the currency" by continually 
repeating that we propose to punish the guilty. Indeed one could make out a 
case in favour of the view that the declarations have had the effect of making the 
anti-Jewish atrocities worse'. 3^
In July, Melchett asked the Archbishop of Canterbury to join him in drawing 
Churchill's attention to the situation in Birkenau and Auschwitz. As a result, the 
Archbishop made a broadcast to the Hungarian people. 4^ The British Section 
also arranged that Silverman should address a Private Notice question to Eden 
in order to elicit a statement of policy. Although the Foreign Office felt that this 
was liable to do as much harm as good, a German order calling for all lists of 
deportations to be finalised within twenty days was nearing completion and there 
seemed no harm in publicising the fact as widely as possible.^s in response to 
Silverman, Eden replied that the news from Hungary was almost certainly 
reliable but that there was no evidence that repeated declarations and warnings 
had had any deterrent effect. The best hope ‘must remain the speedy victory of 
the Allied nations'.^e Although this did not help the Jews of Hungary, the British
73 CZA C2/46, 15 June 1944, Thurtle to Easterman; FO 371/42810, WR 
302/3/48, 5 July 1944, interview. Hall, Silverman and Easterman; 12 July, 
Scarlett, Minutes; FO 371/42807 WR 75/3/48, 3 July 1944, Eden, Minute.
74 CZA 02/16,1 July 1944, Melchett to Churchill; 3 July 1944, Archbishop of 
Canterbury to Churchill; C2/783, 11 July 1944, Easterman to Archbishop of 
Canterbury.
75 FO 371/42807 W95/3/48, 4 July 1944, P.O. [Pierson Dixon], Minutes.
76 FO 371/428089 WR 269/3/48, 13 July 1944, Churchill to Melchett and 
Archbishop of Canterbury.
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Section was satisfied that the Hungarian crisis had received ‘the fullest possible
publicity.’77
The British Section submitted further proposals for warnings to the Germans and 
appeals to the peoples of occupied countries, which it considered important in 
view of the advance of the Allied armies towards territories containing large 
numbers of Jews. However, following the Horthy Offer, the Foreign Office 
decided that it would be contrary to the interests of the Jews themselves to 
pursue this course.7s Nevertheless, the British Section continued its appeals to 
the Hungarians through the Archbishop of Canterbury and various trade unions. 
In particular, it arranged that the International Federation of Transport Workers 
broadcast to Hungarian railway workers an urgent appeal not to operate the 
trains used to deport Jews. It also sought the support of the Jewish Anti-Fascist 
Committee in securing the aid of the Soviet Government through warnings, 
appeals to local populations to help Jews and the active aid of the Red Army.79 
The organisations continually emphasised the important role the Soviets could 
play in aiding Jews. Possibly in consequence of Rathbone's appeal to Eden, the 
Foreign Office approached the Soviets in July, asking that ‘given the victorious 
advance of the Soviet Armies’, a declaration of retribution for war crimes 
committed in Hungary be made, which it was hoped would at least reduce the 
scale of the atrocities. Molotov replied favourably a month later.®o
77 HC Debates, Fifth Series, 5 July 1944, vol.401, cols. 1160-1162; FO 
371/42808 W106/3/48, 10 July 1944,1.LHenderson to J.M.Martin; CZA C2/16, 6 
July 1944, Easterman to Melchett.
78 FO 371/42809 WR 291/3/48,15 July 1944, Easterman to Hail; 22 July 1944, 
Minutes, I.L.Henderson.
79 CZA C2/17, 21 July 1944, Barou and Easterman, Hungary.
80 FO 371/42808 WR 129/3/48, 6 July 1944, Rathbone to Eden; FO 371/42809 
WR 226/3/48,13 July 1944, Telegram no.2107. Foreign Office to Moscow; FO 
371/42810 WR 363/3/48, 18 July 1944, Randall, Minute; FO 371/42815 WR 
784/3/48,17 Aug. 1944, Molotov to Eden.
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A deputation from the National Committee met with Eden in late July. It 
proposed, inter alia, a further appeal to Horthy and a broadcast warning of 
retribution against those guilty of war crimes against Hungarian Jews. Eden, 
backed by Emanuel Shinwell, expressed concern that such a tone might appear 
too menacing and that the potency of such warnings might be diminished by 
constant repetition. Rathbone, however, asserted that only through repetition 
would such warnings be taken seriously. Eden agreed to consider the 
advisability of a further broadcast warning, modified if necessary to suit any 
change in circumstances. In view of the Horthy Offer, Walker noted, an appeal 
to Hungarian humanitarianism seemed more appropriate.®^
Appeals and warnings by leading statesmen prompted by the organisations 
were felt to have had a beneficial effect, as evidenced by the Horthy Offer and 
the suspension of the deportation of Hungarian Jews in mid-July. The Foreign 
Office believed, more cynically, that the halt might be due to difficulties of 
transport’ but acknowledged that 'Jewish circles suggest that Hungarians and 
possibly even Germans have been impressed by protests, and might at this 
juncture be impressed by similar further action'.®2
81 Acc 3121 E3/536/2, 26 July 1944, National Committee, ‘Proposals’; FO 
371/42811 WR 437/3/48, 22 July 1944, E.Shinwell to Eden; WR 457/3/48, 25 
July 1944, Note for Eden; FO 371/42810 WR 363/3/48, 1 Aug. 1944. Walker, 
Minute; W 437/3/48, 29 July 1944, Walker, Minute; FO 371/42812 WR 500/3/48, 
27 July 1944, Foreign Office Memorandum.
82 FO 371/42809, WR 215/3/48, 18 July 1944, Foreign Office Telegram No.581 
and No.2355 to Stockholm and Berne (respectively).
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The Bombing of Auschwitz
The request to bomb Auschwitz and Its connecting railway lines was only one of 
the proposals of the Jewish organisations In the summer of 1944. It coincided 
with both the Horthy Offer and the notorious Joel Brand Deal®^ to exchange 
Jews for trucks and certain non-mllltary commodities. The bombing of Auschwitz 
was not a major Issue at the time, and has assumed Importance only recently as 
a symbol of what could have been done to save lives or at least to lend moral 
support to those In the camps.
Some Jewish leaders, alerted by the Auschwitz Protocols, made urgent appeals 
for bombing raids to Impede the annihilation of Hungarian Jewry. In mid-May, In 
Slovakia, Welssmandel made the first of several calls to world Jewry, 
demanding that the gas chambers and railway lines be bombed. At his request, 
Schonfeld and Goodman approached the British Government.®^ Demands were 
also presented by the Polish Government and by Chaim Welzmann and Moshe 
Shertok, on behalf of the Jewish Agency In London. There Is no evidence that 
the Board discussed the Issue during the summer months; Brodetsky appears to 
have taken a subordinate role. He knew of Welzmann's discussion with Eden 
but 'did not wish to repeat matters' which they had discussed.®® There were no 
calls for or comments about the bombing proposal In the Jewish Chronicle. At 
the end of August, Brotman was approached by Schwarzbart enquiring whether 
he had any Information as to the Government's Intention. He replied that the
83 Braham, op.cit., pp. 1104-9; Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale? (New York, 1994), 
pp. 172-95.
84 Gilbert, op.cit., p.216; Mss VG, 18 July 1944, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to Goodman.
85 Acc 3121 011/7/1/6, 27 June 1944, Schwarzbart to MIkolajczyk; 18 July 1944, 
Interview, Brodetsky and Hall.
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Board was being kept informed, that the matter was still under consideration and 
that he intended to speak to the Foreign Office on the matter.86
Other means of destroying the installations at Auschwitz were proposed. Leon 
Kubowitzki, head of the Rescue Department of the WJC, maintained that the 
destruction of the death installations should not be accomplished by aerial 
bombing as ’the first victims would be the Jews' and that it would be a welcome 
pretext for the Nazis to assert that their Jewish victims had been massacred not 
by Germans but by Allied bombers. On 1 July, he proposed the (rather 
unrealistic) idea of Allied paratroopers or underground Polish fighters being sent 
'to seize the buildings, to annihilate the squads of murderers and to free the 
unfortunate inmates'.87 The Americans rejected this on the grounds that such an 
operation would entail the 'diversion of considerable air support essential to the 
success of our forces' and be of 'doubtful efficacy'.88 Kubowitzki did, however, 
transmit a request from Ernest Frischer of the Czech Government-in-exile to the 
US War Department to bomb the camps. Frischer argued that bombing would 
prevent the Germans from concealing their crimes and possibly stop further 
mass exterminations since so little time was left to them.89
Some members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency Rescue Committee in 
Jerusalem opposed the bombing proposal of its chairman, Yitzhak Gruenbaum. 
But once the Auschwitz Protocols arrived in Jerusalem on 11 June, the Jewish 
Agency in London promptly launched a concerted lobbying effort to persuade
86 Acc 3121 B5/2/7/1, 29 Aug. 1944, Brotman to Brodetsky.
87 WJC, 1 July 1944, Kubowitzki to John W.Pehle, WRB, cited in Gilbert, op.cit., 
p.256.
88 1 4  Aug. 1944, John J.McCloy, Assistant Secretary of State, to Kubowitzki, 
cited in Kubowitzki, op.cit., p. 167; CZA C2/458, Chronology of Events, p.18.
89 AJAC MS col.361 D109/1, 10 Aug. 1944, E.Frischer to WJC.
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the British Government to bomb Auschwitz.so Its first request was made in late 
June, followed by a further appeal on 6 July, which also suggested bombing the 
railway lines and death camps at Birkenau. Eden was 'in favour of acting on 
both these suggestions', and sought the Air Ministry's view of their feasibility.01 
Although Weizmann and Shertok pleaded for the bombing, they later 
acknowledged it would have little practical value, but the 'main-purpose ... 
should be its many-sided and far-reaching morale effect' .02
The Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair, notified Eden that disrupting the railways 
was 'out of our power' and that 'bombing the 'plant' was not possible 'because 
the distance is too great for the attack to be carried out at night'. He suggested 
that the Americans might do this by daylight. However, he added, 'there is just 
one possibility, and that is bombing the camps, and possibly dropping weapons 
at the same time, in the hope that some victims may be able to escape ... 
[although] the chances of escape would be small indeed'. Sinclair proposed to 
put the plan to the Americans. Eden found this 'a characteristically unhelpful 
letter', and suggested that Weizmann approach Sinclair directly.93 The Foreign 
Office did not follow up the suggestion that weapons might be dropped to help 
Jews escape.
The appeals to bomb Auschwitz coincided with the Horthy Offer (9 July) and the 
subsequent cessation of the Hungarian deportations (from 20 July). Although 
the Jewish Agency's priority after the Horthy Offer was securing visas and
90 Dina Porat, The Blue and Yellow Stars of David: The Zionist Leadership in 
Palestine and the Holocaust. 1939-1945 (London, 1990), p.216.
91 FO 371/42809 WR 276/3/48, 6 July 1944, conversation with Weizmann, 
Minute.
92 CZA Z4/15202.11 July 1944, Note on the proposal for bombing death-camps.
93 FO 371/42809 WR 277/3/48, 15 July 1944, Sinclair to Eden.
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transport facilities, principally to Palestine, 4^ it still favoured bombing. However, 
after the deportations stopped, the Foreign Office considered it inadvisable to 
pursue the bombing proposal. Although Sinclair had doubts, he also considered 
that the operation should be given high priority by the Air Staff. He requested 
photographic cover of the camps and installations in the Birkenau area. 
Consequently, he was 'perturbed at having heard nothing more from the Foreign 
Office about the problem of Birkenau' since early A u g u s t .T h e  Foreign Office 
then approached the Jewish Agency for confirmation whether -  in view of 
Horthy's offer to halt the Hungarian deportations -  the Agency still wished the 
bombing to be carried out. Linton insisted that 'there are still many Jews in the 
hands of the Germans who can be sent to these camps to their doom', pointing 
out that 'in the situation that the Germans find themselves to-day, it will be more 
difficult for them to construct new camps, and this might be the means of saving
lives'. 96
In spite of the Jewish Agency's conviction that the proposal remained worthwhile 
and Eden's and Churchill's Initial support. Foreign Office officials opposed the 
idea, partly because of technical reasons (which later proved to be of dubious 
validity), and partly because the deportations had stopped. Henderson cited the 
Air Minister's view that 'this would cost British lives and aircraft to no purpose'. 
Roger Allen concluded firmly that ' i f ... we no longer wish on political grounds to 
proceed with this project, it is for us to tell the Air Ministry'.97
^4 Gilbert, op.cit., pp.288-98.
95 FO 371/42814 WR 749/3/G, 13 Aug. 1944, Air Commodore G.W.P.Grant, to 
V.F.W. Cavendish-Bentinck, Foreign Office.
96 Ibid., 16 Aug. 1944, Linton to I.L.Henderson.
97 Ibid., 18 Aug. 1944, I.L.Henderson and 21 Aug. 1944, R.Allen, Minutes.
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The topographical data on Auschwitz and Birkenau supplied by the Jewish 
Agency were never communicated to the Air Ministry by the Foreign Office and 
was therefore never taken into consideration when the decisions were made.^® 
Yet the only reason given Weizmann was the Very great technical difficulties'99 
Walker thought it inadvisable that Weizmann be informed that the other reason 
was the cessation of the deportations -  so as to deny Weizmann and others 'the 
opportunity of reopening this topic'/®® presumably because if the deportations 
resumed, pressure to bomb the camps would be revived. Consequently, when 
the deportations from Hungary resumed on 26 August (and in spite of the fact 
that deportations had anyway continued from elsewhere), the Jewish Agency, 
believing that the reasons against bombing were technical, appears to have 
temporarily dropped the issue.
Although the information about the resumption of deportations from Hungary 
was not immediately verified, Goodman was notified immediately they resumed 
and he was urged to press the Government to have the railway lines bombed.i®i 
It was not until late September that the Jewish Agency, following confirmation 
that the deportations had resumed, again approached the G overnm ent. 1®2 
Referring to the previously cited 'technical difficulties', Linton pointed out that 
'Since then, however, we understand that the fuel depots in that area have been 
bombed on two occasions. If the position has changed, it might be possible to 
reconsider the question of bombing the Camp'. Even then, officials claimed to be 
unsure whether the Hungarian deportation policy had been reversed. The 
Foreign Office was in any event disinclined to pursue requests for a
98 FO 371/42806 WR 823/1/4,18 Sept. 1944, Mason, Minutes.
99 FO 371/42814 WR 749/3/G, 1 Sept. 1944, Law to Weizmann.
190 Ibid., 26 Aug. 1944, Walker, Minutes.
101 AIWO A-37, 2 Sept. 1944, L.Koziebrodzki, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
to Goodman.
192 CZA Z4/10405, 20 Sept. 1944, Linton to Mason.
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reconsideration of the bombing of A u s c h w i t z E v e n  the Board's FAC was 
uncertain of the situation, having received other reports 'that a group of 320 
Hungarian Jews had recently arrived in S w i t z e r l a n d ' as late as November, 
Mason remained sceptical: 'Our evidence suggests that there have in fact been 
no large scale deportations since about July and indeed the Hungarians 
themselves, both the Horthy regime and the Szalasi regime, have shown some 
degree of readiness to let go Hungarian J e w s 'Jos Perhaps this was a well- 
calculated stalling tactic; operations at Auschwitz were slowing down by this 
stage, mainly due to shortages of fuel for transportation and extermination. 
Mason might well have reasoned that the problem would soon go away by itself.
It was also suggested that the Soviets might be persuaded to bomb the camp. In 
spite of fresh allegations, Lady Cheetham maintained that the Government had 
no proof that Hungarian policy had changed again and that Hungary should 
therefore not be threatened. She agreed that the Soviets might consider 
bombing the railway lines to A u s c h w i t z ,  1 os but as the Soviet army was by now 
so close to Auschwitz, she could hardly have regarded this as a genuine 
possibility. In October, Brotman inquired whether HMG had considered bombing 
the camps in association with the Red Air Force. Brotman was perhaps unaware 
that Churchill was becoming increasingly irritated with Soviet unco­
operativeness following the Warsaw Uprising in August. Nevertheless, there is 
an air of hopelessness about a suggestion which by this late stage Brotman 
must have realised would be rejected out of hand. Mason, who found Brotman
103 FO 371/42818 WR1174/3/48, 20 Sept. 1944, Linton to Mason; 25 Sept.1944, 
Cheetham and Mason, Minutes; Acc 3121 C11/7/1/6, 28 Sept. 1944, Brotman, 
conversation with Mason.
104 Acc 3121 A/32, Sept. 1944, FAC, Minutes, p.243.
105 FO 371/42821 WR 1596/3/48, 10 Nov. 1944, Mason to K.E.Robinson, 
Colonial Office.
106 FO 371/42818 WR 1174/3/48, 25 Sept. 1944, Cheetham, Minutes.
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‘as always, entirely reasonable’, seems to have had little difficulty persuading 
him of ‘the risk of Germany claiming that \Ne had done our best, by bombing the 
camps, to exterminate the inmates o u r s e l v e s . Although the objection had 
already been made by Kubowitzki, but this appears to be a unique case of 
Government policy being dictated by the German Ministry of Propaganda. It is 
interesting that an argument as weak as this was considered adequate to fob off 
Brotman, whereas more sophisticated 'technical reasons' were felt necessary to 
put off Weizmann.
The organisations did not pursue the proposal with any force, possibly because 
they could not argue the technical issue. What matters with regard to their 
effectiveness is not whether the bombing of Auschwitz was feasible, would have 
made any significant difference (an issue which remains contentious to this day), 
or even the issue of m o r a l e , b u t  that once again, the organisations lacked the 
argumentative and negotiating skills to maintain any kind of debate on the issue. 
Even Brodetsky, an expert in aerodynamics, had nothing to offer, deferring to 
Weizmann in this matter
Horthy Offer
It has been argued that Horthy's decision on 6 July 1944 to halt the deportations 
was as much in response to the worsening military situation as to the 
intervention of world and Church leaders who had been motivated to speak out 
by the Auschwitz Protocols and the Swiss press campaign. The threat to bomb 
Budapest (leaked to Hungarian military intelligence and carried out on 2 July)
107 FO 371/39454 014201/131/55,12 Oct. 1944. Mason, Minute.
108 For a morale boost, see Elle Weisel, All Rivers Run to the Sea (London, 
1996), p.347; interview, Ruben Katz [a survivor from Auschwitz], April 1995, 
London and his letter to the J.C., 6 Oct. 1995, p.23.
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finally convinced H o r t h y J os On 18 July the Foreign Office received a message 
from Berne reporting that Horthy had notified the Swiss legation In Budapest 
that, subject to American and British co-operation, his Government was 
prepared to allow holders of Palestine certificates or foreign visas, together with 
Jewish children up to the age of ten, to emigrate from H u n g a r y .U n l i k e  Joel 
Brand’s ‘Blood for Trucks’ deal, the Horthy Offer was unconditional and 
therefore more likely to be acceptable to the Allied governments; nevertheless, 
the British were reluctant to accept it because of the Palestine issue, m
On 19 July, as soon as the offer was made public, Brotman inquired whether, in 
view of its terms, the Foreign Office would invite the Swedes and Swiss to 
honour their previous offers to receive Jewish children. He also requested a joint 
affirmation by the United Nations, or at least by the Great Powers, that they 
would receive in their territories all those Jews who could leave. Henderson, 
acknowledging that other Jewish organisations favoured this move, passed the 
suggestion to the US State Department. Shertok and Linton urged Randall to 
take ‘immediate action to explore and take advantage of the offer.’ Their 
suggestion that the IGCR send a representative to Budapest was rejected on 
the grounds that the present mandate did not allow such negotiation with enemy 
governments. However, the IGCR agreed that a swift and clear response was
necessary.112
109 FO 371/42809 WR 285/3/48, 20 July 1944, Foreign Office to Washington; 
Braham, Politics of Genocide, pp.718.767.
110 FO 371/42809 WR 285/3/48, 18 July 1944, telegram no.3328, Norton, 
Berne, to Foreign Office.
111 Wasserstein, op.cit., p.263.
112 FO 371/42810 WR 329/3/48, 19 July 1944, Minute. I.LHenderson; WR 
388/3/48, 21 July 1944, Memorandum, discussion with Shertok and Linton.
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On 26 July, a National Committee delegation met Eden. The Archbishop of 
Canterbury began by urging that the situation called for sacrifices, which the 
public was prepared to make, in the form of the admission into Britain of 
considerable numbers of Jewish refugees. Eden disingenuously commented 
that the difficulty had not been to receive refugees but to assist their escape and 
added that he had been informed by the ICRC that the deportations had ceased. 
Gollancz asked whether a joint Anglo-American request for implementation of 
the offer could be made and was told that this was already under way. The 
deputation took this as an assurance that Hungary had been notified of British 
readiness to provide transport and accommodation for all Jews who could be 
evacuated from Hungary. In fact, as Rathbone discovered shortly afterwards, 
Hungary had not yet been notified because the Government was awaiting US 
co-operation and she complained to Eden about the delay. In effect, the Horthy 
Offer had not been approved by either Government and Rathbone feared that 
Horthy might revoke it under pressure from the Nazis. The situation was urgent; 
opportunities had been missed the previous year in Sweden because of delays 
and she urged that the Government take unilateral action.ii3
The Government had been obliged to accept the offer in principle, but had 
serious reservations in practice. The fear of a massive influx of Jews into Allied 
territory, especially Palestine, shaped British attitudes during the negotiations. In 
early July, Morrison had expressed anxiety at the prospect of the further 
reception of refugees here’ if the Brand deal were a c c e p t e d . T h e  Foreign 
Office consequently cabled to Washington its fear that the Jewish Agency would 
exert strong pressure in favour of increased Jewish immigration to Palestine in
FO 371/42812 WR 500/3/48, 26 July 1944, National Committee deputation 
to Eden; FO 371/42814 WR 680/3/48, 31 July 1944, Rathbone to Eden.
114 FO 371/42808 WR 170/3/48, 1 July 1944, Morrison to Eden.
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the wake of the Horthy Offer. The possibilities of emigration to Palestine were 
limited to some 14,000 certificates left from the White Paper quota. 
R.M.A.Hankey feared 'a flood of applications to enter Palestine' and that 'We 
shall in a very short time have masses of East European Jews on our h a n d s ' .
Aware of this, Goodman, in his self-styled capacity as ‘representative of the 
World Movement of orthodox Jewry with a very strong branch-organisation in 
Hungary', invited all the Dominions, the Colonies and various South American 
countries to participate in the Horthy scheme. He also appealed to the Red 
Cross in various countries to assist in issuing block visas, to co-operate in the 
care of child refugees and to support attempts to persuade the Eire Government 
to accept 500 Hungarian Jewish children. Nothing came of these a p p e a l s .  
Rathbone managed to obtain assurances of visas for children under ten from the 
Mexican Ambassador, who suggested that she make similar representations to 
the Cuban and Brazilian representatives in B r i t a in .
Protected Status
When the deportation of Hungary’s Jews began. Hertz and others proposed that 
they be accorded British-protected status or Palestinian citizenship. ”'8 This was 
rejected on the grounds that such protection' would be worthless in Nazi- 
occupied Europe (as evinced by Germany's wholesale disregard for the Geneva 
Convention). Even if such protection carried the right of exchange facilities, it
115 FO 371/42809 WR 285/3/48,18 July 1944, Randall, Minutes; FO 371/42810 
WR 315/3/48, 19 July 1944, Hankey, Minutes; 22 July 1944, Foreign Office to 
Washington.
116 Mss VG, 4 Aug. 1944, Goodman to inter alia, the High Commissioner of 
Australia; 29 Aug. 1944, American Embassy to Goodman. See pp.275-7.
117 Acc 3121 B5/2/7/1, 9 Aug. 1944, Frankel to Brodetsky.
118 FO 371/42725 W8099/15/48, copy of letter dated 8 May 1944, Hertz to 
Churchill.
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was argued, there were insufficient German civilians in British hands to 
exchange for ‘British’ civilians. Shipping facilities were anyway limited. 
Furthermore, Britain’s allies would resent preferential treatment accorded to 
Jews when large numbers of non-Jewish nationals remained in grave danger.
In late July, Rathbone proposed a joint declaration by Britain and other UN 
member-states to establish a new status for Jews in Europe as persons under 
special protection for the purposes of retributive justice after the w a r .  120
After the Horthy Offer was issued, the Jewish Agency began an intensive 
campaign to increase immigration to Palestine. On 7 July, Shertok suggested 
that although Hungary's 350,000 Jews could hardly be declared British- 
protected persons, those on the Zionist veterans' list, numbering around 5,000, 
might be issued special certificates purporting to establish that they were 
already Palestine citizens (thereby freeing more certificates for others). Shertok 
argued that the dubious legality of the plan was justified by the gravity of the 
situation. The Jewish Agency was prepared to give a formal undertaking that no 
claim to full Palestinian citizenship would later be made on the strength of such 
documents. Christopher Eastwood of the Colonial Office expressed concern, not 
at the ‘dishonesty’ of the plan, but at the potential embarrassment of any later 
claim to genuine Palestinian citizenship. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office 
appealed to the Palestine authorities and the Foreign Office to agree to it. 121 Sir 
Harold MacMichael dismissed outright the idea of issuing these ‘forgeries', 
expressing little faith in Jewish Agency u n d e r t a k i n g s .  12 2  Nevertheless, special
119 Acc 3121 C11 /11 /3/2, 28 July 1944, Eden to Hertz.
120 Acc 3121 E3/536/2, 24 July 1944, Rathbone, 'Facts and Proposals'.
121 FO 371/42809 WR 194/3/48, 11 July 1944, Eastwood to Randall; WR 
275/3/48, 15 July 1944, Oliver Stanley to Sir H. MacMichael, High Commissioner 
for Palestine.
122 FO 371/42810 WR 320/3/48, 19 July 1944, MacMichael to Stanley.
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certificates of 'potential Palestine citizenship’, intended purely for protective 
purposes and numbering around 8,000, were issued at the end of July.''23
Since the remaining 14,000 Palestine permits were wholly inadequate in the 
present crisis, Rathbone proposed that Jews arriving after the White Paper 
quota was exhausted should be treated as temporary immigrants, stressing that 
‘the mere grant of a Palestine permit may give the recipient some p r o t e c t i o n . 24 
The Foreign Office was more favourably disposed towards a suggestion, not 
involving Palestine, from the Council for Rescue of Jews in Poland (established 
in London in April 1944) that the Polish Government should approach certain 
neutral countries with a view to their issuing a number of fictitious passports, to 
be granted ‘to a few selected trustworthy persons of the Jewish faith.’ The plan 
depended on British and American agreement to accept such persons ‘in some 
place specially reserved for foreign r e f u g e e s . 25
At the Executive Board meeting, however, it was decided not to approach the 
Colonial Office to extend the facilities for asylum in Palestine, nor the Home 
Secretary for admission into Britain. Rather 'it was felt desirable to get the 
general scheme of rescue started [the Horthy Offer] and working before making 
further a p p r o a c h e s ' .  2^ 0  Eden, however, was concerned about pressure from the 
voluntary organisations ‘to accept with the least possible delay the Hungarian 
Offer to release Jews'. The Cabinet Committee was faced with a dilemma. 
Rejecting the Horthy Offer would inflame public opinion, while accepting it risked 
‘civil war in Palestine owing to an inroad of Jews from Hungary into the Levant.’
123 FO 371/42821 WR 1634/3/48, 3 Nov. 1944, Eastwood to Mason.
124 FO 371/42814 WR 685/3/48, 11 Aug. 1944, interview. Hall and National 
Committee.
125 FO 371/42809, WR 290/10/0, 15 July 1944, J.Weytko, Polish Embassy, to 
Randall; 25 July 1944, I.LHenderson, Minute.
126 Acc 3121 B5/2/7/2, 31 July 1944, Brotman to Brodetsky.
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The United States, without proposing to relax its own quota regulations, urged 
that the ‘proposal must be accepted as quickly as possible’. Undaunted by the 
prospect of a vast influx into Palestine of Hungarian refugees for whom Britain 
would have to assume responsibility, the Americans advised a joint undertaking 
by both Governments to ‘care for aH Jews who are permitted to leave Hungary 
and who reach neutral or Allied Nations territory. 27
On 8 August the War Cabinet agreed to accept the Horthy Offer in principle and 
to warn the Americans not to ‘face us with the impossible in the question of 
providing accommodation. ’128 The next day a joint declaration by the two 
Governments through the ICRC accepted the Hungarian offer. Assurances were 
to be offered to those neutral countries which would be invited to accept 
refugees. 129 Despite this, there was little endeavour by the Allied Governments 
to implement the offer. MacMichael expressed serious reservations about 
depositing unlimited numbers of refugees in Palestine, 'which would have a 
definite bearing on our security commitments in the Middle East'. He deemed it 
essential that such refugees be shipped directly to reception countries. 120
Linton was assured that the necessary instructions for the ICRC had been 
prepared. However, because of reports of German pressure on Hungary to 
prevent Jews from departing, he suggested making representations to the 
Hungarian Government through the Vatican; he was told that this had been 
done via the Apostolic Delegate in London. 121 Following the news that the 
deportations had resumed, Brotman proposed fresh warnings to the Hungarians.
127 FO 371/42814 WR 672/3/48, 3 Aug. 1944, Memorandum, Eden.
128 ibid^ WR 682/3/48, 8 Aug. 1944, Memorandum, Eden; 1 Aug. 1944, 
telegram no.6773. Sir R.Campbell to Eden.
129 Ibid., WR 705/3/48,17 Aug. 1944, Foreign Office to Washington.
130 FO 371/42816 WR 890/3/48, 25 Aug. 1944, Lord Moyne, Cairo, to Eden.
131 FO 371/42819 WR 864/3/48, 23 Aug. 1944, conversation with Linton.
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Mason, however, felt that ‘A warning would only be a repetition of what had 
already been done' and that Hungary was likely to follow Romania and Bulgaria 
in capitulating. Brotman wondered, given that Romania was now relatively safe 
for Jewish refugees, whether the Romanians might be encouraged to help in the 
rescue of Jews but was told that the armistice terms between Romania and the 
Allies were still under negotiation. Lastly, he asked whether the Foreign Office 
might invite the Soviets to deal leniently with refugees found in Romania.^32 
Apart from this, Brotman felt it best to await events, as the situation would 
change radically. The National Committee's approaches to the IGCR and the 
Foreign Office had 'elicited nothing different from the Board's own approaches 
and the ICRC was doing everything open to it'.iss
Attitudes within the Foreign Office towards the Jewish organisations varied. Dew 
stated baldly, ‘In my opinion a disproportionate amount of the time of the Office 
is wasted on dealing with those wailing Jews.' Lady Cheetham, however, 
responded, ‘it is surely not a waste of time to interview a well known 
representative of a very respectable Jewish society ... The Jews have been 
given cause to wail by their sufferings under the Nazi regime.’ Mason concurred 
but agreed with Dew that it would be more appropriate for the Jewish 
organisations, rather than HMG, to approach the Soviet Government, in order to 
avoid any implied British doubt as to Soviet co-operativeness. He assured 
Brotman that ‘our suggestion is made solely from the standpoint of what we 
believe to be the most practicable course.’ Brotman appreciated the ‘delicacy of 
an approach to the Soviets’ and hoped that the WRB would be able to help.‘'34
"(32 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/3, 31 Aug. 1944, conversation with Mason; FO 371/42817 
WR 993/3/48, 31 Aug. 1944, Foreign Office Memorandum.
133 Acc 3121 B5/2/7/1,1 Sept. 1944, Brotman to Brodetsky.
134 FO 371/42817 WR 993/3/48, 1 Sept. 1944, Dew. Minute; 7 Sept. 1944, 
Cheetham, Minute; 8 Sept. 1944, Mason, Minute; 13 Sept. 1944, Mason to 
Brotman; 22 Sept. 1944, Brotman to Mason.
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Indeed, Brotman appears to have been so understanding of the Foreign Office 
position as to cause some wonder at how he could have thought his proposals 
viable in the first place.
Despite all efforts, the emigration scheme never materialised, largely because 
the German Government blocked it. Rathbone's concern on this point was 
justified. Hitler had approved the offer only ‘provided the Hungarians allowed the 
speedy resumption of the deportation of the remaining [i.e. Budapest] Jews'.^^^ 
On 15 October 1944, Horthy was arrested and the Fascist ‘Arrow Cross’, under 
German protection, seized power in Budapest. The deportations had resumed at 
the end of August. Easterman and Silverman urged Churchill and Eden, then at 
the Moscow Conference, to see to it that Britain and the Soviet Union took all 
practical measures against the renewed deportations and were informed that 
Churchill was discussing the issue with the S o v ie t s ,  Appeals were also 
addressed to the Pope, and Weizmann cabled Churchill. Brodetsky and 
Brotman raised the possibility of issuing a joint warning with the Soviets to the 
new rulers of Hungary. Hall advised that Churchill would do everything possible, 
but doubted whether a warning would help. The Soviets would be unwilling to 
co-operate, the present Hungarian regime was only a German puppet and 
previous warnings had been ineffectual. Hall instanced the most recent British 
warning, issued in October, concerning the threatened massacre of all internees 
at Auschwitz, which had merely resulted in a Nazi denial.^^ 7
135 FO 371/42815 WR 752/3/48, 9 Aug. 1944, Rathbone to Eden; Randolph L. 
Braham, 'The Rescue of the Jews of Hungary in Historical Perspective’, 
Proceedings of the Fifth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference. 
Jerusalem. March 1983 (Jerusalem. 1988), pp.465-66.
136 CZA C2/458, Chronology of Events, p.21; FO 371/42820 WR 1419/3/48, 23 
Oct. 1944, Mason to Easterman.
137 Acc 3121 B5/2/1, 18 Oct. 1944, interview with Hall; FO 371/42820 WR 
1433/3/48, 17 Oct. 1944, Easterman to Mason; WR 1507/3/48, 18 Oct. 1944, 
Foreign Office, Minute.
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Despite comments such as Dew's, it would be misleading to assume that the 
negative attitudes emanating from the Foreign Office were invariably caused by 
anti-Semitism. In the case of this meeting between Brodetsky, Brotman and Hall, 
Mason commented, 'As was to be expected, they [Brodetsky and Brotman] had 
very little in the way of concrete suggestions to make'. Worse even than empty- 
handedness was the 'general impracticability' of the suggestion that any ex­
enemy government suing for an armistice negotiation might be induced to 'take 
all steps to prevent any action inimical to Jewish welfare within its own territory.' 
That this did not indicate any anti-Semitism on Mason's part is suggested by 
privately expressed anxiety 'about the situation of Jews in Hungary ... it is vital 
that the Russians should get to Budapest at the earliest possible moment; and 
48 hours deliberate delay might well make (or may well have made) all the 
difference by allowing the Arrow Cross time for their beastiv [my emphasis]
work.'138
The private opinions of Foreign Office officials, varied as they were, did not 
seriously impinge on its work. The Foreign Office opposed renewed warnings, 
which would at this stage carry weight only if issued from Moscow and also 
because the Hungarians were unlikely to continue the deportations except under 
pressure from Germany. 139 ;t had advised that Churchill's reply to the 
organisations should be non-committal. Brodetsky and Brotman were told that 
reports of further deportations and massacres of Jews were still unconfirmed. 
This was despite the fact that information from Stockholm confirmed the 
resumption of deportations from Budapest. The Government believed that
138 Ibid, 17 Oct. 1944, Mason, Minute.
139 FO 371/42821 WR 1596/3/48, 10 Nov. 1944, Mason, Minute.
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rescue would come with the Soviet advance and accordingly decided not to 
respond to further letters from the WJC. 1^0
As long as officials stalled, asserting that a report was 'unconfirmed', it was 
impossible to contest the policy of inaction. By this point the Jewish 
organisations had despaired of moving the authorities to act to save the 
remnants of European Jewry. With the end of the war in sight, there was a 
slackening of effort. Ideas had run out. Brodetsky tried in late November to 
persuade the Foreign Office that the Vatican might be encouraged to protest 
about the situation in Auschwitz and Birkenau.i^i Another request by the WJC 
for a broadcast appeal and warning to the Hungarian population elicited a 
belated response that Hungary was now 'entirely under German domination ... 
the best hope lay in the speedy liberation of H u n g a r y . '1^2
Once the Nazis had barred all avenues of escape, little could be done for the 
Jews of Hungary. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the Horthy Offer, following 
the intercession of various governments and others, delayed mass deportations 
from Hungary for a crucial period during August 1944.143 However, by mid- 
September only a small number had managed to leave. The position of the 1200 
Jews in Budapest, who were to constitute the first convoy of emigrants, was still 
unclear. Problems arose because of the impossibility of obtaining exit permits 
from the German authorities. 144
140 Ibid., 24 Oct. 1944, Cairo to Foreign Office; Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 13 
Nov. 1944, conversation with Mason.
141 FO 371/42824 WR 2040/3/48, 30 Nov. 1944, meeting between Brodetsky 
and Mason.
142 FO 371/42824 WR 1991/3/48, 4 Jan. 1945, Mason to Dr.Zalmanovits, WJC.
1 4 3  aJYB, V0 I.4 7  (1 9 4 5 -4 6 ), p .425 .
144 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/3, 14 Sept. 1944, interview with J.Mann.
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The above account confounds those who have argued that the Anglo-Jewish 
organisations did little and supinely complied with Government policy. The 
consistent and determined efforts of the voluntary organisations on behalf of 
European Jewry were largely doomed by the Government's insistence on the 
facile but irrefutable argument that military and other wartime priorities must take 
precedence. No greater success was achieved by the dynamic tactics of the 
British Section than by the conciliatory Board; neither was able to reconcile the 
overriding aim of winning the war with saving European Jewry. The latter was 
not only not a British war aim, but also represented, in British eyes, an 
impediment to the swiftest possible victory.
The organisations were severely restricted because they had no power to 
influence Government policy. What is striking is the dogged urgency of their 
activities, however hopeless, in face of the invariable and inevitable frustration 
confronting them at every turn. Some of their proposals, even had they been 
accepted, were unrealisable due to Nazi determination to eradicate European 
Jewry. For example, the proposal in June 1944 by the British Section and the 
Board that the United Nations fulfil its verbal warnings by immediately putting on 
trial all captured Germans who could be charged with atrocities against Jewish 
or non-Jewish populations would have had little deterrent effect on the Nazis or 
their satellite accomplices. Since there is overwhelming evidence that the racial 
policies of the Nazis were intrinsic to their war aims, concessions to pressure on 
this point would have been tantamount to moral surrender.
The Anglo-Jewish voluntary organisations, for ali their aspirations to political and 
diplomatic status, were merely pawns in the game of war. and played that game 
all the less effectively for their failure to realise it. They never understood that -
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as Harry Goodman observed -- 'Amidst all the vital problems of state, the saving 
of a few individuals is really all we can do'J^s
145 Mss VG. 9 Aug. 1943, Goodman to J.P.Walshe, High Commissioner for 
Ireland.
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Chapter Seven
A Chronicle of Failure? Rescue Efforts, 1942-1944
With Nazi domination over much of Europe and the invasion of the Soviet 
Union in June 1941, any prospect of immediate rescue of the endangered 
populations was unrealistic. The Allied governments consistently argued that 
rescue could only be accomplished by an Allied victory. The Jews of the free 
world lacked military resources and it was not until the summer of 1944 that a 
Jewish unit within the British army in Palestine was established; it was in any 
case unable to act independently.
Rescue operations were largely limited to exchanges of Jews either for 
material compensation (ransom deals) or for German civilians. The goal of 
‘unconditional surrender’, stipulated at the Casablanca Conference in January 
1943 and reaffirmed at the Bermuda Conference in April, precluded any direct 
negotiation with the enemy for anything other than surrender. It was feared 
that any such negotiations would create a rift with the Soviets, who constantly 
suspected the British and Americans of contemplating a separate deal with the 
Nazis, as in the case of Joel Brand's 'trucks for blood' deal in the spring 1944. 
Moreover, fundamental mistrust of German intentions meant that most ransom 
deals were dismissed as German blackmail devices."*
1 FO 371/36694, W416/124/48, 28 Jan. 1943, Randall, Minutes. This document 
refers to the proposal to get 70,000 Jews out of Romania; CAB 95/15 J R. (44), 
2nd Meeting, 31 May 1944, 13 July 1944, War Cabinet Committee on the 
Reception and Accommodation of Refugees; FO 371/42809 WR274/3/48, 16 
July 1944, Churchill, Minutes.
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Crucially, rescue deals on any large scale were in principle antithetical to the 
Government's concern to avoid an influx of Jewish refugees into Britain or 
Palestine: it is 'essential that we should do nothing at all which involves the risk 
that the further reception of refugees here might be the ultimate outcome' .2 
Those who condemn the organisations for 'doing nothing' do not always take 
into account that the Government was more than merely indifferent to rescue 
proposals.
Currencv Restraints
Rescue operations involving the transfer of funds or materials directly or 
indirectly to the Germans conflicted with the principle of economic warfare and 
thus contravened the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1939. The establishment 
of the WRB in early 1944 and British reluctance to institute a parallel body is 
significant. The emphasis of the WRB was on ‘rescue’. Randall pointed out 
that schemes involving 'the provision of money or goods to persons, principally 
Jews, in enemy territories, to enable them to bribe Nazi guards e tc .... is bound 
to conflict with our economic warfare policy.’ The license recently obtained by 
the WRB to transfer $100,000 to the ICRC to be spent in enemy territory 
'represents a complete breach with joint Anglo-American blockade policy', s
Even the sale of exit permits posed a problem. Since June 1942 there had 
been a growing organised traffic in the sale of exit permits, costing up to 
£5,000 per head, from enemy-occupied territories, particularly Holland. Funds 
were supplied by friends or relatives in neutral countries. The Government was
2 FO 371/42808 WR 170/3/48, 1 July 1944, Morrison to Eden. Morrison is 
referring to the Joel Brandt deal.
3 FO 371/42731 W3199/17/48,1 March 1944, Randall to Emerson.
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well aware that the enemy, using such forms of ransom, was trying to raise 
foreign currency and thereby evade the effects of the financial blockade. To 
check this, Government strategy was to give wide publicity to the trade and to 
blacklist anyone acting as an intermediary. Consequently, within a short time 
'the traffic had been killed.
To avoid any transfer of funds to the enemy, the JDC, with US Treasury 
approval, had created a ‘credit system' whereby no hard currency was 
exchanged in enemy territory, only pledges which could be redeemed in 
dollars after the war. Against these dollar credits, local funds could then be 
released to assist Jewish relief and emigration schemes.s The Anglo-Jewish 
organisations were unable to secure a similar arrangement until the summer of 
1944, when a credit scheme began operating through the IGCR. A 
representative of the JDC noted the 'great difference between what the US 
Government allows us to do with dollars as against the real restrictions which 
the British Government imposes on pounds.'®
In Britain, all transactions with the enemy were dealt with through official 
channels, i.e., in the case of British subjects, through the Foreign Office, the 
Prisoners of War Department and in the case of Allied subjects, through the 
Allied governments. Private persons deposited their money with the 
appropriate government department, which took complete control of such 
matters as support payments, repatriation and so on. Following the creation of 
the WRB, the US had granted private organisations licenses enabling them to
4 FO 371/32680 W14587/4555/48, 29 Oct. 1942, Dingle Foot, MEW, to Law; 
J.C., 16 July 1943, p.5.
5 Herbert Katski, Interview, August 1994, New York,
® AR 3344.557, 28 Aprii 1943, Report submitted by David Sulzberger to JDC 
Executive Committee.
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have financial dealings and communication within enemy territory and asked 
the British to grant private relief agencies such licences. This raised an 
important issue for the Treasury and Trading with the Enemy Department, 
which agreed that if the Americans were permitting this on a large scale, 
‘genuine propositions' should be approved by HMG.^
Emerson had already proposed in March that the IGCR should operate a 
credit scheme by opening a special banking account into which it would pay 
sums to provide funds to meet its liabilities and for the JDC to act as its agent 
in operating the credit scheme. This was accepted in July and Emerson was 
asked to advise Schwartz, the European representative of the JDC, that 'none 
of these "credit" funds should be used for schemes of escape, e.g. across the 
Spanish border which might compete with our own scheme for getting various 
important people out of occupied Europe.' It was calculated that some part of 
this fund would be used to transport Jews from Hungary following the Horthy 
Offer.® While private organisations were advised to channel their rescue work 
through the IGCR and its agent the JDC, it was considered necessary to 
exercise control over these private agencies and ‘to discriminate between one 
agency and another, not all of whom were equally responsible'. It was feared 
that the war effort could be harmed, not only financially, by agencies prepared 
to violate the rules of blockade in order to rescue particular individuals.^
7 FO 371/42857 WR 287/41/48, 15 July 1944, H.S.Gregory, Trading with the 
Enemy, to Randall.
8 CAB 95/15 J.R. (44) 1st Meeting, 14 March 1944, War Cabinet Committee on 
the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees; FO 371/42857 WR 405/41/48. 
21 July 1944, C.H.M.Wilcox, Treasury, to Randall.
9 Ibid.. WR 287/41/48, 15 July 1944, Gregory to Randall; WR 380/41/48. 21 July 
1944, R.A.B.Mynors, Treasury, to Gregory.
240
similar restraints operated In the case of private relief organisations to 
refugees In neutral countries. Following requests In early 1944 from Jewish 
communal and relief organisations In Sweden to help Jewish refugees who 
had arrived from Norway, Hertz and Schonfeld proposed a scheme whereby 
the British organisations would contribute £5,000 to relief activities In 
Palestine, while the JDC would refund these payments In the form of grants to 
Sweden. The Foreign Office, however, objected on the grounds that the 
Swedish Government had already undertaken the maintenance of Its refugees. 
Yet, It appeared that these refugees received little beyond the bare 
necessities. Schonfeld was. In effect, trying to get Foreign Office sanction to 
an arrangement which had already been arrived at between the Federation of 
Jewish Relief Organisations In Britain, under Hertz, and the JDC. He pressed 
the Foreign Office to agree, arguing that ‘I f ... we are able to carry out activities 
abroad as well as at home, our experience had shown that the subscriptions to 
a general appeal enabled activities to be maintained In both spheres.’ 
Otherwise, he warned. It would not be possible to raise funds for local causes 
and the full burden of provision would therefore fall on the Assistance Board.i°
The Foreign Office did not disregard this warning outright. The refugee 
question Impinged on Anglo-American relations and there was no wish to 
offend Hertz; enquires were accordingly made of the British Minister In 
Stockholm, who reported that the transfer of further funds was unnecessary 
and would cause resentment among other refugees there. The Foreign Office
10 FO 371/42752 W2128/86/48, 8 Feb. 1944, Schonfeld to Randall; 14 
Feb. 1944, Minutes, Cheetham. For the agreement between the Federation and 
JDC, see AJJDC AR 3344.558,13 Sept. 1943, J.C.Hyman, JDC Executive Vice- 
Chairman, to Hertz.
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accordingly upheld Its refusal.N either the Treasury nor the Foreign Office 
was moved by Schonfeld’s continued rhetoric. The Treasury proposed that 
‘instead of trying to bully you [the Foreign Office], all requests be co-ordinated 
through one central Jewish body, namely the Board of Deputies and 
conducted through the IGC. The Foreign Office concurred. 12
Hertz raised the more general question of financial help being extended by 
British Jews to their representatives in the various neutral countries ‘to enable 
them to carry out any rescue effort that may present itself.’ Aware that British 
currency problems made the position less favourable than that of the 
Americans, he suggested that Anglo-Jewish contributions should be put at the 
disposal of the American Committee in the sterling area in return for 
repayments in the neutral countries.
The Financial and Blockade authorities had no objection to this, provided such 
funds were limited to expenditure in neutral countries, moderate in amount and 
in no way beneficial to the enemy. However, the MEW preferred the funds to 
be remitted directly to Jewish representatives in the neutral countries rather 
than through the American Committee. In this way they could ‘make sure that 
the organisations adhered to the conditions stipulated.’ The Government had 
agreed in February 1944 to Schonfeld’s request that £2,000 be made available 
for refugees holding Mauritius visas who were in transit in Turkey. However, 
Hertz’s proposal raised considerations other than the Exchange Control 
problem of providing the foreign currency required. There would be no problem
11 FO 371/42752 W2128/86/48.15 Feb. 1944, Randall to Mynors; W2453/86/48, 
16 Feb. 1944, Foreign Office to Stockholm; W2672/86/48, 20 Feb. 1944, 
Stockholm to Foreign Office; W3145/86/48, 26 Feb. 1944, Mynors to Randall.
12 Ibid., W 2673/86/48,18 Feb. 1944, Mynors to Randall.
13 FO 371/42777 W4062/667/48, 9 March 1944, Hertz to Eden.
14 Ibid., W4472/667/48, 20 March 1944, W.A.Camps, MEW, to I.LHenderson.
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in assisting refugees who had escaped into neutral territory, but Hertz’s 
proposal did not make clear that the proposed expenditure was limited to this 
and seemed to suggest that the Jewish relief organisations were 
contemplating entering, through their representatives in the neutral countries, 
into financial transactions with, or for the benefit of, persons still in enemy 
territory. This would provide the enemy with valuable foreign exchange.
The MEW was still unclear what Hertz intended, but suggested that he co­
ordinate his efforts through the IGCR. Emerson assured Hertz that there was a 
possibility of financially helping Jews in enemy-occupied territory through the 
IG C R .16 Hertz replied that if Jewish relief agencies placed sums at the IGCR’s 
disposal, these could be used for assistance to Jews in occupied countries, by 
local currency being released to the IGCR agent against promissory notes to 
pay to the holders sterling sums after the war. However, these concessions 
were extremely limited and Hertz’s use of the regular channels proved 
unsatisfactory. Similarly, Schonfeld's approach to Emerson in September 1944 
for £2,000 to rescue Rabbi Ungar of Nitra and his students was rejected, 
Slovak currency being unobtainable in Switzerland. 17
Rescue of Children
The impetus for action on behalf of children came in the wake of the round-up 
and deportation of foreign refugee Jews from unoccupied Vichy France in July
15 FO 371/42777 W4615/667/48. 23 March 1944. Trading with the Enemy 
Department to G.H.Hall.
16 Ibid.. W7712/667/48 12 May 1944. Camps to Randali; W9426/667/48. 4 June 
1944, Hertz to Eden.
"(7 MS 183 Schonfeld, 427 (f.1), 4 June 1944, Hertz to Emerson; 24 Sept. 1944, 
Schonfeld to Emerson; 2 October 1944, Emerson to Schonfeld; 10 Nov. 1944, 
Schonfeld to J.G.Sillem, IGCR; 21 Nov. 1944, Sillem to Schonfeld.
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and August 1942. Harrowing accounts of the children's fate were widely 
publicised in the British and American press. For the first time, schemes were 
improvised for the rescue of Jewish children, by official and private 
organisations, aiming to persuade the authorities to grant entry permits thus 
enabling the children to l e a v e . T h e  admission of refugee children from 
unoccupied France was discussed in September by Randall, Emerson and 
Morrison. Randall remarked that unless most were of Allied origin he would be 
bound to oppose the idea. However, reports that the American Government 
was about to agree to the admission of 1,000 children and a substantial 
number were to be admitted into Santo Domingo, might have changed his 
mind.
Schiff suggested that children and old people with close relatives in Britain be 
admitted, a number he calculated at no more than 300-350. Their maintenance 
would be guaranteed by the Jewish Refugee Committee. The War Cabinet 
was dubious; allowing children into Britain would only encourage the Vichy 
Government to continue its deportation policy, leaving more children 
abandoned. Moreover, any increase in Jewish immigration was likely to stir up 
anti-Semitism, which ‘would be bad for the country and the Jewish community.' 
Nevertheless, Morrison felt that this move would ‘make a very strong appeal to 
the humanitarian feelings’ of the public, making it difficult for the Government 
to refuse. He was therefore inclined to accede to Schiff's request provided 
there were no further concessions.^®
18 M.Marrus and R.Paxton. Vichv France and the Jews (New York, 1983), 
pp.263-69.
19 FO 371/32680 W12687/4555/48, 21 Sept. 1942, Randall, Minutes.
20 Cab 66/29 W.P. (42), 427, 23 Sept. 1942, Morrison, Memorandum to War 
Cabinet.
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The initial concession, covering only children with parents in the UK, was 
considered unrealistic and inadequate. Randall himself minuted that this took 
'no account of the much more common hardship -  namely children whose 
parents, though not dead, have been seized away from them, so leaving them 
stranded.' Hertz urged, as 'an act of charity' that the concession be extended 
to children with close relatives in the U K .21 Hertz also enquired whether 
asylum for Jewish children in Poland could be found in any of the colonies. 
Although sympathetic, Cranborne declined, regretting that the difficulties 'are 
even greater than I imagined.’ Hertz's proposal was rejected not only because 
of transport difficulties but also on principle: ‘the Chief Rabbi’s suggestion 
amounts to discrimination in favour of Jewish children and the segregation of 
the Jews as a separate nationality.’ Cranborne added that 'in practice HMG 
regard the Allied Governments in London as responsible for their own 
nationals, Jews and non-Jews a like . ’22
Hertz's appeal was to the moral imperative of saving children, and he was 
perhaps unable to respond to the fallacies in Cranborne's arguments, namely 
that any refugee, by virtue of being singled out for protection, was in some 
measure the beneficiary of discrimination, whether he were a Pole, a Czech or 
a Jew. Furthermore, if the Allied Governments in London were responsible for 
all their nationals, Jews and non-Jews alike, there would have been no such 
thing as a refugee problem. Hertz appealed, to no avail, for a reconsideration
2 1  FO 371/32680 W13107/4555/48. 28 Sept. 1942, War Cabinet Offices, 
Conclusion 130 (42); MS 183 Schonfeld 290, 30 Sept. 1942, Hertz to Sir 
Alexander Maxwell.
22 FO 371/32680 W13371/4555/48, 29 Sept. 1942, conversation. Hertz and 
Cranborne; 7 Oct. 1942, Randall, Minutes; 9 Oct. 1942, Randall to 
J.B.Sidebotham, Colonial Office; MS 183 Schonfeld 290, 22 Oct. 1942, 
Cranborne to Hertz.
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on the grounds that ‘Jews are not being merely maltreated, starved or shot as 
hostages; a policy of total extermination is pursued'^s
Nevertheless, in October, the CCJR obtained permission to bring in from 
unoccupied France 500 refugee children between the ages of two and sixteen, 
whose parents were dead or had been deported, provided they had a close 
relative in Britain. The age limit of sixteen was reduced to fourteen in the case 
of children of ‘enemy nationality'. An undertaking was given on behalf of the 
Jewish community that the children would not become a charge on public 
funds. However, these plans came to nothing as a result of the occupation of 
Vichy France in November. A few children who had been fortunate enough to 
reach Lisbon and Sweden arrived in Britain. The rest were deported to 
Auschwitz.24
Other proposals were also unsuccessful. The most ambitious of these was the 
Government's decision in February 1943 to allow 4,500 Jewish children from 
Bulgaria to enter Palestine.25 However, owing to Germany's grip on its 
satellites, the exit was barred. A smaller-scale scheme envisaged by 
Schonfeld, to evacuate Jewish children to the British colonies never 
materialised.26 The organisations continued their endeavours to rescue 
children from the Balkans and Hungary, as in the unsuccessful attempt by the 
CBF, initiated by Salomon Adler-Rudel, to bring 20.000 children to Sweden. 27
23 Ibid., 30 Oct. 1942, Hertz to Cranborne.
24 CCJR, Annual Report 1942, p.3.
25 HC Debates, Fifth Series, 3 Feb. 1943, vol.386, col.865.
26 MS 183 Schonfeld 665 [We-Weir], 28 May 1942, Schonfeld to Wedgwood.
27 S.Adler-Rudel, 'A Chronicle of Rescue Efforts', Leo Baeck Institute Year Book. 
XI, (1966), pp.213-41.
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The most dramatic child-rescue scheme was completed In February 1943. In 
August 1942 the Soviet Government had allowed 5,000 Polish Jews, including 
over 800 orphaned children, to leave for Palestine via Teheran, with British 
permission. The Teheran children’ constituted the largest contingent (the first 
group comprising some 856 children) to leave Europe during the war. These 
children came under the care of Youth Aliyah, an Anglo-Jewish organisation. 
After political problems with the Government of Iraq, which rejected British 
proposals to grant the children transit facilities, they finally arrived in
Palestine. 28
Exchange Schemes
One of the commonest rescue schemes involved exchanging Jews holding 
either Palestine certificates or other "protective papers' for German civilians 
held in Allied territory. Holders of such certificates were considered by the 
Germans potential candidates for exchange. However, Britain feared that 
German agents might be included in each group and objected to the return of 
Germans who might contribute to the German war effort. Britain preferred to 
give priority to British citizens rather than Palestinian Jews in Germany. A 
small number of Jews had been exchanged for German civilian internees held 
by the British in Palestine from December 1941, in compliance with Jewish 
Agency and British Government criteria. As a result of representations made 
by the Jewish Agency, later exchange schemes were broadened to include 
"veteran Zionists’, rabbis and those with relatives in Palestine. 29
28 N.Bentwich, Jewish Youth Comes Home 1933-1943 (Connecticut, 1944), 
pp. 105-9.
29 Porat, The Blue and Yellow Stars of David, pp. 144-49.
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Throughout 1943 the Jewish organisations struggled to secure further 
exchanges, but German internees singled out for exchange often ‘declined 
repatriation’. Furthermore, the British authorities objected to ratifying lists of 
candidates who did not fit their criteria for exchange. For this reason, the 
organisations tried to broaden the categories of those eligible for exchange. 
Early in 1943, the Consultative Committee explored the possibilities of an 
exchange of Axis detainees in Allied lands against similar categories of Jews 
In Axis countries. Referring to a group of interned Dutchmen, Brotman 
proposed extending the scheme of exchange of nationals, but was told that 
there was a limited number of German internees eligible for exchange and that 
British subjects, particularly women, must take priority.3°
The issue was again raised in the memorandum sent by the Jewish 
organisations to the Bermuda Conference, suggesting that ‘all Jews... be 
Included in any such schemes of exchange.’ However, Bermuda dismissed the 
proposal for reasons similar to those of the Foreign Office.3i Even within the 
set categories, there was a disparity in numbers. By the summer of 1943, a 
second group had already been exchanged. Approximately 900 names were 
transmitted to the Swiss Government for inclusion In the next exchange, while 
only nine Germans in Palestine had opted for repatriation. Germany had 
objected to the disparity in numbers and the authorities argued that it was not 
the time to Increase the numbers of categories of Palestinians eligible for 
exchange. By the end of 1943, it was clear that there would be no large-scale 
exchange. Even the established Palestine-German exchange mechanism was
30 Acc 3121 C/11/2/38,16 March 1943, Roberts to Brotman.
31 Acc 3121 C11/6/4/1, 25 Feb. 1943, Brotman to Roberts; 16 March 1943, 
Roberts to Brotman; C11/7/3a/2, 15 April 1943, Brodetsky to Eden, 
Memorandum; FO 371/36734 W7542/7542/48, 17 May 1943, Draft Speech for 19 
May 1943 Debate.
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beset with difficulties, while the number of Jewish candidates for exchange, 
following the liquidation of the Polish ghettos, had steadily dw indled.32
Nevertheless, attempts to secure exchanges and broaden the categories 
carried on well into 1944. By March, it had become clear that the British were 
not prepared to exchange Germans for any but British citizens. With the 
deportation of Hungarian Jewry, the voluntary organisations tried to devise 
ways to broaden the categories of those eligible for exchange by having Jews 
recognised as British protected persons and as Palestine citizens. This idea 
was first proposed in May, in an appeal from Hertz to Churchill. Eden rejected 
it, repeating that there 'was a shortage of eligible Germans and priority could 
not be given to foreign Jews over British subjects'.sa Other ideas included 
Shertok's proposal that Hungarian Jews might be issued special certificates 
purporting to establish that they were already Palestine citizens, an Idea 
Initially rejected on the grounds that 'this might prejudice the prospects of 
future exchanges between Allied and enemy nationals'.^^Attempts to broaden 
the categories for exchange were unsuccessful.
Another scheme Involved Polish refugees In Shanghai. After Germany's 
Invasion of the Soviet Union, many Jews who had found refuge in Lithuania 
fled, via Russia, Siberia and Japan, to Shanghai. The 900 Polish Jews in
32 Israel State Archives, P574/17, 11 June 1943, W.Fuller, Chief Secretary’s 
Office, Jerusalem, to Executive of Jewish Agency, Jerusalem; Acc 3121 
C2/2/5/1, 24 May 1943, Brotman to Hertz.
33 FO 371/42751 W 3579/83/48,1 March 1944, Randall, Table showing German 
civilians in the British Empire’; FO 371/42725 W8099/15/48, copy of letter dated 8 
May 1944, Hertz to Churchill; FO 371/42808 WR 161/3/48, 1 July 1944, Sir 
R.Campbell, Washington, to Randall.
34 FO 371/42810 WR 320/3/48, 19 July, MacMichael to Stanley; see pp.227-29.
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Shanghai included a group of over 400 rabbis and theological students. The 
outbreak of war in the Pacific jeopardised the position of these refugees. 
Conditions worsened, while growing Japanese anti-Semitism provoked fears 
that these Jews would share the fate of those in Nazi-occupied Europe, 
especially with the establishment in February 1943 of the Hongkew ghetto.^s
By the summer of 1942 it had become clear to Schonfeld, Hertz and Goodman 
that these refugees must be evacuated, possibly through an exchange with 
Japanese civilian prisoners-of-war. They approached the Colonial Office but 
were told that Allied nationals were primarily the responsibility of their own 
governments. If the Polish Government were persuaded to request the 
assistance of the Foreign Office, the case of the rabbis would receive full 
consideration, although they could not be evacuated until further exchanges 
could be arranged. The second instalment of the first exchange was in the 
embryo stage and even if it proceeded, these rabbis would be low on an 
already 'congested' list of priorities. 3®
In February 1943 Goodman again raised the possibility of negotiating with 
Japan the inclusion of rabbis and theological students in any future exchange. 
He was informed that there would be inevitable d e l a y s . Everything depended 
on the number of Japanese available. In March. Japan had proposed an 
additional exchange of civilian internees up to a total of 1,600 on both sides. 
The prospects therefore looked bleak. The Jewish refugees were technically
35 Pamela Shatzkes, ‘Kobe: A Japanese Haven for Jewish Refugees, 1940- 
1941', Japan Forum vol.3. no.2 (September 1991), pp.257-73.
36 FO 371/32681 W15130/4555/48, 9 Nov. 1942, Cranborne to Hertz; 27 Nov. 
1942, Randall to Sidebotham.
37 AIWO J.Rosenheim Collection, Box 47 Microfilm Reel 11 (hereafter 47/11), 1 
April 1943, Colonial Office to Rabbi Semiaticki.
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Polish nationals and the proportion of Poles included in any exchange was 
likely to be minimal, as the Polish exchange was only part of the British quota. 
Goodman suggested that the American Government give part of its quota for 
this specific purpose,3® an unrealistic proposition in view of the American 
military presence in the Pacific.
In the summer of 1943, a further call came from Shanghai for the immediate 
evacuation of the rabbis and students. Following Goodman's approach, the 
Polish Foreign Ministry suggested that the only way to procure their 
evacuation In substantial numbers would be to arrange large-scale exchanges 
and that the Jewish religious bodies concerned make representations to the 
British and American Governments.®^ Although it was clear that the British and 
Polish authorities were equally intent on fobbing off the organisations. Hertz 
accordingly approached Eden in October. To justify the rescue of this single 
category of refugees. Hertz offered the spurious argument that they 
represented ‘the greatest theological College of World Jewry’ (namely the Mir 
Yeshiva). Hertz had persuaded Sikorsky in early 1943 to ensure that every 
effort be made to bring about the evacuation of all Polish nationals from 
Shanghai, the majority of whom were Jews.^o
There was also competition between Agudists and non-Agudists among the 
refugees, the Agudists maintaining that they were discriminated against in 
terms of numbers (6 out of 42) in the exchange list that had been drawn up by
38 Ibid., 19 May 1943, Rosenheim to Goodman; 22 Sept. 1943, Goodman to 
Rabbi Kalmanowitch, New York.
89 Ibid., 27 August 1943, Cable from Shanghai to Switzerland; 8 Oct. 1943, Karol 
Kraczkiewicz, Polish Foreign Ministry, to Goodman.
40 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fi-Foy], 10 Oct. 1943, Hertz to Eden; AIWO, A-37, 28 
Nov. 1944, Koziebrodzki, Polish Foreign Ministry, to Springer; AIWO 47/11,18 
May 1943, Sikorski to Hertz.
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the former Polish Ambassador. Schwarzbart was accused of favouring his 
Zionist friends at the expense of the Agudist refugees.Goodman intervened 
with the Polish authorities in London, asking that full consideration be given to 
the orthodox group and that at least proportionate representation be afforded 
these refugees in the present exchange. He was assured that full 
consideration would be given to the Yeshiva group. ^ ^Aryeh Tartakower, on 
behalf of the WJC, appealed to Hertz to alert the British authorities to the 
situation. He also approached Tadeusz Romer, the Polish Foreign Minister, 
much to the annoyance of Goodman who 'resented Tartakower speaking on 
our behalf. In April 1944, although the position of the refugees in Shanghai 
was unchanged, the Polish Government gave a written undertaking that in 
future exchanges of civilians the claims of the orthodox group would be 
honoured.-^
The Foreign Office predictably claimed it was not possible to enlarge the 
Polish quota further because 'any modification in favour of the Poles would 
result automatically in a discrimination against other Allies which they would 
justly resent.’ Hertz proposed that efforts be made to facilitate their emigration 
to Palestine via the USSR and asked that Australia, as Protecting Power, 
approach the Soviets with a view to granting transit facilities and to ask the 
Swiss Consul in Shanghai to approach the Japanese to grant exit permits. Law 
suggested that Hertz approach the Polish authorities. The Polish Government
41 AIWO Report, January - June 1943, p.20 and July - December 1943, p.7.
42 AIWO 47/11, 8 Oct. 1943, Kraczkiewicz to Goodman; 9 Dec. 1943, Goodman 
to Kraczkiewicz; extract from JTA, 2 Dec. 1943.
43 CZA 02/296. 16 Feb. 1944, Tartakower to Hertz; AIWO 47/11, 25 April 1944, 
Report of Activities, January - April 1944, p.2; 30 May 1944, Goodman to 
Rosenheim.
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assured Hertz that it would submit the proposal through the Australian and 
Swiss Governments In Moscow and Tokyo respectively.'^
The Allied governments remained unconvinced that this group deserved 
priority over thousands of American citizens also waiting for exchange. 
Negotiations, centring on shipping difficulties, dragged on for over a year 
between the Allied and Japanese governments. in April 1944, the position 
remained unchanged and attention shifted towards the establishment of an 
autonomous Jewish province In Harrar, Ethiopia. Nothing came of this; the 
group remained stranded In Shanghai until after the war, when 500 were 
granted exit permits for emigration to Sweden and eventually reached 
Amerlca.46
Protective Papers
One of the more Ingenious though little appreciated rescue Ideas during the 
war was the Issuing of so-called protective papers, documents which afforded 
protection by making their holders citizens of other countries, mainly South 
American. It was a device Intended to effect rescue by rendering holders 
candidates for exchange with German citizens In those countries and thus 
avoid deportation; they were often separated from other detainees and held In 
special camps, such as Vittel In France and Bergen-Belsen In Germany. In 
some cases these papers were authentic documents. Issued with the approval 
of the governments concerned. More often the documents were forgeries.
44 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fl-Foy], 2 Nov. 1943, Law to Hertz; 8 Nov. 1943, Hertz 
to Law; 22 Nov. 1943, Law to Hertz; 30 Nov. 1943, Hertz to Hall.
45 AIWO 47/11, 3 Jan. 1944, Rosenheim to Goodman. AIWO A-37, 28 Nov. 
1944, Koziebrodzki to Springer.
46 AIWO 47/11, 29 March 1944, Rosenheim to Goodman; MS 183 Schonfeld 
654 [Fl-Foy], 3 July 1945, Schonfeld to Mason.
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Issued on the personal Initiative of consular representatives In Europe, mostly 
for monetary reward; a few, such as George Montelio, the Jewish Secretary- 
General of San Salvador In Switzerland, acted out of humanltarianism 47
The first to recognise the value of such papers was YItzchak Sternbuch, a 
member of the Agudat Israel In Switzerland, who noticed In July 1942, two 
days before the mass deportation of Jews from Warsaw, that bearers of Latin 
American papers were afforded special treatment by the Nazis. Sternbuch 
bought from the Paraguayan consul papers which were sent to Jews In the 
occupied territories. When news reached the West that foreign passports 
might save Jews, a major effort was undertaken by activists In Geneva, 
Istanbul and Holland to secure such documents from Latin American consuls 
In Swltzerland.48
The Initiative to obtain ‘protective papers' In Britain was taken by Schonfeld 
and Goodman, who were among the first few to appreciate their Importance. 
Until the summer of 1943, Brodetsky had heard only vague rumours about the 
protective value of these papers, but by the summer of 1944 he was appealing 
to the Foreign Office to Issue such documents, pointing out that some South 
American governments had saved many Jewish lives by this means. The 
Foreign Office replied that ‘to provide visas In occupied territory In a formal 
way meant that the Germans took note of and nullified all such activity and In 
effect brought greater danger to the Jews seeking means of escape.’ 
Brodetsky suggested that the Protecting Power seek out those for whom
47 Nathan Eck, ‘The Rescue of Jews with the Aid of Passports and Citizenship 
Papers of Latin American States’, Yad Vashem Studies, vol.1 (Jerusalem, 1957), 
pp. 125-152; Isaac Lewin, Attempts at Rescuing European Jews with the Help of 
Polish Diplomatic Missions during World War Two’, The Polish Review, vol.XXII, 
no.4 (1977), pp. 11-12.
48 Ibid.
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certificates or visas were available, rather than invite them to come forward, 
but this too was rejected. ^ 9 Yet he failed to press for a small-scale trial. Here is 
a further example of Brodetsky's style of dealing with officials; he was 
determined to make some effort, while at the same time invariably conceding 
to government arguments, however unconvincing or inconclusive, possibly 
through lack of argumentative or diplomatic skill. In this case, the argument 
was especially weak, both in fact and in principle, so that the feebleness of 
Brodetsky's response is all the more striking.
The Illegal trade in Latin American passports grew. By February 1944 it was 
estimated that over 10,000 had been issued. The figure had grown so high 
that the Swiss Federal Government had to intervene, as its diplomatic position 
was being compromised. The consuls of Haiti, Paraguay and Peru were 
dismissed.50 There seemed little doubt that the German authorities knew what 
had been going on, but because of their exchange value, at times ignored the 
dubious validity of these documents. However, at other times these papers 
afforded no protection at all, as happened in the winter of 1943 at Vittel.
Vittel
Vittel, an internment camp in eastern France, held, besides Allied nationals, 
some 240 Polish Jews possessing certificates of citizenship of various South- 
American states issued by consulates of those states, mainly from Berne. In 
December 1943, Hertz learned that the Germans had confiscated these
49 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/1, 21 June 1943, Professor Hugo Valentin, Upsala, Sweden, 
to Brodetsky; 7 Sept. 1943, Brodetsky to Valentin; C11/7/3a/2, 18 July 1944, 
interview, Brodetsky, Hall and Henderson.
50 FO 371/42755 W3256/91/48, 29 Feb. 1944, Emerson to Howard Bucknell Jr., 
American Embassy, London.
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papers following Paraguay’s cancellation of the citizenship of the 'passport- 
holders', who were now threatened with deportation. The Jewish organisations 
in Britain lobbied the Latin American governments to recognise the citizenship 
of the 'passport holders'. Schonfeld assured the Foreign Office that the 
refugees would not attempt to use the 'passports' as a right of entry to 
Paraguay. Within a few weeks, the Paraguayan Government announced that it 
would continue to recognise the validity of these papers.si
Several other South American governments were induced to confirm the 
validity of passports issued by their consulates in Switzerland, despite the lack 
of previous authorisation. In response to an appeal from Schonfeld, Randall 
approached the Government of Ecuador, which agreed to recognise these 
passports ‘at least for the immediate humanitarian purpose for which they 
were issued, viz. to afford protection to the holders until they escape to 
territory outside enemy control.’ Unsuccessful efforts were also made to 
validate the South American papers of a similar group interned at Bergen- 
Belsen, numbering between 3-4,000 refugees, mainly Jews.sz
From January 1944, certain families in Vittel received certificates from a 
Zionist organisation in Geneva, claiming that they were on a repatriation list 
from Palestine. But as these had not been ratified by London, they were 
considered worthless by the German authorities. The deportation of these
51 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fi-Foy], 16 Dec. 1943, Schonfeld to Hall; FO 
371/42755 W93/91/48, 30 Dec. 1943, Schonfeld to Randall; 10 Jan. 1944, 
W274/91/48, 10 Jan. 1944, Hall to Hertz; AIWO 47/11, 29 Dec. 1943, telegram, 
Goodman to Rosenheim; Acc 3121 C11/6/4/1, 24 Dec. 1943, Professor Samson 
Wright to Roberts.
52 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fi-Foy], 17 Feb. 1944, Schonfeld to Randall; 6 April 
1944, Randall to Schonfeld; FO 371/42755 W5499/91/48, 6 April 1944, Brotman 
to Randall; 14 April 1944, Randall to Brotman; MS 183 Schonfeld 427 (f.1), 16 
Feb. 1944, Schonfeld to Emerson.
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detainees began on 18 April 1944. Unofficial messages drew the attention of 
the Anglo-Jewish organisations to their fate. The Board, meanwhile, was 
assured by the Foreign Office that, contrary to reports, the Latin American 
governments had recognised the passports issued by their consular authorities 
and that all possible steps had been taken to inform the German authorities 
that the Jewish refugees at Vittel were eligible for admission to Palestine.ss
Nevertheless, coded messages from internees in Vittel confirmed that only 
swift exchange for Germans in Allied hands would prevent deportation. In April 
1944, Sofka Skipwith, a British civilian internee in Vittel, sent a list of 250 
names, microscopically copied onto a flimsy piece of cigarette-paper, together 
with pleas for help, to friends and officials in various countries. Two letters 
were sent to London, one to Jock Balfour, a British diplomat and family friend 
and one to Goodman, containing a similar message from Hillel Seidman, 
another internee, concealed in the lining of a coat belonging to a British officer 
freed from Vittel. However, it took until June for Skipwith's letter to reach 
Balfour. Goodman received the information in April, but the cryptic message 
had aroused the suspicion of the authorities, so much so that Goodman 
himself was interrogated.^^
Skipwith's message went unheeded, apparently because of bureaucratic 
confusion. According to a telegram sent by Sternbuch in April, Spain and 
Switzerland, the Protecting Powers, had not yet advised the German
53 FO 371/42755 W5499/91/48, 6 April 1944, Brotman to Randall; 14 April 1944, 
Randall to Brotman.
54 FO 371/42755 W9259/91/48. 3 April 1944, Sofka Skipwith to Jock Baifour; 
W10325/91/48, 27 June 1944, Balfour (Moscow), to Randall; Mss VG, 3 April 
1944, Skipwith and Zeidman to Goodman; interview, Victor Goodman, Aug. 
1995, London.
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authorities to recognise the papers.Conf l ic t ing reports stated that 
deportation had been postponed for the time being and that the internees had 
been returned to Vittel. Goodman was told that they had been transferred to 
the transit camp at Drancy. The Board and the IGCR again attempted to 
secure recognition of the 'passports'. Goodman appealed to have their holders 
included in the next British exchange scheme and for immediate exchange. He 
also appealed to the Irish and Polish governments to help ascertain what had 
happened and to help postpone any deportation order.ss
The Foreign Office assured Goodman that all possible steps were being taken 
and that HMG had made representations to the respective Latin American 
governments, which had agreed to recognise the documents. However, the 
Board realised that recognition of the documents would not satisfy the 
Germans and inclusion in an agreed exchange scheme was required in each 
individual case. After the second deportation, the commandant of the camp 
had announced that the papers had been validated but that this was 
insufficient; the detainees must be exchanged for Germans. A list had been 
drawn up but would only be accepted by Berlin if ratified by London.58 
Goodman realised that what was required was British confirmation that 
Palestine certificates had been issued and that the 163 internees would be
55 Lewin, op.cit., pp. 11-12.
56 AIWO 47/11, 16 May 1944, J.P.Walshe to Goodman; 15 June 1944, 
Rosenheim to Goodman; 28 June 1944, Goodman to Kraczkiewicz; FO 
371/42755 W8472/91/48, 24 May 1944, Brotman to Randall; W9409/91/48, 12 
June 1944, Goodman to Randall; Goodman to Walshe.
57 Ibid., W9409/91/48, 16 June 1944, Randall to Goodman; W9897/91/48, 26 
June 1944, telegram no.781. Foreign Office to Madrid. The High Commissioner 
for Palestine had approved about 90 interned families for admission to Palestine. 
However, as they all held South American passports, Randall felt it would 'not be 
practicable to put their names on the Palestinian exchange list'.
58 Acc 3121 02/2/5/3, Board Report, deportation of Jews of Polish origin from 
the camp at Vittel (n.d.).
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included in immediate e x c h a n g e .He and Schonfeld appealed to the Foreign 
Office to advise the Protecting Power to inform the German Government that 
each Internee would be definitely exchanged. They also approached the 
Spanish and Irish Governments directly, urging them to demand the protection 
and immediate re-internment of the deportees in a camp inspected by the 
ICRC pending exchange. Walker assured Schonfeld that HMG had co­
operated fully in these requests.
No information was received throughout the summer. After the Vittel camp was 
liberated in mid-September, Schonfeld and Goodman continued their efforts to 
trace and rescue the group. In November, reports indicated that the detainees 
had been deported and that some 14 remained in Vittel. Goodman tried to 
enlist Government support for a joint representation to Berlin by the Vatican 
and other neutral states on behalf of the deported Vittel internees. The Foreign 
Office declined, but Henderson reiterated that the Government had asked the 
Protecting Powers to inform the Germans that persons deported from Vittel 
were eligible for exchange and should be returned to camps inspected by the 
ICRC. Schonfeld strove to enlist Government support to ensure that the 
papers remained valid after their expiry date.^i
59 AIWO 47/11,13 July 1944, Rosenheim to Goodman; 24 July 1944, Goodman 
to Rathbone.
GO AJAC MS Coll.361 D109/6, 10 July 1944, Grant, eyewitness report; FO 
371/42872 WR 1004/120/48, 16 Aug. 1944. Goodman to Randall; AIWO, A-37, 
21 Aug. 1944, Goodman to M.Viturro, Spanish Embassy, London; Mss VG, 6 
Sept. 1944, Goodman to Walshe; MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fi-Foy], 18 Aug. 1944, 
Schonfeld to Walker; 25 Aug. 1944, Walker to Schonfeld.
G1 Acc 3121 C2/2/5/3, 31 Aug. 1944, conversion with Mason; 14 Sept. 1944, 
interview, William Frankel and James Mann; FO 371/42872 WR 1221/120/48, 3 
Oct. 1944, Mason to Schonfeld; WR 1541/120/48, 17 Nov. 1944, Mason to 
Goodman; WR 1799/120/48, 30 Nov. 1944, Goodman to Mason; WR 
1930/120/48, 1 Dec. 1944, Schonfeld to Mason.
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All this proved too late for most of those on Skipwith’s list. It has been 
suggested that while her letters were not exactly ignored, 'it was just the wrong 
moment because there was D-Day and things were m o v i n g ' . 6 2  The German 
authorities, with defeat impending, proceeded to liquidate the Vittel camp. Only 
a few benefited from the diplomatic efforts connected with these papers.®^
The Mauritius Scheme
One of Schonfeld's more successful schemes involved securing visas for the 
island of Mauritius. Examination of this scheme provides a valuable measure 
of the effectiveness of rescue efforts and confirms that however original or 
creative a plan might be, its implementation ultimately depended entirely on 
Government approval.
Acceptance of the Mauritius scheme was partly a Government concession, but 
it also served Government purposes. Schonfeld and Hertz were certainly 
skilful in exploiting the interests of the Colonial Office to facilitate this scheme. 
The Government’s strict adherence to the White Paper on immigration into 
Palestine had resulted in numerous unpleasant incidents during the war which 
brought it under fierce criticism both at home and abroad. One example was 
the deportation to Mauritius of over 900 illegal immigrants, who had tried to 
break the British blockade of Palestine in November 1940. The appalling
62 International Herald Tribune. Mary Blume ‘1944: The Many who were not 
Forgotten’, 11-12 June 1994, back page.
63 A.N.Oppenheim, The Chosen People - The Ston/ of the '222 Transport' from 
Beroen-Belsen to Palestine (London, 1996), p.97. According to Oppenheim, 
some 50 Vittel internees, holding Palestine certificates, were included in the third 
Palestine exchange.
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conditions under which they were reportedly held there was a source of 
constant complaint levelled by the Jewish Agency and other bodies. 64
In September 1942, Schonfeld and Hertz approached Cranborne with a 
proposal to transfer 30 rabbis and their families, totalling around 100 persons, 
from enemy-occupied countries to any British territories, such as Mauritius or 
the West Indies, stressing that the ‘proposal did not concern Palestine’. 
Acknowledging that present regulations did not 'permit persons ... in enemy 
occupied territory to proceed to countries under British control', Hertz noted 
that they could sometimes be granted visas once they reached neutral 
countries and proposed that such an exception be made here. He pointed out 
that these rabbis could only obtain visas to neutral countries if they succeeded 
in proving that they would be able to proceed to a final destination. Hertz gave 
assurances that the Jewish welfare societies would guarantee the 
maintenance of these refugees in British territories within the sterling block.®®
By carefully avoiding any reference to Palestine, Schonfeld and Hertz hoped 
that their proposal would be more likely to meet with a positive response. The 
choice of Mauritius, too, would appeal to the Government. The condition of 
detainees in Mauritius was being criticised constantly in Parliament and by the 
Jewish organisations in both Britain and America. The British Embassy in 
Washington expressed concern about 'the potential dangers of this problem 
insofar as it impinges upon British-American relations'. Some 'ammunition' was
64 Aaron Zwergbaum, 'Exile in Mauritius', Yad Vashem Studies. IV (Jerusalem, 
1960), pp. 191-257. See Acc 3121 C l4/26/2 for negative reports from detention 
camp in Mauritius to London.
65 CO 323/1846/2, 3 Sept. 1942, Hertz to Cranborne; 11 Sept. 1942, 
Memorandum; 29 Sept. 1942, conversation, Cranborne and Hertz.
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needed to counter the criticism 66 Thus, the suggestion that Mauritius would be 
a good location for refugees was a welcome one.
The Colonial Office was more sympathetic and amenable to the scheme than 
the Foreign Office, which had always maintained that the refugee problem 
had to be treated as a whole and that no special class or race should be given 
any preference.'67 However, in this case, Cranborne wanted, if possible, 'to do 
what the Chief Rabbi asks', partly on humanitarian grounds, but also out of 
concern to demonstrate 'that the C O. are not generally obstructive as regards 
proposals for assistance to Jews'. He thought the scheme ‘not impracticable’ 
and requested the names and numbers of the rabbis in question and their last 
known addresses, so that they could be vetted by the security authorities. 68 a  
list of 25 rabbis and their families was submitted at the end of November and 
the Colonial Office enquired of the governors of the various Colonies as to the 
availability of temporary refuge.
Nevertheless, there was little progress. Oliver Stanley replaced Cranborne as 
Colonial Secretary in December but this did not affect the scheme as much as 
the announcement in February 1943 that the Government of Palestine had 
agreed to admit 4,500 Bulgarian children and 500 accompanying adults, 
including some doctors, rabbis and 'veteran' Zionists (5 percent of the total), 
from enemy-occupied territory. 69 Hertz and Schonfeld were concerned that the
66 Ibid., 15 Feb. 1943, G.H.Gater, Colonial Office to JA; FO 371/42777 
W2924/667/48, 23 February 1944, P.O., Mr.Martin and W9689/667/48, 14 June 
1944, P.O., Graham White; W4885/667/48, 30 March 1944 and 22 May 1944, 
Michael Wright, British Embassy. Washington, to Refugee Department; FO 
371/42814, WR 685/3/48, 8 Aug. 1944, conversation, Rathbone and Cranborne.
67 FO 371/42777 W8260/667/48, 22 May 1944, Colonial Office to Randall.
68 CO 323/1846/2, 19 Sept. 1942, Cranborne, Minutes; 29 Sept. 1942, 
conversation, Cranborne and Hertz.
69 Ibid., 15 Feb. 1943, Minutes.
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Jewish Agency would ‘no doubt show preferential treatment for rabbis who are 
ardent Zionists', thereby excluding ‘their’ rabbis. This was not quite correct as 
the Chief Rabbi of Palestine had already appealed to the High Commissioner 
on behalf of Rabbis Ungar and Schrelber of NItra and Bratislava respectively 
and Immigration certificates had been granted.^o Trying to persuade Stanley to 
pursue 'the plan originally envisaged’, Schonfeld explained that 'the proportion 
of adults to be admitted under the new scheme Is rather limited...[and] will 
Involve considerable delay owing to the unavoidable negotiations with "other 
parties” ', namely the Bulgarian authorities.
Hertz thus had doubts about the new arrangements announced In February. 
Nor was the Colonial Office prepared to ask the High Commissioner to make 
additional certificates available for Schonfeld’s rabbis and their families. What 
prompted the Colonial Office to proceed with the original scheme and find 
temporary refuge In the British colonies was the requests received from the 
Czech and Polish Governments In April and May and their assurances that the 
refugees would be repatriated after the war.^z The Foreign Office had Insisted 
that Schonfeld first approach the national governments of these rabbis 
‘because It Is only from those governments that any guarantees of their 
removal after the war could be obtained.’ The Colonial Office shared the 
Foreign Office's scepticism about the value of guarantees 'by Agudat Israel or 
any other body of that kind'. Schonfeld pointed out that the Chief Rabbi had no 
locus standi with the foreign governments located In Britain and requested
70 Ibid., 29 April 1943, Clark, Minutes; 21 May 1943, Stanley to Randall; MS 183 
Schonfeld 290, 24 Feb. 1943, Colonial Office to Schonfeld.
71 CO 323/1846/2, 5 May 1943, Schonfeld to Stanley.
72 Ibid., 21 May 1943, Colonial Office to Randall; 30 May 1943, Hertz to Stanley; 
3 June 1943, Colonial Office to East Africa, Cyprus, Mauritius, and the 
Seychelles; 15 March 1943, Randall to Sidebotham; 18 March 1943, Stanley to 
Schonfeld; 13 April 1943, E.RaczynskI to Sir A.Cadogan.
263
that Hertz continue to submit cases to the British authorities directly. The 
Colonial Office refused: ‘we may get into the position of giving preference to 
the rescue of Polish or Czechoslovakian Jews over that of Polish or 
Czechoslovakian nationals'. An exception was made for stateless refugees, 
who had no Allied government to apply on their behalf in Britain.^s
Most of the Colonial territories refused to accommodate these refugees. Only 
the Governor of Mauritius was willing to accept the rabbis, on condition that 
they lived in the same camps as the Jewish refugees already interned there. 
Hertz not only agreed but added that, contrary to hostile reports, he had heard 
'that conditions in the camp are highly satisfactory.'74 Schonfeld requested that 
the rabbis' names be sent to the German Government, via the Swiss, to 
facilitate their departure. The Foreign Office refused; this would be ‘a long step 
nearer to negotiation of the kind condemned at Bermuda.'75 There were also 
reports of new regulations stipulating that Jews would be allowed out of 
enemy-occupied territory only if they had an unconditional visa' for a neutral 
country. Schonfeld inquired whether HM representatives could ask the neutral 
governments to issue an ‘ordinary visa', instead of transit visas, on the 
understanding that the refugees would, as soon as possible, proceed to 
Mauritius. The Foreign Office complied, its note to the Missions concerned 
stating, ‘We do not wish to modify the terms of this despatch'. However, the
73 Ibid., 23 Feb. 1943, Stanley to Schonfeld; 3 March 1943, Sidebotham, Minute; 
15 March 1943, Randall to Sidebotham; 18 March 1943, Stanley to Schonfeld.
74 Ibid., 10 June 1943, East African Governors Conference to Stanley; 11 June 
1943, Logan, Seychelles, to Stanley; 10 June 1943, Sir D. Mackenzie Kennedy, 
Mauritius, to Stanley; 18 June 1943, Stanley to Hertz; 21 June 1943, Hertz to 
Stanley.
75 FO 371/36735 W9463/8833/48, 13 July 1943, Randall to S.M.Campbell, 
Colonial Office.
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Turkish authorities were reluctant to grant unconditional entry visas and the 
matter was not pursued
The Foreign Office opposed the extension of the scheme; this 'would create 
serious difficulties.' However, the political situation again led the Government 
to continue it. The pledge in February that the Bulgarian Government would 
allow 4,500 Jewish children and adults to leave for Palestine had not been 
fulfilled. In June 1943, under German pressure, Bulgaria closed its frontier to 
all Jews. There was now little prospect of legal immigration into Palestine from 
the Balkans, and under pressure from the Jewish Agency, HMG decided in 
July 1943 that in future all Jews who succeeded in escaping to Turkey would 
be eligible, after a preliminary security check, for admission to Palestine. Only 
the Jewish Agency was privy to this new arrangement. The Colonial Office 
advised keeping it secret, ostensibly in the interest of the refugees 
themselves’, but, in effect, so as not to advertise that Palestine was now open 
for immigration.77
Thus, anyone who succeeded in escaping to Turkey or other neutral countries 
should now have been dealt with in accordance with the new policy without 
necessitating special arrangements for admission to Mauritius. The Colonial 
Office was reluctant to extend the Mauritius scheme beyond the original 32 
[sic] rabbis and their families. Stanley had fulfilled his predecessor's promises 
and felt that the new policy rendered further special action unnecessary. In 
spite of the need for secrecy, it was therefore felt that Hertz should be told of
76 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fi-Foy], 23 July 1943 Schonfeld to Randall; FO 
371/36735 W 11710/8833/48, 19 Aug. 1943, Refugee Department to The 
Chancery, British Embassy, Lisbon; W13532/8833/48, 9 Sept. 1943, British 
Embassy, Angora to Eden.
77 CO 323/1846/2, 29 July 1943, Minutes.
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the new Palestine policy, so as to end the pressure to continue the Mauritius
scheme/8
However, it was finally decided that secrecy must be maintained and Hertz 
was not informed of the new policy. Consequently, in order 'to keep up with 
him the fiction that these Rabbis may go to Mauritius', the Colonial Office 
enquired whether Mauritius could accept any more rabbis, pointing out ‘that 
probably not all of them will succeed in reaching neutral countries.’ Having 
secured the agreement of the Governor of Mauritius, Stanley agreed, in 
September 1943, to extend the scheme to cover 340 persons. 9^
In February 1944, Schonfeld requested the Foreign Office to forward £2,000 to 
HM authorities in Turkey for the maintenance of refugees holding Mauritius 
visas, in advance of their arrival. This was to ensure that ‘no burdens, however 
temporary, are placed upon [the Turkish authorities] as a result of the transit 
facilities they had granted.’ Despite exchange control difficulties, the MEW  
agreed.89 However, only 28 Turkish visas had so far been granted. Schonfeld 
offered to go to Istanbul to rectify inefficiencies and expedite matters. The 
British Ambassador in Turkey rejected this offer and recommended that all 
work should be co-ordinated through Chaim Bari as, the Jewish Agency 
representative, ‘otherwise wires would get crossed'. 8i
78 Ibid., 20 July 1943, J.Megson, Minutes; 28 July 1943, Eastwood, Minutes.
79 FO 371/36735 W12392/8833/48. 5 Aug. 1943, telegram no.612, Stanley to 
Mauritius; W12809/8833/48, 3 Sept. 1943, Colonial Office to Schonfeld; CO 
323/1846/2, 3 Sept. 1943, C.H.Thornley to Schonfeld; 9 Sept. 1943, Stanley to 
Kennedy, Mauritius; FO 371/42777 W2G17/667/48, 17 Feb. 1944, J.Megson, 
Colonial Office, Minute.
80 FO 371/42777 W1869/667/48. 4 Feb. 1944. Schonfeld to Randall: 
W4472/667/48, 20 March 1944, Camps to Henderson.
81 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fi-Foy], 3 March 1944, Schonfeld to Randall; 25 
March 1944, Randall to Schonfeld.
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The news from Turkey continued to worsen. In April 1944, Schonfeld was 
notified that the ‘greatest obstacle to rescue was the limitation of Turkish visas 
and the suspension of visas granted’. At his instigation, Randall made 
enquiries which resuited in a report from the British Embassy in Istanbul, 
maintaining that the Turkish authorities had not withdrawn facilities and that 
visas valid for two months were still available for rabbis on application to the 
Turkish legation in Budapest.82
In May, Schonfeld proposed that the holders of Mauritius visas be included in 
some exchange scheme. Since HMG was prepared to accept them in British 
territory, they might be regarded as ‘quasi British-protected subjects.’ In this 
way, ‘the enemy would recognise their status and either allow their departure 
or treat them as protected persons.’ However, Randall reiterated that persons 
to be included in the proposed German-Palestine exchange must be either 
Palestine residents or relatives of such persons. Nor was it possible to 
contemplate the inclusion of the rabbis in any exchange of British subjects. 
This was a similar proposal to Hertz's, made a few days later, that ‘all Jews in 
enemy territories are British-protected persons’ for whom exchanges would be 
arranged and places of refuge found'.83 Not only were the German authorities 
uniikely to agree to this, but it would presumably place genuine 'British- 
protected' people in greater danger than they were in already, by devaluing the 
'protected' status to the point of meaninglessness.
82 FO 371/42777 W6700/667/48, 26 April 1944, Schonfeld to Randall; 
W8706/667/48, 7 June 1944, Randall to Schonfeld.
83 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fi-Foy], 19 April 1944, Schonfeld to Randall; 4 May 
1944, Randall to Schonfeld; see footnote 33.
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After the German occupation of Hungary In the spring of 1944, Schonfeld tried 
to extend the Mauritius scheme. In early May, Hertz informed Stanley that in 
spite of the near-impossibility of transferring the refugees to Mauritius, he had 
definite evidence that the visas had saved many lives. He added that ‘the 
likelihood of any of these people actually reaching Mauritius was very slight' 
and therefore appealed for an increase in the number of visas to 1,000. The 
Colonial Secretary was sympathetic and put Hertz's case to the Foreign Office, 
stressing that there was ‘little practical effect on Mauritius of granting up to 
1000 visas'. 84 The Foreign Office raised no objection, despite wondering how 
the scheme could save so many lives if none of the rabbis ever reached 
Mauritius. Schonfeld explained that 'it has been confirmed that the possession 
of emigration facilities ...has rescued holders from deportation and all that it
implies.‘85
Stanley appealed to the Governor of Mauritius to grant Hertz’s request to 
extend the numbers again, explaining that not more than one-third were 
expected to reach Mauritius and that in any event, the prospects of any 
refugees reaching the Colony were remote.86 The Governor accepted the 
suggestion but demanded in return that Hertz ‘influence the Jews in the 
detainment camp ... to adopt a more reasonable attitude.’ Stanley informed 
Hertz of the Governor's consent and requirements. At the same time, the 
Foreign Office was receiving reports that conditions in Mauritius were worse 
than ever.87 Schonfeld persisted with the scheme, submitting three lists of
84 FO 371/42777 W8260/667/48, 4 May 1944, Hertz to Stanley; 22 May 1944, 
Stanley to Randall.
85 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fl-Foy], 24 July 1944, Schonfeld to Randall; FO 
371/42859 WR 1502/45/48, 25 Oct. 1944, Schonfeld to Mason.
86 FO 371/42777 W10001/667/48, 20 June 1944, telegram no.501, Stanley to 
Mauritius.
87 FO 371/42858 WR 45/45/48, 29 June 1944, telegram from Mauritius to 
Stanley; FO 371/42859 WR 1502/45/48, 19 July 1944, Stanley to Hertz; FO
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Hungarian, Polish and Czech nationals. Within three months all were granted 
visas for Mauritius. In late October 1944, Schonfeld was still submitting iists for 
Mauritius visas for Hungarian Jews.®®
In an attempt to rescue some of those who had recently been deported from 
Nitra, Slovakia, among them Chief Rabbi Ungar, Schonfeld requested that the 
British authorities ask the Swiss to inform the German Government that these 
people held Mauritius visas. The Foreign Office complied.®  ^ While there were 
no Germans with whom these refugees could be exchanged, the Protecting 
Power was asked to bring their names again to the notice of the German 
Government.9®
It is intriguing that the Government readily acceded to Schonfeld's request. 
However, in December 1944, the Foreign Office expressed concern over 
criticism being voiced in "liberal quarters’ in the United States over its Mauritius 
policy, which might "damage our good relations’. In defence, Mason suggested 
that the Foreign Office should refer to the ORREC's request for visas to 
Mauritius. Acknowiedging that the scheme was primarily a protective measure. 
Mason added: "it wouid be unlikely that the Emergency Council would adopt
371/42858 WR 916/45/48, 28 July 1944, E.Rainer, Mauritius, to Dr.Ed, 
Jerusalem.
88 Ibid., WR 416/45/48, 24 July 1944, Schonfeld to Randall; MS 183 Schonfeld 
654 [Fi-Foy], 12 Oct. 1944, Mason to Schonfeld; FO 371/42859 WR 1502/45/48, 
25 Oct. 1944, Schonfeld to Mason.
89 FO 371/42859 WR 1841/45/48, 21 Nov. 1944, Schonfeld to Mason and 
Eastwood; WR 1941/45/48 9 Dec. 1944, telegram no.3763. Foreign Office to 
Berne; FO 371/51146, WR 55/55/48, 5 Jan. 1945, Henderson, Minute; WR 
87/55/48, 8 Jan. 1945, Schonfeld to Henderson.
90 Ibid., WR 827/55/48, 31 March 1945, Henderson to The Chancery, British 
Legation, Berne.
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this line if they felt that conditions in Mauritius were really as bad as some of 
the complaints make out. ”91
Ironically, by April 1945, the Government was still willing to continue the 
scheme. Despite the changed circumstances of the war, after the liberation of 
France and the Balkans, it continued to grant such visas because ‘possession 
of them has been held to constitute a sort of claim through which the German 
authorities can be persuaded to allow the Rabbis to leave enemy territory'. 
After Turkey declared war on Germany, Henderson suggested that HMG ask 
the Swiss authorities to grant transit visas. ^ 2
Altogether, Schonfeld obtained 340 Mauritius visas (to cover 1000 people) and 
the necessary transit visas from Turkey, Spain and Portugal, which, he 
claimed, saved the lives of many of those to whom the visas were allocated, 
regardless of whether the holders ever arrived in Mauritius. Although the exact 
number saved by these papers is impossible to quantify, it is known that those 
holding such papers stood a much better chance of survival.^s The value of 
the scheme was protective, a point not fully appreciated by those who argue 
th at, 'Unfortunately, due to conditions on the Continent not a single rabbi ever 
utilised a Mauritius visa'.94
91 FO 371/42859 WR 1972/45/48,13 Dec. 1944, Mason to Eastwood.
92 MS 183 Schonfeld 654 [Fi-Foy], 10 April 1945, Henderson to Schonfeld; 15 
April 1945, Schonfeld to Henderson.
93 MS 183 Schonfeld 593/1, GRREC, 1938-1948, Rescue Work.
94 Meir Sompolinsky ‘Ha-Hanhagah Ha-Anglo Yehudit, Memshelet Britaniah ve- 
ha-Sho’ah’. ( PhD thesis. Bar Han University, Israel, 1977, pp.IV, 171-187.)
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The Irish Visas
Goodman’s attempts to secure Irish visas for Jews trapped in occupied Europe 
shows that even persistent and relentless efforts, if misdirected, could not 
necessarily effect rescue. In the final analysis what mattered was the 
responsiveness of the government concerned, not the actions of individuals or 
organisations.
Between 1943-45 Goodman continually tried to persuade the Irish 
Government to grant visas for Jewish refugees. This was done with the full 
consent of the British Government, the National Committee and the Joint 
Consultative Committee, although Goodman acted alone, negotiating directly 
with the Eire Government. He was in regular contact with J.P.Walshe, 
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, and made numerous trips to 
Dublin to talk to him and Robert Briscoe, head of the Irish Jewish community. 
Nevertheless, the Irish Government procrastinated throughout the 
negotiations.
Irish policy towards refugees generally and Jewish refugees In particular was 
highly restrictive and ungenerous. However, It would be misleading to depict 
the policy of Prime Minster Eamon de Valera as anti-Semitic. Policy was 
motivated by pragmatism and self-interest, determined by a high level of 
unemployment. Walshe pointed out that 'Small countries like Ireland do not 
and cannot assume [the] role of defenders of just causes except their own', ss
95 Dermot Keogh, The Irish Free State and the Refugee Crisis, 1933-45’, Paul 
R.Bartrop, ed.. False Havens: The British Empire and the Holocaust (New York, 
1995), pp.211-37.
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Goodman's proposais included the idea that Ireland grant a limited number of 
visas (100) to recommended individuals, 'whose emigration is of an urgent 
character' and that the Irish consuls in Axis countries approach the German or 
Italian authorities. Goodman offered guarantees that refugees would not 
become a charge on the State. In addition, in 1943 the Colonial Office was 
considering the renewal of Palestine or British visas which had lapsed at the 
outbreak of hostilities, but was unwilling to commit itself until the refugees 
reached neutral territory. Goodman asked that Eire grant them visas, pointing 
out that the likelihood of such visas being used was remote. He also 
suggested that the Eire Government charter a boat, at his own expense, to 
transport the 4,500 refugee children en b/oc from Bulgaria to a Turkish or 
Palestine port. His final request was that the Eire authorities consider the 
reception of a limited number of child refugees, possibly orphans, into local 
Jewish homes.96
While in Dublin, Goodman secured approval for these proposals from 
Dr.Paschal Robinson, the Papal Nuncio, who agreed to recommend them to 
De Valera. Goodman also met with representatives of the Irish Red Cross and 
discussed two more proposals, the sending of Irish food parcels to Poland and 
the possibility of bringing relief to Polish Jews in Shanghai.^^ On his return, 
Goodman put these proposals to Randall, who saw no difficulty in arranging 
transit visas for Eire through Britain, subject only to security considerations. 
Goodman relayed this to J.P.Dulanty, High Commissioner for Ireland in 
London, adding that Randall was keen to assist the departure of refugees from 
Spain to enable her to absorb new refugees and was particularly interested in
96 Mss VG, 8 April 1943, Goodman to Dulanty; 3 May 1943, Goodman to 
Walshe; Mss SG, 16 May 1943, ‘Goodman goes to Dublin’.
97 Ibid., 5 May 1943, Goodman to Walshe.
272
settling the problem of transporting children from Bulgaria.^® Shortly 
afterwards, however, Brotman learned that the Bulgarian authorities had 
retracted their offer. He remarked, 'it was no good chartering a ship, even if 
that were possible, if there were no children or other refugees to take away'.^s
Goodman informed Randall that Dulanty had stated that the Dublin authorities 
were prepared to grant visas for a limited number of adults and children, 
subject to the approval of the local Jewish community. This led Hertz and 
Goodman to appeal to the Dublin Jewish community, which, after some 
reluctance, finally agreed to helpT®® Still there was no progress. Goodman 
grew impatient: ‘It is three months now since the matter was raised in Dublin. I 
am convinced that the position has deteriorated on the Continent and I feel 
sure that a number of cases which might have been saved...have since been 
losr.101
In August, Goodman appealed to Walshe not to delay handing out visas, as 
the situation was worsening. There was a growing fear that territories under 
Italian occupation might be invaded by German t r o o p s .  102 He sent a list of 
candidates for visas to Dulanty, acknowledging that the occupying authorities 
would probably not grant exit permits; nevertheless, ‘in our experience ... the 
granting of visas to a neutral country tends to ameliorate the treatment which 
they receive.' Dulanty had discovered that the authorities in Vichy and Berlin 
had refused to grant exit permits even to holders of Irish visas. Nevertheless,
98 Ibid., 20 May 1943, Goodman to Dulanty.
99 Acc 3121 011/6/4/1,10 June 1943, interview with Randall.
100 Mss VG, 7 July 1943, Points of discussion with Randall; 9 Aug. 1943 and 24 
Nov. 1943, Goodman to Walshe.
101 Ibid., 23 July 1943, Goodman to J.A.Belton, Office of the High Commissioner 
for Ireland.
102 Ibid., 9 Aug. 1943, Goodman to Walshe.
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Goodman stressed that 'the Foreign Office is of the opinion that whilst exit 
permits may not be granted the visas might prevent deportation'. He pursued 
the matter relentlessly, sending in a second list of candidates and emphasising 
the helpfulness of other neutral countries which had received thousands of 
refugees.
There was no response from Dublin. Goodman's frustration increased: ‘All that 
is asked is that a formal visa be given and even if only one single life is saved 
the action will not have been without result.' He pointed out that a news 
agency report had confirmed that persons holding visas were exempt from 
deportation to the death camps in the East and sent a copy of this letter to the 
Papal Nuncio in Dublin, who regretted that he could do little to h e l p . i t  
seems strange that Goodman apparently still did not realise that the repeated 
evasions were more than merely bureaucratic.
When the Jewish press, somewhat prematurely, publicised the proposals, 
Walshe advised Goodman, ‘I think, on the whole, it would be wiser to avoid 
publicity until something concrete happens...The reports... to say the least, 
[are] somewhat exaggerated." When asked to inquire about the death camps 
at Auschwitz and Birkenau, Walshe replied, ‘we have been informed that the 
rumours in relation thereto are absolutely devoid of foundation." Goodman was 
obliged to tread carefully: ‘ [I] am relieved to hear that the reports about the 
camps at Oswiecim and Birkenau are unfounded. We can only hope that these
103 Ibid., 6 Sept. 1943, Goodman to Dulanty; 7 Sept. 1943, Dulanty to Goodman; 
17 Sept. 1943, Goodman to Dulanty; 20 Oct. 1943, Goodman to Dulanty.
104 Mss VG, 9 Nov. 1943, Goodman to Dulanty; 24 Nov. 1943, Goodman to 
Walshe; 1 Dec. 1943, Paschal Robinson, Apostolic Nunciature to Goodman.
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statements are c o r r e c t . This seems an extraordinary comment to have 
made in December 1943, but it does reinforce the contention that until June 
1944 Auschwitz-Birkenau was not identified as a mass extermination camp.
Other schemes had been more favourably received. One such was initiated by 
a Mrs. Patrick Hore-Ruthven, in co-operation with the Irish Red Cross, 'for the 
reception in Eire of 500 refugee children, preferably Catholic’, from France and 
Belgium, and to ‘feed them and return them to their homes after the war'. 
Emerson advised Hore-Ruthven that the scheme would have a better chance 
of success if it were taken up directly by the Eire Government with the German 
authorities, los Certainly a scheme to bring 500 Roman Catholic children to Eire 
would not have posed the cultural and religious problems of assimilation and 
settlement that might have arisen from a similar scheme involving Jewish 
children. Moreover, unlike Goodman's candidates, Hore-Ruthven’s child 
refugees would most probably be repatriated after the war.
In early March 1944, Goodman expressed bitter disappointment that nothing 
had come of the discussions. He noted that many refugees had fled to 
Hungary and unless they could produce emigration visas for some other 
country, were threatened with imprisonment or deportation. Visas could be 
issued only by countries, such as Ireland, which were not at war with Hungary. 
Goodman reiterated that, apart from the impossibility of transport, there was 
only the remotest possibility of anybody ever using an Irish visa, and that the 
main purpose of the visas was to prevent deportation. He pointed to the efforts
'105 Mss VG, 29 Nov. 1943, Walshe to Goodman; 19 Dec. 1943, Goodman to 
Walshe. See in same file J.C. and Jewish Weekly, 3 Nov. 1943; for counter 
report, see JTA , 13 Nov. 1943.
106 FO 371/36518 W17133/4/49, 11 Dec. 1943, Cheetham, Minute; 
W17685/4/49, 16 Dec. 1943, Cranborne to Hore-Ruthven; W17783/4/49, 21 Dec. 
1943, Broomfeld, Ministry of War Transport, to Henderson.
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of other neutral countries and hoped that Eire would not ‘refrain from 
participating in this great endeavour.’
In July 1944 Goodman appealed to Walshe to intervene with the Hungarian 
authorities, as King Gustav of Sweden had done. Walshe replied that he would 
do ‘what is possible but no direct contact with Hungarian Government.’ 
Goodman renewed his appeals to the Eire Government for reception facilities 
following the Horthy offer to permit the emigration of all Jewish children aged 
under ten, in possession of visas. Commenting that Eden intended to co­
operate fully in carrying out the Horthy proposals, Goodman proposed to pay a 
visit to De Valera to discuss the scheme.os
Dulanty discussed the matter with the Dublin authorities, pointing out that other 
neutral countries had agreed to take some Hungarian Jews and proposing that 
Eire should offer to take 500 children under ten years of age on the 
understanding that it would be for the duration of the war and that no 
maintenance charges would fall on Eire. On his return to London, Dulanty 
expressed reservations to the Dominion Office about dealing with the 
representative of 'a body like Agudas Israel ... however responsible it might 
be'; he preferred to negotiate with the British Government, which he presumed 
'would make provision for transport to Eire'. This reluctance to deal with a non­
governmental Jewish organisation had probably adversely affected many of 
the earlier negotiations with Goodman. Nevertheless, it seems that Dulanty 
considered these ideas ‘not so much on compassionate grounds but from a 
feeling that it would be useful to Eire if she could say after the war that she had
107 Mss VG 17 March 1944, Goodman to Dulanty; 31 March 1944, Goodman to 
Walshe.
108 Ibid., 7 July 1944, telegram, Goodman to Walshe; 10 July 1944, telegram, 
Walshe to Goodman; 31 July 1944, Goodman to Dulanty.
276
not entirely stood aside from helping as regards the European refugee 
problem.’ The Dominion Office suggested that Dulanty take up with Emerson 
the possibility of the transport and accommodation in Eire of a certain number 
of Jewish refugees. 109
The Irish Government was inherently reluctant to deal with the Agudah. In 
contrast to its repeated rebuffs to Goodman, it responded positively to the 
request of the American Government in the summer of 1944 to accept 500 
Jewish children from the Continent. This agreement originally specified French 
Jewish children but was later amended to include Hungarian Jewish children. 
Goodman again intervened, trying to have this arrangement extended to 
include refugees without reservation as to number and age. The Irish 
Government agreed to the amendment in respect of nationality, but insisted 
that the quota be limited to children, for reasons of security, and to 500 for 
absorption capacity. Goodman gave way and assured the Irish Red Cross that 
his organisation would be pleased to assist in any administrative 
arrangements. 110 Due to developments in Hungary, however, Ireland was 
unable to proceed.
Thwarted endeavour
The Jewish organisations made various approaches to the Government to try 
to extend the Palestine-exchange schemes involving European Jews. Most of 
these came to nothing. Mainly due to the efforts of the Jewish Agency, the
109 FO 371/42815 WR 785/3/48, 16 Aug. 1944, E.G.M. [Initld.], Dominions 
Office; 23 Aug. 1944, Walker, Foreign Office, to Maclennan, Dominions Office.
110 Mss VG, 29 Aug. 1944, Sidney H. Browne, American Embassy to Agudas 
Israel; FO 371/42817 WR 1125/3/48, 8 Sept. 1944, Browne to Mason; 21 Sept. 
1944, Mason to Browne; 18 Sept. 1944, Cheetham, Minutes; AI WO, A-37, 12 
Sept. 1944, Goodman to Irish Red Cross.
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three Palestine-exchange schemes between 1941-1944 provided some 
opportunity for rescue, but their scope was limited because Britain lacked 
exchangeable German citizens. Probiems of transport also militated against a 
further exchange scheme in 1944.1
it is impossible to calculate how many people were saved by possession of 
protective papers. The Anglo-Jewish organisations intervened successfuily to 
secure the validation of documents issued by South American consuls in 
Europe. However, these papers obtained deferment from deportation only for 
so long as it suited the Germans to recognise them as vaiid. Whiie efforts to 
save the Jews in Vittel were largely unsuccessful, at least many hundreds 
elsewhere, holding South American papers, were saved from extermination. A 
group of holders of South American passports at Bergen-Belsen survived the 
war. 112 However, there was no serious attempt by the Anglo-Jewish 
organisations to exploit the potentiai of protective papers.
Schonfeld's Mauritius scheme and Goodman's irish visa proposai demonstrate 
that the amount of effort invoived was in itseif almost entirely irrelevant, but 
that tactical ingenuity had an important part to play. Schonfeld and Hertz were 
able to persuade the Government to acquiesce in one of the few attempts 
during the war to secure protective visas for the British Colonies. This was in 
part due to their avoidance of the Palestine issue, but more importantly, their 
scheme served a useful purpose in terms of complementing British objectives.
I l l  D.Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews (New York, 1985), pp.276-77. Wyman 
maintains that oniy 463 Jews were invoived in the three transfers. On transport 
problems, see Wasserstein, op.cit., p.235.
‘*"*2 Porat, ibid., p. 148. For exampie, see Yad Vashem Archives, 0 4 8 /B I9-6 
(69/65), 17 March 1944, Goodman to Dulanty. A letter received through the Red 
Cross, dated January 1944, states that some people living in Amsterdam had 
been saved from deportation through visas granted by South American countries. 
See also Isaac Lewin, op.cit., p. 12.
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Goodman’s equally determined efforts met with failure, largely because his 
efforts were addressed to a recalcitrant Government, which saw them as 
merely an irritating interference in a matter on which it was only prepared to 
deal at governmental level. Goodman directed his energies at the patently 
unhelpful Irish Government instead of seeking one which might have been 
more sympathetic.
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Chapter Eight
A Chronicle of Success? Relief Efforts, 1942-1944
With most rescue schemes doomed, the only possibility of action lay in 
relieving the suffering of European Jewry. Brodetsky's memoirs frankly admit 
that 'we could do nothing for them ... except protest, send some food parcels 
with Government permission and get the BBC European service to speak to 
them about the freedom for which we were fighting.
British Blockade Policv
Systematic mass starvation was one of the weapons of extermination used by 
the Nazis against the Jewish populations of occupied Europe. In response, 
various organisations, British and American, attempted to initiate food relief 
schem es.2 All such schemes were subject to Trading with the Enemy 
regulations and Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) approval. Such efforts 
inevitably conflicted with British blockade policy, considered an essential 
weapon of modern warfare and one of the most decisive factors in bringing 
about the Allied victory in 1918.3 In August 1940, Churchill announced the 
Government's intention 'to maintain rigorously the blockade of all territories 
occupied and controlled by the enemy and to lay squarely upon the shoulders 
of the enemy the responsibility for providing for the needs of the inhabitants'. 
This policy was reaffirmed in the spring of 1941 and in the autumn of 1942 the
1 Brodetsky, Memoirs, p.208.
2 CZA C2/409, Aug. 1942, British Section, ‘Help for the Ghettos'.
3 FO 837/1214, 15 Feb. 1943, MEW, Summary of the Main Reasons for 
Continuation of the Food Blockade’ ( Summary ).
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British and American governments resolved formally upon a joint policy on 
these matters.4
Up to 1942, Germany was little affected by the food blockade owing to its 
systematic spoliation of the occupied territories. It was then faced with a crisis 
situation and increased pressure to maintain supplies from the occupied areas. 
Until late 1944, it was able to maintain a reasonable rationing system, after 
which time supplies diminished sharply and the food situation became a 
serious problem. The Bermuda Conference in April 1943 dismissed the 
suggestion that the Allied Governments send food through the blockade, on 
the grounds that such a policy hindered the war effort.s Towards the end of 
1943, the MEW reaffirmed the importance of the blockade policy, but its 
justification had changed considerably: 'In 1940 there was a real danger that 
supplies of foodstuff might be dispatched to enemy Europe under the guise of 
relief’; by 1943 it was ‘a question of psychological rather than economic 
warfare.’ The requirements of the United Nations were such that there was 
hardly anything in the way of relief supplies available. It was considered better 
not to emphasise this shortage but to continue to base the argument on 
grounds of blockade rather than supply. The MEW admitted that ‘The main 
reason, nevertheless, for refusing requests made by refugee Governments in 
London and humanitarian organisations... is that in practice we could not admit 
the claims of one area while rejecting those of another, and that any 
abandonment of the general principle would create exceptions which we would 
have no means of satisfying.’®
4 HC Debates, Fifth Series, 1939-1940, vol.364, col.1161; FO 837/1214 
T550/G/Z, 24 Feb. 1943, MEW, Note on Blockade Policy Respecting Relief 
(Blockade Policy), p.1.
5 FO 371Æ6725 W6785/677/48, 20 April 1943, Discussion no.2.
6 FO 371/36518 W17877/4/49, 25 Dec. 1943, MEW to W.Reifler, American 
Embassy, London.
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However, an exception was made for Greece, which was suffering 'absolute 
famine’ and from January 1942 shipments of wheat were permitted to pass 
through the blockade/ The British Government was approached throughout 
1941 with requests from Allied governments, notably those of Belgium and 
Norway, to admit relief supplies through the blockade. These were rejected.® 
The concession to Greece had broken down the principle of complete 
blockade and the Government anticipated a flood of piecemeal suggestions to 
convey food through the blockade. It realised that ‘it will therefore be 
invaluable to find a concession which can be extended in varying measures to 
all the Allied countries ... without the risk of substantial benefit to the enemy’ 
The Government agreed to allow various Allied governments to remit funds 
and make purchases from neutral countries within the blockade area since the 
surplus products of such countries might, in any event, be available to the 
enemy in the ordinary way of trade. These foodstuffs were then sent as relief 
to various occupied territories. Consignments were limited by the resources of 
the neutral countries concerned and were 'sharply distinguished' from 
shipments through the blockade.
Apart from applications by the Allied governments, the voluntary Jewish 
organisations also suggested that Jews in the Polish ghettos be treated as the 
equivalent of prisoners-of-war in internment camps and receive similar 
privileges in respect of the blockade. The blockade authorities had
7 FO 837/1214, 15 Feb. 1943, MEW ‘Summary’. There were political and 
strategic reasons for feeding the starving population of Greece. See Procopis 
Papastratis, British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War. 1941- 
1944 (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 114-18.
8 FO 837/1214. T550/G/Z, 24 Feb. 1943, 'Blockade Policy", p.2.
9 FO 837/1223,17 March 1942, W.A.Camps, MEW, Minutes.
10 FO 837/1214, 15 Feb. 1942, MEW, ‘Summary’; FO 371/36518 W17877/4/49, 
25 Dec. 1943, MEW to Reifler.
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categorically refused to allow any consignments from overseas for persons 
other than prisoners-of-war and civilian internees. They insisted on the 
formality of the 1929 Convention relating to POWs, because it offered, in their 
opinion, the best guarantee that the relief sent actually reached the intended 
beneficiaries. The German Government refused to extend ROW status to 
Jewish deportees, who it claimed had been arrested for reasons of 'public 
security'. On several occasions the organisations, particularly the WJC, tried to 
ensure that Jews in the Polish ghettos and internment camps qualified as 
beneficiaries of Red Cross parcels by according them ROW and civilian 
internee status.
On the whole the British and American governments worked closely together 
on blockade policy. Prior to America's entry into the war, Jewish organisations 
in the United States had sent almost 100,000 food parcels to the Jews of 
occupied Poland. The British blockade authorities considered that this would 
benefit the enemy and both Governments therefore tried early in 1941 to stop 
these schemes. The WJC acquiesced, bringing it into conflict with the Agudat 
Israel. 12 it was only in deference to the personal request of Lord Halifax, then 
British Ambassador in Washington, that the Agudah reluctantly agreed to 
discontinue sending parcels. 13
11 FO 371A36665 W12089/49/48. 18 Aug. 1943. Easterman to Law; Acc 3121 
C l 1/12/94, 6 Feb. 1942, B.Margulies, Council of Polish Jews in Britain; AJJDC 
AR 3345.536 [n.d.] efforts by the Federation of Czech Jews; June 1942, Rhys 
Davis M.P. raised the question in the Commons.
12 AJAC MS 361 D2/5, 22 April 1941, E.F.Henriques, Trading With The Enemy 
Department, to British Section and ‘Relief Activities of the WJC; 22 Aug. 1941, 
Congress Weekly: A Painful Controversy’; 30 June 1941, Perlzweig to 
Easterman; FO 371/32681 W14681/4555/48, 3 Nov. 1942, Postal and Telegraph 
Censorship, Report on Jewry.
13 MS 183 Schonfeld 673 [AG-AL]. Aug. 1942. AlWO.
283
However, the news that Polish Jews were subject to particularly brutal 
discrimination, and news of dispatch of parcels to Greece and Belgium made it 
hard to sustain the case against sending parcels to Poland. As a result of 
efforts made throughout 1942, and despite British objections, the State 
Department modified its ban and permitted US relief agencies to send $12,000 
worth of food parcels per month to specific addresses in Nazi-occupied 
E u r o p e . W i t h  the creation of the WRB in January 1944, the US position 
regarding the blockade changed dramatically. On the initiative of several 
Jewish organisations, the Americans privately took unilateral action over relief, 
thus threatening the British Government with considerable public and 
parliamentary embarrassment. In February 1944, for example, the WRB 
approved the proposal of the JDC to make $100,000 immediately available to 
the ICRC for expenditure including the purchase in Romania and Hungary of 
food and other supplies, and appropriate licences were issued to the JDC by 
the US Treasury. This represented a complete breach of Anglo-American 
blockade policy, which had always refused the ICRC permission to buy food in 
enemy territory. is
Food Parcel Schemes
Britain's blockade policy remained firm, despite public agitation and pressure 
from Allied governments in Britain for a modification of the blockade policy 
during the winter of 1941-42. In the spring of 1942 the Famine Relief 
Committee was established. Its members, including representatives of the
14 AJAC MS coll. 361, D2/5, 24 Oct. 1941, S.WIse to Halifax; 22 Oct. 1942 ,1.M. 
Minkoff to Perlzweig.
15 FO 371/42731 W2640/17/48, 12 Feb. 1944, H.Bucknell, Jnr., US Embassy, 
London, to Emerson; 17 Feb. 1944, British Embassy, Washington, to Foreign 
Office; Feb. 1944, Eden to Winterton; W3199/17/48, 28 Feb. 1944, Bliss, MEW, 
to Randall.
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church and academia, called for a project of child relief to certain occupied 
countries. Although the scheme was modest in scope, the Government was 
not prepared 'to shift the responsibility for providing for the occupied territories 
from the shoulders of the enemy Powers on to those of the United Nations ... 
they believe that there are grave psychological dangers in accepting any 
commitment in this respect, however small'. However, the main objection to 
the proposal was that 'relief could not be limited in the way they suggest. We 
could not feed children in Belgium and Southern France, and refuse the 
others.' Naturally, this argument could not be used publicly, as 'we should be 
accused of refusing to save any children at all, because we could not save the 
lof.16
Such was the Government's position when the Anglo-Jewish organisations first 
proposed to instigate a food-parcels scheme in February 1942. However, 
certain concessions were possible that did not contradict the principle of the 
blockade. As mentioned. Allied governments and their agents were allowed to 
buy goods in neutral countries within the blockade area, provided that these 
goods were not of the kind imported through blockade controls by the 
supplying country. This activity differed from the sending of small parcels from 
Portugal to individual addresses in various European countries; these parcels 
contained products imported through the blockade control, and the scheme 
was consequently frowned on by the MEW.^^
In the summer of 1941, after pressure from Belgians in Britain, the authorities 
allowed parcels to be sent on their behalf from Lisbon to their families in
16 FO 837/1214 T550/G/Z, 24 Feb. 1943, 'Blockade Policy", pp.2-3; 13 April 
1943, Selborne to Eden, pp.6-7.
17 FO 837/1223 1550/129, 20 Jan. 1942, Camps to G.G.Markbreiter, Home 
Office.
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Belgium. The total amount requested was four tons weight monthly, and the 
transfer of funds involved a monthly maximum of £3,000. Since Allied and 
indeed Axis nationals were freely able to make such arrangements 
(Portuguese firms had conducted a brisk trade in these parcels since early 
1941), the British Government agreed to the request. Similar facilities were 
granted to other Allied governments, such as the Free French and Norwegians 
and remained the basis of authorised schemes. The Government did not 
consider that these schemes bore any real relation to the question of blockade 
and relief policy. It was, however, considered 'important to keep them within 
bounds on account of the relative shortage of escudo currency and the 
administrative complications likely to result if they were unduly extended'. 
The authorities had noted that the Portuguese had greatly reduced the variety 
of items which might be included in these parcels and hoped that 'the traffic 
may therefore die a natural death'.
Thus, when the Anglo-Jewish organisations presented their request in 
February 1942, a precedent had been set, which relied on Portuguese postal 
regulations permitting the dispatch to énemy and most occupied territories of 
small parcels of foodstuffs weighing one pound apiece. The initiative for the 
parcel schemes for the Polish ghettos came from Goodman, who throughout 
February 1942 requested joint action by the various organisations. Initially 
there was some opposition from the Board on the grounds that 'To ask for food 
to be given to one section of the Polish population when all are starving -  
even if you take the ghetto conditions into account and the fact that officially 
Jews get smaller rations than non-Jewish Poles -  seems to be a request
18 FO 837/1214, T550/G/Z, 24 Feb. 1943, 'Blockade Policy', p. 10; FO 
371/42731 W303/17/48, 22 Dec. 1943, Randall to Emerson.
FO 837/1223 T550/129, 20 Jan. 1942, Camps to Markbreiter.
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which would be Inadvisable to make'.^o Hence the Board delayed replying and 
Goodman applied directly to the Foreign Office, which passed the request to 
the MEW.21 The main difficulty for the MEW was how to avoid breaching the 
blockade of enemy-occupied Europe and prevent food parcels being diverted 
for German use. While It might be practicable to allow a strictly limited number 
of parcels to be sent, It was Impossible to make arrangements with Individual 
organisations and for this reason W.A.Camps approached the Board directly.22
Brodetsky called a meeting of representatives of 13 Jewish organisations on 
23 July at which Camps confirmed the Allied governments' resolution to 
prevent foodstuffs reaching Nazi Europe. However, Camps pointed out that 
some neutral countries had a surplus of certain classes of foodstuffs which 
were available to the enemy and Allies equally and that Allied governments of 
the occupied countries were permitted to purchase parcels of these surplus 
foodstuffs for Individuals. The Polish Government-ln-Exlle In London had been 
operating such a scheme during the previous ten months.23 Permission to 
transfer money from Britain to Portugal for the purpose of sending food parcels 
to the Jews of Poland received final approval In September 1942. The 
concession, like those granted to the Allied governments, was restricted to 
commodities already In surplus In Portugal. The scheme was to be managed 
by the Board under the auspices and control of the Polish Government In 
London, so that It 'should not appear to be a specifically Jewish one.'24 Thus,
20 Acc 3121 B5/2/2/3, 5 Feb. 1942, Brotman to Brodetsky.
21 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/94, 4 Feb. 1942, Goodman to Brotman; MS 183 Schonfeld 
673 [AG-AL], Aug. 1942. AlWO.
22 Acc 3121 011/12/91, 29 June 1942, Lionel LCohen, MEW, to Brotman.
23 Ibid., 23 July 1942, Conference, Relief of Jews In the Ghettos; 10 July 1942, 
Interview with Stanczyk.
24 Ibid., 30 July 1942, 'Postal Packets to the Ghettos'; 15 Sept. 1942, copy of 
letter from A.S.Tolhurst, Trading with the Enemy Department.
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in agreement with the Trading with the Enemy Department, the scheme 
provided for the transfer of £3,000 per month to Portugal for the purchase and 
dispatch of 8-10,000 one pound packets of food, mainly fish in oil, produced in 
Portugal. The dispatch of parcels was handled by Dr.Stanislaw Schimitzek, 
Polish representative in Lisbon, in co-operation with Dr. Joseph Schwartz, JDC 
representative there, who agreed to act on the Board's behalf. The Board 
appointed a small committee for the purpose of, inter alia, selecting names 
and addresses of recipients.^s
In this case, and under conditions of the strictest privacy, the Government was 
prepared to waive its insistence that Jews were not entitled to separate or 
preferential treatment. Certainly the scheme was conducted under Polish 
auspices, and kept as secret as possible, and the concession fell well within 
the limits of the blockade policy and involved neither political compromise nor 
material sacrifice on part of the Government.
From the start, the British authorities insisted on the minimum publicity for the 
scheme, which would otherwise attract the attention of the Nazis, a point which 
the organisations endorsed. The scheme was on a small scale and confined 
strictly to Britain. Public fund-raising campaigns were thus undesirable and it 
was 'considered unwise to allow the general public to form an impression that 
the Government had extended facilities to any special class of perso n s '.^e  The 
bulk of the £3,000 monthly requirement was to be raised privately from Anglo- 
Jewish sources and from allocations by the organisations. Brodetsky 
suggested that the CCJR make a grant to cover the first three months'
25 CZA C2/416, 7 Aug. 1942, Easterman to Brotman.
26 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/91, 30 July 1942, 'Postal Packets to the Ghettos’; 15 Sept. 
1942, Tolhurst to Brotman; 12 Oct. 1942, Zygielbaum to Brotman.
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supplies. Regarding the scheme’s specifically Jewish character, Sir Robert 
Waley-Cohen feared that there might be resentment at an arrangement 
favouring Jews in preference to other starving peoples. Brodetsky responded 
that the Jews in the ghettos were receiving only half the supplies allotted to 
people outside the ghettos. The Central Council made available the sum of 
£6,000, provided by the Jewish Colonisation Association (ICA), for the first two 
months’ outlay. 27
Securing names and addresses presented difficulties, since the scheme could 
not be made public. It was accepted that some disclosure must be made to the 
Jewish organisations to secure this information. Although the Board took 
precautions to keep the matter sub rosa, the secret leaked out in September 
1942. The Board was now inundated with enquires from Jewish organisations 
abroad, hoping to arrange similar schemes.28
By November 1942, only one month’s funds had been transmitted, via Lisbon, 
and concern mounted as food shortages in Poland were becoming chronic.29 
The main concern now was whether the parcels were arriving. The original 
arrangement was that parcels were to be sent to individual recipients whose 
names and addresses had been collected in Britain. By December 1942, 
following the news of dramatic shifts in population as a result of deportations, it 
became necessary to modify the scheme. It was decided that all parcels
27 CCJR, 27 July 1942, Executive Committee Meeting, Minutes, p.2 and 23 
Sept. 1942, p.3; Acc 3121 C11/12/91, 31 July 1942; 24 Aug. 1942, Brodetsky to 
S. Marks.
28 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1942, Goodman to Brotman.
29 Ibid., 24 Nov. 1942, Easterman to Brotman; 24 Dec. 1942, Brotman to Camps.
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should be addressed to Jewish organisations in the ghettos, for distribution as 
they thought fit.^ o
The scheme was viewed throughout as ‘an experiment’, the continuance of 
which would depend on whether the parcels reached their destinations, 
especially in view of reports that the ghettos were being liq u id a te d .T h e  
Board was prepared to run it on a trial basis for six months; according to 
Brotman, ‘a substantial proportion of parcels do get to the intended recipients', 
although he appears to have had no definite evidence of this. The Germans 
had placed a complete ban on postal communications and the MEW doubted 
whether more than a few parcels had reached their destinations. By the end of 
1942 it was regarding the scheme more dubiously and Leonard Montefiore 
requested confirmation before handing over the second £3,000. At the same 
time, Stanczyk assured the Board that ‘postal packets of food were, on the 
whole, being delivered to their recipients.’^ 2
In January 1943, Portugal placed an embargo on sending further postal 
packets to Poland. The ban was eased in February and by April it was 
reported that a number of receipt cards had been returned, indicating that 
shipments had apparently reached their destination. The Board now looked to 
the JDC for guidance as to whether to continue the scheme. 3^ However, lack 
of acknowledgement was not proof that goods had not arrived. The difficulties 
of correspondence with Jews in Poland might easily account for the small
30 Ibid., 23 July 1942, Conference, Relief of Jews in the Ghettos; 30 July 1942, 
‘Postal Packets to the Ghettos’, p.2; 24 Dec. 1942, Brotman to Camps; 30 Dec. 
1942, Brotman to A.Schoyer; 14 Jan. 1943, Brotman to Dr.Grosfeld.
31 Ibid., 27 Nov. 1942, Brotman to Schwartz.
32 Ibid., 25 Nov. 1942, Brotman to Marks; 26 Nov. 1942, Camps to Brotman; 13 
Dec. 1942, L.M.Montefiore to Brotman; 14 Dec. 1942, Brotman to M.Stephany.
33 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/3, 2 April 1943, Herbert Katski, JDC, Lisbon, to Brotman; 
22 April 1943, Brotman to Katski.
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number of individual receipts returned or for the fact that receipts were signed 
by the respective Judenrat (Jewish Council).^4 it was not realised at this point 
how far the extermination of Polish Jewry had advanced. Doubts again arose 
whether to continue the parcel scheme. By May 1943, Lisbon had confirmed 
that collective delivery was no longer possible and that parcels could only be 
sent to individual addresses. This reduced the scope of the scheme although 
there were hopes that it would return to a full capacity of 10,000 a month. 
However, each change of regulation necessitated a new licence, resulting in 
more delays.^s Parcels were thus sent alternately to individuals and to 
organisations.
The uncertainty about the receipt of packages was serious, as it imperilled the 
future of the scheme. Up to July 1943, out of the first shipment of 12,500 
packages, some 7,000 were still unaccounted for, even after making 
allowances for those reported to have been confiscated, returned or receipted. 
Of the 925 packages acknowledged, 849 were signed by the Judenrat It was 
unclear whether the addressee or the Judenrat had received it first or whether 
the latter had passed it on. Only 76 personal acknowledgements were 
received. 36 It is debatable in any event whether these receipts were genuine.
Up to this point, the parcel scheme was not considered a success. Nearly all 
parcels addressed to Jews in the territories of Upper Silesia had been returned 
to Lisbon marked ‘addressee left to an unknown destination". Consequently, it
34 AJJDC AR 3344.801, 2 July 1943, Katski to Brotman; Katski, interview, 
August 1994, New York.
35 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/3, 28 May 1943, Brotman to Edith Pye, Famine Relief 
Committee; AJJDC AR 3344.801, inter alia, 6 March 1943, Katski to JDC, New 
York.
36 Ibid., 26 June 1943, Report from Caldas da Rainha, Lisbon, to the JDC, New 
York.
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was necessary to revise the plan of action. In July 1943 the German postal 
authorities decreed that from 31 August 1943 food packages addressed to 
Jews residing in the Gouvernement General (GG) would no longer be 
delivered to addressees; such parcels were to be confiscated without 
compensation to the sender.37 it was therefore agreed to interrupt the dispatch 
of parcels to GG territory. As individuals and Judenrats outside the GG 
seemed to be receiving the parcels, it was decided to continue the scheme for 
their benefit. On the other hand, parcels were still to be dispatched during 
September to the incorporated territories but would go only to addressees who 
had previously confirmed receipt.3®
Juedische Unterstuetzunasstelle fur das Gouvernement General
Power to assist Jews in the GG now lay solely with the Ju ed isch e  
Unterstuetzungsstelle (JUS), the Jewish Aid Centre in Krakow, the only 
remaining Jewish organisation in Poland authorised to carry on such w o r k .39 
This organisation, headed by Dr. Michael Weichert, received food parcels and, 
curiously, continued officially operating even after the liquidation of the ghetto 
was completed In December 1943. Weichert, who remains a controversial 
figure, was tried and acquitted after the war on charges of collaboration. His 
writings provide an important source of information about the food-packet 
programme and although much of it is evidently calculated self-justification and 
must therefore be treated with caution, some documents and affidavits 
produced at the trial remain valuable. Weichert was charged with deliberately 
misleading Jewish organisations abroad by minimising the extent of the
37 Acc 3121 011/12/92/2, 23 Aug. 1943, Schimitzek, Lisbon, to Stanczyk; 16 
Aug. 1943, Katski to Brotman.
38 Ibid., 11 Aug. 1943, Postal Packets Scheme.
39 Ibid., 30 Oct. 1943, Schimitzek to Stanczyk.
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extermination of Polish Jewry. At the trial, evidence was produced that after 
November 1942 the Germans allowed the JUS to function for propaganda 
reasons and as a useful tool of deception.^
Although the Germans, for whatever reason, allowed the JUS to function, it 
was able to operate only intermittently as a receiving and distributing agency 
for supplies from abroad. The importance of these thousands of small parcels 
was that Weichert, through the help of the Rada Glowna Opiekuncza, the 
Chief Aid Committee, was able to sell the contents, buying flour and medicines 
with the proceeds, especially important to Jews in hiding after the liquidation of 
the ghetto.41 Weichert claimed that a large quantity of goods did reach the 
camps, some of it smuggled in. In July 1943, he reported that 'Contrary to 
1942 we have no transportation difficulties now. ..Up to date all consignments 
reached their destination oromotlv and in good condition.’ [my emphasis] 
Weichert explained, incredibly, that each shipment was made In response to 
an order from the camp, ghetto or factory on the basis of a list furnished by 
him. Yet a few weeks later, Weichert wrote that since the JUS had resumed its 
activities, it had not received any parcels from Jewish relief agencies and 
reserves were almost exhausted.42 He was evidently anxious to demonstrate 
that he had done an effective job and that any deficiencies were the fault of the 
relief organisations. Moreover, it was an effective way to secure further 
supplies.
40 Michael Weichert, Yidishe Aleinhilf cites Memorandum, Order of 18 Nov. 
1942, p.377; Epilogue, pp.356-57.
41 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/2, 22 May 1943, notification that JUS had reopened; 
AJJDC AR 3344.801, 2 July 1943, Katski to Brotman; Weichert, op.cit., 
pp. 156.158.169.348,352,385.
42 AJJDC AR 3344.801, 15 and 29 July 1943, Weichert to the Committee for the 
Assistance of the War Stricken Jewish Population, Geneva. For a positive 
opinion of Weichert, see Malvina Graf, The Krakow Ghetto and the Plaszow 
Camp Remembered (Florida. 1989). pp.81-82,129.
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By September 1943 only £9,000 had been sent to Lisbon and further transfers 
of money had been discontinued following reports from Poland that the 
delivery of parcels was worsening. Nevertheless, as an experiment, a trial 
shipment of 10-20 parcels to the JUS in Krakow was made.^3 In November 
1943, Schwartz told Brotman that the JUS was still functioning, albeit 
sporadically, and that 30-40 packets a month had been sent and receipts 
obtained. As a result, the JDC began to send between 1,000-1,500 packages 
to Krakow on a trial basis with the intention of sending further and larger 
consignments, subject to receipts. ^ 4
In March 1944, the JDC in Lisbon heard that the JUS had received and 
distributed these trial packets. By 17 April it was reported that 2,097 parcels 
sent between February and April had reached their destination: 'the result 
consequently can be considered as positive (satisfactory)’ and the JDC  
envisaged sending larger consignments. In May it was agreed that 2,500 
packages a week be sent to the JUS. If this success continued, the parcel 
scheme would require more funds to carry on. In June the CCJR and the ICA 
allocated £18,000 for the following three months.45 Yet Weichert’s activities 
were regarded with increasing suspicion. In May 1944, the Bund notified the 
Board that ‘this organisation was started by the Germans for the purposes of 
deception’ and that ‘parcels would never reach the Jewish inmates’. The Bund
43 AJJDC AR 3344.802, 2 Sept. 1943, Katski to JDC, New York; Acc 3121 
C l 1/12/92/5, 24 Sept. 1943, South African Times report that all parcels were 
being confiscated. For contradictory reports that the JUS was receiving parcels, 
see C l 1/12/92/3, 30 Oct. 1943, Schimitzek to Board.
44 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/2, 5 Nov. 1943, conversation, Brotman and Schwartz; 26 
Nov. 1943, Brotman to Schwarzbart.
45 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/5, 22 March 1944, Brotman to Camps. For a positive 
report on the amounts received by the JUS, see 11 May 1944, Schimitzek to 
Stanczyk; 22 March 1944, Schwartz to Brotman; 9 May 1944, JDC, Lisbon, to 
Schimitzek.
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asked that the dispatch of medicines and gifts from abroad to the JUS be 
stopped 46
The Board was deeply disappointed. Yet despite reports throwing doubt on the 
validity of the scheme, both the Board and the JDC were reluctant to abandon 
it.47 There may perhaps have been some unconscious compulsion to do (and 
be seen to be doing) something useful, however small in scale. Donald 
Hurwitz, the JDC representative in Lisbon, reported that the ICRC and other 
sources had assured him that 'the scheme has been effective’. Hurwitz urged 
that the dispatch of parcels to Krakow should be maintained, ‘at least at its 
present level’.48
The Board discussed the future of the scheme with Stanczyk. Brotman and 
Stephany felt that "whilst there was undoubtedly a leakage to the Germans of 
these food parcels', the benefit of the scheme outweighed this problem. 
Stanczyk agreed that the dispatch of parcels to Krakow should be continued 
as fully as possible.49 In July, however, Weichert went into hiding. In spite of 
Weichert’s claims, it is impossible to ascertain how many parcels actually 
arrived. Certainly the Germans confiscated some, yet Weichert maintained 
that ‘help from abroad was invaluable for the survival of Jews'.^o It must be 
remembered, however, that Weichert’s remarks were intended to justify his
46 Ibid., 30 May 1944, confidential, Stanczyk to Brotman; 1 June 1944, Brotman 
to Stanczyk; AJJDC AR 3344.802, 24 May 1944, Report of Jewish National 
Committee in Poland.
47 Ibid., 30 May 1944, Stanczyk to Brotman; 1 June 1944, Brotman to 
Schwarzbart.
48 Ibid., 14 June 1944, Hurwitz to Brotman; 11 July 1944, Hurwitz to Stanczyk; 
14 July 1944, Stanczyk to Brotman.
49 Ibid., 21 July 1944, interview with Stanczyk.
50 Weichert, op.cit., pp. 173,355,363. Weichert claims that Joseph Horn, Tadeusz 
Pankiewicz and others commented on how invaluable was the help from the 
JUS. See Tadeusz Pankiewicz, The Crakow Ghetto Pharmacv (New York, 1987).
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activities and to defend him from the charge of collaboration. The claim that 
food parcels from abroad were instrumental in saving Jews from death Is, on 
the face of it, absurd. But Weichert's comment is (no doubt intentionally) so 
vaguely worded as to be effectively meaningless.
The Board continued to send parcels to Poland well into September 1944, 
after the publication of the Auschwitz Protocols and despite reports of the 
scheme's ineffectiveness. It also attempted to extend the parcel scheme to 
cover Terezin and Hungary, but the MEW prohibited any increase in the 
£3,000 monthly allowance for transmission to Portugal. Indirectly, however, the 
failure of the Polish scheme helped the other parcel schemes, as funds were 
eventually diverted to Terezin and Hungary. It is hard, however, to see what 
value can have been placed on the continuation of the Polish scheme at a time 
when details of the mass extermination of Polish Jewry were becoming widely 
known.
Parcels to Czechoslovakia and Hunaarv
At the end of December 1942, Ernest Frischer, a Jewish member of the Czech 
State Council, suggested that the Board extend its Polish parcel scheme to 
Terezin.51 At this point, however, the Board could not extend the scheme 
outside Poland. The Czech Government, after repeated efforts, initiated a 
scheme for sending food parcels to Terezin and elsewhere where Czechs and 
especially Czech Jews were interned. For this purpose the Czechoslovak 
Relief Action Committee was formed. In March 1943, Frischer received 
Treasury permission for the Czech Government in London to transfer £3,000 a 
month to the Czech Embassies in Lisbon and Barcelona to finance a food
51 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/91, 23 Dec. 1942, Frischer to Brotman.
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parcel scheme for Czech nationals interned in occupied Europe. The Czech 
Government contributed £6,000 to initiate the project. The remainder was to 
be raised from non-governmental contributions. Here again, HMG strictly 
forbade any publicity for the scheme; hence there could be no public appeals 
and the utmost discretion was to be observed.52
Frischer noted that these resources could only cover the costs of some 16,000 
to 20,000 parcels monthly, so that each of Terezin's 60,000 internees, for 
example, would receive only one, one pound parcel once in three months. In 
the case of Terezin, it was believed, there was more likelihood of the food 
reaching its destination. Packages were sent to individuals only. Information 
had been received by the ICRC that 90 percent of parcels reached their 
destination, presumably because the Terezin camp had recently been visited 
by representatives of the Red C ross.53 The essential problem with the Czech 
scheme appeared rather to be shortage of funds.
Frischer appealed to Brodetsky that since little use had been made of the 
Treasury concession for Poland and the funds had not been fully exhausted, 
some of the money should be utilised for alternative schemes. He asked that 
Brodetsky secure a Treasury amendment that money earmarked for Poland be 
diverted to Terezin and other internment camps in occupied Europe. The 
Board complied and at Frischer's request also tried to obtain Treasury 
permission for part of the monies to be sent to Switzerland instead of Portugal,
52 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/3, 5 March 1943, Frischer to Brotman; FO 371/42731 
W303/17/48, 14 Nov. 1943, 'Help to Groups of Refugees in Europe'; Mss VG, 
Memorandum, Parcels to Camps in Czechoslovakia and other parts of Europe, 
[n.d. probably 1944].
53 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/5, 17 Nov. 1943, British Red Cross to Brotman; 6 May 
1944, Frischer to Brodetsky. For 'confirmation from the addresses that the 
parcels and their contents were received in good order', see Mss VG, 
Memorandum, ff. 52.
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as the ICRC in Geneva was better placed to send mass supplies of essential 
food and medicaments to Terezin. This request met with some success, but 
efforts to secure an increase in the monthly remittance of £3,000 in order to 
make up for the period in which it had not been fully used in Poland, were 
rejected on the grounds that 'It raises a number of extra questions'. 4^
Camps agreed to consider a proposal for a single transfer of £9,000 to 
Portugal, over and above the current monthly £3,000, to bring relief to Jewish 
inmates in Terezin. Unaware that Birkenau was a mass extermination camp, 
Frischer asked the Board to try to obtain British permission to send large-scale 
consignments there. The Foreign Office advised that the Czech Government 
should apply to the IGCR to take up the proposal to send relief though 
Switzerland to Czech nationals at Birkenau. The IGCR would, in turn, seek 
MEW approval for a remittance to be made to Switzerland to buy supplies to 
send to Birkenau. it was first necessary to try for an agreement in principle.ss
The Czech parcel scheme cost £36,000 a year. The Czech Government had 
contributed £10,000 and the Czechoslovak Relief Action Committee collected 
a sum of £6,000 from Czech nationals in Britain. Together with a further 
£1,000 from the United Relief Appeal, a sum of £17,000 was appropriated for 
1944. In April, the ICA was approached for £6,000 but there was still a serious 
shortfall by the middle of 1944. Frischer now urged that British Jewry should 
contribute to the Czech scheme. The Czech Government agreed that any
54 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/2, 21 Aug. 1943, Frischer to Brodetsky: 28 Aug. 1943, 
Frischer to Brodetsky; 17 Sept. 1943, Frischer to Brotman; 21 Sept. 1943, 
Brotman to Camps; 25 Sept. 1943, Camps to Brotman; 16 Nov. 1943, Frischer to 
Stephany.
55 FO 371/42731 W1133/17/48, 29 Jan. 1944, Randall to Camps; W1808/17/48, 
2 Feb. 1944, Camps to H.O.Fiser, Czech Ministry of Social Welfare; Acc 3121 
C l 1/12/92/5, 2 Feb. 1944, Camps to Brotman.
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Jewish money contributed in connection with its own parcel scheme could be 
applied to ali Jews, regardless of nationality, in Terezin and other cam ps.
The Board was unable to ascertain what proportion of funds would be needed 
for Poland. At the end of May 1944, Frischer informed Brodetsky that the 
Czech Government was able to utilise neither the licence granted by the 
British Government nor the additional licence granted by the MEW for one 
transfer of £9,000 to Lisbon because the money needed had not been made 
available. Frischer blamed British Jewry, which 'undoubtedly is financially 
strong enough to support the action [but] has so far contributed very little.'^7
Brodetsky agreed that the Central Council make an adequate contribution 
towards the Czech Government's parcei scheme. Explaining that the ICA grant 
of £2,000 for the dispatch of parcels through the Czech Relief Action 
Committee was considered insufficient, Brodetsky asked whether the Central 
Council would make a vote independently of the ICA. The Council agreed to 
grant £9,000 for the next three months, to be matched by a similar amount 
from the ICA. Together with the money avaiiable to the Czech Government, 
this resulted for the next three months in the provision of food parcels to the 
full capacity of the licences for transfer of money to Jews 'wherever they were 
in the position to receive them'. To the Board, this meant, 'Poland, Terezin and 
Hungary.' 58
56 Ibid., 6 May 1944, Frischer to Brodetsky; 8 May 1944, Brodetsky to Stephany.
67 Ibid., 24 May 1944, Brotman to Hertz; 31 May 1944, Frischer to Brodetsky. 
The ICA had already given £13,000, but this came from Baron Hirsch’s fund, 
which was not British.
68 Ibid., 8 May 1944, Brodetsky to Stephany; 13 June 1944, Brodetsky to 
Frischer.
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However, the position in Hungary was more problematic. At the request of 
Hertz and Schonfeld, the Board asked that permission be given for a 
proportion of the £3,000 transferred monthly to Lisbon for the Polish scheme to 
be used for the dispatch of food parcels to Hungarian Jews concentrated in the 
ghettos. However, political and technical difficulties, especially the problem of 
sending parcels to enemy territory, prevented this. The Board was advised to 
consult the IGCR. Emerson, however, was unable to help. Brotman therefore 
suggested that as Poland was not at war with Hungary, it might be possible for 
Stanczyk to enlist Polish support to facilitate the dispatch of food parcels for 
Hungary. 59
Although the Board's request for a separate allocation for assisting Jews in 
Hungary was rejected, the MEW was willing that the Polish Government spend 
part of its allocation in sending parcels to Hungary. The amount to be 
apportioned to Hungary depended on the extent to which it was still practicable 
to send parcels to Poland. Brotman explained, ‘Our desire is that the Jews in 
Poland should have first claim on the money available for the dispatch of 
parcels’. In August 1944 the MEW agreed with the Polish Ministry that part of 
the funds could be diverted to Hungary.5°
Despatching parcels was now the main problem, especially across France, as 
the railways were being sabotaged by French partisans and the bridges 
bombed by the Allied Air Forces. After 26 July all dispatches from Portugal 
were interrupted because of these difficulties; further dispatches depended on
59 Ibid., 21 May 1944, Hertz to Brotman; 24 May 1944, Brotman to Hertz; 1 June 
1944, A.G.Wrightson, MEW, to Brotman.
60 Ibid., 18 July 1944, Wrightson to Brotman; 7 Aug. 1944, M. A. Urbanski, 
Polish Ministry of Social Welfare, to Wrightson; 11 Aug. 1944, Rith Quennell, 
MEW to Urbanski; 28 Aug. 1944, Brotman to Urbanski.
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political and military conditions. By the end of September, transport was so 
dislocated that there was still no way of conveying parcels to Poland, Hungary 
or anywhere else. Nevertheless, the Board made frequent enquires to 
ascertain whether the Hungarian ghettos continued to e x i s t . This was 
necessary as the situation of the Jews in Hungary had apparently improved, 
albeit temporarily, after Horthy’s order in July to stop the deportations. 
According to information sent by the JDC, until recently there had been no 
food shortage in Hungary. Information was also received that, as a result of 
the Horthy Offer, the ICRC was authorised to provide relief for interned or 
confined Jews. However, reports indicated that the Red Cross was allowed to 
visit only the ghettos In Budapest and not elsewhere.®2
At the end of September, it was still unclear whether there were food 
shortages in Hungary. In mid-October, due to military developments in south­
eastern Europe, the food situation in Hungary seemed likely to deteriorate and 
worse still, the deportations were resumed. There seemed no possibility of 
sending parcels either to Poland or Hungary and efforts were now made to 
divert funds to liberated France. 63
The food-parcel scheme was one of the very few cases of the government 
authorising a specifically Jewish relief effort, even though this operated under 
the auspices of the Polish and Czech Governments-in-exile. These schemes 
were invariably kept quiet and given no publicity. Since precedents had 
already been set with Allied governments, the scheme was allowed to operate.
G "I Ibid., 7 Aug. 1944, Schimitzek to Brotman; 28 Sept. 1944, Brotman to Samuel; 
Acc 3121 02/2/5/3, 18 July 1944, interview with Hall.
62 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/5, 21 July 1944, interview with Stanczyk; C9/1/92/4, 18 
Aug. 1944, cable from Lichtheim to Linton.
63 Acc 3121 C l 1/12/92/5, 10 Nov. 1944, J.LTeicher, Polish National Council, to 
Brotman.
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Nevertheless, it was very restricted and remained well within the parameters of 
Government regulations. There was no breach of British blockade policy. No 
major Government concession was involved and the voluntary organisations 
were hardly able to extend the scheme beyond its original, closely defined 
limits.
The effectiveness of the food-parcel relief schemes is impossible to estimate. 
Reports conflicted as to the extent to which packages were rece ived .^4 No 
account was taken of the possibility of systematic deception designed to foster 
the illusion that some parcels were being received, in order to encourage the 
sending of more. After the war, Brotman wrote somewhat defensively that 
'considerable risks had to be taken and we felt that even if a large percentage 
of the parcels sent were lost or purloined by the Nazis, it would still be worth 
while'. He regretted that so few parcels had reached their intended recipients, 
pointing also to transport difficulties in Europe, and the limited facilities of the 
Portuguese postal arrangements. Brotman observed: ‘We have not given any 
particular publicity to the scheme ... The Board has never been an 
organisation to publicise its activities, and its feeling of restraint in this matter 
has not entirely gone'.^s The Board's anxiety, both before and during the war, 
to be publicly seen to be 'doing something' rather belies the modesty of these 
remarks.
G4 Katski, interview, August 1994. Katski maintains that a certain number of relief 
packages did get through, although he cannot quantify numbers. Acc 3121 
C l 1/12/92/5, 28 Nov. 1945, Brotman to Schwarzbart, enquiring if the latter had 
any definite information about the receipt of parcels.
G5 Ibid., 22 Nov. 1945, J.M.Rich, Secretary, South African Board of Deputies, to 
Brotman. Rich had enquired about these ‘clandestine’ relief efforts, see 28 
Nov. 1945, Brotman to Rich.
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It seems as if Brotman is trying here to defend the Board from charges of 
engaging in perhaps naive and futile measures which in all likelihood 
succeeded only in supplying the enemy, also suffering severe food shortages, 
with provisions. Certainly the organisations, victims of a sophisticated scheme 
of deception, had valid reasons for their cautious optimism about the relative 
success of the food-parcel projects. Their information came from the JDC, an 
experienced organisation close to events, on whose authority they quite 
reasonably relied. In administrative terms they made full use of their limited 
opportunities to bring whatever relief they could to European Jewry.
Jewish Relief Units
Anglo-Jewish relief work for the post-war period was similarly restricted. All 
efforts had to be integrated with general British relief work. The guiding 
principle of British policy remained that Jews in Europe were citizens of their 
countries of origin and should not be accorded distinctive treatment as Jews.®® 
The Government had become increasingly worried that any implied recognition 
of Jewish nationality or any acknowledgement of a Jewish claim to special 
consideration might give credence to Jewish demands over Palestine. During 
the liberation, British military commanders refused to accept that Jews had 
urgent particular needs and insisted that they be classified by their former 
nationality. Brodetsky's recommendation that the War Office give Allied troops 
In the liberated countries background guidance on Jewish problems was 
considered unnecessary.®7
66 FO 371/36694 W124/124/48. 31 Dec. 1942, H.E.Caustin, Allied Post-War 
Requirements Bureau.
67 FO 371/35220 U5342/3646/74,28 Oct. 1943, Foreign Office, Minute.
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Anticipating a gigantic post-war relief and rehabilitation problem, the United 
Nations set up in September 1941 an Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War 
Requirements Bureau. It had no executive function but was to gather 
information to plan for the requirements covering the first 18 months of the 
post-war period. This Bureau was eventually absorbed into UNRRA, set up in 
November 1943, which became the major international relief body for 
distressed populations in Allied-liberated territories.®® In 1942, at the informal 
suggestion of the Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau, a number of private 
relief agencies formed a consultative body known as the Council of British 
Societies for Relief Abroad (COBSRA). The Jewish organisations represented 
on the Council were the Board and the CRREC.®^
The Jewish organisations recognised that this vast problem had to be 
undertaken by governments, but pointed to distinctively Jewish relief and 
rehabilitation issues; these included Jewish religious needs and the rebuilding 
of Jewish communal life. More importantly, at the end of the war 'the surviving 
Jewish population will be composed of a mass of homeless, uprooted people 
... Problems of identification, of legal or factual residence, and of nationality 
are due to arise in respect of every Jewish group.'^® Beyond the immediate 
common problems of humanitarian relief, the anomalous status of Jewish 
refugees posed a greater legal difficulty: stateless Jews, formerly residents of 
Axis countries, would be particularly difficult to resettle. Because of this, the 
organisations wanted Jewish participation in the planning and implementation 
of post-war relief and reconstruction.
68 FO 371/40521 U602/41/73, 20 Jan. 1944, War Cabinet Conclusions (Extract) 
9 (44). The UK made a contribution of £80 million to UNRRA in January 1944.
89 Zorach Warhaftig, Relief and Rehabilitation (New York, 1944), p.34.
70 WJC Memorandum on Post War Relief and Rehabilitation of European Jewry, 
submitted to UNRRA, 11 November 1943, cited in Warhaftig, op.cit., pp. 16-19.
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Schonfeld's suggestion that Hertz represent Jewish interests through the 
agency of the British delegation was rejected on the grounds that HMG ‘cannot 
represent non-British interests' in UNRRA or anywhere else. Furthermore, 
HMG ‘cannot undertake to give more favourable treatment to British subjects 
who are Jews than to British subjects of other religious denominations. 
Despite appeals for Jewish representation made by various Jewish groups, 
particularly the WJC, the Council of UNRRA was reluctant to accept 
representation from private organisations, which it was feared would impede 
its work. The view which prevailed, as stated in November 1943, was that 
relief and rehabilitation were to be dealt with 'within each affiliated nation' 
individually, based on 'the relative needs of the population ... without 
discrimination because of race, creed or political belief. While UNRRA 
declined to allow Jewish observers into its committees, it did add that 'every 
effort will be made to utilise any additional assistance which could be provided 
by voluntary organisations to deal with special needs'.
Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad (JCRA)
Unlike the American JDC, which already had experience in relief and 
reconstruction (following World War I), Anglo-Jewry had to create an ad hoc
71 FO 371/36694 W124/124/48, 28 Dec. 1942, CRREC proposals; W416/124/48, 
30 Dec. 1942, Brodetsky, meeting with Law; Acc 3121 B5/2/1, 15 April 1943, 
Brodetsky, interview with Governor Herbert H.Lehman, Director of UNRRA; FO 
371/35298 U5661/933/73, 10 Nov. 1943, G.Pinsent, Relief Department, Foreign 
Office, to Schonfeld; 12 Nov. 1943, Schonfeld to Pinsent.
72 AJAC MS Coll.361, D4/13, 11 April 1944, WJC Relief Committee, Minutes, 
p.3; FO 371/40527 U1992/41/73, 6 March 1944, interview with Sir G.Rendel, 
Foreign Office; FO 371/40533 U2420/202/73, 17 March 1944, Goodman to 
Rendel; FO 371/41129 UR 49/15/850, 26 June 1944, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, 
Chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements Bureau, to 
E.L.Hall-Patch, Relief Department, Foreign Office.
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organisation. Prior to the establishment of UNRRA, the JFC proposed in the 
summer of 1942 the establishment of a central Anglo-American Jewish 
Advisory Body to advise the Allied Control Commission on problems affecting 
Jews on the Continent.^s However, Law felt that this might ‘derogate from the 
authority of the Governments of the Allied Nations’ and J.H.Gorvin, of the 
Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau, warned that it might indicate ‘some sort 
of super-national endeavour’ which would assume undue power in each 
country. The Board explained that the proposed organisation would be an 
entirely non-political relief organisation.^^
Following the decisive Allied successes in North Africa and at Stalingrad (late 
1942-early 1943) and the prospect of victory, the voluntary organisations 
accelerated their preparations. At the end of 1942 the Board formed an 
Emergency Committee for European Post-War Relief and in January 
convened a conference. Brodetsky’s renewed attempt to secure Jewish 
participation in general relief work was unsuccessful. Law advised that 
although the organisations were free to set up these bodies, relief and 
reconstruction was ‘in each country the responsibility of the particular 
government.’75
There was no official objection to the Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad 
(JCRA), which was established in January 1943. Under the chairmanship of 
Dr.Redcliffe Salaman, this body was formed purely to arrange practical relief
73 Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 1 Oct. 1942, interview with Law; C l 1/64/2, 18 Dec. 
1942, Brodetsky to Law; 18 Dec. 1942, Brodetsky to Wise; CBFRR, 28 May 
1945, Minutes, p.5.
74 Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 1 Oct. 1942, interview with Law; B5/2/2/3, 10 Dec. 
1942, Brotman to Brodetsky; CZA A255/491, 1 Jan. 1943, Brotman to I.Sowerby, 
Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau.
75 FO 371/36694 W416/124/48, 30 Dec. 1942, Notes for Law’s meeting with 
Brodetsky; Acc 3121 C11/7/3a/2, 28 Jan. 1943, Brodetsky, interview with Law.
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and rehabilitation, and was not concerned with political or legal issues such as 
the future status of Jews, or emigration and resettlement/^ its main activity 
was to recruit, train and equip teams of volunteer workers to care for Jewish 
survivors of the Holocaust. The JCRA was financed by the CBF, which since 
1940 had restricted its work to refugees in Britain, and now, with liberation 
imminent, extended its activities abroad, changing its name to the Central 
British Fund for Jewish Relief and Rehabilitation (CBFRR). In August 1943, the 
JCRA was officially accepted as a member of COBSRA. All voluntary bodies 
were required to work within the regulations formulated by COBSRA, which in 
turn worked under the direction of the Relief Department of the Foreign Office, 
itself largely bound by the requirements of the military authorities.77
A number of factors therefore limited efforts for Jewish relief. As a member of 
COBSRA, the JCRA, though primarily concerned with Jewish relief, was 
required to take part in general relief work abroad. The Committee reluctantly 
accepted that its post-war relief plan must constitute a Jewish contribution to 
the general effort and that recruits must offer their services unconditionally and 
be prepared to work closely with UNRRA and the military authorities. The 
JCRA repeatedly stressed to the authorities the special character of Jewish 
relief and that its volunteers could make their best contribution in work for 
fellow Jews. 78
76 The Committee for Jews in Germany, established in 1945 by the Board, dealt 
with these issues. See Statements, one on post-war policy in general and the 
other on Palestine in particular, in The Jews in Europe -  their Martyrdom and 
their Future' (Board of Deputies, 1945). These issues are not addressed here.
77 FO 371/41285 UR 313/313/854, 19 Sept. 1944, informal interview with 
representatives of the JCRA and Board.
78 Acc 3121 B5/2/4, 21 Jan. 1943, Brotman to Brodetsky; CZA A255/491, 13 
June 1945, JCRA.
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This posed problems for some volunteers: ‘Much heart-burning was wasted on 
an attempt to define the aim of the Jewish Relief Units before they had started 
to relieve.’ Abraham Gaines, chairman of the Volunteers Committee, 
challenged Leonard Cohen’s claim that the object of the JCRA was general 
relief work, including Jews equally with everyone else, arguing that the 
Committee had been formed specifically to help Jews. Cohen, Vice-Chairman 
of the JCRA, however, considered that to take as a first aim the relief of 
Jewish suffering was ‘too narrow’ and insufficiently humanitarian. A 
consensual statement was finally agreed, accepting that the JCRA had been 
established by British Jews To bring help to their brothers whose spiritual and 
physical needs they are best qualified to understand, and to all in need.’ Q^
The Government confirmed that Jewish relief units would be welcomed in the 
liberated territories, provided they went as British units similar to those sent 
out by other Societies and not as part of an international Jewish organisation.’ 
The Jewish Committee accepted this, but queried the conditions governing 
eligibility to volunteer. In the pre-Armistice period, the Government stipulated 
that only individuals of British nationality could be enlisted, even though 
refugees from enemy territories could potentially provide valuable service. The 
latter were expected to join in the relief efforts of their respective governments. 
The JCRA, anticipating a relaxation of this rule, nevertheless included alien’ 
refugees, numbering well over half of its 400 volunteers, in its training 
schemes.80 The Foreign Office feared that Jewish officials appointed to both
79 CZA A255/491, 21 Feb. 1944 and 4 April 1944, JCRA Volunteer Committee 
Meeting; Bentwich, Thev Found Refuae. p. 136.
80 FO 371/35298 U933/933/73, 25 Feb. 1943, Gorvin to N.B.Ronald, Foreign 
Office: FO 371/36694 W5081/124/48, 25 March 1943, W.D.Hogarth to Gorvin; 
FO 371/40555 U5951/202/73, 4 July 1944, Enrolment of Foreign Doctors in 
COBSRA Teams; CZA C2/111, 4 Feb. 1943, Executive Committee, Immediate 
Relief in Europe; CZA A255/491, 8 Sept. 1944, JCRA to Harry Kassel, French 
North Africa; CBF, 10 May 1945, Minutes, p.3.
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UNRRA and Palestine Jewish units in Cairo would ‘turn out to be actively 
disposed towards Zionism, and therefore ‘will have to be got rid of’. Norman 
Bentwich, an ardent Zionist, was regarded as an unsuitable candidate for 
UNRRA because of his ‘political views’.®"*
Relief activities of the CRREC
Whilst the Government insisted that the relief of European Jewry was to be 
integrated with general relief, it did accept that some aspects of relief could 
only be undertaken by Jewish bodies. Whatever view was taken by the Anglo- 
Jewish community regarding priorities, help would certainly be needed in 
providing religious requisites to the Jewish communities of liberated Europe. 
This was undertaken by Schonfeld and Hertz, who formed a body in late 1942 
for Post-War Religious Reconstruction. This was incorporated into the JCRA, 
which felt that there should be one united Jewish body for all relief work, 
religious and secular. The amalgamation 'worked smoothly and satisfactorily', 
the JCRA acknowledging that it obviated the problem of competing appeals, 
and that the CRREC was well placed to deal with the specifically religious 
aspects of Jewish relief.®z
Schonfeld attempted to refute the argument that Jews must be treated 
exclusively as nationals of their country of origin, pointing out that they 'have 
been persecuted as a religious group no less than a racial entity, and their 
rehabilitation should take into account the religious factors as well as the social
81 FO 371/40537 U3586/41/73, 25 April 1944, telegram from Lord Moyne, Cairo, 
to Foreign Office; U3614/41/73 17 May 1944, Leith-Ross to Hall-Patch.
82 CBF Microfilm reel 23. file 123/47, 4 Feb. 1945, JCRA 1943-1944, Survey of 
Past and Suggestions for Future.
309
aspects'.83 The Government regarded his proposals, even though presented 
on a religious basis, as unacceptable. Sending Jewish Ministers with 
‘diplomatic privileges’ to the ghettos to form part of any military commission 
was rejected because ‘such a concession wouid provoke demands for similar 
favours from Christian bodies which also suffered’. The military authorities 
were not prepared to admit the participation of relief units organised on a 
specifically religious basis, but only on the basis of the minimum aid needed to 
prevent disease and unrest, without distinction of race or religion. Moreover, 
the Government was concerned that any individual relief effort might be 
construed as 'part of some international Jewish organisation' -  that is, a veiled 
attempt to bolster the Zionist cause.84
However,Schonfeld felt that account must be taken of the fact that a proportion 
of the surviving Jewish population regarded the strict observance of Jewish 
ritual food regulations as an essential tenet of their faith. Anticipating that it 
would eventually be allowed to transport kosher food, the CRREC first 
arranged to collect stores to supplement official relief arrangements and help 
the starved ghetto inhabitants swiftly’. Schonfeld issued an appeal suggesting 
that British Jews should save a portion of their kosher foodstuffs for the benefit 
of co-religionists. The Government had agreed in principle that aid by religious 
communities to their co-religionists in connection with relief stocks (insofar as 
these were obtainable under rationing restrictions) be allowed, but this was 
now regarded as excessive. The Foreign Office was concerned that the 
activities of British Jews should not ‘upset Allied national Governments.’ If they
83 FO 371/36694 W124/124/48, 28 Dec. 1942, CRREC, Immediate Problems 
and Proposals for Religious Reconstruction of Continental Jewry.
84 Ibid., 31 Dec. 1942, Caustin to Ronald; FO 371A35298 U5688/933/73,27 Jan. 
1944, Comments on CRREC Memorandum; FO 371/35298 U5019/933/73, 16 
Oct. 1943, Hall-Patch to G.Morgan, War Office.
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knew that ‘we were lending official support to a scheme to give food-stuffs to 
Jews over and above the rationing which will be received under Relief 
arrangements ..[it] might arouse the resentment of the population concerned 
against their Jewish compatriots.' It was best left for the CRREC to approach 
each of the Allied governments.®^
Further opposition to voluntary stockpiling of kosher foodstuffs came from Sir 
Robert Waley-Cohen, adviser to the Ministry of Food on the Jewish food 
question. Consequently, the Minister, Lord Woolton, disallowed the stockpiling 
of rationed foods because 'it would not be in the public interest that consumers 
reduce their consumption... it would undoubtedly have a bad effect on this 
nation's war effort'.®® The scheme was thus put on hold for several months. 
After lengthy discussion, the Ministry of Food, while withholding official 
support, agreed to the voluntary stockpiling of unrationed goods, which the 
CRREC confirmed would be bought for household consumption In the normal 
course and not specially purchased for the purpose of the appeal. It would lie 
with the governments of the countries concerned whether or not they included 
among their relief requirements articles of food peculiar to any particular 
religion. In spite of the delay, which deprived it of much of its initial support, the 
scheme began operating in September 1943, with the co-operation of the 
Board's Relief Committee. The community responded generously, with about 
100 collection centres receiving some 150,000 packages, which, when 
circumstances permitted the resumption of supplies to Europe, were sent 
abroad and to the liberated concentration camps.®^
85 FO 371/35298 U4259/933/73 13 Sept. 1943, R.Ashton, Minute.
86 Ibid., 1 Sept. 1943 G.H.C.Amos, Ministry of Food, to Sir Robert Waley-Cohen.
87 J.C., 6 Aug. 1943, p.5; MS 183 Schonfeld, 593/1, CRREC Report for period 
ending 1 November 1945, pp.2-3.
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The refusal in 1943 to allow the dispatch of kosher food to liberated Europe 
was eventually reversed when, in 1945, conditions in the liberated areas 
revealed an unprecedented scale of disease and starvation. The Ministry of 
Food consented in February 1945 to the dispatch of 20,000 tins of kosher food 
to France and Belgium for civilian relief, provided that it was sent through the 
proper channels and that no further food for the liberated areas was collected 
by either the JCRA or CRREC. All further dispatches were to be controlled by 
the Allied authorities and no dispatch of individual food parcels was allowed 
during the military period.®® This was doubtless why Schonfeld was able to 
obtain permission to implement his food relief and mobile synagogue 
schemes: the magnitude of the human catastrophe was such that in the 
confusion which reigned during the early stages of liberation, any help was 
welcomed, particularly if it contributed to controlling epidemics of disease.
Certainly, during the military period, owing to transport difficulties, it was quite 
impracticable to deliver certain types of food to specified individuals. However, 
Schonfeld’s Mobile-Ambulance Synagogues scheme provided Jewish religious 
and material relief. These mobile ambulances were to be used initially by 
chaplains on active service for the welfare of Jewish troops. However, 
Schonfeld made it clear that they were also to provide relief for Jews in the 
liberated territories, functioning both as synagogues fully equipped with 
religious requisites including kosher food and as mobile first-aid clinics. 
Schonfeld persuaded the authorities to grant licenses for these vehicles, 
raised the necessary funds from the community and travelled under the 
protection of officially recognised agencies. Under the auspices of the War 
Office, special relief teams of around ten social workers, together with a doctor
88 FO 371/35298 U5019/933/73, 11 Oct. 1943, Morgan to Huxley, Relief 
Department; FO 371/49103 Z2135/103/17, 21 Feb. 1945, Camps, Minute; FO 
371/51355 UR 524/47/850, 9 Feb. 1945, Ministry of Food, Memorandum.
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and nurse, consisting entirely of British and Allied nationals, accompanied the 
mobile synagogues. The first went abroad in November 1944; by 1945 there 
were 13 such vehicles, with a projected total of 50. Some 25 Ministers 
volunteered for service abroad and registered with the CRREC. The Council 
arranged the mission of four civilian ministers of religion to the liberated 
concentration camps, to facilitate the mental rehabilitation of Jewish 
sufferers.®®
The authorities had made it clear that organisations able to provide their own 
transport would be more welcomed abroad than those without.®® Here again, 
one sees how effectively Schonfeld was able to conduct relief activities within 
the framework of existing regulations, while operating in a somewhat cavalier 
manner within these parameters. The Mobile Synagogues were able to 'sail' 
under the protection of officially recognised agencies. Its officers established 
personal contact with authorities in local command, both military and civilian. 
‘Schonfeld went to Europe in British military uniform, as an army chaplain 
...People were not too sure about his rank, but he acted as if he were Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff. He gave orders right and left, set up soup kitchens, 
synagogues and study rooms and commandeered whole transport fleets'.®i
Schonfeld was also able to undertake this work because the Government, and 
more specifically the Treasury, had come to accept that religious 
reconstruction was a desirable post-war aim not encompassed by official
89 FO 371/41285 UR 607/313/854, 1 Aug. 1944, Schonfeld to War Office; MS 
183 Schonfeld, 593/1, Report for period ending November 1945, p.5; AI WO F-21, 
Rosenheim Correspondence, CRREC, Dec. 1943; 25 May 1945, Schonfeld to 
W.J.Worth, War Office.
CZA A255/491, 1 Dec. 1944, Notes of the work of the JCRA.
91 Chaim Bermant, 'One of God's Cossacks’, J.C., 19 Feb. 1982, p.22; 
Schonfeld, Message to Jewry, p. 154.
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bodies. He emphasised that his chief concern was the religious side of post­
war relief, and that Jewish religious issues were not confined to questions of 
religious worship but impinged on a number of wider areas: The Synagogue is 
the centre of Jewish communal life, and around it are formed welfare and 
information centres, as well as educational establishments'. Schonfeld's roving 
synagogues later provided a focus for communities attempting to regroup
themselves.92
In the first year of the JCRA, when its principle task was to prepare volunteers 
for work abroad, expenditure was moderate, mainly confined to training and 
maintenance: once liberation began, heavy demands were made for supplies 
of food, clothing, prayer books and ritual articles. Brodetsky recognised that 
most of the relief work would depend on Jewish charity, adding 'our work 
ought to be mainly of a permanent constructive character rather than a 
continual pouring of relief with no ultimate end'.^a Both Treasury restrictions 
and lack of funds constrained the efforts of the organisations. Funds as such 
could not be sent abroad and efforts were restricted to the reconstruction of 
communal institutions, synagogues and the establishment of children’s homes 
as distinct from pure short-term relief. ^ 4
Treasurv Policy
The JCRA had hitherto made no public appeal for funds, and expenditure for 
administration and training, which had been kept at a very low figure, had been 
met by a few individual contributions. The CBFRR was one among some 35
92 FO 371/36694 W6194/124/48. 13 April 1943. Schonfeld to Leith-Ross: 
Schonfeld, op.cit., p. 154.
CZA C2/782, 15 Dec. 1944, Brodetsky to Anthony de Rothschild.
94 CBFRR, 14 Aug. 1945, Minutes, p.1.
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voluntary organisations now attempting to launch appeals and to obtain 
permission to remit funds abroad for the relief of those in distress following the 
liberation. Yet COBSRA had ruled that none of the voluntary organisations 
should make public appeals until it decided that it was opportune to do so.
As these funds would be used outside the sterling area, and thus be subject to 
exchange control, the Treasury had to draw up some formula which would 
serve as a guideline for their use. Law announced in February 1945 that 
monies collected in Britain could not be ordinarily transferred abroad and in 
most cases would have to be spent on the purchase of goods in Britain. This, 
in turn, would interfere with the official programme of supplies through UNRRA 
and other governmental organisations, as well as create transport difficulties. 
Instead, the organisations were to place their funds at the disposal of the Allied 
Governments or of UNRRA, to be utilised on their behalf. The Treasury would 
allow remittances for the support of relatives and dependants abroad and for 
the reconstruction of religious life in Europe. But relief as such was prohibited. 
The authorities were aware that this might be hard to justify, as restoration of 
Jewish religious life was scarcely separable from the physical relief of Jews. 
However, officials argued that 'we cannot allow remittances unless we receive 
some "value" in return. The value may be spiritual, cultural or political, but we 
cannot be satisfied with the mere satisfaction of a charitable impulse'. It was 
not explained how the distinction was to be defined. Nevertheless, religious 
reconstruction was encouraged, as being likely to diminish ‘the danger of 
disintegration in Europe'. The emphasis was on ‘spiritual, not material 
goods.'95 It was by exploiting the vagueness of this semantic quibble that
95 FO 371/51355 UR 993/47/850, 28 March 1945. Brooks (Treasury) to Hall- 
Patch.
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Schonfeld was able to enlist official support for his activities abroad during this 
period.
In view of the Treasury’s stipulations, the CBFRR now had reservations 
whether to launch the proposed appeal for £1 million. It had made no new 
appeals to the Jewish community for funds for European Jewry after 1940, 
since when the greater part of its expenditure on refugees in Britain was borne 
by annual grants from the Treasury. The launching of the new appeal was 
postponed until 1945, when the Jewish Agency's United Palestine Appeal was 
completed and because of the difficulty in obtaining a Treasury ruling on the 
transfer of funds abroad.
The committee confirmed that it did not propose to use any of the money for 
relief, in the ordinary sense of the word, namely for supplies to the Continent, 
but that the money was intended for the equipment and maintenance of the 
two Jewish voluntary teams working under COBSRA, and for the rehabilitation 
of Jewish communities, in work such as the rebuilding of synagogues and the 
establishment of children’s homes. Although Rothschild and Reading 
appreciated the exchange difficulties, suggesting that currency arrangements 
be made with the JDC, they hoped the Treasury would allow British Jews to 
make some contribution to the rehabilitation of their co-religionists on the 
Continent, particularly as this was something which could not be undertaken 
by UNRRA since it involved discrimination and was not likely to be undertaken 
by the governments.
While the Foreign Office was sympathetic to some of these ideas, the CBF 
was advised not to launch its appeal until Treasury regulations had been
96 Ibid., UR 632/47/850, 22 Feb. 1945, Reading to Law.
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finalised. Rothschild accordingly advised the CBF to wait. However, Brodetsky 
and others felt that it was important to have the money available. ^ 7 After long 
delays in obtaining a ruling regarding the transfer of money, the One Million 
Pound Appeal for the assistance of Continental Jewry was finally launched. 
But the response of the Anglo-Jewish community was disappointing. By the 
end of 1945, the Appeal had produced only half the hoped-for amount.98
Several causes contributed to this inadequate response. Certainly the 
diminution of income as a result of heavy wartime taxation and the loss of 
earnings of men on military service meant that there was less disposable 
income available for charitable purposes generally. In addition to the material 
damage inflicted on Jewish institutions in Britain during the air raids, there 
were the enormous costs of evacuation and the maintenance of widely 
scattered Jewish communities. This dispersion resulted in an inevitable 
loosening of the cultural and religious ties which had formerly bound the 
Jewish community and encouraged Jewish charitable activity.9® Perhaps a 
certain degree of compassion fatigue had set in; survivors were less dramatic 
than imperilled victims. Apologies had been offered by those financially hit by 
the war, but there was also concern that the appeal might relieve the various 
governments of their responsibility and that charitable donations were no 
longer tax-deductible. Competing appeals were a further drain, especially 
following the Zionist Conference. 19° Zionist fund-raising had increased during 
the war, and the United Palestine Appeal fixed its goal at one million pounds
97 CBFRR, 13 March 1945, Emergency Committee Meeting.
98 CBFRR, Annual Report, 1943-1944, p.8 and 1945, p.5.
99 Albert M.Hyamson, 'British Jewry in Wartime’, Contemporarv Jewish Record. 
vol.VI, no.1, (February 1943), pp. 14-22.
100 CBF, Microfilm Reel 21, File 111, Leonard G. Monteflore, Fund Raising 
Appeal; CBFRR, 22 Aug. 1945, Minutes, p.3.
317
for both 1944 and 1945J°i By contrast, on his return from the Continent in 
June 1945, Leonard Cohen reported that in terms of religious reconstruction, 
with only 10-20 percent of Europe's Jewish population left, there was tragically 
less need and impetus to rebuild all the synagogues which had existed before 
the war. 102
These factors may explain the striking contrast between the pre-war period 
(when Anglo-Jewry raised £3 million) and the poor response in 1945. 
Frustration at the difficulty in raising funds led to the resignation of Colonel 
Fred Samuel, senior Treasurer of the CBF since its inception in 1933. He 
noted that fund-raising was very much harder than it had been before the war 
and was deeply disappointed by the Jewish public's poor response.
Frustration and Delay
Jewish volunteers were unable to participate in relief work for over a year after 
the establishment of the JCRA. After many delays, in February 1944 the JCRA 
sent two relief teams to Cairo, where they waited to be transferred to the 
Balkans and Italy. The delay in sending more workers to the Continent in 1945
"101 AJYB, vol.42, 5701 (1941-1942), p. 132. The sluggish response of Anglo- 
Jewry to its own Essential Services Appeal during the evacuation period in 1941 
was noted: 'The fact that an appeal issued contemporaneously by the Jewish 
National Fund (1941) raised no less than £64,950 within three months suggests, 
perhaps, that Jewish interests shifted ... and that the prospect of securing a 
permanent future for oppressed Jewries in Palestine attracted greater support 
than the temporary alleviation of a local plight'; AJYB, vol.47, 5705 (1945-1946), 
p.350.
102 CBFRR, 13 March 1945, Emergency Committee Meeting, Minutes; 4 June 
1945, Report by Leonard Cohen.
103 CBFRR, 8 Oct. 1945, Minutes, pp.2-3; 13 Nov. 1945, Minutes. The Treasury 
did, however, agree to grant £ for £ to the voluntary bodies for relief and 
rehabilitation in Europe and the JCRA was consequently able to recover half its 
principle expenditure. CBFRR, Annual Report, 1945, p.6.
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was largely due to official ‘red tape’. No relief worker could leave Britain 
during, and for some time after, the war without the consent of the Foreign 
Office. Furthermore, Treasury permission had to be obtained to transmit 
money to support them, so that however keen the volunteers were, there were 
many hurdles to overcome before help could reach those in need, especially 
since the war was not yet over.
Writing in 1945, Bentwich pointed out that the enterprise of organising relief 
and rehabilitation was more complicated than had been foreseen. The JCRA 
could send teams abroad only under the auspices of UNRRA, as all voluntary 
efforts had to be co-ordinated by a single authority. The hopes of the big 
international teams had been frustrated and the Jewish bodies associated with 
UNRRA shared this frustration. ‘UNRRA had to contend with a certain amount 
of jealousy on the part of the military, which had its own relief organisation.’ 
The military objected to independent activity by what it regarded as sectional 
bodies and no relief worker could be dispatched unless specifically asked for 
by the military. The problem lay in persuading some states liberated from Nazi 
control to accept expert officers and relief teams. 'Some of them looked 
askance at the outsiders -  "relief busybodies" -  bringing help.' Leonard 
Cohen, the first Director of the teams in the field, made frequent journeys to 
the Continent to negotiate with officials, military and civil, about opportunities 
for service. Not until April 1945 were Jewish teams able to go to Belgium and 
Holland. They were held off in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania and 
experienced great difficulties in Greece, where civil strife raged. Only in Italy 
were they able to work with relative freedom. The Jewish teams were ‘a very
104 FO 371/40555 U5726/202/73, 9 June 1944, K.J.Gabbett, Relief Department, 
Foreign Office; Interview Henry Lunzer, a member of the JRU, June 1994, 
London; AR 3344.558, 19 Oct. 1944, Recent Developments in the Work of the 
JCRA.
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tiny cog In a very big machine’. While the committees working for relief had to 
help all sufferers, without restricting efforts to persons of their own religion or 
nationality, there were opportunities to help fellow Jews. For example, Morris 
Feinman, the first Jewish volunteer to go abroad, went to the UNRRA refugee 
centre at Casablanca, where he acted as welfare officer for hundreds of 
Jewish refugees from southern Europe. He died there in August 1944.i°5
The JCRA recognised that relief in eastern and central Europe depended on 
Russian co-operation. Brodetsky and members of the JRCA inquired 
informally whether the Soviet authorities would accept Jewish volunteers in 
liberated areas of eastern Europe under their military control. The Soviets 
were apparently not ’disposed’ to do so and the Jewish relief teams were 
advised to approach them directly, after the September 1944 meeting of the 
Montreal Conference of UNRRA.^o® However, by the end of 1944, nothing had 
been arranged. Brodetsky admitted that 'All one could do was to supply the 
Soviets with materials for relief purposes, and they do the rest... [like] a funnel 
into which one pours everything one has'.i®^
Once some of the difficulties had been surmounted, the JCRA was able to 
send several hundred relief workers to the Continent and provide food, 
clothing (a joint Relief Clothing Committee was formed in December 1944) and 
other supplies. Even after the German surrender, there were many delays in 
bringing help and relief to the camps and liberated territories everywhere. After
105 QZA A255/491 19 March 1945, N.Bentwich, ‘Jewish Relief Units’; 30 Oct. 
1944, Leonard Cohen, ‘Note on Jewish Relief and Rehabilitation’. See also 
Bentwich, Thev Found Refuae. p. 134; Isaac Levy, Witness to Evil: Bergen 
Belsen 1945 (London, 1995), pp.27-8.
106 FO 371/41285 UR 313/313/854, 12 Sept. 1944, interview at the Foreign 
Office.
107 CZA C 2/782,15 Dec. 1944, Brodetsky to Anthony de Rothschild.
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years of helpless inactivity, the voluntary organisations were now faced with a 
situation of unprecedented difficulty, for which they had no previous training or 
practical experience.
The wartime documents relating to the planning of immediate post-war relief 
and reconstruction show a remarkable lack of realisation of what was to 
confront the relief units entering liberated Europe and especially the 
concentration camps. It is not surprising that so much effort was dedicated to 
the planned 'reconstruction' of Jewish religious and communal life, when it was 
assumed that Jewish life in Europe could be restored to its pre-war state. 
Salaman still felt as late as February 1945, that 'our policy must aim at 
assisting in the reconstruction of living, self-controlled [sic] Jewries ... our task 
must be to encourage local self-help, examine local schemes of communal 
development... [in order to] set going once again the machinery of a healthy 
community working under its own p o w e r ' . o^s whatever knowledge they may 
have had of the Final Solution, nothing could prepare the relief teams for the 
full horrors that they actually found, or for the scale of the unprecedented 
disaster they were called on to face.
108 CBF Microfilm reei 23, file 123/47,4 Feb. 1945, JCRA 1943-1944, Survey of 
Past and Suggestions for Future.
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Conclusion : Lack of Will or Lack of Skill?
The Record of English Jewry... is again one of effort rather than achievement, 
of activity rather than accomplishment'. i
Soon after the Anschluss, chafing with helpless frustration at the growing 
German menace. Neville Laski observed 'how difficult the situation was for the 
British Government and [how] much more difficult it must be for the Board 
which had none of the resources of a government at its disposal.'2  What was 
true in 1938 was even more true during the war.3 Yet critics have repeatedly 
attacked Anglo-Jewry for 'doing' little to save the doomed Jews of Europe. 
What, in practice, they mean by 'doing' is not clear. In effect, Anglo-Jewry was 
able to 'do' nothing but use negotiation and persuasion to convince the 
authorities to change its restrictive policy or to take action the leadership itself 
could not take.
There is enough evidence to support the view that the Anglo-Jewish 
leadership pressed the Government unremittingly to act to save Jewish lives. 
Two factors rendered their efforts almost wholly futile: their own lack of the 
necessary diplomatic and negotiating skills and, more importantly, the 
Government's refusal to divert resources from the primary endeavour of 
achieving the speediest possible victory. The most disastrous periods in the 
European Jewish tragedy coincided with the greatest pressure on the British 
and Allied Governments, so that the persistent importunity of the Jewish 
organisations occurred at times when it was least likely to meet with a positive
1 Shabtai Rowson, cited in AJYB 5704 (1944-45), vol.46, p. 187.
2 Acc 3121 A/29, 21 March 1938, Board Minutes.
3 See pp. 162-63.
322
response. This is particularly evident in the winter of 1942 when the news of 
the Final Solution was confirmed and the North African military operation had 
begun and in the summer of 1944 at the time of the Hungarian deportations 
and the Second Front and the D-Day landings. The annihilation of European 
Jewry was a central German war aim; preventing it was not an Allied war aim. 
Anglo-Jewish efforts were a hindrance -  an irritant to Government officials. 
For this reason, the leadership's lack of political expertise was secondary to 
the near-insurmountable nature of the task.
The record for the pre-war years is markedly different. Owing to the financial 
guarantee of 1933, Anglo-Jewry had an important and productive role to play 
in assisting the admission and maintenance of refugees from Central Europe. 
The unimpressive wartime record has somewhat overshadowed the pre-war 
achievement. Indeed, the Anglo-Jewish leadership of the 1940s is currently in
danger of being turned into a symbolic scapegoat. Instead of focusing on the
obstacles facing it, recent historians have demonized a 'diffident and insecure'
leadership which put its own selfish interests ahead of its moral responsibilities
to European Jewry. Such generalisations about a putative group outlook
obscures important individual differences. While many were confident and 
secure in their Anglo-Jewish identity, there was a deficiency in the calibre of
the Anglo-Jewish leadership during the war; it could boast no inspired,
imaginative or charismatic figures.
Anthony de Rothschild, Leonard Montefiore, Waley-Cohen, Laski et a i were 
hardly timid or insecure. It might even be argued that the leadership's failings 
were exacerbated by a false confidence in its status within what can loosely be 
described as the British establishment (Anthony de Rothschild had been head 
boy at Harrow, and many Anglo-Jewish leaders of the period were public-
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school educated). A good publlc-school background during this period 
certainly provided an entree to society and the professions but was no 
guaranteed passport to the inner circles of government and politics.
Brodetsky's predecessor as President, Neville Laski, K.C., was by training 
commercial and practical. He was strongly aware of the powerlessness of the 
Anglo-Jewish community. When asked, 'what can we have done to stay the 
march of events' [sic], he admitted that he did not know. 'But we have not the 
international political influence or the boundless riches which our enemies so 
sedulously fasten upon us. We have no armed forces... Be it remembered that 
the Powers, great and small, have not been able to stay the forces of evil 
which now have involved the world'.4 Laski possessed the worldly wisdom of a 
lawyer, while experience, 'tempered by the caution of the lawyer', convinced 
him that ideological purity manifesting itself in 'a more activist policy' was liable 
to do more harm than good. 'We do not loom as large in the eyes of 
governments as in our own eyes.'s Because of this powerlessness, it was 
essential to handle negotiations with 'our friends' exceptionally carefully. This 
is not synonymous with kow-towing to the authorities.
Otto Schiff, a merchant banker, was always conscious of the financial 
imperative of balancing the books. He felt strongly that his own reputation, 
together with that of the community he served, was at stake. He gave 
everything to the refugee cause, working day and night at the expense of his 
own stockbroking business and always maintaining the ethos of the City -  'my 
word is my bond'. He would not betray the trust that the Government had 
vested in him, and consequently he earned the respect of the authorities. This
4 Neville Laski, December 1939, Retirement Speech, p.2.
5 Ibid, p.8.
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does not make him a traitor to the Jewish cause, as has been insinuated.e He 
was one of the more effective leaders of the Jewish community because he 
was able to serve it with the administrative skills he had acquired over the 
years, especially through his dealings with Belgian refugees after World War I. 
His was a thankless task -  he took the brunt of criticism for all the procedural 
weaknesses of refugee admissions in the pre-war years, both at the time and 
later. The task itself was both unglamorous and difficult, requiring excellent 
administrative skills, which Schiff possessed in abundance.
Brodetsky, wartime President of the Board and therefore the most prominent 
individual leader, took on the presidency soley out of pique that his nomination 
had been opposed by Laski and Anthony de Rothschild.7 In Brodetsky's 
defence, Israel FInestein claims that 'The Board was an unruly assembly in a 
turbulent period. It was an unaccustomed role for him.'a To blame the Board 
for Brodetsky's own failure to control it and to blame this in turn on 
inexperience is merely to excuse his inadequacies and to emphasise that 
Brodetsky was not up to the job. This does not in any way detract from his 
moral integrity and commitment. Granted that the presidency of the Board was 
a much more demanding role during wartime, the fact remains that Brodetsky 
assumed the position voluntarily.
Brodetsky held the chair of Applied Mathematics at Leeds University and was 
well known for his work in the field of aerodynamics. A dedicated Zionist, he 
was impractical and idealistic but obliged to deal in the political game of 
compromise in the midst of a world war. Brodetsky was especially unqualified
6 Alderman, Modern British Jewrv. p.278.
7 Brodetsky. Memoirs, p. 195.
8 Israel FInestein, 'Selig Brodetsky 1888-1954: The Prodigy from Fashion Street', 
Aubrey Newman, ed.. The Jewish East End 1840-1939 fJHS. 1981), p. 107.
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for his task. The fact that he was a mathematician, rather than a politician or 
strategist, had a lot to do with his failure to grasp the shifting realities of the 
wartime situation. An abstract théoriser, he was said 'to be the only man in 
Britain who understood Einstein's theory.'9 This seems unlikely; in any case, 
what mattered for Anglo-Jewry was that he did not understand the arts of shift 
and stratagem. To some extent, his failings were those of an academic who 
had been thrust into a political role, yet Weizmann, an organic chemist at 
Manchester University, was better able to negotiate and compromise where 
necessary, and, from the Government's point of view, was an altogether more 
formidable intellect. 10
Brodetsky's memoirs suggest that he failed at times to grasp unspoken ironies 
or innuendoes; he tended to adopt an over-literal approach to the language of 
diplomacy rather than decoding it. A revealing example illustrates this: 
'Brotman and I saw Law ... and suggested the possibility of an approach to the 
German Government to allow Jews to leave. Law said that was possible only if 
the War were stopped for a period'. Brodetsky's account of this exchange 
reveals that he completely failed to comprehend the sarcasm of Law's remark; 
on the contrary, he proceeded to make an even more foolishly sweeping 
suggestion, 'that if the Germans let all [my emphasis] the Jews go into 
neighbouring countries it would create a big problem, but it would not be 
insuperable. '11 It is only too easy to imagine what Law must have thought of 
this idea.
9 Acc 3121 B5/2/7/2, cites the Birmingham Mail. 8 June 1944. 
^0 See p.224.
11 Brodetsky, Memoirs, p.223.
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Ultimately. Brodetsky was unable to mount and carry through a rigorous 
argument: his tendency to petty assertiveness, on the one hand, was coupled 
with a lack of political ruthlessness on the other: 'It was easier for him to give a 
qualified yes than an outright no, to pressure groups or individual 
representations... He had neither the ruthlessness of a politician nor any talent 
or inclination for political in-fighting. He was an idealist and an optimist. '12 In 
short, he was poorly equipped to take on the wartime government.
Solomon Schonfeld was able to utilise the status of son-in-law to Chief Rabbi 
Hertz to give the stamp of authority to his own sometimes unorthodox 
proceedings. Bentwich admiringly described him as 'indeed Machiavellian ... I 
soon realised that I was no match for him and that I could not follow the twists 
and turns of his agile if erratic mind.'13 Schonfeld has been described as 'a 
loner who cut corners and had no patience with official communal bodies... He 
did it his way -  and succeeded remarkably. If you count the descendants of 
the people he saved, tens of thousands owe him their lives'.#
While Schonfeld’s methods unquestionably displayed a degree of ingenuity not 
evident in the pedestrian manoeuvres of Anglo-Jewry's leaders -  such as his 
purchase of Stranger's Key, an island in the Bahamas, to provide protective 
papers for refugeesis -  he was no more able to influence Government policy,
Finestein, 'Selig Brodetsky 1888-1954', op.cit., p. 104.
12 CZA A255/491, JORA and GRREC, hand-written note by N.Bentwich (n.d. 
probably 1943-44).
14 J.C., 26 April 1996, p.27; interview. Lord Jakobovits, January 1994; Chaim 
Bermant, Lord Jakobovits. The Authorized Bioaraphv of the Chief Rabbi 
(London, 1990), p. 19: ‘If I am alive today, it is entirely due to the efforts of that 
man [Schonfeld] and the same can be said for countless others’. See Ms 183 
Schonfeld 593/1, CRREC 1938-1948, p.1. According to this report, from 1938 
until the outbreak of war. Schonfeld rescued 1,300 individuals.
15 Conversation with Jonathan Schonfeld, April 1994.
16 See pp.260-70.
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and succeeded only in devising creative rescue schemes which worked 
acceptably within governmental limits. The Mauritius visas scheme is a case in 
point. 16 Critics of the 'timid' Anglo-Jewish leadership, who point approvingly to 
Schonfeld's 'peremptory' dealings with the authorities, have not looked closely 
at the record, which shows him to have been shamelessly sycophantic in the 
pursuit of his ends.
Chief Rabbi Hertz's position, more than anyone else's, remained unchanged 
on the outbreak of war. As the spiritual leader of Anglo-Jewry, whose 
commitment to Jewish values presented no problem of divided loyalty, he was 
entitled to press the humanitarian case for refugee rescue and relief for its own 
sake, and did so vigorously and unstintingly.17 His wholehearted support for 
Zionism was matched by a genuine 'loyalty to Britain and ... belief in British 
ideals', 18 a loyalty which had signally manifested itself in his defence of the 
British cause in the Boer War before he came to England as Chief Rabbi. This 
loyalty, the product of his faith in the British values of toleration and liberalism, 
was undoubtedly more sincere than the 'loyalty' of his son-in-law, but like 
Schonfeld, and for similar reasons. Hertz was committed to the preservation of 
Judaism and Jewish scholarship. A distinguished Biblical scholar himself, it 
was inevitable that he should be personally drawn to the rescue of religious 
scholars and officials -  the two functions, in practice, being often synonymous 
-  without detriment to his commitment to endangered Jews everywhere. Hertz 
was able to speak out forcefully on behalf of European Jewry without losing 
the respect of the Government. 19 He was an uncompromising representative
See, for example, pp.245-46.
"•8 Isidore Epstein, ed., Joseph Herman Hertz. 1872-1946. In Memoriam 
(London, 1947), p.31.
19 See p. 241.
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of the religious cause, of whom it was said 'that Dr. Hertz was always prepared 
to adopt pacific means when all other means had failedl'2o Despite this, he 
passionately deprecated anything that savoured of communal disunity, which 
had proved 'so calamitous at the Evian Conference and must be eliminated at 
all costs'. 21
Harry Goodman, political secretary of the Agudah, was venerated within his 
own community for his 'selfless vigour', 'outstanding statesmanship' and 
passionate commitment to the orthodox religious cause.22 His energy and zeal 
were undoubted assets in his wartime work, which included his role as 
publisher and editor of the Jewish Weekly and his weekly broadcasts to Jews 
in occupied Europe via the BBC on behalf of the Ministry of Information, 
providing them with encouragement and faith. Yet even his admirers provide 
inadvertent clues to his weakness as a leader: 'When speaking in public, he 
was never on his feet but always balanced himself on his toes, raising his 
voice to the highest pitch, holding a bundle of documents in one hand and 
waving his other at a spell-bound audience.' This style of oratory is indicative 
of his belligerent tactics, while the expressions 'stormy petrel' and 'enfant 
terrible'23 further hint at his inability to compromise. Goodman's obstinacy, 
which should have been an asset, led him to refuse to give up strategies which 
were ill-conceived from the start. Thus he wasted a great deal of energy on the 
fruitless quest for Irish visas, while Rathbone, more judicious in her choice of
20 Epstein, op.cit., p. 12.
21 See pp.52,172; Acc 3121 C11/7/1/6, 31 May 1943, Hertz address. Reception 
for prominent Jewish personalities of Allied Countries at the Dorchester Hotel.
22 j ,c . , October 1961, cited in Mss VG files.
23 Jewish Tribune, 30 October 1981, cited in Mss VG files.
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target, successfully obtained visas for Mexico and other Latin-American 
states.24
The WJC has also been singled out for special commendation on account of 
its forthright approach to relief and rescue. Certainly its stance was more 
dynamic than that of the Board, while its efforts were equally unremitting. The 
British Section was served by a team of devoted and talented leaders. Alex 
Easterman, a journalist, who gave up his career to become Chief Political 
Officer, was trained and skilled in the art of rhetoric. Dr. Noah Barou 'was a 
voluble Russian Jew who drove us to get things done. "Think hard" was his 
motto'. Sir Sidney Silverman has been described as 'a somewhat naive man 
but a born fighter who intuitively seems to have understood that European 
Jewry was facing a disaster unparalleled in history and that one had to react 
quickly.'25 Equally dedicated were Lord Melchett and his sister Lady Reading, 
who observed, 'We were a diverse crew, speaking different languages, but we 
managed to get on together' . 26 The British Section, however, 'would have 
been the first to admit that they were not equipped to cope with events of such 
enormity which, of course no one could have foreseen.'27
A number of individuals also worked tirelessly for the refugee cause, Eleanor 
Rathbone acted as an inspiration to others and kept the momentum going 
within Parliament. For Rathbone, Eden's announcement in December 1942 
was 'a challenge to redouble her own efforts and to combine with others so 
that nothing should be left undone which might rescue at least some of the
24seep.227.
25 Walter Laqueur, 'Jewish Denial and the Holocaust', Commentary, vol.68 (July- 
December 1979), p.45.
26 Eva Reading, For the Record: The Memoirs of Eva. Marchioness of Reading 
(London, 1973), p. 176.
27 Laqueur, op.cit., p.45.
330
many who were threatened by Nazi T e r ro r ’. 28 Yet, on her own admission, 
Rathbone and her colleagues found it impossible to impress upon the 
Government either the moral necessity or the logistical possibility of rescue. 
Critics of the ’feeble’ and ’inactive' Anglo-Jewish effort might do well to ponder 
the implications of Rathbone’s self-confessed defeat, especially in view of her 
confrontational style, which proved equally ineffective in moving the 
Government.
Lack of Will?
Anglo-Jewry's wartime leadership has been accused of a variety of sins, 
including selfishness, insecurity, jealousy, pettiness and pusillanimity. There is 
an increasing danger, evident in the writings of the revisionist historians, of 
judging the leadership by its putative motives rather than by what it actually 
did. Brodetsky stated unequivocally that 'my main concern at that time was to 
do something to save Jews from the Nazi hell.'29 There is no reason to believe 
that this remark, given the time and zeal he threw into the cause, was 
insincere. The hostile criticism of a supposedly passive and insecure 
leadership does not stand up to scrutiny in the light of a documentary record of 
relentless endeavour. Anglo-Jewry’s leaders may well have suffered from 
inflated self-importance; accusations of 'Kbved'(honour)-hunting were possibly 
grounded in truth,20 but it is hard to accept that these people would have given 
up so much time and energy simply for an ego-boost at the expense of their 
careers.
28 Acc 3121 E3/536/2, 29 March 1946, National Committee, circular letter, 
no.VIII.
29 Brodetsky, Memoirs, p.221.
80 See p.51.
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If the leadership was motivated even in part by egotism, it must certainly have 
suffered miserably. Its repeated attempts to placate an irate Anglo-Jewish 
community can hardly have nourished its self-esteem. Laski, Brodetsky and 
Brotman frequently referred to their wish to be seen to be doing something. 
This was not vanity. In January 1943, for example, Brodetsky and Brotman 
complained to Law of 'having great difficulty in holding their co-religionists at 
bay", 31 phrasing which smacks more of hunted animals than egomania or 
exhibitionism.
One explanation suggested for world Jewry's failure to do more to help 
European Jewry was lack of full knowledge of the horrors of the Holocaust. 
Certainly this can be inferred from some of the statements made both during 
and immediately after the war. Brodetsky claimed, somewhat defensively, that 
'We still did not realise the terrible extent of the annihilation of the Jewish 
populations of Europe carried out systematically and in cold blood by the Nazis 
till it all came out at the Nuremberg Trials ... The world was shocked by the 
revelation.'32 This statement could, of course, be taken literally; Jews and non- 
Jews alike experienced incredulity at the revelations of Auschwitz and other 
concentration camps. It may be added that the psychological difficulties of 
comprehending the unprecedented nature of the Final Solution were 
exacerbated by the fact that the truth was commingled with a vast amount of 
rumour, speculation and misinformation. In circumstances which made it 
almost impossible to sift truth from falsehood, scepticism and incredulity were 
perhaps the inevitable responses of the Anglo-Jewish leadership to the 
'information' emanating from Europe.
31 FO 371/36694 W416/124/48, 29 Jan. 1943, Law, Minutes; See pp. 162-63, 
185.
32 Brodetsky, Memoirs. p.218.
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Lack of Skill?
Evaluating the abilities of the Anglo-Jewish leadership is a more objective 
exercise and involves consideration of two kinds of skill -  administrative and 
political. On an administrative level, following years of philanthropic activity,
the Anglo-Jewish organisations drew on their considerable expertise and 
helped to rescue some 60,000 Jewish refugees before the war, guaranteeing 
their maintenance and re-emigration. While some of the criticisms levelled 
against them were valid, on balance they did a remarkable job. They raised £3 
million (approximately £90 million at today's valuers), an impressive sum for so 
small a community, especially at a time of economic recession.
Even for wartime, a good record of administration remains. Internment 
provides an unusually clear-cut example by which the efforts of the 
organisations can be evaluated. It was in facilitating humane treatment and 
conditions for internees that they were most effective. The extent to which the 
organisations were able to ameliorate conditions for Jews in occupied Europe 
was necessarily far more limited, primarily because of blockade regulations. 
Food-parcel schemes represented a desperate attempt to do something, 
notwithstanding their poor probability of success.
One major indictment, however, remains to this day, namely that so many 
children were lost to the Jewish community by being placed, when they arrived 
in 1938-39 and during the evacuation period, in non-Jewish foster homes 
where they were brought up in the faith of their guardians. One critic maintains
33 Bank of England: The £ in 1939 was equivalent to £27.19 at February 1997 
rates.
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that T h e  Jewish institutions withdrew those children whose relocation 
presented no particular problem, but did not hurry to exert pressure on those 
Christian families with whom the children had fully settled in ... There was 
likewise a disinclination to institute legal proceedings for fear of an anti-Semitic 
backlash.'34 This was an enormously complex issue, involving many conflicting 
considerations, which do not necessarily lend themselves to similar 
conclusions in each individual case. It also raises difficult questions about 
whether the preservation of a child's religious or Jewish identity was or should 
have been intrinsic to Jewish rescue and relief.
Politically, the Anglo-Jewish leadership was exceptionally weak during the war. 
In terms of diplomacy, evaluation of the community's efforts and skills depends 
largely on the extent to which it was possible to manipulate the levers of power 
in Britain to effect rescue and relief. Anglo-Jewry was never able to override
bureaucratic red tape and intransigence, as demonstrated by its failures in 
relation to Palestine and British immigration, shipping and relaxation of the 
blockade rules.
The Anglo-Jewish leadership saw only two extremes -  the 'policy of activism' 
(pressure politics) and conciliation or acquiescence. Communal leaders were 
unable to channel their real desperation in a productive way which might have 
led to shifts in attitude. Law's note on a 16 December 1942 meeting is 
revealing: 'the deputation expressed great appreciation of my alleged 
sympathetic attitude ... I was very much impressed by their anger against the 
Home Secretary.... It has always seemed to me that the apprehensions of the 
Home Office have been exaggerated and that it would be very difficult for us to
34 Zorach Warhaftig, Refugees and Survivors: Rescue Efforts during the 
Holocaust (Jerusalem, 1988), pp.324-25. interview, Warhaftig, July 1994: 'I have 
a bitter heart'.
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go on confining ourselves to denunciation of the German action while refusing 
to take any alleviating action ourselves. I did not give the deputation any idea 
that this was my view.'as The Jewish leadership was evidently showing all its 
cards while Law showed none of his. He read their minds with ease; the 
leadership, by contrast, assumed he meant exactly what he said. The concept 
of a 'hidden agenda' does not seem to have struck the stolidly literal-minded 
deputation. More importantly still. Law's comments suggest that he would have 
been receptive to persuasive argument. The battle was not necessarily over 
before it had begun.
Yet the negotiating style of the Anglo-Jewish leadership ensured that in 
practice it was. Close analysis of a typical document reveals the extent to 
which the leadership was out of its depth. This document, the record of a 
meeting between Brodetsky, Brotman and Law in January 1943, betrays a 
subtext of irritation and contempt beneath an apparently objective surface. 
Law noted:
'They then attacked me on the general question ... I spoke to them very 
strongly ... They said that of course the war must come first, but they kept 
harping back to mass movements running into tens of thousands, which 
showed clearly enough that they were not really impressed by the difficulties. I 
repeated that it was an international problem'.ss
One notes at once that instead of deploying the fine art of driving a diplomatic 
bargain, the parties are engaged in a polite war of words ('attacked ... very 
strongly'). Whereas bargaining involves a process of adjustment and 
compromise satisfactory to both parties, Brodetsky and Brotman came in with 
unrealistically inflated demands for 'mass movements running into tens of
35 FO 371/30925 012716/61/18.16 Dec. 1942, Law, Minute.
36 FO 371 ^ 6694 W 416/124/48, 29 Jan. 1943, Law, Minute; See pp. 174-75.
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thousands' rather than starting low and only gradually raising the stakes. Most 
damaging of all, there is no negotiation going on, but only repetition of two 
intractable and incompatible positions, with Brodetsky and Brotman 'harping 
back' instead of moving on, and Law simply repeating 'that it was an 
international problem'. Walker's comments on the meeting are equally 
revealing. 'No reference should be made to the 200,000 lei a head proposal', 
he writes, concerned that the Foreign Office should show as few of its cards as 
possible, 'but [Brotman] might be induced to show his hand by asking what he 
suggests to get the Jews out of Roumanie', a comment which attributes more 
guile to Brotman than was fair. Randall's concluding remark, that the Board 
proposals amounted to a demand 'to so divert our resources that we might 
lose the war!' may or may not have been true, but the exclamation mark 
suggests that he certainly thought it was (the demand can hardly have done 
Anglo-Jewry's reputation for loyalty much good either). His note ends, 'The 
Home Office was in favour of putting this point-blank to the enthusiasts with 
their quite unrealistic proposals.' If anything, bureaucratic indifference and 
bureaucratic patience were beginning to wear thin as official politeness began 
to give way (in private) to acid but etymologically precise references to 
'enthusiasts' and 'unrealistic proposals'. 37
It was an unequal contest in which the Board was consistently outwitted. 
Home and Foreign Office officials were selected and trained, via the Civil 
Service examinations and years of experience, to handle such negotiations 
with superlative finesse and adroitness. The Anglo-Jewish leadership lacked 
both political acumen and training. But it believed it could take on the 
Government on equal terms because its leaders were used to 'playing' Board 
politics. They knew the language of diplomacy but could not play the game.
37 Ibid., 28 January 1943, Walker, Minute; 28 Jan. 1943, Randall, Minute.
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For example, in a discussion with Randall in January 1944, Brodetsky failed to 
capitalise on the Government's insistence that European Jews were the 
responsibility of their home states. On this occasion Brodetsky lost the 
opportunity to persuade Randall that neutral states should be encouraged to 
admit refugees on the basis that they would be repatriated to their countries of 
origin after the war. Instead of using the Government's own reasoning to show 
that such refugees were the responsibility of their home governments and 
could, if necessary, be deported to their native states, Brodetsky frustrated his 
own ends by a clumsy, if idealistic, insistence that the refugees would not want 
to return to their home countries.as This was possibly true, and the refugees 
would no doubt have proved ideal candidates for the Zionist state Brodetsky 
dreamt of, but it was hardly tactical to press a point whose political and 
financial implications were so uncongenial to the British Government.
Like many of his colleagues, Brodetsky never seemed able to gauge exactly 
the balance needed between pressing too hard for an unrealistic object and 
treading too carefully to make any impression at all. Similarly, Anglo-Jewish 
leaders were unable to challenge specious governmental arguments, stalling 
tactics such as buck- passing and asserting that reports were 'unconfirmed' or 
that co-operation with Washington was necessary. Anglo-Jewish leaders 
tended to repeat their ideas without developing them, in the hope that 
repetition might do what persuasion could not. The contest and the issues 
were intellectual rather than ethical; the skills required were argumentative 
rather than rhetorical. The problem lay not with a 'timid' community but with 
leaders who were no match for their opponents at the Home, Foreign and 
Colonial Offices. It was not a matter of persuading the Foreign Office of a 
humanitarian imperative (as the Board assumed) but of convincing it that
38 See p. 195-96.
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action on behalf of Jews was politically expedient (for example, it would deflect 
American criticism of Britain's Palestine policy). This was clearly a supremely 
difficult, if not impossible, task, but one that was never properly understood.
Anglo-Jewish leaders were, furthermore, negotiating from a position of 
weakness. Lack of power and influence led, understandably, to
demoralisation, while the argument, continually cited by the authorities, that 
real rescue could only come with an Allied victory was attractively, if 
superficially, persuasive and reassuring .39 However, negotiating from a 
position of weakness does not invariably entail defeat. In the autumn of 1939, 
facing financial collapse, the Anglo-Jewish organisations (together with the 
Quakers and Christian Council) told the Government that they would have to 
close their offices and warned that refugees would be thrown onto the National 
Assistance Board. This moved the Government to act, and in an 
unprecedented move, it made a huge financial commitment, the first grant in 
aid given but not administered by a government in w a r t i m e . While on this 
occasion financial support was won, the price was a weakening of the 
organisations' negotiating powers for the future.
The most productive situation occurs when both sides have something to offer. 
However, this was not the case here. The Anglo-Jewish community had no 
bargaining chips. What the Jews had to offer, the Government already had. 
Years of Jewish professions of loyalty culminated in proclamations of support 
for the war effort, such as 'Jews In England will take their share, to the fullest
Some of the ideas about negotiation in this chapter are drawn from Roger 
Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating agreement without civino in 
(London, 1996).
40 See pp. 114-15.
41 See p. 127; Wasserstein, ‘Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Great Britain 
during the Nazi Era', p.36.
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extent, In all aspects of active defence should war break out' / 2  At the outbreak 
of war, Weizmann wrote to Chamberlain, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, 
offering the Government 'all the Jewish manpower, technical ability and 
resources at our command', adding that the Jews 'stand by Great Britain and 
will fight on the side of the democracies'.43 From the Government's point of 
view, this was a truism, like declaring that British Jews would pay their taxes 
along with everyone else. Not only were Jews subject to British law, but it 
would have been extraordinarily self-defeating for British Jews not to support 
the effort to defeat Nazi Germany.
The Anglo-Jewish leadership had only a poor grasp of the dynamics of 
negotiation. Instead of seeing discussion with Government officials as an 
exercise in diplomatic 'trade-offs', the Board (in particular) tended to make 
appeals and requests based on absolute ethical imperatives -  as if it were 
dealing with bishops rather than civil servants. The language and values of 
humanitarianism in which it dealt represented a near-valueless currency from 
the governmental point of view.
Thus it was unable to grapple with the Government's oft-repeated contention 
that rescue efforts imperilled the war effort and delayed victory. In presenting 
the issue in simplistic zero-sum terms, the Government was able to exploit the 
fallacy of the excluded middle; its inference, that any action, great or small, 
was equally capable of delaying victory, was patently untenable, especially 
after the autumn of 1944, when victory had become a near certainty. But the 
organisations, accustomed to think in all-or-nothing moral imperatives, were
4 2 j 7A, 25 Aug. 1939, p.4.
43 Brodetsky, Memoirs, p. 192.
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incapable of addressing this fallacy and making a case for some form of 
rescue effort, however modest. ^ 4
It should be stressed that the inter-war and wartime governments made no 
secret of their conviction that refugees were an immigration problem rather 
than a humanitarian disaster. Only in the post-war period has the concept of 
'human rights' become an issue, since when pressure has increasingly been 
put on governments to come to the aid of persecuted minorities or disaster 
victims world-wide.45.The humanitarian argument, however well pleaded, 
could hardly have been expected to have any significant influence on the 
wartime government.
In inventing options for mutual gains or dovetailing differing interests, 
Schonfeld had the edge over Brodetsky, as exemplified in the Mauritius 
scheme, which served a governmental purpose in deflecting criticism of British 
treatment of illegal Jewish immigrants from Palestine held in Mauritius. 
Schonfeld was skilful at capitalising on chance opportunities and knew that 
harping on Palestine would subvert his immediate short-term aim of saving 
lives. The Mauritius scheme also succeeded because Schonfeld started with a 
modest request, listing only 30 names, gradually increasing the numbers to 
100, until finally there were over 1,000.46 It is unlikely that an initial list of 1,000 
names would have been approved. By contrast, Brodetsky thought in all-or- 
nothing terms, as shown by his impractical suggestion that the whole Jewish
44 See pp. 186-87, 285.
45 James N.Rosenau. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and 
Continuitv (1990V pp.438, 448. See also Leo Mates, T h e  Holocaust and 
International Relations', Lyman H.Legters, ed.. Western Societv after the 
Holocaust (Boulder. Colorado, 1975), pp. 131-47.
46 CO 323/1846/2, 2 July 1943, Colonial Office to Foreign Office: 'I am afraid that 
we never understood that you would attempt to bring as many as 100 Rabbis 
within this special scheme'.
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population of occupied Europe could be transferred to neutral countries;^^ 
unfortunately, perhaps, Brodetsky's wishful thinking stopped short of an offer 
to foot the bill.
Both before and during the war, Jews were regarded as the responsibility of 
their home states, of which they were legally citizens, even though German 
Jews were disenfranchised by the 1935 Nuremberg Laws.-^® For reasons of 
principle as well as of policy, the Government was reluctant to recognise a 
Jewish national identity. This would reinforce German propaganda about the 
Allies being engaged in a 'Jewish war', complicate Britain's Palestine policy 
and create problems of repatriation after the war.^s The result was a specious 
inference that to discriminate in favour of persecuted Jews was to discriminate 
against their persecuted compatriots. The principle was always cited to justify 
inaction on behalf of Jews by a form of reductio ad absurdum which rendered 
all humanitarian relief and rescue discriminatory. On the one hand, the 
Government argued, Jews were citizens of their home states and thus the 
responsibility of their home governments. On the other hand, it was also 
claimed that Jews could not be given priority because thev were Jews over 
their fellow Poles, Czechs etc. Either argument, in any case, was only tenable 
if the Nazi policy of a Final Solution of the Jewish problem in Europe were 
ignored. That the Government chose to do so is not surprising. The Anglo- 
Jewish leadership was certainly aware that Sonderbehandlung required 
Sonderpolitik, but failed to argue and develop this point convincingly.
47 Brodetsky, Memoirs, p.223.
48 FO 371/24100 W 13311/3231/98, 8 Sept. 1939, Parliamentary Questions, 
Colonel Wedgwood to Sir John Anderson.
49 See pp. 158, 263.
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This was perhaps because the principle that Jews did not constitute a discrete 
national entity but were nationals of their home states was ingrained in Anglo- 
Jewish thinking. Not only was this Government policy but It was in Anglo- 
Jewry's interest that it should be. The last thing it sought was discrimination. 
The Anglo-Jewish establishment had so thoroughly imbibed this principle and 
become so deeply 'anglicised', that it had perhaps become incapable of 
refuting the governmental sophisms it generated. It would certainly have been 
difficult to claim that British Jews were British citizens of the Jewish faith while 
maintaining simultaneously that continental Jews were in any radical sense 
different from their own compatriots. Certainly the 'minorities treaties' imposed 
on a number of East European states after World War One did involve some 
recognition of a Jewish collectivity. Nevertheless, if European Jews comprised 
ethnic minorities within larger states, as was claimed by the Anglo-Jewish 
organisations, Anglo-Jewry would necessarily have to acknowledge itself an 
ethnic minority -  hence not 'really' British -  an inference it was anxious to 
avoid. 50
The official documents of the period give the distinct impression that 
Government officials were irritated by repeated requests on behalf of 
European Jewry. This view is endorsed by Rathbone's complaint about 
Morrison during the 19 May 1943 Debate: 'why does he always make us feel 
... as if the whole question of refugees was becoming a bore and an irritation 
to him and that he was transferring to refugees the dislike which he openly 
feels for ourselves?'si
50 Geoffrey Alderman, 'British Jewry: Religious Community or Ethnic Minority?', 
Jonathan Webber, ed., Jewish Identities in the New Europe (London, 1994), 
pp. 189-92. Alderman points out that the Board of Deputies has 'consistently 
opposed the inclusion of a Jewish category in the question on ethnic origins in 
the decennial census '
51 HC Debates, 19 May 1943, col. 1141.
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Foreign Office impatience was perhaps compounded by the frequent naivete, 
vagueness and impracticality of the Anglo-Jewish leaders. Following the 
December 1942 Declaration. Brodetsky recalls suggesting that 'the German 
Government should be told, through some appropriate channel, that Jews, 
especially women and children, should be allowed to leave all countries under 
German control', as though Hitler were likely to be scolded into capitulation. It 
had been known from the earliest stages of the war that the Germans were 
treating civilian populations with the utmost brutality and that they had no 
respect for the Geneva Convention, although until 1941 the Nazis were 
prepared to allow the Jews to leave occupied Europe.
The weakness of the organisations lay not only in the poor quality of some of 
their proposals but also in the presentation of proposals. Especially amateurish 
was the way in which ideas about exchange possibilities were presented. 
Proposals to use limited exchange opportunities to save foreign nationals 
(Jewish or otherwise) rather than British servicemen and civilians in German 
hands were vague and naive. Their attempts to grapple with the problem 
included the suggestion that refugees be accorded the status of British- 
protected persons. Apart from the unlikelihood that this would impress the 
Nazis, there was still no reason for the British authorities to give precedence to 
purported British-protected persons at the expense of real ones.
Neither were shipping proposals well presented. Vagueness did not help; it 
was much easier to reject in principle a request for 'shipping' than to explain 
why a thoroughly detailed, properly costed, specific single shipping scheme 
(what would now be called a feasibility study) imperilled the outcome of the 
war. The organisations failed to realise that 'selling' a proposition to the
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Government was not helped by leaving the Government to do all the 
preliminary planning itself. Some suggestions were in themselves sound. 
Rathbone and others pointed to the fact that British vessels returning half- 
empty from Greece and elsewhere might be used for the carriage of refugees, 
citing as a precedent a report 'that the U.S.A. was considering importing by 
this means a quarter of a million Italian labourers for agricultural work.' 52 Yet 
ideas were not followed through and important points of detail, such as the 
dangers of sailing without a guarantee of safe-conduct from the German 
Government were not addressed, leaving it open to the Government to use 
such details to block the idea as a whole.
In any case, the argument against releasing ships was, in principle, well
founded. The organisations did not have the detailed knowledge to counter it 
in practice and the argument itself could not be refuted since it was based on 
the unverifiable premise that any diversion of resources, however small, was a 
threat in principle to the swiftest possible victory. Yet the case for shipping was 
not necessarily hopeless. After Bermuda, Law himself wrote, 'If neutral 
shipping is unobtainable, is it really beyond the bounds of possibility that we 
should find one s h ip ? 'S 3 The implication here is that the Foreign Office might 
have been prepared to make a concession in favour of a single, small-scale 
plan. It was not, however. Law's job to make the necessary inquiries and the 
Anglo-Jewish leaders did not seem to think it was theirs.
Attempts to bring pressure to bear on the Government by force of public 
opinion were unsuccessful. There was apparently wide public sympathy -  a
52 Acc 3121 E3/536/1, January 1944, 'Continuing Terror: How to Rescue Hitler's 
Victims', pp.8-9.
53 See p. 184.
344
March 1943 Gallup poll indicated 75 percent support in favour of Britain 
helping Jews and Victor Gollancz's pamphlet 'Let My People Go' elicited much 
public support and offers of help. However, this did not amount to a serious 
force which could have affected the formation or conduct of policy.5 4 
Governments are moreover more authoritarian during wartime and a National 
(coalition) government had no electoral reason to pander to public feeling.
Requests for declarations and warnings were occasionally granted. The 
December 1942 Declaration, for example, was undoubtedly the result of 
energetic pressure from Jewish groups. Just how influential these warnings 
were is another matter. They had little or no effect on the Nazi leadership, but 
may have acted as a partial deterrent to the satellites and their populations.55 
While the Germans were patently unimpressed, Jewish leaders were 
convinced that 'many satellites listened; [and] many non-Jews were 
strengthened in their resolve to assist their hunted fellow men'.56 The 
propaganda value of declarations and warnings, like that of radio broadcasts 
to occupied Europe, was more highly rated by the Jewish organisations than 
by the Government, whose genuine scepticism was compounded by 
reluctance to lose diplomatic credibility by 'debasing the currency'. But 
however limited their effectiveness, there can be no doubt that it would have 
been less still had it not been for the persistent efforts of the organisations.
^  Acc 3121 E3/536/1, 31 May 1943, National Committee, Resolutions of various 
organisations. See p. 164.
55 Acc 3121 E3/536/1, January 1944, 'Continuing Terror', p.9; Michael Balfour, 
Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organisations. Policies and Publics in Britain and 
Germanv (London. 1979), p.303.
56 A.Leon Kubowitzki, 'Address on the Rescue Attempts of the World Jewish 
Congress', WJC (British Section), War Emergency Conference of the WJC, 
November 1944, p.22.
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There is now a tendency to assume that any effort, however far-fetched, was 
justified by the desperate plight of European Jewry. Some, however, were 
patently not worth making. The Government was right in suspecting that 
declarations made no difference to the Nazis and expresssed the view that 
they might make the situation worse -  it was not simply trying to fob off the 
organisations, and although a theoretical case might be made for issuing 
them, it was at an early stage evident that repeated threats of retribution were 
almost completely pointless. The Government no doubt also objected to 
Declarations as merely raising unrealistic expectations among the 
organisations. Yet Anglo-Jewry was clearly desperate to do something 
(contrary to what its critics maintain) but was almost always foiled, often 
because of governmental intransigence but also, at times, because of genuine 
governmental conviction that the effort itself was futile. This point can be seen 
as recently as 1994, when an international criminal tribunal was established at 
the Hague to try war criminals from Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. This 
tribunals' existence did not deter atrocities.
The Jewish organisations did not fail for lack of trying; in the final analysis their
cause was incompatible with Britain's perceived overail goai. The Government
saw the Jewish problem as a side issue of the war. Nazi Germany did not see
it thus and nor did the Jews. It has been pointed out that 'None of the 
pronouncements emanating from the wartime summit meetings made
reference to Hitler's war on the Jews; Teheran (November 1943), Yalta
(February 1945) and later on at Potsdam (July 1945) are eloquent testimony to
the low priority enjoyed by the Jewish tragedy'.57 The refugee problem was
consistently slighted by British officials, who were incapable of believing that
57 Henry R.Huttenbach, 'Comment: Human Rights and the Memory of the 
Holocaust -  Is there a Connection?', Lyman H.Legters, ed., op.cit., p. 149.
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Hitler 'would devote such a large part of the German war effort to 
exterminating the Jewish race throughout the whole of Europe'.58 The Jewish 
issue, a matter of life-and-death to the organisations, hardly features in the 
memoirs of, for example, Anthony Eden, Herbert Morrison or Frank R oberts. 9^
Some historians regard anti-Semitism as playing a major role in Government 
decision making. Bauer contends that 'on the basis of the British documents • • 
a good deal of antisemitism, quite openly expressed in internal discussions,
entered into the British stand'.eo Certainly, there was anti-Semitism in the 
Foreign Office, as evidenced by the openly derogatory comments of individual 
officials. Certainly also, the rescue of European Jewry was not an Allied war 
aim. But this is not incontrovertible proof that British wartime policy was anti- 
Semitic. Some officials, such as Paul Mason and Lady Cheetham, expressed 
private anxiety and were more sympathetic to the Jewish cause.ei There is no 
evidence to contradict Wasserstein's contention that 'conscious anti-Semitism 
should not be regarded as an adequate explanation of official behaviour'.62  
British indifference to the Jewish catastrophe was grounded in the perceptions 
that the rescue of European Jews posed immigration problems in Britain and 
Palestine, that anti-Semitism in Britain would be exacerbated by unregulated 
Jewish immigration and that precious resources could not be diverted from the 
war effort in order to achieve what was in any case a dangerous and near-
58 See, for example, FO 371/32680 W12853/4555/48, 25 Sept. 1942, Frank K. 
Roberts, Minutes; Frank Roberts, Dealing with Dictators: The Destruction and 
Revival of Europe. 1930-1970 (London, 1991), p.46.
59 Earl of Avon (Sir Anthony Eden), The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning 
(London, 1965); Herbert Morrison (Lord Morrison of Lambeth), Herbert Morrison: 
An Autobiooraohv (London. 19601: Roberts, op.cit.
60 Yehuda Bauer, 'Rescue by Negotiations? Jewish Attempts to Negotiate with 
the Nazis', M.Marrus, ed.. The Nazi Holocaust, vol.9. (London, 1989), p.20.
61 See pp.231, 233.
62 Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, p.352.
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hopeless task. It is Interesting that neither publicly nor privately did any of the 
Anglo-Jewish leaders complain of anti-Semitism, either at the political or the 
personal levei.ea
Most of Anglo-Jewry's efforts on behalf of European Jewry during the war 
proved abortive, whether they were the product of polite negotiation, guile or 
'activism'. The poor reputation of Anglo-Jewry's wartime leadership is the 
natural concomitant of its intrinsic inadequacy, but to view this in isolation is to 
perpetuate a great injustice against a community which lacked nothing in 
tireless effort or zeal. The only lack of will was on the part of the Government.
63 See, for example, Brodetsky, Memoirs, op.cit,, Bentwich, Mv Seventv-Seven 
Years and Bernard Homa, Footprints on the Sands of Time (Gloucester, 1990).
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